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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the dispute that arose between the 
United States and key European members of NATO (Britain, West 
Germany and France) over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 
The debate is traced from its inception on March 23, 1983, when 
Reagan announced his decision to accelerate ballistic missile 
defence research, to the eclipse of SDI as a major source of 
transatlantic and international controversy when Presidents 
Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December 1987. The 
transatlantic SDI debate is investigated to determine: (1) the 
underlying cause, or reasons, for the controversy, (2) how the 
Alliance managed the differences which arose, and (3) how East- 
West relations affected the manner in which the controversy was 
handled. This study includes analysis of past transatlantic 
controversies about military strategy; reasons why Reagan 
launched SDI as a unilateral programme; the nature and reasons 
for West European opposition to SDI; how compromises over SDI 
were sought and effected (or rejected) between the U.S. and 
Britain, West Germany and France; the role of the ATBM debate in 
the SDI controversy; and the significance of the Reykjavik summit 
and the INF treaty in the SDI debate. Three main and related 
conclusions emerge from this study. First, that differing 
conceptions of what constituted a credible nuclear strategy and a 
stable nuclear regime, rather than the issue of BMD deployment, 
was the primary cause of the SDI controversy. Second, that in 
managing the SDI dispute, the Alliance ignored the salience of 
differing conceptions of strategy and sought agreement on the 
terms of SDI research in order to maintain NATO unity. And 
third, that contrary to what the literature on alliances posits, 
the improvement in East-West relations toward the end of the SDI 
debate increased rather than decreased NATO unity.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
8I. THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER SDI
This study examines the controversy that the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) engendered within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the manner in which this 
controversy was managed. The primary questions that this thesis 
seeks to answer are: Why did the Reagan Administration's decision 
to pursue SDI cause such controversy within the Alliance? And 
how, and to what extent, did the United States, Britain, West 
Germany and France reconcile their disagreements about SDI?
The disagreement over SDI within the Alliance has been 
primarily attributed to the assumption that the United States and 
Europe had divergent security interests and that the deployment 
of HMDs would therefore affect European and American security 
differently. A central argument forwarded in this study is that 
the transatlantic controversy was not primarily due to the 
prospect of BMD deployment; rather SDI caused controversy because 
it highlighted and heightened long-standing disagreements within 
the Alliance about nuclear strategy, arms control, and the 
conduct of East-West relations. SDI thus became a vehicle through 
which these prior differences manifested themselves; it was not 
however their primary cause.
The second argument forwarded in this thesis concerns that 
manner in which the SDI controversy was managed. I argue that 
rather than confront the doctrinal differences exacerbated by 
SDI, the Alliance deliberately ignored them in order to maintain 
transatlantic unity and instead focused on finding areas of
9agreement that were peripheral to the main issues evoked by SDI. 
While this method of papering over important differences 
constituted the primary means by which the SDI controversy was 
managed, a seemingly contradictory element of decision-making 
within the Alliance dictated the manner in which SDI arose and 
was occasionally handled within the Alliance; unilateral American 
action.
Explaining how these seemingly contradictory methods 
coexisted and why papering over differences was the method to 
which the Alliance consistently reverted, despite the Reagan 
Administration's occasional unilateral initiatives, can most 
appropriately be explained by reference to the detailed analysis 
presented in the main text of this study. Yet, to provide a 
basis for understanding the underlying dynamics of the 
transatlantic SDI debate, it is necessary to understand the 
essential dilemma of the Alliance.
From its inception in 1949, NATO relied on the US strategic 
nuclear guarantee to deter a Soviet attack against Western 
Europe. Ensuring the credibility of this guarantee has been a 
central preoccupation of Alliance members throughout NATO's 
history. While some American officials questioned this reliance 
on nuclear weapons even before it became official NATO policy, 
the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee was not 
seriously questioned until 1957 when the Sputnik launch 
demonstrated the Soviet Union's ability to deliver nuclear 
warheads to US territory. Since that time the United States has
10
attempted, in the words of Albert Wohlstetter, "to reconcile the 
possibility of increasing self-destructive levels of violence 
with the original and continuing purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, 
namely, to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe.
In response to this dilemma the Kennedy Administration 
advocated a strategy of "flexible response" for the Alliance.
Its primary objective was to try to reduce NATO's reliance on 
nuclear weapons and, to the extent that nuclear reliance was 
still necessary, to rely on limited nuclear options in order to 
limit both the levels of damage and the likelihood of escalation. 
In general. West European governments opposed these changes on 
the grounds that by reducing the prospect of devastating 
retaliation they weakened the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons 
and thereby increased the likelihood of a Soviet attack on 
Western Europe. Furthermore, West European officials argued that 
in the event of conflict the more limited scenarios envisaged by 
US planners could lead to a limited nuclear war on European 
territory.
Given these West European objections, American officials had 
to attempt to reconcile their desire to fashion what they 
considered a more credible NATO strategy with the necessity of 
maintaining Alliance unity. Accordingly, the NATO strategy that 
emerged in 1967 reflected a compromise between the United States
Albert Wohlstetter and Richard I. Brody, "Continuing 
Control as a Requirement for Deterring," in A. B. Carter, 
J.D. Steinbrenner, and C.A. Zracket (eds.) Managing 
Nuclear Operations. (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings 
Institution, 1987), p. 178.
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and West European governments. In concrete terms, the strategy 
of flexible response, while increasing NATO's conventional forces 
and reducing reliance on indiscriminate nuclear strikes, retained 
the essential elements of the strategy it was meant to replace: 
ultimate reliance on US strategic nuclear forces to deter Soviet 
attack against Western Europe. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the flexible response debate demonstrated the extent to 
which the requirements of strategic credibility and Alliance 
cohesion were increasingly coming into conflict.
Recognizing this inherent dilemma, the United States, 
beginning in the late 1960's, attempted to bring its key West 
European allies into its nuclear planning process through the 
creation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The premise of 
the NPG was that joint decision-making on issues directly 
affecting NATO strategy would engender greater Alliance 
consensus. Consequently, the NPG was an important step in 
enabling NATO to function as a genuine Alliance.
At the same time, the NPG was unable to solve the dilemma 
inherent in the American nuclear guarantee. As long as NATO's 
security ultimately rested on the strategic nuclear guarantee of 
the United States, and as long as the Soviet Union possessed the 
ability to retaliate with devastating effect should the United 
States execute this guarantee, the underlying nature of NATO's 
security was tenuous. For, whatever one's views about the 
willingness of the United States to defend Western Europe, the 
fact that in doing so it ensured its own destruction was bound to
12
create incessant and nagging doubts about the credibility of the 
US nuclear guarantee and thus the credibility of NATO strategy. 
Moreover, this strategic dilemma was bound to drive the United 
States to change NATO strategy in order to reduce the likelihood 
that in defending Western Europe it would bring about its own 
destruction despite the knowledge that in doing so it risked 
antagonizing West Europeans.
Understanding this dilemma is essential to understanding why 
the United States alternated between unilateral actions and 
papering over differences in order to reduce disagreement in 
managing the SDI controversy. In essence these two strategies of 
management reflected the two competing requirements of the 
Alliance; ensuring a credible strategy and maintaining unity.
The introduction of SDI as a fait accompli and the Reykjavik 
proposals reflected the US desire to increase the credibility of 
NATO strategy, while the desire to paper over differences 
reflected the desire to maintain Alliance unity. Investigating 
how these usually contradictory requirements were reconciled will 
be a primary objective of this study.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Literature on Alliances
The existing literature on Alliances can be conveniently 
divided into three main areas: Alliance formation. Alliance 
performance, and the effect of Alliances on the international
13
system.2 of these three main categories, the one most directly 
relevant to this thesis concerns the issue of Alliance 
performance. Although an extensive literature exists on the 
topic of Alliance performance, there are few widely accepted 
theories regarding the manner in which Alliances function or what 
factors are most important in the way they manage disputes. 
Indeed, the entire literature on Alliance performance suffers 
from a paucity of generally accepted theories, a criticism that 
is almost universally advanced by scholars.^
Despite these shortcomings, certain general propositions 
about Alliance performance have gained acceptance within the 
field. Two are of particular relevance to this thesis. First, 
that nuclear weapons generally have a deleterious effect on 
Alliances. And second, that the perception of the external 
threat confronting an Alliance is the major determinant of 
Alliance cohesion.
The first proposition - that nuclear weapons tend to 
undermine the efficacy of Alliances - enjoys a reasonably wide 
consensus in the literature. As Henry Kissinger remarked, 
"Nuclear weapons tend to introduce inconsistencies into
See for instance Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (eds.) 
Unitv and Disintegration in International Alliances. (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 12.
Michael Don Ward, Research Gaos in Alliance Dynamics, 
(Denver, CO: Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 
19, No. 1, 1982).
14
traditional Alliances, because no country will die for 
another."* This proposition about the effect of nuclear weapons 
on Alliances is particularly relevant for this thesis because the 
assumption that nuclear weapons have a deleterious effect on 
Alliances derives from assumptions regarding the degree to which 
the vulnerability of a country to nuclear retaliation renders its 
nuclear guarantees to allies less credible - an assumption 
underlying the Reagan Administration's decision to pursue SDI.
The SDI controversy within NATO should, therefore, shed light on 
the validity of this assumption regarding the effects of nuclear 
weapons on Alliances.
The second proposition concerning Alliances that is relevant 
to this thesis - that as external threats increase so does 
Alliance cohesion - is perhaps the most universally accepted 
assumption in the Alliance performance literature. According to 
the authors of an extensive review of the Alliance literature, 
"Probably the most widely stated proposition about Alliances is 
that cohesion depends upon the external danger and declines as 
the threat is r e d u c e d . A n d  after rigorously testing this 
proposition the authors concluded that "cohesion is thus largely
Henry Kissinger, "The Changing Nature of Alliances." 
Paper read at a meeting of the U.C.L.A. National Security 
Studies Program (May 15, 1964). While this notion enjoys 
relatively wide acceptance within the literature there 
are exceptions. See for example, A.F.K. Organski, World 
Politics. 2nd edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. 
p.331-332: "Nuclear weapons do not reduce the value or
number of alliances."
Holsti, OP. cit.. p. 17.
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dependent on the intensity of that threat, and the major cause of 
their [Alliances] disintegration may be the reduction or 
disappearance of the external threat.”®
Yet, it will be argued in this case that the relationship 
between external threat and Alliance cohesion was the opposite of 
that posited in the literature, namely^ that as the degree of 
external threat diminished Alliance cohesion increased. One 
purpose of this thesis will be to investigate and test the 
assertion forwarded by a prominent student of Alliances who 
argues that "policies designed to improve East-West relations are 
not necessarily compatible with those designed to enhance the 
cohesion of NATO.
The NATO Literature
There have been useful empirical studies on the effect of 
external threats on NATO cohesion. They suffer, however, from 
two major shortcomings. First, they deal with a period of the 
Alliance's history when the implications on nuclear parity had 
yet to be grasped. Second, these studies examined the Alliance 
before the detente of early 1970's which, of course, had a great 
effect on NATO.
For the most part, the literature on NATO is dominated by
® Holsti OP. cit.. p. 41.
 ^ Holsti, OP. cit.. p. 144
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historical accounts. There are exceptions®, of course, but in 
general there has been little systematic study of, or general 
conclusions about, how NATO manages its disputes. Nevertheless, 
the extensive literature on the Atlantic Alliance is valuable. 
The history of past disputes have been exhaustively chronicled.® 
Usually, they concerned themselves with a particular country, 
or a particular mechanism by which the Alliance handles its 
disputes. There have also been useful comparisons of ways that 
the Alliance has dealt with different i s s u e s . M o r e o v e r ,  
excellent studies have been conducted on the strategy of the 
Alliance, its shortcomings, strengths, and possible remedies for 
the strategic dilemmas that confront the Alliance.
Edwin H. Fedder, NATO; the Dynamics of Alliance in the 
Postwar World. (New York; Dodd, Mead & Co., 1973).
For example, see David N. Schwartz, NATO * s Nuclear 
Dilemma's. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984) ; 
Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); Paul Buteux, The
Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and
Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988).
See for instance Catherine M. Kelleher, Germanv and the 
Politics of Nuclear Weapons. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1975), and Wilfred L. Kohl, French 
Nuclear Diplomacy. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1959).
See for instance David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear 
Dilemmas, o p . cit.
See for instance, Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and 
American Foreign Policy. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1957) .
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The Literature on SDI and NATO
The literature on both the Strategic Defense Initiative and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is extensive.
Numerous edited volumes exist that detail particular aspects of 
the transatlantic controversy over SDI; they cover such topics as 
the implications of SDI for the ABM treaty, NATO strategy, East- 
West relations, European industrial competitiveness, as well as 
the position of various countries toward the American 
initiative.14 Moreover, there are some excellent book length 
studies that examine both SDI and NATO and focus either on the 
military implications of the prospective deployment of ballistic 
missile defences, or the implication of Soviet BMD activity on
1^  The literature on both SDI and NATO is voluminous. On 
SDI major works by proponents of SDI include Keith B. 
Payne, Strategic Defense: "Star Wars” in Perspective
(Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986); Alun Chalfont, Star 
Wars: Suicide or Survival. (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1985) ; and Angelo Codevilla, While Other Build: 
A Common Sense Approach to Strategic Defense. (New York, 
NY: Free Press, 1988). For works critical of SDI see 
E.P. Thompson, Star Wars: Science Fiction, fantasv. or 
serious probability. (New York: Pantheon, 1985) ; Stanford 
A. Lakoff and Herbert F. York, A Shield in Space?: 
Technology. Politics. and the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989).
14 See for example Stanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby 
(eds.) Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance. 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987); Hans Gunther
Brauch (ed.). Star Wars and European Defence. (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1987); Regina Cowen, Peter Rajcsanyi, 
and Vladimir Bilandzic, SDI and European Security. 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987); and Fred S. 
Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost 
feds.).Swords and Shields. (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1987).
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the Western Alliance.
To date, the transatlantic SDI controversy has not been 
adequately studied. To be sure, the issue of SDI and the NATO 
Alliance has been explored by scholars; yet little systematic 
study of the effect of SDI on the Atlantic Alliance exists. Thus 
while the above mentioned studies raise important questions, they 
do not offer a comprehensive account or analysis of the manner in 
which the Atlantic Alliance conducted, managed, and ultimately 
resolved the controversy to which the SDI gave rise.
The work that comes closest to doing so is Ivo H. Daalder's 
The SDI challenge to Europe. D a a l d e r  describes various 
important aspects of the transatlantic dispute about SDI. He 
portrays the political, strategic, and technological "challenge" 
which SDI posed to Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. While he ably describes the objections which European 
countries voiced concerning SDI, by his own admission, he offers 
little analysis: "While at times analytical, the SDI story is 
mainly told through an examination of diverse European reactions
For a study warning of the negative implications of the 
prospective deployment of HMD's see Ivo H. Daalder NATO 
Strateov and Ballistic Missile Defence. Adelphi Paper 
233. For a study which takes a more positive view of the 
implications of BMD deployment see Robert M. Soofer, 
Missile Defenses and Western European Security. (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1988). For an excellent study of 
the impact of Soviet BMD on NATO see David S. Yost, 
Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western 
Alliance, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988) .
Ivo H. Daalder, The SDI Challenge to Europe. (Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987).
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to these multiple facets of the SDI programme. Thus this 
book offers no central theme or argument that provides the reader 
with a basis for understanding the underlying forces of the 
transatlantic controversy and consequently no framework within 
which to understand the nature and ultimate outcome of the 
European/American dispute about SDI.
The generalizations and conclusions which Daalder offers 
tend to simplify the essential nature of the transatlantic 
controversy. In so doing, he presents à somewhat inaccurate 
picture of the origins of SDI^®, the reasons underlying the 
European reaction to SDI. Daalder exaggerates Europeans' 
enthusiasm for nuclear weapons. For instance, in contrasting the 
American and European view of the desirability of retaining a 
regime based on nuclear deterrence he states that: "this 
conviction on the part of Americans [that nuclear weapons should 
be abolished] is not, however, shared by all Europeans and is 
thus one instance where security interests profoundly diverge." 
This is at best only partially true. Indeed, the British Labour 
Party was during most the SDI debate committed officially to the 
policy of unilateral disarmament and the removal of American
17
18
Daalder, o p . cit. p. 6.
Daalder attributes the Reagan Administration's decision 
to pursue SDI to an American propensity to view 
"technology as a substitute for policy itself." In fact, 
while the United States has at times demonstrated an 
unwarranted faith in technology, Daalder's interpretation 
underestimates the salient importance of political and 
strategic factors in determining Reagan's decision to 
launch the Strategic Defense Initiative. See Daalder, o p . 
cit.. p. 4.
20
nuclear weapons from British soil, while the West German SPD was 
officially committed to the creation of nuclear free zones in 
Central Europe and the transcendence of nuclear deterrence 
through a security partnership with the East. The Labour Party 
and the SPD's opposition to nuclear deterrence played a 
significant role in determining the opposition which both the 
British and West German governments faced when they decided to 
support SDI research. For despite the anti-nuclear aspects of 
SDI which worried the British and German governments, the Labour
Party and the West German SPD tended to view SDI as a
continuation of American attempts to increase the warfighting 
potential of its arsenal and augment the capacity of US leaders 
to confine nuclear war to European territory. Thus the extent to 
which nuclear weapons were viewed in Europe as integral to 
European security interests was highly dependent on the party 
which occupied power in Britain and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Consequently, Daalder presents a somewhat inaccurate 
portrayal of the way that the controversy was managed within the 
Alliance. Moreover, his study covers only the first half of the 
transatlantic debate about SDI.
Most importantly for the purposes of this study, Daalder, in
the opinion of this author, misinterprets the reasons why SDI
created such controversy within the Alliance. He states "that 
Europe and the United States have divergent security interests. 
The implications of a fundamental, indeed, revolutionary change 
in the security system which the deployment of strategic defences
21
might bring about, must therefore be analyzed from the 
perspective of these differing interests."i* He contends that 
"the deployment of strategic defenses may improve some NATO 
member countries*s security but make matters worse for 
others."^® His contention, then, is that the intra-Alliance 
dispute about SDI was primarily attributable to differing US and 
West European strategic interests and the differing manner in 
which deployment would affect the respective sides of the 
Atlantic.
III. THESIS STATEMENT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Thesis Statement
A central argument that this thesis will attempt to 
demonstrate is that the Strategic Defense Initiative caused 
controversy within the Alliance because it highlighted and 
heightened long-standing disagreements between the United States 
and its key West European allies about what constituted a 
credible NATO strategy and a stable strategic regime. I attempt 
to refute the proposition that the intra-Alliance controversy 
about SDI was due to the United States and its West European 
allies having divergent security interests that, in turn, would 
dictate differing implications for deployment in the United 
States and Western Europe.
Above all, I argue that despite the differences that were
Daalder, o p . cit.. p. 33. 
20 Ibid.
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highlighted and heightened by SDI, the Alliance attempted to 
paper over these differences by ignoring the fundamental 
doctrinal disagreements that were exposed by SDI. In side 
stepping fundamental differences, the Alliance attributed the 
controversy caused by SDI to the distant prospect of deployment. 
Accordingly, the management of the SDI issue focused on creating 
restrictive criteria governing research that ensured that there 
was a clear distinction between research and deployment; 
furthermore it was held that any deployment decision would have 
to observe strict criteria of cost effectiveness and negotiate 
the prospect of deployment with the Soviet Union. Significantly, 
these criteria and stipulations did not address the fundamental 
doctrinal issues raised by SDI; they were means by which to avoid 
addressing them and therefore became instruments for papering 
over the most significant issues raised by SDI.
A third and subsidiary argument that is forwarded concerns 
the role that East-West relations played in the debate. I argue 
that as East-West relations improved Alliance cohesion increased; 
it did not diminish as the alliance literature predicted.
Significance
The issue of why SDI caused such disagreement within the 
Alliance and how this disagreement was managed has significance 
both for policymakers and scholars. The SDI had particular 
significance for the NATO Alliance because it constituted the 
first major inter-governmental disagreement about strategy since
23
the advent of nuclear parity. While the INF controversy 
engendered wide-spread controversy among Western European 
publics, NATO's decision grew out of a common desire to reinforce 
the credibility of established strategy and not, like SDI, a 
desire to change the strategy itself. What SDI thus signified 
were profound American doubts about its ability to extend nuclear 
guarantees to non-nuclear allies under conditions in which it was 
itself vulnerable to devastating retaliation should it implement 
these guarantees. In this sense, the SDI transatlantic 
controversy raises important questions about the viability of 
alliances in the nuclear age.
Another significant question raised in the transatlantic SDI 
controversy concerns the nature of alliances themselves. As was 
stated above, current theory on alliance performance stresses 
that alliances are more unified when the threat from outside is 
greatest for this reinforces their respective need for one 
another.21 The intra-Alliance controversy about SDI throws 
this long-held assumption into serious doubt and thus makes a 
contribution to the literature on alliances. The unique 
circumstances created by an alliance under conditions of nuclear 
parity may well have altered if not invalidated the proposition 
that an increased external threat leads to greater cohesion 
within alliances.
Because the penalties for the failure of deterrence in the
21 See for instance Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (eds.) 
Unitv and Disintegration in International Alliances. (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).
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nuclear age are so enormous and because the credibility of the 
threat to risk nuclear war in behalf of allies is suspect, the 
amelioration of tensions with adversaries as a means of 
preventing war has been deemed essential to security.
Accordingly, actions that are seen to hinder such improvement or 
to increase the external threat to the alliance have centrifugal 
rather than centripetal influences on the alliance.
Investigating how, in the transatlantic SDI controversy, this 
detente requirement was reconciled with the need to maintain 
adequate deterrent capabilities could provide valuable insight 
into the future of alliances as nuclear weapons proliferate.
Above all, this study will determine the underlying cause of 
the transatlantic SDI controversy and thus enable us to better 
understand why the participants decided to go about managing the 
dispute in the way in which they did. It is expected that the 
results of this study will reveal that it is not specific weapons 
systems that create difficulties within the Alliance but rather 
the differing conceptions about nuclear strategy and arms control 
that different members of the Alliance harbour.
IV. PROCEDURE
This is a case study of the transatlantic controversy about 
SDI from March 23, 1983 when Ronald Reagan delivered the speech 
that launched the Strategic Defense Initiative until December 
1987 when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF 
treaty, thereby eclipsing SDI an issue of major contention with
25
the Alliance. In utilizing the case study method, both the 
strengths and weakness of this approach have been taken into 
account.22 The strengths of the individual case study are, of 
course, that it allows for a far more detailed and varied 
examination of a specific historical event than would a 
comparison of many different cases. Indeed, it is hoped that in 
addition to demonstrating the validity of the propositions being 
forwarded this thesis will make an original contribution to the 
SDI literature by providing the first comprehensive account of 
European/American relations over the SDI that is based mainly on 
primary sources.
The weakness of the case study method are equally apparent. 
Because only one case has been selected, it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions in the absence of corroborating cases.
Yet such limitation are to be expected when studying the case of 
European/American relations over the SDI. First, there are no 
other similar Alliances with which to compare NATO. While the 
Warsaw Pact would be one obvious candidate for such a comparison, 
the structure of that Alliance was different in so many 
significant respects as to render it less than satisfactory as a 
basis for comparison. Second, the SDI debate constituted the 
first European/American debate about strategy in an era of
22 See Alexander L. George, "Case Study and Theory 
Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison," in Lauren, Diolomacv: New Approaches in
Theory. History, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New 
York, 1979), pp. 61-62.
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unquestioned US-Soviet p a r i t y . D e s p i t e  these limitations, 
the case study method is employed in this thesis because it is 
the most appropriate way to investigate the questions being 
posed; it facilitates the collection of the detailed information 
required; and it provides a historical framework for analysis.
In order to investigate the cogency of the arguments being 
forwarded in this thesis, the following procedure will be 
followed.
First, in order to provide a framework or context for this 
study, I will analyze relevant past transatlantic disputes about 
strategy in order to identify the underlying and persistent 
sources of disagreement within the Alliance as well as determine 
the manner in which these disagreements were resolved.
Second, I will investigate the origins and purposes of SDI, 
giving special attention to determining to what extent SDI was 
similar to and different from initiatives that have occupied 
NATO's attention in the past.
Third, I will undertake a detailed examination of the 
initial British, West German, and French reactions to the 
American initiative. This will entail examining and interpreting 
primary source documents to determine the issues that were of 
underlying concern in London, Bonn, and Paris. After the 
respective positions of Britain, West Germany and France are 
delineated, I proceed to analyze why each country held the
As mentioned previously, while the INF controversy was 
every bit as threatening to the unity of the Alliance, it 
was not a debate about strategy.
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positions that it did and then juxtapose these reasons against 
those that the United States forwarded in arguing that SDI was 
necessary. It is expected that in comparing and analyzing the 
positions of the four countries in this way, we will be able to 
determine the underlying nature of the SDI controversy within the 
Alliance.
Fourth, after establishing the underlying cause of the 
disagreement on SDI, I will seek to determine how the intra- 
Alliance disagreements were managed and how the positions of each 
country changed over time. This will entail analyzing the 
British, West German, French, and US positions on the three main 
events pertaining to SDI that arose after Reagan's March 23, 1983 
speech:
o the debate about West European participation in SDI 
research.
o the question of whether to build an Anti-tactical 
ballistic missile (ATBM).
o the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath.
Hypotheses
In order provide a framework for analy the SDI dispute three 
main hypotheses related to the thesis will be examined throughout 
the schema presented above. One pertains to the underlying cause 
of the disagreement and the other two pertain to manner in which 
the controversy was managed or resolved.
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The first hypothesis is that differing European and American 
conceptions of the proper nuclear strategy for the Alliance was 
the primary cause of the SDI controversy during the 1983-87 
period. The antithesis of this proposition or argument is that 
the primary cause of the SDI controversy was that differing 
American and West European strategic interests, including the 
manner in which deployment would affect West European and 
American security, was the primary cause of the transatlantic 
dispute over SDI.
The second hypothesis is that in managing the SDI dispute 
the Alliance papered over the fundamental doctrinal disagreements 
that SDI highlighted and heightened. In so doing attention was 
focused on the issue of research and the implications of 
deployment, rather than different conceptions of a credible 
strategy.
In the third hypothesis, it is argued that Alliance cohesion 
did not increase in response to the perception of a greater 
external threat. This thesis will argue that, in fact, the 
opposite was more nearly the case, namely, that as the external 
threat to the Alliance increased Alliance cohesion decreased. 
Moreover, it will be argued that the degree of external threat 
was not the primary determinant of Alliance cohesion; rather, it 
was internal factors that played the most important role in 
determining Alliance cohesion. Determining the relationship 
between internal and external threats in determining Alliance 
cohesion will be an ancillary result of investigating the effect
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of external threat on Alliance cohesion.
Sources
This thesis is based mainly on primary sources. For US 
sources I relied heavily on Congressional testimony, official 
texts of speeches published by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), Defense Department posture statements, and 
Presidential directives on SDI. In addition, I conducted 
interviews at the State Department in April 1986 and interviews 
at the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) at the Pentagon 
in the Fall of 1986 and the Spring of 1987. Not surprisingly, 
given the emphasis which the Reagan Administration gave to SDI, 
the amount of material from US sources was enormous.
For obtaining information on the Federal Republic of Germany 
I relied heavily on German language sources. The proceedings of 
the Deutsche Bundestag, which I obtained at the Bundestag Library 
in Bonn, proved most valuable as they allowed me to obtain 
material both on official governmental views of SDI as well as 
the views of the opposition parties. Moreover, speeches by the 
German Defence Minister, Manfred Worner, that were not given 
before the Bundestag proved extremely useful in untangling the 
complexity of the West German position on SDI. I am indebted to 
the German Information Center in New York as well as the German 
Embassy in London for supplying me with copies of these speeches 
as well as other publication of the West German Ministry of 
Defence. In addition, I made use of other speeches provided by
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the German Information Service through their Speeches and 
Statements service.
I relied heavily on translated speeches in investigating the 
French government's position toward SDI. Fortunately, the French 
Embassy in London and, to a lesser extent, the French Embassy in 
Washington provided voluminous and comprehensive translations of 
speeches on foreign policy and defence issues. In addition, I 
relied on press accounts to a greater extent when studying the 
position of the French government than I did with the other 
countries in the intra-Alliance controversy about SDI.
For British sources, I utilized Parliamentarv Reports which, 
like their German counterparts, provided valuable information 
both on governmental and opposition viewpoints on SDI. I also 
relied heavily on other official publications such as Defence 
Estimates, inquiries by Parliamentary Committees such as the 
Defence committee, as well as speeches by the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. These sources were gathered 
primarily at the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS). In examining the positions of the WEU and NATO, I relied 
on official communiques of their meetings as well as press 
accounts of these meetings.
The primary limitation encountered in conducting this study 
involved the fact that many primary source documents that could 
have been useful were unavailable because their declassification 
must await the passage of time. In order to compensate for this 
handicap, I conducted interviews with government officials.
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While these interviews were in many respects helpful, I did not 
find government officials particularly forthcoming. Instead, 
these interviews were useful in confirming the validity of 
information available in the open literature.2*
The Major Countries
In analy the SDI controversy within the Alliance, I have 
chosen to focus on four main countries: the United States, 
Britain, West Germany and France. As the leader of the Alliance 
and the initiator of the SDI programme, the inclusion of the 
United States is not difficult to justify. In addition to the 
United States, I examine the policies of Britain, West Germany 
and France. I have done so primarily because these three 
European countries alone possess the combination of economic, 
military and political power which confers upon them a status, 
influence and prestige not enjoyed by other European members of 
NATO. Simply put, London, Bonn and Paris have played a more 
important role in Alliance deliberations, especially with respect 
to nuclear weapons, than have other European countries.
Moreover, the focus on these four countries was justified in 
light of the fact that the SDI debate was conducted primarily bi­
laterally between these countries (usually between the US and 
Britain, West Germany, and France, respectively). While there 
was some multilateral debate and diplomacy both within NATO and
A list of the interviews conducted is included in the 
bibliography.
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the WEU, the most frequent and important interactions occurred 
bilaterally and therefore the main focus of this study will be on 
the individual countries rather than on either NATO or the WEU, 
although the roles of these institutions will, of course, be 
discussed when appropriate. Within the context of their 
positions as the most important European countries within NATO, 
Britain, West Germany and France played a distinctive role within 
the Alliance.25 (In general, I will discuss the West European 
countries in the following order: Britain, West Germany, and 
France. I have chosen to do so because Britain was most 
frequently the first West European country to respond in a 
substantive way to SDI and this reaction often affected the way 
that West Germany and France reacted. Similarly, I have placed 
West Germany ahead of France because it usually reacted before 
France.)
Britain's role in the Alliance has been dominated by its 
desire to maintain the so-called "special relationship" with the 
United States. Despite growing evidence that Britain's interests 
lay increasingly on the European continent, the lure of the 
"special relationship" proved difficult for British governments 
to resist, and none more so than Mrs. Thatcher's. British 
governments have seen the special relationship not only as a 
means of vicariously maintaining its global role, but as a
25 The practice of concentrating on Britain, France, and 
West Germany is widely followed in other NATO studies. 
See for example: Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, oo. 
cit.. Daalder, The SDI Challenge to Europe, oo. cit.. 
Stromseth The Origins of Flexible Response, oo. cit.
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relationship that places Britain in a position to mediate 
disputes between Washington and continental European capitals. 
While this role made Britain's European credentials suspect on 
the continent, it did facilitate the resolution of many 
transatlantic disputes.
Germany's role in the Alliance was perhaps the most complex 
of the major European countries. German officials had to shape 
their policy around the often conflicting objectives of ensuring 
the territorial integrity of their country against possible 
attack and the imperative of overcoming the artificial division 
of their country by improving relations with the Soviet Union.
As the only one of the "big three" without nuclear weapons and 
given its geographical position on the front line of the NATO- 
Warsaw Pact confrontation, the Federal Republic was particularly 
dependent on the United States and hence eager to ensure the 
credibility of the American commitment to her defence. At the 
same time, German officials sought to reassure their Western 
partners of the Federal Republic's steadfastness, which it 
expressed in the form of fielding the largest Western 
conventional force on the continent. Yet this process of 
ensuring continued Western commitment to her defence tended to 
conflict with the objective of seeking closer ties with the 
Soviet Union, which viewed German support for NATO strategy and 
objectives as inimical to Soviet interests and as a possible 
harbinger of a revival of German militarism. Consequently,
German officials were particularly sensitive to developments that
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could complicate arms control agreements and the improvement of 
East- West relations. The Federal Republic, therefore, had to 
balance its desire for the continued credibility of NATO strategy 
with the need to ensure the continuation of arms control and the 
possibility of improved East-West relations.
France also had to balance a set of distinctive interests 
within the Alliance. First and foremost, France had predicated 
her security policy on the twin pillars of deterrence and 
independence as manifested by its strong commitment to an 
independent nuclear deterrent. Traumatized by its defeat in 1940 
and subsequent dependence on foreign powers to restore its 
sovereignty, France, particularly under de Gaulle, has sought to 
ensure that it would never again be defeated or become dependent 
on another power for its survival. France has thus historically 
played the role of maverick in the Alliance, trying to challenge 
the United States for leadership and pursuing independent defence 
strategies, a policy that culminated in France's withdrawal from 
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. At the same time, 
French officials had been careful not to undermine the American 
presence in Europe which they regarded as indispensable to their 
security. What they sought was a more prominent European voice 
in Alliance affairs, if necessary through a distinctively 
European defence identity within the NATO structure. For this 
reason France placed great emphasis on its special relationship 
with Germany seeing this as a possible foundation which could
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form the basis for a European defence identity.^6 Thus, France 
has sought a delicate balance of trying to simultaneously build a 
greater European identity without undermining the United States*s 
continued commitment to European security.
V. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
In Chapter two, I examine past transatlantic controversies 
about NATO strategy in order to analyze the underlying causes of 
past disputes as well as the manner in which these disputes were 
managed. In Chapter three the origins of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative are considered. Analysis is directed towards the 
reasons underlying the Reagan Administration's defence policy 
prior to SDI. This delineation includes consideration of the 
difficulties and obstacles encountered by the administration as 
it attempted to implement its offensive modernization programme 
and, finally, why it decided to launch the Strategic Defense 
Initiative when it did.
In Chapter four, the initial European reaction to SDI is 
analyzed. This chapter focuses on why Britain, West Germany and 
France initially reacted the way that they did to SDI. In 
Chapter five, the Reagan Administration's effort to enlist 
European support for SDI is analyzed. Accordingly, the US effort
26 Developing close ties with West Germany also served 
another French objective, namely, to counteract what 
Paris perceived as a Drang nach Osten that they believed 
still tempted German policymakers and also to ensure that 
Germany would never fell sufficiently isolated that it 
might try to strike out on its own.
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to assuage European anxieties about the strategic implications of 
SDI is studied as well as the Reagan Administration's invitation 
to West European countries to participate in SDI research. The 
European response to the Reagan Administration's invitation to 
participate in SDI research is examined as is the opposition 
which the British and West German governments experienced when 
they decided to accept the American invitation. In Chapter six, 
the basic issues and controversies surrounding the possibility of 
introducing ballistic missile defences into the European theatre 
are studied.
In Chapter seven, I analyze the European reaction to the 
Reykjavik summit and the refusal of the United States to trade 
away SDI. Included in this chapter is consideration of the 
reasons which the tabling of the Reykjavik proposals engendered 
in Europe, the role that the INF Treaty played in this debate and 
the forces leading to eventual eclipse of the transatlantic 
debate over SDI. In chapter eight, I examine to what extent the 
evidence presented in this study confirms the thesis that was 
forwarded in the beginning, what lessons can be drawn from this 
transatlantic controversy, and the contributions that this thesis 
can make to the literature on NATO and Alliances in general.
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II. HISTORY OF PAST TRANSATLANTIC DISPUTES ABOUT MILITARY 
DOCTRINE
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the framework 
within which to analyze the transatlantic controversy over the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. This entails examining why past 
disputes arose within the Alliance as well as how these disputes 
were managed. Moreover, it involves examining the underlying 
causes of intra-Alliance controversy and the extent to which 
these controversies had been managed or resolved. Investigating 
these factors should provide valuable insight into the reasons 
why SDI was launched, why it was presented the way that it was, 
why it evoked such strong reaction, and why it was managed the 
way that it was. Accordingly, in this chapter past disputes are 
analyzed in order to answer such questions as: Why NATO came to 
rely so heavily on the US strategic nuclear guarantee? Why was 
the credibility or this guarantee doubted? And how did NATO 
respond to these doubts?
The answers to these questions will be sought by examining 
four major past disputes within the Alliance: the establishment 
of massive retaliation in the 1950*s, the flexible response 
debate of the 1960*s, the 1967-1972 ABM dispute (which, while far 
less contentious than the SDI dispute, foreshadowed many of the 
concerns that were later broached in the SDI debate), and the INF 
controversy, which was the last major transatlantic dispute 
before the launching of SDI and as such provided the immediate 
context within which the SDI dispute should be understood. While 
different in many respects the controversies that will be analy
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in this chapter were chosen in order to highlight the key 
doctrinal issue that has occupied a central place within NATO 
since its inception, namely, the credibility of extended 
deterrence.
Throughout our examination and analysis of these events, we 
will seek to determine what major issues persisted over time and 
why, what issues became more and less important, what distinctive 
roles Britain, West Germany and France played in these disputes, 
and what trends were discernable with respect to the manner in 
which disputes were handled or managed. It is hoped that in 
answering these question we will be able to determine, among 
other things, to what extent SDI was similar to as well as 
different from the controversies that preceded it.
II. MASSIVE RETALIATION
The Origins of NATO's Nuclear Reliance
When NATO promulgated its first military plan in 1949, the 
Alliance partners agreed to a Strategic Concept for the 
Integrated Defense of the North Atlantic Area which called for 
the United States to respond to a Soviet attack against Western 
Europe with "strategic bombing promptly by all means possible 
with all types of weapons without e x c e p t i o n . Y e t  almost
"Memorandum by The Secretary of State [Acheson]," 20 
December 1949, quoted in Albert Wohlstetter, "The 
Political and Military Aims of Offense and Defense 
Innovation," in Swords and Shields, eds. F.S. Hoffman, A. 
Wohlstetter, and D.S. Yost (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1987), p. 29.
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immediately following NATO's decision to base its defence on the 
deterrent value of US strategic nuclear weapons, doubts emerged 
as to the advisability of this reliance. Even before the 
Military Committee had formally adopted NATO's Strategic Concept, 
the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic weapon, an event which 
immediately raised questions about the credibility of the newly 
formed strategy. Shortly before the NATO treaty was ratified. 
Dean Acheson gave voice to these concerns in a remarkably 
prescient secret memorandum;
Is it true that within 5-10 years the U.S.S.R. may by 
expected to have a stockpile of atomic weapons of sufficient 
size effectively to neutralize the present advantage which 
we possess and might this time be shortened if the U.S.S.R. 
developed a thermonuclear reaction? ... If this is so, would 
we be better off addressing ourselves now to finding 
substitutes for the defensive shield our atomic weapons are 
now giving our allies?^
Acheson argued that unless this pressing issue were immediately 
addressed "reliance upon the atomic defensive shield" would 
probably "prevent progress toward the substitutes."^ These 
words proved prophetic.
The problems associated with the near exclusive reliance on 
strategic nuclear threats were reinforced by the outbreak of the 
Korean War as well as by evidence that the Soviet Union was 
developing a hydrogen bomb. Accordingly, the Truman 
Administration began augmenting NATO's conventional forces, and.
 ^ Ibid., p. 30.
 ^ Ibid.
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in February 1952, together with its European Allies, adopted the 
Lisbon conventional forces goals which called for NATO to field 
96 NATO divisions by 1954. The rationale underlying this 
decision was provided by U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. 
Lawton Collins who argued in Senate hearings in February 1951 
that; "Without adequate army forces on the ground, backed up by 
tactical air forces, it would be impossible to prevent the 
overrunning of Europe by the tremendous land forces of the police 
states no matter what air and sea power we could bring against 
them.... it takes army troops on the ground to repel an invasion 
on the ground."*
The Lisbon goals for the build up of conventional forces 
were never achieved. Three major factors explain this. First, 
none of the parties to the Lisbon decision was willing to spend 
the considerable sums which they believed would be needed to meet 
the Lisbon goals. Second, there was great doubt that even if the 
established goals could be affordably procured, NATO would still 
confront a superior Soviet ground force. And third, there was 
the belief that any conflict would quickly escalate to the use of 
nuclear weapons in which case the conventional forces would be 
irrelevant. It is important to emphasize these reasons behind 
the failure to build up conventional forces because they set the 
pattern for subsequent failures to augment conventional forces
Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty 
in the European Theater, Senate Hearings, p. 154 as quoted 
in David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas. 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 19.
42
and thus contributed to NATO's initial propensity to rely so 
heavily on nuclear weapons, a reliance from which the Alliance 
found it difficult to free itself. What is perhaps most 
important to realize about the early years of the Alliance was 
how quickly reliance on nuclear weapons was established, how 
doubts immediately arose as to the wisdom of this reliance, and 
how despite these serious doubts NATO found it difficult to free 
itself from its dependence on nuclear weapons.
Massive Retaliation and the Eisenhower Administration
Given the political and economic realities confronting it 
when it entered office as well as its political inclinations, the 
Eisenhower Administration advocated that NATO base its strategy 
on the use of nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional 
advantages, arguing that they provided a cheaper and ultimately 
more effective means of deterrence. This new policy direction 
became known as the "New Look" and was characterized by American 
reliance "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, 
instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing"^ in 
response to most military contingencies. Many interpreted this 
policy as sanctioning indiscriminate and immediate attacks 
against the Soviet Union itself in the event of conflict. In
John Foster Dulles, "Proposed 'Talking Paper* for Use in 
Clarifying United States Position Regarding Atomic and 
Hydrogen Weapons During Course of NATO Meeting in Paris 
on 23 April 1954," quoted in Jane E. Stromseth, The 
Origins of Flexible Response; NATO's Debate over Strateav 
in the 1960's. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. 13.
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fact, while it indeed envisaged extensive nuclear responses, 
there was nothing to suggest that such strikes need lead to a 
general nuclear war. Indeed, it was "[t]he assumption that the 
tactical use of nuclear weapons could compensate for deficiencies 
in conventional ground forces [that] underlay much of the 
thinking about defence issues in the Eisenhower
Administration."G
In October 1953, the Eisenhower Administration's preference 
for reliance on nuclear weapons was translated into official US 
policy through the promulgation of NSC 162/2, which "authorised 
the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to base their planning 
on the use of nuclear weapons in the event of general or local 
w a r . T h e  specific operational plans which arose from this 
directive instructed the United States military to extend 
"tactical atomic support for US or allied military forces in 
general war or in local aggression whenever the employment of 
atomic weapons would be militarily advantageous."® The 
guidelines further stated that "the tactical atomic support which 
can be provided to our Allies will become increasingly important
Ibid.. p. 17.
See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: 
Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 
International Security. Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 
3-71.
"Military Strategy to Support the National Security 
Policy Set forth in NSC 162/2," JCS2101/113, 9 December 
1953, quoted in Stromseth, pp. cit., p. 13.
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in offsetting present deficiencies in conventional 
requirements.
On April 23, 1954, the American Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, explained to a restricted session of the North 
Atlantic Council the implications of this new strategy for the 
NATO Alliance. Dulles argued that effective deterrence of Soviet 
attack could be secured "only if based on the integration of 
effective atomic means within our overall capability.
Explaining the decision to forgo a major conventional build up, 
Dulles stated that:
In reaching the decision to level off force build-ups, and 
to concentrate on qualitative improvements, we and our 
Allies have placed great reliance upon new weapons to 
compensate in part for the numerical disparity between NATO 
and Soviet forces... The United States considers that the 
ability to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons is 
essential for the defense of the NATO area in the face of 
the present threat. In short, such weapons must now be 
treated as having in fact become 'conventional*.^
The United States preference for a strategy of heavy 
dependence on nuclear weapons became official NATO policy in 
December 1956, when the Military Committee approved MC 14/2; this 
policy became known as "massive retaliation".
Given the United States* unquestioned role as the leader of 
the Alliance and as the ultimate source of European protection.
 ^ Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 14. 
Ibid.
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NATO strategy in the early years was essentially dictated by 
Washington. This is not to say that London, Bonn and Paris did 
not hold strong opinions about what direction Alliance policy 
should take or that they had no influence. Examining what role 
they did play, what positions they adopted and why helps to 
understand later positions that they took. Indeed, one of the 
striking feature of the positions taken by Britain, West Germany 
and France in the early years of the Alliance is how little they 
changed over the ensuing years and how durable their specific 
concerns and objectives were. It is thus instructive to examine 
the positions of the British, West German and French governments 
toward the policy of massive retaliation.
The British Reaction to Massive Retaliation
The British government, having no interest in procuring 
large conventional forces, supported the Eisenhower 
Administration's policy of massive retaliation. More 
importantly, however, British officials concentrated during this 
period, on acquiring both atomic and thermonuclear bombs of its 
own, capabilities which it achieved in 1952 and 1957 
respectively. Britain was keen to acquire nuclear weapons for 
two reasons. First, both the Labour and Conservative governments 
believed that possessing nuclear weapons was essential to 
maintaining the United Kingdom's great power status. Second, 
there was a suspicion that the United States could revert to the 
isolationism of the inter-war years thus leaving Europe exposed
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to Soviet conventional forces. This view was strengthened by the 
Suez crisis and the Sputnik launch which pointed out U.S. 
unreliability and growing Soviet capabilities, respectively.
Thus while there was agreement on the emphasis on nuclear 
weapons, the British government was becoming increasingly 
concerned about the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.
The West German Reaction to Massive Retaliation
The West German government was less concerned about the 
credibility of the US nuclear guarantee than were the British and 
French governments. West Germany's reaction to the policy of 
massive retaliation was heavily influenced by its almost total 
reliance on the United States for its security, its stated 
commitment to abjure possessing its own nuclear weapons 
capability, its desire to be seen as a dependable member of NATO, 
and, finally, by a surprising initial inability to grasp the 
implications of the Eisenhower Administration's policy.
The West German government did not at first grasp the 
implications of the U.S. policy of massive retaliation.^^ The 
most logical explanation for this state of affairs was that 
Adenhauer and his Defence Minister Theodore Blank were at that 
time concentrating on the goal of fulfilling the Lisbon goals as 
a means of demonstrating West Germany's commitment to NATO and
This is particularly strange in light of the news reports 
and controversy created by the Carte Blanch exercise in 
which a simulated tactical nuclear exchange caused an 
estimated 1.7 million German deaths and over 3.5 million 
injuries.
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integrating West Germany into the western Alliance. To have 
faced squarely the implications of the New Look would have meant 
devaluing the contribution that West Germany could make to the 
Alliance and thus render it less important to its Western 
partners, something that West German officials were reluctant to 
do. Perhaps most importantly, Adenhauer had won a bitterly 
fought battle within the German Bundestag on the question of 
German rearmament in which he argued that a strong conventional 
defence was necessary if Germany were to survive a conflict 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. To have accepted the 
implication of the New Look with its heavy nuclear emphasis would 
have vitiated the very arguments that Adenhauer had recently used 
to justify the basis for his entire defence policy.
In July 1956, one week after the Adenhauer government won 
its final victory in this debate and secured Bundestag approval 
for conscription, news of U.S. Admiral Radford's plan to reduce 
substantially the American conventional forces in Europe leaked 
to the press, causing wide-spread consternation within the West 
German government. Adenhauer, however, continued to stress 
the paramount importance of conventional forces. It was not 
until pressure from his military and the appointment of Franz 
Josef Strauss as new Defence Minister (who understood the 
implication of the New Look and was an enthusiastic supporter of 
arming the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons) that West Germany 
began to grasp the implications of the New Look for West German
Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, pp. pit., p. 53.
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defence policy. Accordingly, in December 1956, Adenhauer 
requested that the United States arm West German forces with 
nuclear weapons that would be under the ultimate control of NATO 
commanders. Although Adenhauer was clearly bitter about the 
inconsistency of American policy, he was careful to avoid 
articulating his displeasure.
The French Reaction to Massive Retaliation
The French government, like the British, was also interested 
in obtaining a nuclear deterrent of its own. French officials, 
like the British counterparts, believed that nuclear weapons were 
a necessary component of great power status, and would ensure a 
more prominent voice within Alliance c o u n c i l s . T h e  French 
government also wanted to possess nuclear weapons as a hedge 
against the possible resurgence of German militarism. Most 
importantly, however, French officials, led by General Pierre 
Gallios believed that if not in the 1950's then certainly 
thereafter the US strategic nuclear guarantee would no longer be 
credible in the face of the growing capabilities of the Soviet 
Union.
The American Shift
In response to criticism both within the United States and
14 Ibid.. p. 144.
French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, authorized the 
building of an atomic bomb in 1956.
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in Western Europe, the Eisenhower Administration began to revise 
it defence policy. While operational planning had never 
contemplated immediate resort to all-out nuclear attacks in 
response to a Soviet conventional attack, many American 
officials, particularly Dulles, intentionally created the 
impression that the United States was indeed basing its policy on 
the threat of strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union 
from the very outset of hostilities. Yet by 1957, even Dulles 
had abandoned this pretence. He declared that it was necessary 
to "convince US allies that local attacks can be countered 
without necessarily inviting all-out nuclear war" and to 
"decrease the danger of local conflicts which might 'escalate' 
into general w a r . I n  October 1957, Dulles attempted to 
elaborate his rationale for these declarations in a Foreign 
Affairs article:
The United States has not been content to rely upon a peace 
which could be preserved only by a capacity to destroy vast 
segments of the human race. Such a concept is acceptable 
only as a last alternative. In recent years there has been 
no other... Recent tests point to the possibility of 
possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation 
effects of which can be confined substantially to 
predetermined targets.
... It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear 
weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military 
invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt...
Thus the tables may be turned in the sense that instead of 
those who are non-aggressive having to rely upon all-out 
nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be 
aggressors will be unable to count on a successful 
conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh the
16 Ibid., p. 19.
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consequences of invoking nuclear war.^?
As David Schwartz has written, "Dulles seemed to be implying that 
the threat of massive retaliation had never presented much of a 
deterrent to an aggressor intent on conventional success; by 
implication, he argued that only the recent development of small- 
yield battlefield nuclear weapons would deter such an 
a g g r e s s o r . A s  such, his statements were interpreted as a 
major shift in US policy. In fact, Dulles was in many respects 
merely bringing US "declaratory" policy into line with "action" 
policy, since the reliance on tactical nuclear weapons began long 
before 1957 and actually predated the Eisenhower Administration. 
Nevertheless, these changes caused considerable consternation in 
Europe capitals, where the change in US declaratory policy was 
viewed as evidence of a declining willingness to extend the 
nuclear guarantee to Europe.
Yet, in the United States, even reliance on tactical nuclear 
weapons had become controversial. Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief 
of Staff, "questioned the advisability of planning for the use of 
nuclear weapons in local wars."i* Not only was he concerned 
about the high levels of destruction attending such use, but he 
also argued that the use of tactical nuclear weapons could too
John Foster Dulles, "Challenges and Response in United 
States Policy," p. 31, quoted in D.N. Schwartz, NATO * s 
Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington; The Brookings Institution, 
1983), p. 51.
Ibid.
19 Stromseth, pp. cit.. p. 16.
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easily escalate to a general nuclear exchange. Despite the 
launch of Sputnik and the Soviet expansion of tactical nuclear 
weapons - which strengthened Taylor's arguments for improved 
conventional forces - Eisenhower refused to authorise a 
fundamental shift away from the United States' heavy reliance on 
nuclear weapons. Although he shared Taylor's concern about the 
dangers of escalation inherent in the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons, Eisenhower continued to resist calls for increased 
conventional force expenditures, contending that to do so would 
endanger the economic health of the United States.2° Yet the 
explicit statement that the US would now rely on tactical nuclear 
weapons as well as Dulles' admission that reliance on massive 
retaliation through the employment of strategic nuclear weapons 
was not credible, did constitute a significant shift from the 
strategy that was articulated in the early years of the 
Eisenhower Administration.
These American changes, designed to lend greater credibility 
to a strategy that many, including quarters in Europe, believed 
was waning in credibility, only served to produce even greater 
concern about US reliability. The American changes confirmed 
West European doubts about the credibility of US strategy. In 
some senses one could expect that this would have evoked a sense 
of vindication among West European governments, but it did not. 
While denigrating the credibility of the American nuclear 
guarantee may have been logically compelling and thus conducive
20 Ibid., p. 21.
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to garnering support for independent nuclear.forces, for the 
United States itself to question the credibility of its deterrent 
was profoundly unsettling for West Europeans because it was, 
after all, a deterrent that they relied upon for their security.
III. THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DEBATE
The credibility of the American nuclear guarantee was very
much on the mind of John F. Kennedy. As a Presidential candidate
and Senator, Kennedy was an outspoken critic of the Eisenhower
Administrations's policy of massive retaliation. He contended
that resort to strategic nuclear strikes in response to a Soviet
conventional attack in Europe lacked credibility because of the
United States' vulnerability to Soviet retaliatory strikes.
Reliance on tactical nuclear weapons elicited scarcely less
support from Kennedy; he maintained that their use in the
European theatre entailed unacceptable risks of escalation to
wider nuclear conflict:
If it is applied locally, it can't necessarily be confined 
locally. [The] Russians would think it a prelude to 
strategic bombing of their industrial centers. They would 
retaliate - and a local use would become a world war.^i
Kennedy's opposition to what he considered the United States'
dangerous reliance on nuclear weapons to confront most major
military contingencies led him to recommend a new strategy for
NATO, a strategy which later came to be known as flexible
response.
21 Ibid., p. 27.
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The controversy engendered by the Kennedy Administration's 
effort to substantially alter Alliance strategy is of particular 
interest for our purposes, as it constitutes the last major 
doctrinal dispute within NATO before the Reagan Administration 
launched SDI. Thus, particularly with reference to the doctrinal 
dimensions of the SDI dispute, the flexible response controversy 
sheds light on the nature and extent of the strategic differences 
which existed within the Alliance. Moreover, there are striking 
similarities between the way in which flexible response and SDI 
were formulated and presented to the Alliance. Yet because East- 
West relations did not yet play the prominent role that they were 
to play in future controversies, examining the flexible response 
debate allows us to analyze each countries doctrinal position 
relatively independent of East-West relations.
The central feature of Kennedy's new policy was to recommend 
augmenting conventional forces so as to enable NATO to respond to 
a Soviet conventional attack without having to employ nuclear 
weapons. The task of formulating the specific manner in which 
this was to be accomplished and of implementing this preference 
was entrusted to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who shared 
Kennedy's deep scepticism regarding the credibility of massive 
retaliation. McNamara did not believe that the 6000-7000 nuclear 
weapons which NATO possessed in the early sixties provided 
"usable military p o w e r . T h i s  view was reinforced as a
Robert McNamara, interview by Michael Charlton in The 
Star Wars Historv. (London: BBC Publications, 1986), p. 
19.
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result of the Berlin crisis of 1961 which, as he later explained, 
confronted the United States with the task of conceiving 
precisely how its vast nuclear arsenal might be used to influence 
events:
Beginning then, and extending months into the future, we 
studied intensively how, if at all, NATO might initiate the 
use of nuclear weapons with advantage to NATO. I did not 
find then, and I've never seen since, any indication that 
anyone in the world knows how to initiate the use of nuclear 
weapons with advantage to NATO. At that point we came to 
the conclusion that nuclear warheads are not weapons; they 
have no military value whatsoever, excepting only to serve 
as a deterrent to one's opponent's use of such weapons. 3^
He therefore argued that improving the West's ability to deter a 
conventional attack entailed "recognizing that we needed to 
increase conventional forces, and that we could not use, 
militarily, this tremendous nuclear force."2*
At the same time, realizing that a certain reliance on 
nuclear weapons would still be necessary if for no other reason 
than to deter or, if necessary, respond to Soviet nuclear use, 
McNamara instituted changes in US nuclear targeting strategy. He 
moved to implement more flexible and limited means of employing 
US nuclear weapons should the need arise, recommending that "to 
the extent that nuclear weapons were to be used, to use them late
Ibid.. 18. While some have doubted whether McNamara was 
quite so unequivocal about his opposition to nuclear use 
while Secretary of Defense as his statements during the 
1980's suggest, the declassified documents of the period 
essentially corroborate his strong opposition to NATO's 
reliance on nuclear weapons. See especially Stromseth, 
pp. cit., pp. 42-68.
24 Ibid., p. 19. Emphasis in original.
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and in limited quantity, and against military as opposed to 
population targets, in order to limit the Soviet nuclear response 
and thereby limit the damage to NATO."2^
McNamara did not, however, view this counterforce strategy 
for the use of nuclear weapons as providing compensation for the 
inadequacies in NATO's conventional posture. This point he made 
clear in his landmark Athens address to the North Atlantic 
council;
we believe that the combination of our nuclear superiority 
and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of 
minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfil our 
[nuclear] pledge. But I would be less than candid if I 
pretended to you that the United States regards this as a 
desirable prospect or believes that the Alliance should 
depend solely on our nuclear power to deter the Soviet Union 
from actions not involving a massive commitment of Soviet 
force. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and 
experience that we possess can find a better way than this 
to meet our common threat.
Thus for McNamara the counterforce strategy fulfilled a specific 
yet limited purpose in the US nuclear guarantee to Europe. As he 
recalled many years later, "We recommended 'flexible response', 
which has an element of extended deterrence in it. But we 
considered that the extended deterrent element-that is, using 
nuclear weapons in response to Soviet conventional attack-was a 
last resort action. We urged that NATO reduce substantially the
25 Ibid.. p. 17.
Robert McNamara, "Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO 
Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, Restricted Session," as 
quoted in Schwartz, pp. cit.. p. 160.
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likelihood that it would ever be required, by increasing 
conventional forces."2?
In the course of attempting to implement these changes in 
NATO policy, the United States encountered strong and often 
bitter resistance from Britain, West Germany and France. They 
objected to the US emphasis on increased conventional forces as 
this was interpreted as signalling a reduction in the US nuclear 
commitment to NATO. British, West Germany and French officials 
were concerned that flexible response would decouple US and 
European security by allowing the Soviet Union to entertain the 
possibility of a conventional assault on Western Europe 
unaccompanied by the fear that such an action would result in the 
destruction of the Soviet Union at the hands of the US strategic 
nuclear arsenal. Within the context of these general concerns, 
Britain, West Germany and France had specific reservations about 
flexible response.
The British Response to Flexible Response
The British government was opposed to the flexible response 
policy that McNamara articulated in Athens and Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. They resented the US Secretary of Defence's attack on 
the viability of "independent" nuclear deterrents of Britain and 
France; they contended that a conventional defence of Europe was 
not viable, and they feared that the American proposals would
McNamara, in Charlton, pp. pit. , p. 17. Emphasis in 
original.
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undermine its efforts to gain entry into the EEC. When the 
Labour Party entered power in 1964, the Kennedy Administration 
found a British government that was far more sympathetic to 
flexible response than Macmillan had been, though this change in 
the British disposition did not lead to full Anglo-American 
agreement. Irrespective of which party was in power, the 
reaction of the British government was characterized by a keen 
desire not to allow disagreements over strategy to undermine the 
"special relationship."
British officials did not believe that a full conventional 
defence of Europe was either feasible or desirable. Given 
Britain's difficult economic condition and the large size of 
Soviet conventional forces, Macmillan did not believe that the 
American proposals were feasible. Moreover, he contended that 
such a strategy rested on the dubious premise that any initial 
attack by the Soviet Union would not begin with nuclear weapons. 
The British Prime Minister, therefore, decided to retain his 
governments policy of reliance on nuclear weapons and opposed the 
strategy of flexible response.
Predictably, then, McNamara's statement, in Ann Arbor, that 
the United States opposed "weak nuclear capabilities, operating 
independently, which are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and 
lacking and credibility as a deterrent,"^® was resented in 
London. Although the American Secretary of Defense issued a
See McNamara, "Address to the Ministerial meeting in 
Athens," o p . cit. p. 46.
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statement immediately following these remarks which stated that 
they did not apply to Britain, British sensibilities were 
definitely aroused by McNamara's remarks. The British government 
considered it essential for the United Kingdom to maintain its 
own deterrent and resented American intimation to the contrary. 
MacMillan considered the British deterrent essential to 
maintaining Britain's great power status and influence within 
NATO as well as a prudent hedge against the possibility that the 
United States may fail to come to Europe's defence. Yet he 
expressed opposition in a way that was calculated to maintain the 
exceptionally close relationship that he had forged with Kennedy.
This decision payed off handsomely for Macmillan as it 
enabled Britain to remain a nuclear power at an acceptable cost. 
When the United States unilaterally cancelled the Skybolt missile 
that it intended to sell to Britain (which was to base its 
nuclear deterrent on this system), it created a minor domestic 
crisis in Britain. This decision highlighted Britain's 
technological dependence on the United States and reinforced 
perceptions of American unreliability. During an Anglo-American 
summit meeting in December 1962, shortly following the Skybolt 
decision, Kennedy agreed to provide Britain with the Polaris 
missile as a replacement. In order to portray this decision as 
being in accordance with the policy of opposing independent 
nuclear forces, the Nassau agreement stipulated that the British 
force would be integrated into a NATO nuclear force, thought one 
paragraph of the agreement stated that the British nuclear force
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could be withdrawn if "supreme national interests were at stake.” 
The practical effect of this agreement was to ensure Britain's 
status as an independent nuclear power for at least another 
generation.
The Labour Party's victory in the 1964 General Election 
brought to power a government that was far more favourably 
disposed toward the strategy of flexible response than was its 
predecessor. The Labour Party had long been critical of 
Britain's and the Alliance's excessive reliance on nuclear 
weapons. As Labour defence spokesman Patrick Gordon Walker 
argued in the House of Commons:
The United States has been engaged on a really very 
courageous recasting of its whole strategic thought in order 
to find an alternative to the repellent doctrine of massive 
retaliation. President Kennedy has himself led and 
initiated this. As he says, he wants another choice other 
than between humiliation and a holocaust. He must have a 
means of meeting at any appropriate level attacks which 
might come from Russia on any scale, including non-nuclear 
attacks met by non-nuclear forces.29
But when in power the Labour Party found it difficult to 
translate its agreement about the goals of flexible response into 
a concrete contribution toward its realization. Like the 
Conservatives they opposed the réintroduction of conscription, 
and economic realities did not allow for the substantial 
increases in spending that would have been required to build 
enough conventional forces to endow NATO with the force structure
29 House of Commons Debates, 5 March 1962, cols. 63-64.
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necessary to support the strategy of flexible response.
With respect to Britain's nuclear deterrent, the Labour 
Party had vowed to renegotiate the Nassau agreement which Kennedy 
and Macmillan had signed. It did this in form only. Defence 
Minister Denis Healy suggested that the MLF proposal, which 
constituted the vehicle through which Polaris would be utilized, 
be reshaped into an Atlantic Nuclear Force. This initiative 
essentially died aborning, yet the Labour Party carried through 
with previous plans to acquire the Polaris missile, thereby 
allowing Britain to retain the independent nuclear force which 
the Labour Party had previously criticized.3°
The Labour Party's primary contribution during the flexible 
response controversy was to promote the creation of the Nuclear 
Planning Group. Denis Healy developed a particularly close 
relationship with McNamara and used this to push for greater 
European participation in nuclear planning. Healy argued that 
European members of NATO should have a far greater say in 
determining how, when, and in what numbers tactical nuclear 
weapons should be employed in the event of conflict. He believed 
that constructing arrangements to ensure such close cooperation 
would allow European governments to exercise far greater control 
over their destiny than "hardware" solutions such as the MLF. 
Healey was instrumental, along with the West German Defence 
Minister Schroder, in developing a plan for the employment of
Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response, op. cit., p 
163.
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tactical nuclear weapons that emphasized greater flexibility with 
regard to the number and timing of targeting packages. These 
proposals were eventually adopted by NATO in 1969.
The British reaction to flexible response, like the German 
and French, was characterized by certain fundamental factors that 
were to play a prominent role in the SDI dispute. First, 
throughout the flexible response controversy, despite harbouring 
serious doubts about the effects of American proposals, British 
officials were careful to object in a manner calculated to 
maintain the strength of the special relationship. The British 
government believed that ultimately European security rested on 
the strength of the Atlantic Alliance and not on the precise 
nature of its military doctrine, however important that may be. 
Moreover, both Macmillan and Wilson believed that the ultimate 
influence of Britain would be far greater if it refrained from 
outright opposition and attempted to change American policy in 
private. The fruits of this policy were proven during the 
flexible response controversy when Kennedy agreed to Macmillan's 
request for the Polaris missile almost solely on the basis of the 
British Prime Minister's appeal to the traditions of the special 
relationship.31
Second, British governments, whether under the Conservatives 
or Labour, found the lure of reliance on nuclear weapons 
difficult to resist. While the Conservatives were certainly more 
enamoured by nuclear weapons and in particular by the benefits
31 See Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, op. cit.. p. 82.
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that an independent forces accorded in terms of prestige and 
influence, the Labour government did not, as it could have, 
cancel the Polaris missile. Nor, despite their support for 
greater conventional efforts, did they abandon their ultimate 
faith in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. As Denis Healy, the 
Defence Minister at the time, later remarked;
I basically agreed in principle with McNamara, but the 
difficulty of the McNamara theory was first, that it 
required the Europeans to spend more; and second, nuclear 
deterrence was perfectly effective in stopping war. No- 
first-use would have been McNamara's objective, whereas the 
Europeans believed that nuclear deterrence gave deterrence
on the c h e a p . 32
In other words, Healy did not really agree with McNamara's theory 
which was, as we have seen, that nuclear deterrence was no longer 
credible. While he saw merit in proposals for a more flexible 
force, ultimately he remained convinced that the threat of 
nuclear retaliation would deter conflict. This was a view that 
the Labour Party was eventually to abandon, but it remained a 
significant article of faith of every post-war British 
government, whether Conservative or Labour.
The West German Reaction to Flexible Response
The West German government reacted negatively to McNamara's 
flexible response proposals. While West German officials were
32 Interview with Denis Healy 13 September 1983, as quoted 
by Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response, o p . cit., 
p. 164.
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more restrained in their reactions than their French 
counterparts, there can be little doubt that the American 
proposals evoked considerable consternation in Bonn. They feared 
that his emphasis on conventional defence would create domestic 
difficulties, undermine the credibility of the American nuclear 
guarantee to Europe, weaken the concept of forward defence which 
was a prime tenet of their defence policy, and complicate Franco- 
German relations.
The Kennedy Administration's desire to reduce NATO's 
reliance on nuclear weapons was viewed by the West German 
government as yet another American reversal in defence policy.
As previously mentioned, in the mid-1950's the Adenhauer 
government had staked its political prestige on a conventional 
build-up and had won a bitter battle in the Bundestag over West 
German rearmament. Soon after this battle had been won, however, 
the United States undermined his government by indicating that 
conventional forces would not after all play such an important 
role and that henceforth nuclear weapons would constitute the 
essential element of NATO strategy. Adenhauer overcame this set 
back and eventually won approval for arming the Bundeswehr with 
nuclear weapons, thus bringing West German policy in line with 
declared American preferences. Given this background, it was 
understandable that West German officials reacted with 
consternation to McNamara's call for a build up of conventional 
forces and a concomitant down grading of the formerly touted
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nuclear emphasis.
To compound matters still further, the American proposals 
dovetailed with arguments that the opposition Social Democrats 
had been making for years thus creating acute embarrassment for 
Adenhauer and his Cabinet. SPD defence experts such a Helmut 
Schmidt and Fritz Ehler praised McNamara*s proposals, arguing 
that they conformed to West German interest far better than a 
strategy based on nuclear weapons. In his widely noted book. 
Defence or Retaliation.^ 4, Schmidt argued that in the absence 
of a credible conventional defence, Europe and especially Germany 
would become a nuclear battlefield in the event of war. He did 
not believe that the prospect of nuclear strikes and the threat 
of escalation would make an attack unlikely. Instead, he 
contended that as Soviet nuclear capabilities grew, these threats 
would become increasingly incredible and thus unlikely to provide 
a reliable deterrent. Adenhauer resented the fact that the 
Kennedy Administration adopted policies that were favoured by his 
opposition. He contended that it was he who expended great 
political capital in order to push through policies in the 
Bundestag that the United States favoured. Now the United States 
was undermining the very party that had been the most loyal 
supporter of American policy within West Germany. This was a 
sentiment that would be voiced by Adenhauer*s political heir.
See Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response, op. 
cit.. p. 76.
Helmut Schmidt, Defence or Retaliation; A German View, 
(New York: Praeger, 1962).
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Helmut Kohl, when the Reagan Administration presented SDI.
The West German government was also distressed by the manner 
in which the American proposals were presented. At the NATO 
ministerial meeting in Athens, McNamara essentially confronted 
the other members of the Alliance with an American fait accompli. 
Subsequent presentations about the new American policy were 
hardly more favourably received. American officials made little 
effort to solicit contrary opinions and left the impression with 
participants that the United States had decided on the course 
which NATO policy would follow and that the rest of the Alliance 
would have to adjust itself to these new realities. As one noted 
historian of this period relates:
For the Germans these sessions seemed to provide further 
evidence of the Americans' determination to impose, not to 
discuss, changes in the common strategy, changes that would 
benefit the United States. The decision already had been 
made and publicized; German counterarguments were obstacles 
to be overcome, not legitimate points worthy of further
consideration.
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute German opposition to 
flexible response primarily to Bonn's displeasure with the way 
flexible response was presented or to the difficulties which this 
initiative created domestically.
Substantive concerns regarding the effect a flexible 
response on German defence and foreign policy were what most
Catherine Kelleher, Germanv and the Politics of Nuclear 
Weapons, as quoted in Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible 
Response. o p . cit.. p. 128.
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occupied West German decision makers. In particular, they were 
concerned that emphasizing the conventional build up would 
undermine the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Unlike their 
French colleagues West German officials were not interested in 
questioning the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.
On the contrary, they viewed any indication from Washington that 
extended deterrence was weakening as undesirable because, after 
initial reluctance to embrace the nuclear emphasis of the 
Eisenhower years. West Germany embraced nuclear deterrence as the 
only viable means of defence.
Because of its geographic location and non-nuclear status. 
West Germany was far more vulnerable in any type of war, whether 
conventional or nuclear, than other members of the Alliance.
Even an effective conventional defence would not suffice to 
safeguard West Germany because it would necessarily entail making 
West Germany the battlefield for such an encounter, thus 
undermining the cherished and politically essential concept of 
forward d e f e n c e . I n s t e a d ,  Adenhauer and Strauss stressed the 
importance of preventing an attack by confronting the Soviet 
Union with the possibility that if they started a conflict it 
could end in their own destruction. This strategy they believed 
required an explicit American commitment to use nuclear weapons
One of the conditions that West Germany demanded for its 
participation in NATO was the concept of forward defence 
which meant that they would countenance no strategy that 
envisaged trading space for territory, which given 
military realities would be the only viable means of 
mounting a credible conventional defence.
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from the outset of any hostilities. The West German government, 
therefore, had little use for nuclear concepts such as pauses and 
nuclear thresholds which accorded conventional forces a greater 
role. They regarded the mere articulation of such concepts as 
deeply injurious to the credibility of NATO strategy. As Strauss 
argued in the Bundestag, "to meet a conventional attack, whether 
large or small, with conventional weapons alone was the ideal 
invitation to an aggressor to attempt such an attack, knowing 
that it would not be as dangerous."3?
The Adenhauer government was also concerned that the 
flexible response proposals could endanger its relations with 
France. West German officials feared that were they to accept 
McNamara's proposals, Franco-German relations could be undermined 
at a time when Adenhauer was attempting to forge closer relations 
with Paris. West German officials were well aware of France's 
opposition to flexible response and feared that it would be 
forced to choose between Washington and Paris at precisely the 
time when it was attempting to forge closer Franco-German ties.
Despite the controversy that the flexible response proposals 
created West Germany and the United States were able to resolve 
their differences. Three factors greatly facilitated the 
eventual agreement of West Germany to the US policy of flexible 
response. The first was the US abandonment of the original goal 
of flexible response. By 1967, when it became clear that the 
United States would be unable to convince its Alliance partners
The Times. 27 April 1961.
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to augment conventional forces sufficiently, it abandoned the 
goal of providing a fully conventional defence for Europe. West 
Germany could therefore endorse flexible response without 
abandoning its commitment to nuclear deterrence. Second,
France's withdrawal from NATO enabled the West German government 
to endorse flexible response without damaging relations with 
France. Third, after the fall of the Adenhauer government in 
late 1963, a new CDU government led by Ludwig Erhard attempted to 
restore good relations with Washington. While for political as 
well as strategic reasons this could not entail accepting 
American proposals, it did lead to a change in emphasis in which 
they attempted to stress areas of agreement. For instance, Bonn 
conceded that massive retaliation was not a suitable strategy to 
meet all contingencies. Moreover, while refusing to endorse 
American attempts to build up a conventional force to match the 
Soviet Union, West Germany to an extent greater than any other 
member of the Alliance augmented its conventional forces. Thus 
while differences remained about strategy, the West German 
government under Erhard came closer to the position of the United 
States than its predecessor.^®
West Germany's reaction to flexible response highlighted 
some of the fundamental factors that determined Bonn's defence 
and foreign policy, factors that were to play a significant role 
in shaping the Federal Republic's response to SDI. First, the 
CDU/CSU showed itself to be firmly wedded to the policy of
38 Stromseth, op. cit.. p. 73.
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nuclear retaliation as the only credible means of deterring 
aggression, and consequently highly resistant to American 
attempts to undermine this strategy. Second, the flexible 
response debate showed how American initiatives often created 
significant domestic difficulties for German governments. Third, 
American attempts to change strategy placed Bonn in an awkward 
position vis-a-vis Paris. Finally, despite these great 
difficulties we see how the West German government, because of 
its ultimate dependence on the United States sought ways to 
maintain good relations with the United States by partially 
accommodating the wishes of the United States. This latter 
objective reflected the West German government's belief that 
because of its extreme dependence on the United States, avoiding 
an open rift with Washington was essential.
The French Reaction to Flexible Response
The French government's reaction to the US government's 
flexible response strategy was overwhelmingly negative. De 
Gaulle was far more opposed to the American proposals than either 
his British or West German counterparts. He believed that 
flexible response conflicted with France's most basic political 
and military interests in Europe. De Gaulle was uninhibited in 
expressing his profound reservations.
The French government interpreted McNamara's proposal to 
augment NATO conventional forces and bring all nuclear weapons 
under American control as a direct challenge to France's right to
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possess its own nuclear weapons and thus a threat to French 
security. French officials found this particularly objectionable 
because they viewed the American nuclear guarantee as no longer 
credible. The French government also contended that the emphasis 
on tactical nuclear weapons implicit in flexible response was 
incompatible with European interests since they would lead to the 
destruction of the very territory they were meant to defend. As 
to the prospects of a defence based on conventional weapons. 
General Alliert, the chief of the staff of the French armed 
forces argued that this would "result in an unacceptable loss of 
territory."39 The French government believed that the only 
credible means of deterring attack was to present the Soviet 
Union with the prospect that it would itself be subjected to 
devastating nuclear attacks if it attempted to attack Western 
Europe. Because they doubted the credibility of the American 
guarantee, French officials maintained that only the French 
nuclear deterrent could be relied on to protect France.
De Gaulle also had political as well as military reasons for 
opposing the American proposals. He believed that flexible 
response was designed to keep Europe in a subordinate position by 
making it dependent on the United States for its defence. This 
was incompatible with de Gaulle's vision of a united, independent 
Europe capable of defending itself. He argued that the strategy 
of flexible response would make Europeans the conventional foot 
soldiers for a strategy that was in the end controlled by the
39 Ibid., p. 101.
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United States, a circumstance clearly incompatible with de 
Gaulle's vision of Europe. French officials also believed that 
U.S. policy toward Europe unfairly singled out the French nuclear 
deterrent. The French government took particular exception to 
the fact that while McNamara argued against the existence of 
independent nuclear forces, he had made an exception in the case 
of Britain. The US government's decision to exempt Britain from 
the McMahon Act in 1958 and to agree to provide Britain with the 
Polaris missile further confirmed de Gaulle's belief in the 
Anglo-American dominance of the Alliance and that Britain was 
merely a Trojan horse for the United States.4°
Because de Gaulle was unable to reconcile his objectives 
with those of the United States or push through French ideas 
within the Alliance, he announced in March 1966 his intention to 
withdraw France from the Alliance's integrated military structure 
(while remaining a member of the Alliance). It would be a 
mistake, however, to attribute de Gaulle's decision to withdraw 
from NATO military structure solely to his disagreement with the 
United States about military strategy. In withdrawing from NATO 
de Gaulle was making a grand statement about his desire to chart 
an independent course for his country in which France would 
conduct an independent military and foreign policy.
As Pierre Messmer, who was France's defence minister at the 
time (and a strong opponent of flexible response) later
This perception contributed of course to de Gaulle's 
vetoing of British entry to the Common Market in 1963.
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recounted, "Flexible response was not the cause of de Gaulle's 
decision to leave NATO. It was the occasion or pretext. De 
Gaulle wanted an independent military policy in which we would 
have the chief military responsibility for our own nation.
This is of course not to suggest that flexible response did not 
arouse the ire of the French government; it is merely to point 
out that the disagreements about flexible response were part of a 
wider and far more fundamental disagreement between France and 
the United States.
Thus the 1960s saw an elaboration and culmination in French 
attitudes already prevalent in the 1950's. Yet it would be a 
mistake not to emphasize the key role that de Gaulle and his 
vision of Europe played in producing France's strong reaction to 
flexible response. De Gaulle's legacy left an impression and set 
a pattern for the future that even his Socialist opponents of the 
time were eventually to follow.
This legacy included two salient characteristics that were 
to have a profound effect on the European/American controversy 
about SDI. First, France emerged as the most critical and 
outspoken critic of American strategy. French strategic thinking 
and American thinking were predicated on fundamentally different 
premises, thus creating a wider doctrinal rift between Paris and 
Washington than between the United States and Britain. That 
French officials were less reluctant than their European 
counterparts in vocalizing these disagreement should not detract
Stromseth, op. cit.. p. 122.
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from the fact that the disagreement were of a fundamental 
doctrinal nature. The second legacy was the extent to which the 
French government seemed determined to use admittedly genuine 
doctrinal differences to pursue objectives and goals within NATO 
that were in many respects unrelated to the doctrinal dispute at 
hand. This was a propensity that was to play a significant role 
in the SDI dispute.
Flexible Response: The Enduring Leaacv
The flexible response controversy contained important 
lessons about the way in which controversies were managed within 
the Alliance, the nature and extent of disagreement within the 
Alliance about strategy, the role of the British and French 
nuclear forces, and the role of non-strategic factors in 
determining the reaction of each country. These factors played a 
key role in the SDI debate and it is thus important to evaluate 
their effect On the flexible response debate.
In drawing conclusions about the manner in which the 
flexible response controversy was managed within the Alliance it 
is noteworthy that, like SDI, flexible response was presented to 
the Alliance as a fait accompli. This was naturally resented by 
other Alliance members, particularly West Germany. This created 
the impression that the United States did not take its Allies 
interests into account before embarking on a major revision of 
NATO strategy.
Another major weakness of American efforts to convince its
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Allies to accept flexible response was that the central thrust of 
the American flexible response proposals - conventional emphasis, 
opposition to independent nuclear forces - was seriously 
undermined by other American actions which contradicted the logic 
of flexible response. For instance the Multi-Lateral Force 
proposal which concentrated on Alliance nuclear arrangements 
diverted attention from efforts to improve conventional forces. 
And while the United States was trying to reduce NATO's reliance 
on nuclear weapons it made substantial increases in the nuclear 
weapons deployed in the European theatre. Thus American actions 
had the effect of undermining their arguments for augmenting 
conventional forces and this led to doubts about American 
reliability.
The management of the flexible response controversy was in 
the end however resolved by skilful compromise. The basis for 
the compromise rested on the American decision to retreat from 
its insistence that NATO rely on a full conventional defence and 
a willingness to accept ultimate reliance on nuclear weapons as 
the cornerstone of Alliance strategy. The compromise was also 
facilitated by the France's withdrawal from NATO integrated 
military structure, and Britain and West Germany's willingness to 
countenance greater reliance on conventional forces and a 
revision in the nuclear strategy that emphasized immediate and 
massive nuclear responses to any significant Soviet conventional 
attack. Thus, despite its role as the leader of the Alliance, it 
was the United States that was forced to abandon the essence of
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the flexible response strategy. In part, this was attributable 
to the fact that a key component of the strategy required 
considerable European contribution and that in its absence the 
strategy of flexible response could not be implemented. Among 
other things this indicated that changing the status quo was 
difficult. Perhaps more importantly, though, it reflected the 
American view that the unity of the Alliance was of greater 
importance than the agreement on strategy.
Thus, although the United States and its European Allies 
were unable to resolve their fundamental strategic differences 
over NATO strategy, they agreed to the adoption of flexible 
response as the official strategy for the Alliance in 1967. Not 
surprisingly, the doctrinal guidelines which finally emerged from 
NATO's military committee MC-14/3 were couched in deliberately 
ambiguous terms in order to accommodate the conflicting political 
and strategic sensitivities of the participating parties. The 
doctrine of flexible response called for NATO to respond to a 
conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact with conventional forces 
and then, if necessary, to escalate to the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons. Because NATO failed to institute the 
conventional force improvements that stood at the core of the 
American conception of flexible response, in the event of 
conflict the Alliance would still be forced to rely on the early 
resort to battlefield nuclear weapons as a prelude to more 
extensive nuclear strikes involving the strategic nuclear forces 
of the United States.
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Thus in the end, NATO retained the very reliance on nuclear 
weapons McNamara had deemed of questionable utility and which had 
led him to advocate the changes in NATO strategy in the first 
place. As one prominent strategist remarked, "NATO's version of 
flexible response differed substantially from that of the early 
Kennedy Administration. Where the latter had primarily 
emphasized reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and especially on 
their massive, unrestrained use, the former reaffirmed NATO's 
primary reliance on the ultimate threat of a massive nuclear 
exchange and did only a little more than threaten to arrive at it 
gradually rather than immediately."^^ Thus, in many respects 
the strategy of flexible response was more notable for its 
resistance to, than incorporation of, the changes which McNamara 
deemed essential to maintain a credible capacity to defend the 
NATO Alliance.
As the flexible response controversy demonstrated, the 
strategic differences within the Alliance were serious and deep. 
Despite the compromise on flexible response there was little 
change in underlying differences on the proper strategy for the 
Alliance. This is an important fact to remember because the 
continuing existence of these underlying differences were to play 
a major role in both prompting future American efforts to revise 
NATO strategy and also in determining the British, French, and
Albert Wohlstetter and Richard I Brody, "Continuing 
Control as a Requirement for Deterring," in A.B. Carter, 
J.D. Steinbrenner, and C.A. Zracket (eds.) Managing 
Nuclear Operations. (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings 
Institution, 1987), p. 179.
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German responses to these initiatives.
Another significant feature of the flexible response 
controversy was the extent to which it demonstrated the 
importance which Britain and France attached to continued 
viability of their own nuclear forces. By recommending 
simultaneously a reduction in NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons 
through a conventional build up and his opposition to national 
nuclear forces not operating under NATO's central control, 
McNamara reinforced French and British beliefs in the importance 
of these forces. For if the United States no longer had 
confidence in its nuclear guarantee and therefore recommended 
increased reliance on conventional forces it was seen in London 
and Paris as all the more necessary to retain their own nuclear 
forces as a hedge against American abandonment.
One of the most significant outcomes of the flexible 
response debate was the establishment of the Nuclear Planning 
Group (NPG). The NPG emerged from McNamara's intention to 
involve the United States' Allies in the planning of nuclear 
employment strategy as well as planning the composition of the 
nuclear forces stationed in Europe. McNamara had originally 
conceived of the NPG as consisting of the Defence Ministers of 
the US, Britain, Germany, and if it was willing to participate, 
France.43 Later he expanded this group to include Italy and 
three other NATO countries on a rotating basis. The
43 Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 
1965-1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) , 
p. 39.
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establishment of the NPG marked a turning point for NATO. It 
constituted a recognition by the United States that decisions 
regarding nuclear weapons, which after all had a major impact on 
Europe, should be jointly discussed and decided upon. Moreover, 
the NPG provided a permanent forum for conduction these 
consultations. As we shall see, the NPG became an extremely 
important instrument through which the Alliance formulated 
decisions and mitigated the severity of disputes.**
Finally, it is noteworthy that Britain, West Germany and 
France utilized opportunities created by the flexible response 
controversy to promote other objectives. Britain continued to 
cultivate the special relationship in the expectation that this 
would not only enhance its influence within NATO but in other 
areas as well.*5 west Germany, because of its relatively 
dependent position, concentrated on maintaining good relations 
with both Paris and Washington, a balancing act which it would 
have to repeat when the SDI controversy arose. The French 
government asserted its desire to conduct an independent defence 
as well as foreign policy and to promote greater European unity 
and defence cooperation.
What was notably absent from the flexible response debate
44 For an excellent description of the role of the NPG see 
Ibid.. pp. 39-110.
The cultivation of the special relationship with the 
United States also had the effect of complicating British 
efforts to gain entry into the EEC. De Gaulle saw 
Britain's close relationship with the United States as a 
potential threat to the European character of the EEC 
after British entry.
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was concern about how potential changes in NATO strategy would 
affect relations with the Soviet Union. This was largely due to 
the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were not 
conducting arms control negotiations during the 1960*s that dealt 
with strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. This absence of 
concern about how Alliance initiatives affected arms control 
negotiations or East-West relations, did not, as we shall see, 
endure.
IV. THE FIRST TRANSATLANTIC DEBATE ABOUT BKDs (1967-1972)
As with the flexible response controversy, the Johnson 
Administration's proposal to build a limited ballistic missile 
defence system has similarities with the SDI debate. Like SDI, 
it was presented to NATO without prior consultation and it evoked 
a strongly negative reaction in Europe. The ABM debate was, 
however, important for other reasons as well. It was the first 
time that an American initiative evoked strong concerns in Europe 
about the implications that carrying out this initiative could 
have on East-West relations and arms control. While Europeans 
were sceptical of the strategic implications of ABMs, they were 
primarily concerned that if the United States pursued ABMs it 
would have a detrimental impact on arms control and East-West 
relations. Despite the similarities that existed between the ABM 
debate and the SDI controversy there were also important 
differences. Examining why the two debates were different 
illuminates the reasons why some American initiatives are more
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controversial than others and how the SDI controversy was both 
similar to and different from the prior Alliance debate about 
ballistic missiles defences.
Ballistic missile defences became a major issue of 
contention within the Alliance in September, 1967 when Robert 
McNamara delivered a speech in San Francisco outlining the 
Johnson Administration's intention to deploy a "light" ABM 
defence, ostensibly in response to the emerging Chinese ballistic 
missile capabilities. While the "anti-Chinese" orientation of 
the proposed ABM system was offered as the primary rationale for 
deciding upon deployment, the American Secretary of Defense also 
noted that a "Chinese-oriented ABM deployment would enable us to 
add - as a concurrent benefit - a further defense of our 
Minuteman sites against Soviet attack" as well as "protection of 
our population against the improbable but possible accidental 
launch of an intercontinental missile by any of the nuclear 
powers."46 Europeans objected to the American decision both 
because they believed that it reflected an unwarranted American 
paranoia vis-a-vis China and because they suspected that the 
anti-Chinese rationale could be a cover for American plans to 
mount a more comprehensive system against the Soviet Union. And 
Europeans feared that any system designed to defend against
46 "Text of McNamara Speech on Anti-China Missile Defense 
and U.S. Nuclear Strategy," New York Times. 19 September 
1967 as quoted in "BMD and East-West Relations," R.L. 
Garthoff, in Ballistic Missile Defense, eds. A.B. Carter 
and D.N. Schwartz (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
1984), p. 281.
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Soviet strategic ballistic missiles would needlessly endanger the 
prospects for arms control and improved East-West relations as 
well as threaten to undermine strategic stability and the 
credibility of US nuclear guarantees to Europe - not to mention 
the deterrent effectiveness of British and French nuclear forces.
Ironically, McNamara shared these European concerns, but for 
domestic political reasons was forced to advocate some level of 
ABM defence as a sop to those in Congress and within the Johnson 
Administration who advocated more extensive ABM deployments.
Thus far from being a stalking horse for a more comprehensive 
system, advocacy of the Chinese system was a means by which 
McNamara hoped to prevent the emergence of a heavy defence 
against Soviet ICBMs.*? Indeed, McNamara had publicly stated 
his opposition to ABMs on numerous occasions. In the very speech 
in which he announced the Johnson Administration's decision to 
deploy an ABM defence against China, McNamara argued that even in 
the absence of US-Soviet agreement on limiting offensive arms, it 
would be "foolish" to deploy ABMs. He described in detail his 
view of the pernicious implications of the "action-reaction" 
effect on offensive and defensive deployments and the "mad 
momentum" which drove each side to utilize new technologies to 
build ever more sophisticated weapons.*® Accordingly,
McNamara strongly urged the Soviet Union to join the United 
States in eschewing defensive deployments and limiting offensive
Ibid. . p. 284. 
Ibid.. p. 280.
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arms through negotiated agreements.
It was, in fact, McNamara who attempted - against the advice 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Walt Rostow (Johnson's National 
Security Advisor) - to convince President Johnson as early as 
November 1966 that the United States should not develop and 
deploy an anti-ballistic missile system in response to Soviet ABM 
preparations. He wanted to omit proposals for deploying ABMs 
from the defence budget the Johnson Administration was preparing 
to submit to Congress for fiscal year 1968. Realising, however, 
that Johnson could not so easily disregard the concerns of his 
military and national security advisors, particularly in the face 
of undisputed Soviet ABM activities, McNamara recommended holding 
the funds earmarked for ABM development in abeyance until efforts 
could be undertaken to "join with the Soviets to negotiate an 
agreement (a) to limit, and hopefully terminate, any anti- 
ballistic missile defence, and (b) with that as a foundation to 
move ahead on limiting future offensive weapons deployments. 
Johnson agreed to this position, although he remained under 
considerable Congressional pressure to respond more forcefully to 
Soviet ABM activities. Thus McNamara had succeeded in his 
primary objective of preventing the immediate deployment of ABMs 
but was still subject to forces that compelled him, against his 
own preferences, to announce the decision to develop an anti- 
Chinese Sentinel system.
Robert McNamara, interview in Charlton, op. cit.. p. 4. 
Emphasis in the original.
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Despite private understanding of McNamara's difficulties, 
European officials objected to the substance of his remarks as 
well as his failure to inform or consult them prior to 
presentation. The San Francisco speech was given one week prior 
to the second meeting of the newly formed Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG) which had been designed to give key European countries 
greater input into military decision-making on nuclear issues. 
Indeed, during the first NPG meeting McNamara "led a discussion 
on the question of the possible deployment of anti-ballistic 
missile (ABM) systems, raising the technical, strategic and 
financial aspects of the issue as well as reporting on the state 
of the Soviet Union's p r o g r a m m e . M o r e o v e r ,  it was agreed to 
begin a study on the issue on ABM deployments including the 
question of whether Europe should be included in such 
deployments.
European displeasure was further exacerbated because the ABM 
issue had taken on added significance when President Johnson 
announced that Soviet officials had "confirmed the willingness of 
the Soviet government to discuss means of limiting the arms race 
in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles."5% Given the 
importance which European governments attached to these 
negotiations and the integral role that ABM deployment decisions
Buteux, pp. cit., p. 71. 
Garthoff, pp. pit., p. 282.
52 "The President's News Conference of March 2, 1967,"
Weeklv Compilation of Presidential Documents, volume 3 
(GPO, 1967) quoted in Garthoff, pp. pit., p. 282.
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would play in determining their success, McNamara pledged "to 
keep the allies fully advised on future developments."^3 The 
United States' failure to consult its Allies prior to McNamara's 
San Francisco speech therefore came as an unwelcome surprise in 
European capitals as it seemed to belie assurances that Europeans 
would be consulted in advance of important strategic decision 
affecting their security.
Not surprisingly then, the deliberations at the second NPG 
meeting one week following McNamara's major policy statement on 
ABM's reflected European unhappiness with the manner in which the 
issue of ABM had been handled by the Johnson Administration as 
well as the potentially deleterious consequences which Europeans 
believed would follow deployment. McNamara attempted to assuage 
these European concerns by noting at a pre-meeting news 
conference that the Allies had indeed been previously consulted 
in various non-NPG NATO meetings and that, in any event, the 
proposed Sentinel ABM system against China "had no relationship 
to N A T O . E u r o p e a n s  were not, however, so easily appeased.
They contended that the deployment of an ABM system in the United 
States would lead to "an arms race which, in turn, will increase 
tensions between the two superpowers and thus produce an 
environment in which there will be little movement on the whole
Buteux, op. cit.. p. 72. 
Ibid., p. 78.
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issue of the future of E u r o p e .  .."^5 this respect their
views mirrored those of American ABM critics, including of course 
the American Secretary of Defense, who was put in the 
embarrassing position of advocating a position with which he 
personally disagreed. McNamara's position was further 
complicated by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin's refusal, despite 
earlier indications to the contrary, to consider limiting ABM 
deployments.56 This position undermined McNamara's tactic of 
delay in proceeding with decisions on ABMs in the hope that an 
arms control solution could obviate their deployment. None of 
these difficulties, however, mitigated the fundamental European 
opposition to US anti-ballistic missiles deployments.
In addition to McNamara's San Francisco proposal, the NPG 
took up the issue of the desirability of deploying a ballistic 
missiles defence for Europe. British Defence Minister Denis 
Healey, who had been one of the most critical of McNamara's San 
Francisco speech, led the European opposition to the idea of 
deploying an ABM system in Europe, arguing that it "would not be 
particularly useful or viable, and that any attempt to develop 
such a system would have unfortunate consequences for the 
prospects for arms control and detente."5? While the final
55
56
57
Johan J. Holst, "Missile Defense: Implications for
Europe, " in Whv ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense 
Controversy. eds. J.J. Holst and W.J. Schneider, Jr. (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 190.
Buteux, pp. pit., p. 79.
Ibid., p. 81.
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status of European ABM's was not resolved at the September 1967 
Ankara meeting, it was decided that the work on the study that 
had been commissioned at the first meeting, which would deal both 
with the issue of ABMs for Europe and the United States, should 
be accelerated and readied for final consideration at the next 
NPG meeting at the Hague.
In April 1968, the NPG adopted the findings of the ABM study 
prepared under its auspices; it stated that an ABM for Europe was 
not "politically, militarily or financially warranted."^® In 
the study it was argued that no prospective ABM system for Europe 
could offer protection that would avoid "catastrophic damage"^® 
in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe. It 
also confirmed previously expressed fears about the effects of 
such a system on the prospects for arms control negotiations with 
the Soviet Union.*® Most importantly the study "recognized 
explicitly that European ABM deployment (by NATO or by European 
members of NATO) could have significant adverse political 
implications for East-West r e l a t i o n s . I n  short, the defence 
ministers concluded that "the deployment of a European ABM system
This account of the study is based on Garthoff, "BMD and 
East-West Relations," in Ballistic Missile Defense, eds. 
A.B. Carter and D.N. Schwartz, p. 283. Garthoff was a 
participant in the NPG staff group which prepared the ABM 
study.
Ibid.
*® Buteux, op. cit.. p. 85.
Garthoff, pp. pit., p. 283
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was not justified."62
In addition to addressing the question of ABMs for Europe 
the NPG study addressed the issue of ABM deployment in the United 
States. The study also determined that "the reasons leading the 
United States to deploy a 'light* ABM defense against China were 
not relevant to European defense."63 Thus with respect to ABM 
deployments by the United States or the Soviet Union, the study 
argued that provided such systems remained "light" they "need not 
affect adversely either the military balance or political 
relations and arms control."6* It was, however, suggested that 
should such a "light" defence be expanded to a "heavy" defence 
adverse consequences could follow. In fact, Europeans were far 
from enthusiastic about even "light" defences, believing that 
these could easily be expanded to more comprehensive systems.
Europeans feared that if the United States and the Soviet 
Union were to deploy more than token ABM systems, the validity of 
the US nuclear guarantee to Europe could be severely undermined. 
As a rule Europeans did "not differentiate between various 
alternative US BMD deployment configurations, particularly 
between large-scale defense of populations centers and point 
defense of strategic forces."65 Both options were regarded as 
harmful to European strategic interests. Because the Alliance
63 Buteux, pp. pit., p. 85.
63 Garthoff, pp. pit., p. 283.
64 Ibid.
65 Holst, pp. pit., p. 190.
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had just recently decided, after a contentious six year debate in 
which the question of the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee 
constituted the primary focus, to adopt a new strategy (flexible 
response), European governments were particularly sensitive to 
any developments that could be construed as damaging the 
credibility of extended deterrence.
Thus while many Europeans were not unsympathetic to the 
argument that decreased American vulnerability to Soviet 
retaliation would render US leaders more likely to extend the 
nuclear guarantee to Europe, they believed that this advantage 
was more than offset by the consequences of a corresponding 
Soviet deployment. They feared that if both superpowers 
possessed ABM systems, the United States*s ability to inflict 
retaliation on the Soviet Union would be diminished, thus 
weakening the ability of American strategic nuclear forces to 
deter attack on Western Europe. Moreover, they maintained that 
an ABM system, particularly one devoted to population defence, 
would make America far more invulnerable than its European Allies 
and perhaps encourage tendencies to retreat to a Fortress America 
in which the U.S. would be far less likely to perceive the need, 
or possess the inclination, to extend its strategic nuclear 
guarantee to Europe.
Although flexible response was designed to address precisely 
such fears regarding the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee 
to Europe, there remained lingering doubts about the extent to 
which flexible response reflected a growing American reluctance
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to engage its strategic nuclear forces in defence of Western
Europe in favour of increased reliance on tactical nuclear
weapons. As Johan Holst, a leading European strategist, and
later Foreign Minister of Norway, wrote at the time:
The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has, in 
the European view, to a significant degree contributed to 
the posture of deterrence by constituting a connecting link 
with the American strategic deterrent through a process of 
escalation. However, the introduction of controllable 
strategic nuclear forces and an associated doctrine of 
flexible and restrained use tended to decouple the tactical 
nuclear weapons from some of their deterrent value. 6^
A salient European fear in this regard was that the trend toward
decoupling would be further exacerbated by the deployment of
ballistic missile defences. It was thought that "area defense
systems would introduce an added firebreak which would further
decouple the tactical nuclear weapons from the strategic
deterrent by largely denying the Soviet Union the option of a
nuclear demonstration attack against U.S. territory, because such
attacks would only be effective (associated with high confidence
of penetration) if the attacks are large.
It is worth examining this European decoupling fear because
it reveals fundamental doctrinal disagreements which underlay
much of the dispute between the United States and Western Europe
with respect to ABMs. In expressing concern about the ability of
the Soviet Union to engage in limited nuclear strikes on American
territory, Europeans were stating their opposition to any
Ibid.. p. 197. 
Ibid.
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development that inhibited the chance that a conflict could or 
would escalate to the strategic nuclear level. They reasoned 
that if the Soviet Union were unable to strike the United States 
in any but a limited fashion, it would refrain from doing so 
altogether, thus adversely affecting the likelihood that a war in 
Europe would escalate to the strategic nuclear level. And without 
a reasonable prospect of such escalation, Europeans saw little 
chance that a war could be adequately deterred. Implicit in this 
scenario is the assumption that on its own the United States 
would not have sufficient incentive to initiate nuclear strikes 
against the Soviet Union as well as the assumption that the 
Soviet Union would have some incentive to engage in escalation to 
the strategic level before the United States. These fears 
reflected, above all, a response to the deeply held suspicion 
that in the event of conflict the United States' inclination 
would be to eschew the use of strategic nuclear weapons. It was 
therefore necessary to construct, or leave in place, a strategic 
regime in which the chances that the United States could exercise 
this predilection would be severely circumscribed.
Related to the European concern that the deployment of ABMs 
would negatively affect the willingness and capacity of the 
United States to extend its nuclear guarantee to Europe was the 
fear that superpower defences would vitiate the credibility of 
the French and British nuclear deterrents. In fact, the fear 
that the United States would be reluctant to initiate the use of 
strategic nuclear forces lent even greater urgency to the task of
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preserving the effectiveness of British and French forces which 
many in Europe viewed as a trigger to the initiation of a US 
nuclear response. There were, therefore, considerable fears that 
the British and French nuclear forces would be unable to 
penetrate anything but a quite limited Soviet ABM system.
Given these and the other aforementioned concerns, one would 
have expected that the United States' announcement in March 1969, 
that it had dropped its plan to use ABMs to counter the emerging 
Chinese threat in favour of a "concentrated defense of ICBM 
forces (Safeguard)"^®, would have evoked considerable 
consternation in Europe. That it failed to do so was 
attributable to the fact that the United States, in contrast to 
its Sentinel announcement, had consulted with its European Allies 
prior to the decision, and that by March 1969 there was 
considerable hope that the problems associated with ABM 
deployments could be resolved through arms control negotiations. 
Moreover, the emerging diplomatic thaw and West Germany's pursuit 
of Ostpolitik engendered the perception that improved East-West 
relations would soon ensue, in which case the threat would recede 
and military questions would correspondingly decline in 
importance.
In many respects these optimistic prognostications proved 
accurate. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM 
Treaty in 1972, which London and Paris believed guaranteed the 
future effectiveness of their deterrent forces. And the advent
68 Garthoff, pp. cit., p. 285.
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of detente, culminating in the Helsinki accords, led to 
considerable reduction in tensions in Europe and seemed to 
confirm the hope that military question would no longer occupy 
such an important place in European politics. Indeed, the issue 
of ABMs played a very secondary role in Alliance politics after 
the ABM Treaty was signed, a treaty that was regarded as not only 
a guardian of strategic stability but of the continued viability 
of the British and French deterrents.
Significance of the ABM Debate
The significance of the first ABM debate extends well beyond 
the fact that the arguments employed, both for and against, were 
strikingly similar to those that were later used in the SDI 
controversy. What was perhaps most significant was that for the 
first time the Alliance became significantly concerned with how a 
military initiative affected the prospects for arms control and 
East-West relations. NATO and particularly the European members 
codified this concern in the Harmel Report which stated that the 
NATO Alliance had to become an instrument not only for defence 
but for detente as well.
The establishment of East-West detente and the arms control 
agreements - primarily the SALT I and ABM treaties - that 
constituted its centrepiece had great significance for the manner 
in which NATO managed its disputes. Following the signing of the 
1972 SALT treaties, American strategic initiatives were judged 
within a different context. Whereas before - with the exception
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of the ABM initiative, which was rendered moot through the SALT 
treaties - doctrinal concerns were paramount, now each initiative 
had to be weighed carefully against its implications for arms 
control and East-West relations.
V. THE INF CONTROVERSY
On October 28, 1977, Helmut Schmidt delivered a speech to 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 
which he argued that the SALT agreements had codified strategic 
nuclear parity between the United States and Europe thus rendered 
the theatre nuclear balance more important. This speech sparked 
two years of intensive deliberations resulting in the double 
track decision of December 1979: NATO would prepare to deploy 
Cruise and Pershing II missiles while simultaneously pursuing 
arms control with the Soviet Union on Long Range Theatre Nuclear 
Forces (LRTNF).
The INF^s controversy was the last major dispute in which 
the Alliance was embroiled prior to SDI. It therefore 
constitutes an important barometer of the state of the Alliance 
prior to March 23, 1983. It also provides an opportunity to 
examine how the Alliance had changed since it was formed in 1949, 
both with respect to the major concerns that occupied officials 
and, perhaps more importantly, how initiatives were formulated, 
presented and managed within the Alliance. Thus for the purposes
The terms Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), and 
Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) , and Long Range Intermediate 
Range Forces will be used interchangeably.
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of better understanding the Alliance's SDI debate, the INF 
episode was instructive for two reasons. First, it set a pattern 
of consultation and joint decision-making that Alliance members 
expected to be continued in the future.7° Second, it 
highlighted both the changing and enduring nature of the problems 
confronting the Alliance.
NATO's December 1979 double track decision which authorized 
the deployment of Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) and 
the initiation arms control talks on these weapons systems, 
differed in important and fundamental ways from past disputes 
within the Alliance. First, unlike prior initiatives, which were 
essentially unilateral American attempts to either introduce new 
weapons systems or doctrines on the Alliance, the double track 
decision was primarily European in origin. While the United 
States took its traditional leadership role once Chancellor 
Schmidt of West Germany placed the issue of LRINF at the 
forefront of the Alliance agenda, it is unlikely that without the 
strong impetus provided by the West German leader, the LRINF 
decision would have reached fruition.
The second way in which the INF issue episode differed from 
previous Alliance initiatives was the extent to which the final 
decision was the product of extensive and sustained 
consultations. Whereas in the past the consultative mechanisms
Much of the following discussion draws on David 
Schwartz's excellent account of the INF episode, based on 
extensive interviews. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas. 
O P . cit., pp. 193-256.
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were usually utilized for obtaining West European response or 
input into initiatives that were essentially American in origin, 
during the INF debate there was genuine joint decisionmaking in 
the formulation of the final proposals. This constituted a 
significant change in the Alliance and reflected the growing 
influence of European countries as well as a willingness on the 
part of the United States to take its Allies concerns more 
seriously.
The final, and perhaps, most significant feature of the INF 
debate was the extent to which arms control and East-West 
relations played a vital role in deliberations. While arms 
control and East-West relations were important concerns when the 
United States broached the possibility of deploying ABMs in the 
late 1960's the issue was of relatively fleeting concern as it 
soon became subsumed under the SALT I talks and did not remain a 
contentious issue on the Alliance agenda. The INF debate was 
thus the first major Alliance debate in which arms control and 
detente played a significant role.
Background to the Schmidt Speech
In order to understand why Chancellor Schmidt delivered his 
famous speech to the IISS in October 1977, it is essential to 
understand the circumstances that led to it. Strategically, the 
signing of the SALT I treaty had codified the relationship of 
nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
While US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had increased the
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targeting flexibility of the US strategic nuclear forces in order 
give them greater credibility for extending the American nuclear 
guarantee to Europe, the fact of nuclear parity and similar 
Soviet efforts to endow their forces with greater targeting 
credibility tended to negate any advantage that NATO hoped to 
accrue from these c h a n g e s . A s  a result the credibility of 
the US strategic nuclear guarantee became increasingly suspect in 
Western Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany.
These fears about the credibility of US strategic nuclear 
forces naturally led West European officials to focus greater 
attention on the weapons systems in the European theatre. When 
they did so they began to view with alarm Soviet deployment of a 
new generation of long-range nuclear missiles which were targeted 
directly at Western Europe. While the deployment of a weapons 
system for which NATO had no symmetrical system would have 
aroused anxiety under any circumstances, it was particularly 
disconcerting when viewed in conjunction with fears about the 
waning credibility of US strategic nuclear forces.
These fears were further heightened by what many European 
officials regarded as an American willingness to sacrifice 
European security interests in order to reach arms control 
agreements with the Soviet Union. Throughout the SALT I 
negotiations the Soviet Union argued that any American nuclear
Europe was officially unhappy with these changes, 
although some officials were encouraged that the United 
States was attempting to increase the credibility of its 
strategic nuclear guarantee.
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system that was capable of reaching Soviet territory should be 
considered "strategic." While the United States successfully 
resisted the inclusion of these Forward Based Systems (FBS) in 
the SALT I treaty, Soviet negotiators renewed their attempts to 
include these systems in the SALT II negotiations, contending 
that since the USSR had no comparable systems, the Soviet armed 
forces should be allowed to maintain a strategic force that 
equalled the sum of American long-range systems, FBS, as well as 
the nuclear delivery capability of the US Allies in Europe. The 
United States rejected these demands but agreed that it would not 
"circumvent" any agreed upon limits by augmenting its FBS 
systems.
This was not, of course, the first, nor would it be the last 
time - as we shall see later when we discuss the Reykjavik summit 
- when European governments worried that arms control improperly 
pursued would be harmful to their interests. What gave added 
salience to European annoyance with the United States was that 
American officials placed European governments in the 
uncomfortable position of seeming to oppose the direction of arms 
control negotiations that were viewed in a positive light by 
European publics. The arms control talks were viewed as 
essential to the continuation of the detente that been achieved 
in the early and late 1970's which, because it seemed to be 
foundering due to lingering distrust over the October 1973 Mid 
East War and the civil war in Angola, were taking on increased 
significance as a means of recovering some of the momentum that
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had been lost.
Indeed, one of the more important changes that was revealed 
by the INF episode was the extent to which arms control had 
become a central concern to Europeans and the extent to which the 
implications of new weapons systems would have on the prospects 
of arms control. This attachment to arms control reflected not 
only the belief that the arms control could further stabilize the 
military relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but 
perhaps most importantly was the belief that arms control had 
become the central feature of detente and that the success of 
these negotiations was essential for the continuation of good 
East-West relations. Understandably, West European governments 
were loath to be seen as blocking such agreements. At the same 
time, European officials were keen to ensure that any US-Soviet 
arms control agreements would not diminish their security. In 
theory, US and European objectives were similar but European 
officials feared, and given their historical experience not 
without reason, that the United States in its effort at reaching 
dramatic and domestically popular agreement would sacrifice 
European interests.
At a 1974 summit meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald 
Ford in Vladivostock, the Soviet dropped its insistence that all 
Forward Based systems be included in any SALT II agreements but 
forwarded a proposal "not to transfer strategic offensive arms to 
other states, and not to assist in their development, in 
particular, by transferring components, technical descriptions or
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blueprints for these arms."?^ The Carter Administration 
rejected this proposal, interpreting it as an attempt to prevent 
the United States from helping its Allies by transferring 
military technology applicable to long-range theatre systems to 
its Allies in Western Europe. Despite the US rejection of the 
Soviet proposals, many European governments feared that 
eventually American officials would sacrifice European security 
in the interest of a SALT II treaty. But what gave these 
concerns even greater salience was the growing belief in the 
European and American strategic communities that advances in 
cruise missile technology offered an effective and relatively 
inexpensive means of countering what they perceived to be the 
growing theatre nuclear imbalance.
The US Response
European interest in cruise missiles, no doubt spurred by 
the extent to which they had become embroiled in the SALT II 
negotiations, was mounting by the summer of 1977. Unable to 
ignore this issue, the United States prepared a briefing for the 
North Atlantic Council on the LRINF issue. The American 
delegation was led by Assistant Secretary of State for Politico- 
Military Affairs, Leslie Gelb, who gave an unconvincing 
presentation that merely served to heighten European concerns 
that the United States was prepared to sacrifice the cruise 
missiles in order to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union.
72 Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, o p . cit.. p. 204.
100
The issue of non-circumvention and non-transfer continued to be 
issues of great concerns and, despite the fact that the 
Administration cleared its positions with its Allies at a North 
Atlantic council meeting before submitting them to Moscow, 
suspicions lingered in European capitals that the Carter 
Administration would in the end sacrifice European security 
concerns in order to achieve the SALT II agreements, an agreement 
which Europeans knew was of utmost domestic political importance 
to the American President.
The United States' NATO Allies considerable concerns were 
dramatically heightened in August 1977 when The Washington Post 
leaked what it described as the contents of a Presidential Review 
Memorandum 10. The newspaper account contended that in this 
document that reviewed US defence policy, it was recommended that 
the US "accept the Weser-Lech line as its main line of 
defence."73 if true this would have constituted a retreat from 
the Alliance's policy of forward defence which was the sine quo 
non of West German defence policy. While the Carter 
Administration vehemently denied The Washington Post article, 
privately West European officials were not convinced. Indeed 
this incident seemed to confirm that the United States was 
willing to sacrifice European security interests and that it was 
incapable of seeing how American actions created domestic 
difficulties for the European governments.
Thus by the fall of 1977, West European governments were
73 Ibid.. p. 213.
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greatly concerned about the commitment of the United States to 
their security. They believed that parity codified in SALT I had 
rendered US strategic nuclear guarantees less credible thus 
increasing the importance of the theatre balance; that the 
theatre balance, because of Soviet SS-20 and backfire deployment, 
was rapidly evolving in a direction inimical to European 
interests; that the American Administration was insufficiently 
cognizant of these concerns; and, that the United States 
government was unwilling to prevent a counter to these 
circumstances by allowing the Soviet Union to block the 
introduction of cruise technology into Europe. All of these 
factors were leading to a crisis of sorts in US-West German 
relations. The German Chancellor was known to have a relatively 
low opinion of the American President?* and his new 
Administration, regarding them as neophytes who could not grasp 
the complexity of the geopolitical realities they were 
confronting.
The Schmidt Speech
On October 28, 1977, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
delivered the prestigious Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture and 
used this occasion to publicly air many of his concerns. This 
speech was regarded as having a seminal influence on NATO's INF
?* Helmut Schmidt, in his characteristically frank manner, 
makes no secret of his attitude toward Jimmy Carter in 
his Memoirs. See Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers. (New 
York: Random House, 1989), pp. 181-183.
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double-track decision. He stated that the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT)
codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT 
neutralizes their strategic nuclear capacities. In Europe 
this magnifies the significance of the disparities between 
East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional 
weapons... No one can deny that the principle of parity is a 
sensible one. However its fulfilment must be the aim of all 
arms-limitation and arms-control negotiations and it must 
apply to all categories of weapons. Neither side can agree 
to diminish its security unilaterally.
....we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that 
these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's 
deterrence strategy.... strategic arms limitations confined 
to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably 
impair the security of the West European members of the 
Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if 
we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military 
power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.
While Schmidt later regretted some of the more sweeping 
statements he made in the speech, its meaning was difficult to 
ignore. In essence, Schmidt was raising the same objections 
about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee that the 
United States had implicitly employed in justifying greater 
conventional emphasis in the 1960's flexible response debate, 
namely, that the advent of parity has drastically reduced the 
credibility of threatening the use of US strategic nuclear 
weapons to deter conflict in Europe. In this sense the Schmidt 
speech constituted a milestone in European-American relations and 
indicated a degree of strategic convergence within the Alliance
Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial 
Lecture," as quoted in Schwartz, pp. pit., p. 1.
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that had not existed before. The implications that Schmidt drew 
from these changes was that with the strategic nuclear capability 
of the United States neutralized, greater attention needed to be 
directed toward what he regarded as the "Eurostrategic" balance. 
And he regarded the trends in this area as hardly less alarming 
than those on the strategic level. The clear implication drawn 
from the speech was that NATO would have to match Soviet theatre 
capabilities through corresponding deployments of its own.
Schmidt's speech was important for other reasons as well. 
While he did, indeed, call attention to perceived military 
shortcomings, he also suggested a means of countering this threat 
through arms control. While this part of his speech did not 
attract as much attention as the rather stark portrayal of the 
military situation, it reflected an important reality of the 
emerging security environment, namely, the need to pursue 
effective deterrence and arms control simultaneously. This 
reality was to dominate the two years of deliberations that 
followed Schmidt's IISS speech and eventually led to the Brussels 
double-track decision.
The Aftermath of the Schmidt Speech
There is little doubt that by outlining and highlighting the 
inadequacies in the theatre nuclear balance, Schmidt caused the 
Carter Administration to take these European concerns far more 
seriously than it had theretofore done. Indeed, the 
Administration implicitly accepted the criticism by not
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attempting a public response to Schmidt*s analysis. Moreover, 
whereas before the United States government had developed a 
preference for dealing with the problems posed by the SS-20 
through the NPG and without proposing a counter deployment, the 
attention that was directed at the issue following the Schmidt 
speech rendered such strategies obsolete. The Carter 
Adminstration realized that it would have to develop plans for 
counter deployment.
This realization was reflected in the first meeting of the
High Level Group(HLG) in December of 1977. Although the HLG was
formed prior to the Schmidt speech in order to study ways of 
improving NATO's defence posture, the HLG became identified with 
the LRINF issue that was brought to the fore by Schmidt and 
indeed its primary, if not sole, function became to handle the 
LRTNF issue. The primary result of this meeting was an American 
perception that "a consensus could be reached on what needed to 
be done about the theatre nuclear force modernization."^^
This calculation was borne out at the subsequent HLG meeting
in February 1978. At this meeting, the participants agreed that
"LRTNF modernization was necessary; it should be an evolutionary 
upward adjustment; and it should endow NATO with an enhanced 
capability to strike targets in the Soviet U n i o n . M u c h  to 
the surprise of US officials the West German government indicated 
its opposition to any arrangements that would entail dual key
Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, op. cit.. p. 113. 
Ibid.
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arrangements. This position could hardly have dovetailed more 
closely with American preferences since members of the Carter 
Administration with memory of the MLF controversy were keen to 
avoid a repeat of the internecine struggle over control that 
plagued those deliberations.^® Thus barely six months after 
the Schmidt speech, the NPG had reached a consensus on how to 
proceed with the question of LRTNF modernization.
The Debate within the Carter Administration
While Department of Defence officials were working on the 
LRINF issue through the NPG, a consensus was emerging within the 
Carter Administration as well.?® Officials believed that 
unless the US responded forcefully to the growing perception of 
an imbalance the perception would arise that NATO lacked the will 
to respond to perceived threats to its security. They also 
contended that unless the Carter Administration was perceived as 
responding, US leadership could be damaged. Finally, they 
believed the LRINF deployments would plug gaps in the escalation
78
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Britain also opposed dual-key arrangements for any 
weapons that might be stationed on its territory but for 
different reasons than those offered by the West German 
government. In the British case it was primarily 
financial concerns that dictated opposition; the British 
governments simply did not want to share the cost of 
maintaining the cruise deployments.
The NPG deliberations were not officially binding.
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ladder and thus enhance the credibility of flexible response.®® 
Ironically, whatever doubts remained about the wisdom of 
proceeding with LRINF modernization were overcome after the 
Carter Administration's unhappy experience with the neutron bomb 
controversy. After convincing a reluctant Helmut Schmidt to 
endure considerable political risks and ask the United States to 
deploy the neutron bomb, the Carter Administration suddenly and 
inexplicably cancelled the weapons programme, humiliating a 
bitterly disappointed German Chancellor. Following this debacle, 
the Carter Adminstration was widely perceived in Western Europe 
and inept and vacillating. In order to restore its image and the 
US leadership role within the Alliance, the Carter Administration 
was now determined to demonstrate through the LRINF modernization 
issue that it was competent and purposeful.
Accordingly, in June 1978 Carter issued Presidential Review 
Memorandum 38 which mandated a specific response to the LRINF 
modernization issue. As a result the U.S. government agreed that 
LRINF was necessary in order to demonstrate that the Alliance was 
responding to the threat; to enhance the military potential of
®® Other officials in the State Department were less 
enthusiastic, although they were clearly in the minority. 
They argued that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to 
distinguish between LRINF and central strategic systems 
thereby increasing the dangers of escalation; that in any 
event the Soviet Union might be incapable of determining 
whether a weapons came from Europe or say a submarine 
nearby thus vitiating distinction between theatre and 
strategic weapons; and finally that the LRINF was 
redundant given the fact that any target that could be 
reached with LRINF could be hit more accurately and with 
greater command and control confidence with strategic 
weapons.
107
the Alliance; and to proved the Alliance with bargaining leverage 
in any arms negotiations. The US also developed a range of 
specific options that it presented to the High Level Group in 
October 1978. Subsequent meeting in November 1978 and February 
1979 led to further discussions and in April 1979 the HLG 
presented its parent body, the NPG, with five specific 
recommendations: (a) LRINF modernization was necessary, (b) the 
deployment should include the GLCM and an upgraded Pershing 
Missile®!, (c) the number of missiles deployed should be 
between 200 and 600, (d) missiles should be deployed in as many 
appropriate countries as possible in order to prevent the 
perception that West Germany was being singled out, (e) a final 
decision on these recommendations should be made by December 1979 
so as to avoid having the LRINF interfere unduly with upcoming 
elections in member countries.
Once this consensus had been reached within the NPG, the 
Carter Administration, eager to prevent a repeat of the neutron 
bomb disaster, conducted high level diplomatic activity in order 
to coordinate the Alliance response at the highest levels and to 
ensure that the consensus reached at the NPG accurately reflected 
the views of the member countries. At a summit meeting at 
Guadeloupe, Carter sounded out his British, West German and
®! The Alliance hoped that it could present the Pershing II 
as an improvement on the Pershing I and thereby prevent 
the provocation that would have been involved in 
deploying the Longbow which was a plan for a full-fledged 
mobile longer range missile that some in the US Air Force 
favoured.
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French colleagues on the issue of LRINF modernization. While it 
is unclear exactly what transpired at these meetings, the LRINF 
was a top item on the agenda.
In a follow-up to the Guadeloupe meeting the deputy national 
security advisor, David Aaron, went to Europe to determine the 
precise nature of the positions of the highest level officials in 
Europe. In London and Paris, officials indicated their support 
for LRINF modernization, although French officials did not make 
public their endorsement®^. In West Germany, however, Aaron 
"found some political ambivalence about the program."®® 
Influential members of Chancellor Schmidt's party began to argue 
that if NATO proceeded with LRINF modernization, arms control 
negotiations and detente could suffer irreparable harm and that 
the fruits of Ostpolitik could be endangered. While Schmidt did 
not share this assessment, he was under considerable pressure to 
accommodate the concerns of this increasingly vocal opposition 
with the SPD. Schmidt, in turn, communicated these concerns to 
the Carter Administration.
The Alliance's Decision
In response to these West German (and Dutch) concerns, the 
NPG created a Special Group (SG) to study the arms control
®^  In the Fall of 1983 when the issue was far more 
controversial than it was in January 1979, French 
President Mitterrand, fearing that the West German 
governments was wavering, addressed the Bundestag and 
strongly urged deployment.
83 See Schwartz, op . cit.. p. 213.
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implications of the LRINF modernization. The SG was composed 
primarily of foreign ministry officials who were of the same 
seniority as their defence ministry counterparts on the HLG. The 
SG agreed that the arms control negotiations on LRINF would "take 
place within the framework of the projected SALT III negotiations 
between the Untied States and the Soviet Union." In doing so, 
however, they were careful to recommend that the framework allow 
for a way to keep British and French forces outside of any 
agreement. They also agreed that the European members of NATO 
should be closely consulted about the progress of any prospective 
negotiations on the LRINF issue, probably through the SG itself.
At the end of September 1978, less than one year after 
Schmidt had delivered his speech to the IISS, both the HLG and SG 
had presented their final reports to the NPG on the LRINF issue. 
The HLG report, as previously mentioned, recommended the 
deployment of GLCM and Pershing II deployment, while the SG 
delineated specific arms control proposals for the LRINF 
deployment.
During most of 1979, the Carter Adminstration was 
preoccupied with the conclusion of the SALT II negotiations.
After the SALT II treaty was initialled in September 1979 
attention was focused on the LRINF issue. In order to coordinate 
the recommendations of the HLG and the SG, the Carter 
Administration developed an Integrated Decision Document that was 
to be formally presented at a scheduled December 1979 NATO 
meeting. The final form of this document reflected extensive
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consultations with the United States' European Allies and it thus 
came as no surprise that at an extraordinary meeting of NATO 
foreign and defence ministers®* agreed to commit their 
respective governments to both the deployment of LRINF missiles 
and the initiation of arms control talks on these weapons 
systems.
Almost immediately following the December 1979 double-track 
decision the context in which the decision had been taken was 
radically altered. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led to 
a dramatic deterioration in East-West relations. Moreover, the 
ascension to office of Ronald Reagan brought to the American 
Presidency a man who was openly hostile toward detente and arms 
control, leading to a further deterioration in US-Soviet 
relations. The dawn of the new Cold War led to heightened fears 
of conflict. Moreover, during its first year in office the 
Reagan Administration engaged in some infelicitous rhetoric about 
limited nuclear war in Europe and the possibility of firing 
nuclear warning shots in the event of conflict between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. These circumstances led to heightened awareness 
of the possibility and the consequences of conflict in Western 
Europe.
Given these circumstances it was hardly surprising that the 
prospect of INF deployments became the focus of far greater 
controversy than before, particularly in Western Europe where the
®* France, not being a member of the Integrated Military 
Command, was not included.
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rhetoric and behaviour of the Reagan Adminstration, particularly 
concerning nuclear weapons, were seen as equally if not more a 
threat to peace than the poor state of East-West relations.
After initially delaying consideration of arms control talks 
about INF, in October of 1981, the Reagan Administration, under 
the prodding of the West German government, suggested the so 
called "zero option" which called for the elimination of all 
Soviet LRINF in return for a pledge by NATO not deploy its 
Pershing II and Cruise missiles. While this announcement 
succeeded in dampening the protests against the double-track 
decision, experts in both Europe and the United States regarded 
the offer as designed to win propaganda points; they, as well as 
the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, regarded it as non- 
negotiable since the Soviet Union would never accept it®^.
Despite the positive effect that this offer had on European- 
American relations, doubts and suspicions lingered about the 
seriousness with which the Reagan Administration would pursue 
arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
These fears were given renewed impetus when it was revealed 
through a newspaper leak that the US negotiator, Paul Nitze, and 
the Soviet negotiator, Yuily Kvitsinsky, had tentatively agreed 
to a formula whereby the United States would agree to forgo 
deployment of Pershing Ils altogether and deploy a limited number 
of cruise missiles in return for a substantial reduction in
®® See Alexander M. Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1984), p. 292.
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Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 deployments. This unathourized 
offer was rejected by the White House, and apparently by the 
Kremlin as well. In any event, this incident rekindled latent 
suspicions about the Reagan Administration's commitment to arms 
control agreements. In addition, the American offer was not 
discussed beforehand in the NPG nor was the text made known 
afterwards to the NPG, consequently breaking the agreement about 
keeping European Allies informed about the negotiations.
Thus the Reagan Administration's approach to INF already 
indicated a not insignificant departure from the Carter 
Administration's approach. First, they were noticeably more 
hostile to arms control agreements, and second they were far less 
concerned about keeping its Allies informed about negotiating 
positions.
Implications of the INF Debate
The INF double-track decision differed in important ways 
from past NATO initiatives. It did so in two fundamental ways, 
one procedural, the other substantive. The first major 
difference related to the way in which this initiative was 
formulated. Whereas most past NATO initiatives were conceived in 
Washington and then hoisted on the United States' European 
partners in the expectation that they could be convinced or 
forced to acquiesce to American wishes, the double track decision 
was the first major NATO initiative that was genuinely jointly 
formulated. To some extent this reflected the fact that the
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impetus for the double track decision came from Europe, primarily 
West Germany. But it also reflected an evolution in the 
consultative procedures. The NPG expanded its functions by 
developing sub-structures that dealt with specific issues such as 
LRINF and arms control. This pattern of consultation was 
important not only insofar as it enabled the Alliance to deal 
with the LRINF modernization issue so well, but also because it 
created a precedent and set a pattern that European Alliance 
members in particular expected to see continued.
The major substantive difference between INF and prior 
Alliance initiatives was the extent to which arms control and 
East-West relations played such a vital role in calculations 
concerning this initiative. This reflected the profound changes 
that had occurred in the international environment since the 
flexible response debate in the early and mid-sixties. In the 
ten years that elapsed from the end of the flexible response 
debate to the beginning of the INF controversy a fundamental 
change occurred in the relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. With the signing of the SALT I treaty not only 
was strategic parity codified but a recognition that security 
could not be achieved solely through unilateral defence 
deployments. But SALT I was also important for what it 
signified. It was the capstone of detente. The enormous 
benefits that Europeans had gained through improved East-West 
relations created what Josef Joffe aptly called the "detente
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imperative.
The reasons that it became an imperative are important 
because they illuminate the complex relationship between East- 
West relations and NATO doctrine that began to emerge during the 
INF debate and which were revealed in its full complexity during 
the SDI debate. The rationale for the "detente imperative" had 
been recognized and set forth in the Harmel Report of 1967. This 
report stated that the Alliance had two main functions. The 
first was to provide for the common defence. The second was to 
become an instrument to promote detente. The report stated 
emphatically that "military security and detente are not 
contradictory but complementary."®^ The Report argued that 
"the relaxation of tension is not the final goal but is part of a 
long-term process to promote better relations and foster a 
European settlement."®®
But another unstated reason underlay the perceived need to 
improve East-West relations and this was the nature of Alliance 
doctrine and the realities of nuclear parity. Given the 
relationship of parity between the superpowers deterrence became 
far more precarious as West European officials became
86
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See Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership. (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 1-42.
The Future Tasks of the Alliance (The Harmel Report), 
Report of the Council, Annex to the Final Communique of 
the Ministerial Meeting, December 1967, reprinted in 
Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring 
Alliance. (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 223.
®® Ibid.
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increasingly unsure of the credibility of US strategic nuclear 
guarantees. Thus they, as well as many US officials, regarded it 
as imperative to mitigate the political tensions that could make 
war likely. In this sense, detente not only became a vehicle 
through which to achieve a political settlement in Europe but 
also a tool of self-preservation. For it was the unique aspect 
of nuclear weapons that they were simultaneously the guarantor of 
one's security and a mortal threat to one's survival. It was 
this strategic reality that lay behind the policy recommendations 
articulated so eloquently in the Harmel Report.
But the implications of nuclear parity also had profound 
implications for the double track decision. While the INF 
decision was ostensibly a response to the decreasing utility of 
strategic nuclear weapons (because this type of warfare was 
neutralized by the ability of the Soviet Union to respond in 
kind), the particular weapons chosen in many ways mimicked the 
capabilities of strategic weapons. Both the Pershing II and 
GLCMs were capable of striking Soviet territory and could thus be 
considered strategic (as indeed they were by the Soviet Union). 
Thus in many respects the plan to deploy LRINF would seem to 
indicate an intention to rely on the very threats which had been 
determined to be of decreasing utility and which had led to calls 
for the deployment in the first place.
At the same time, the INF deployment, however dubious their 
strategic rationale, served an important political purpose. 
Because they were seen as weapons that coupled the United States
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to Europe, they were seen as reinforcing the doctrine of flexible 
response. Thus, in many ways, despite later fears that 
deployment would lead to a greater probability of limiting 
nuclear war to Europe, they increased the likelihood that a war 
could not be contained to Europe. In this sense, despite the 
fears about extended deterrence that existed in West European 
governments, LRTNF deployments were viewed positively because 
they were seen as reinforcing the doctrine of flexible response.
In the end, then, the Alliance's double track decision was 
more an indication of its political will than a serious attempt 
to address the strategic conundrums that were articulated in 
Schmidt's speech. While the willingness to modernize was in many 
respects an indication of the political strength of the Alliance, 
it also was significant because it indicated the seemingly 
intractable nature of the strategic dilemmas with which NATO was 
confronted. Just how intractable would become evident in the 
transatlantic debate about SDI.
Another extremely important feature of the INF controversy 
was the extent to which it revealed the complexity of factors 
influencing Alliance cohesion. As the first major NATO 
initiative that occurred during the era of detente, it provided 
valuable insight into the triangular and complex relationship 
between Alliance doctrine, East-West relations, and European- 
American relations. While West European governments believed 
that it was essential for the United States to engage the Soviet 
Union in serious arms control negotiations, there was a
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concomitant and somewhat contradictory concern of American 
abandonment through an arms control agreement that would 
undermine the foundation of NATO strategy.
In sum, the INF decision indicated that while the Alliance 
had evolved in important ways since its inception, it still 
confronted many of the same strategic dilemmas that had occupied 
decision makers since its early days. Moreover, NATO's INF 
experience also pointed out the complex role that East-West 
relations and arms control played in European-American relations. 
While West European officials were often concerned that the 
United States played insufficient attention to arms control, 
there was the simultaneous concern that American Administrations 
would go too far in arms control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and thereby endanger the doctrinal coherence of NATO 
strategy. The precise nature of this complex relationship will 
be illuminated when the transatlantic debate about SDI is 
delineated and analyzed.
VI. CONCLUSION
By tracing the development of the Alliance from its 
inception, we were able to discern not only the major issues that 
have occupied Alliance deliberations, but more importantly, which 
issues have become more important over time. In doing so, we 
were able to identify significant trends within NATO, both with 
respect to major areas of contention and the evolution of the 
procedures that were designed to manage these issues. Three
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major trends stand out. First is the persistent nature of the 
doctrinal differences between the United States and its Western 
European Allies. Irrespective of the nature of the particular 
initiative, whether it increased or decreased reliance on nuclear 
weapons, the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee was 
questioned in Europe. The second discernable trend in Alliance 
disputes was the growing significance, beginning in the late 
1960s, of East-West relations in NATO deliberations. And the 
third trend concerned the manner in which NATO handled 
differences within the Alliance. This last trend was most 
discernable when one compares the way in which both flexible 
response and the ABM decisions were handled as contrasted with 
the INF decision. Whereas flexible response and the ABM decision 
were unilateral American initiatives presented to NATO as a fait 
accompli. the double track decision received its impetus from 
West Germany and was jointly formulated through extensive 
consultations. Before proceeding to discuss the origins of SDI, 
it is instructive to analyze in greater detail the first trend 
enumerated - doctrinal disagreement between the United States and 
Western Europe.
The European View of Strategy
It is of course a simplification to speak of a West 
"European" or "American" view of strategy because different 
nations and administrations are involved. With these caveats in 
mind, however, it is possible to discern certain views that more
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or less define the doctrinal positions on the respective sides of 
the Atlantic. In general, Britain, West Germany and France 
preferred to rely on a strategy that stressed the importance of 
threatening strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union 
should they decide to attack Western Europe. While the immediate 
resort to such strikes was not openly advocated because they had 
long since been deemed incredible. West Europeans believed that 
it was possible to create circumstances in which the Soviet Union 
would be uncertain as to whether an attack against NATO would 
lead to an all out nuclear war. West European leaders argued 
that the mere existence of tactical nuclear weapons on the 
potential battlefield led to the possibility that nuclear weapons 
would be used. And once any nuclear weapons were employed, it 
was not unlikely that exchanges would escalate to far more 
destructive and wide-ranging strikes that would engulf both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Thus West Europeans, in 
general, relied on a doctrine that could be called escalation 
uncertainty.
West Europeans preferred to rely on such a strategy because 
they viewed it as most likely to prevent conventional war. As we 
have seen. West European governments were reluctant to incur the 
cost of deploying substantial conventional forces. The 
reluctance of British, West German and French governments to 
countenance a large conventional build-up was not merely 
attributable to a belief that it would be difficult to obtain 
domestic support; it was also due to the belief that even a large
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NATO conventional force would not suffice to prevent war in 
Europe. First, they believed that even if such a defence were 
militarily feasible, the level of destruction that conventional 
conflict would cause was apt to be so horrific as to defeat the 
purpose of any possible defence. This view was particularly 
prevalent in West Germany on whose territory the brunt of the 
conventional engagements were likely to occur.
Second, most European officials contended that it was nearly 
inconceivable for two nuclear-armed powers to engage in a large 
scale conflict without one side resorting to nuclear weapons.
And it was believed that once nuclear weapons were used the 
chances of escalation were so high that to build up conventional 
forces when the eventual outcome would be determined by the wide- 
scale use of nuclear weapons was expensive and unnecessary.
The American View of Strateav
Whereas Europeans considered the aforementioned strategy the 
only viable one, American officials argued that the strategy of 
reliance on strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union 
would progressively lose credibility as Soviet capabilities 
improved. American officials argued that while the credibility 
of the nuclear guarantee under conditions of superiority was one 
thing, when conditions changed it was necessary to adopt strategy 
to these evolving circumstances. Indeed even before flexible 
response was officially approved by the Alliance in 1967, the 
counterforce strategy elaborated at the beginning of the Kennedy
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Administration - which endowed US nuclear forces with a more 
credible capacity to extend nuclear guarantees to Europe - was 
abandoned (on the declaratory level) because the substantial 
increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities undermined the 
assumptions upon which it was based. As McNamara later 
explained, "the counterforce strategy was a function of a very 
limited Soviet nuclear capability. It was appropriate for 1962. 
By 1964-66, it was no longer appropriate, as they [the Soviet 
Union] had multiplied their strategic nuclear capability several- 
fold."®^ These circumstances led McNamara to change 
declaratory strategy toward "assured destruction"®®, a posture 
which stressed the virtues of mutual vulnerability as a condition 
which ensured that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States 
would resort to nuclear use against the other.
Yet NATO strategy still rested on the willingness of the 
Uriited States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. In other 
words. Alliance strategy ultimately rested on the willingness of 
the United States to respond to aggression in a way that US 
leaders believed would lead to their own destruction. Thus the 
strategy suffered from a certain inherent lack of credibility. 
This point was made with devastating clarity by Henry Kissinger 
in his widely noted Brussels speech in 1979:
89 Robert McNamara, interview by Charlton, op. cit., p. 18.
®® Ibid.. p. 19. SIOP-62, which provided the operational 
underpinning for the counterforce strategy was not, 
however, changed.
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our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply 
strategic assurances that we cannot possible mean or if we 
do mean, we should not want to execute because if we 
execute, we risk the destruction of civilization.^^
In short, from the beginning, the NATO Alliance had to 
contend with the vexing dilemmas created by the dangerous 
combination of intense geopolitical and ideological conflict 
between two blocs each armed with nuclear weapons. This entailed 
above all attempting to reconcile two impulses that were rendered 
contradictory by virtue of the nature of the nuclear world. The 
first was the desire to protect oneself from aggression and the 
second was the desire to survive the act of defending oneself. 
These contradictory impulses led to a state of affairs in which 
the Alliance came to rely on a nuclear threat that was variously 
considered as the principal protection and one highly dubious in 
credibility. While the existence of vast nuclear arsenals seemed 
to create a strategic environment in which escaping the nuclear 
dilemmas was impossible, the desire to do so on the part of the 
United States was evident.
Examining the history of NATO's past disputes provides a 
means of determining the deep and long-standing nature of the 
strategic, as well as political, differences that have dominated 
intra-Alliance deliberations from NATO's beginning.
Significantly, it was found that the differing conceptions of 
strategy harboured by the United States and its key West European
Henry A. Kissinger, For the Record. (Boston, MA: Little 
and Brown, 1979) p. 240.
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Allies were the root cause of disputes that arose in response to 
the presentation of new American initiatives, whether these 
initiatives were new weapons systems or proposals for changing 
NATO strategy. Keeping the salience of these underlying 
strategic differences in mind is central to a proper 
understanding of the fundamental dynamics of European/American 
relations over the SDI.
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III. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 1983 Ronald Reagan delivered a nationally 
televised speech to the American public that was to prove one of 
the most controversial and significant speeches of his tenure.
In this historic address, Reagan laid out his vision of a world 
in which nuclear weapons could be "rendered impotent and 
obsolete" through the development of a ballistic missile defence 
system. While he stated that he was merely proposing a research 
project and cautioned that the realisation of such a system could 
take 2 0 years or even longer, Reagan's clear preference for a 
non-nuclear world created the impression that, if feasible, the 
United States government planned to proceed with the deployment 
of a comprehensive ballistic missile defence system.
The reaction to the March 23rd speech - soon dubbed the Star 
Wars speech^ -was decidedly mixed. Most commentators 
interpreted Reagan's proposals as an ill-advised attempt to open 
the pandora's box of BMDs after they believed that this 
destabilizing weapon had been safely buried in the 1972 ABM 
treaty which created the conditions for strategic stability and 
represented the touchstone of detente. Others welcomed the 
decision, arguing that the strategic nuclear equation had come to 
favour the Soviet Union and that SDI promised a way to rectify 
dangerous imbalances. Still others saw SDI as a means of moving
It is interesting to note that although Reagan mentioned 
nothing in his address about space-based defences, the 
comprehensive nature of the defence he was proposing led 
commentators to assume - correctly - that his proposal 
envisaged stationing defence systems in space.
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US defence policy away from reliance on nuclear weapons; they 
contended that the advent of nuclear parity had decisively 
diminished the utility of nuclear weapons and that SDI held out 
the promise of basing US strategy on a more realistic and safer 
foundation. The disagreements regarding the implications of 
Reagan's proposal did not, however, rest solely on differing 
views on the implications of BMD deployment; divergent 
perceptions concerning the objectives of SDI were a major source 
of controversy as well.
This chapter addresses fundamental issues about the origin, 
rationale and development of the Strategic Défense Initiative. 
Four major questions are addressed:
1. What was President Reagan's role in the development of
SDI?
2. How was SDI related to perceived U.S. military 
inadequacies in the 1970s?
3. Why was SDI launched by Reagan on March 23, 1983 as a
unilateral American programme. Why wasn't Europe 
consulted?
4. What was the rationale advanced to support SDI? To
what extent was this rationale new? To what extent a
culmination of past strategic concerns of U.S.?
Answering these questions is crucial to understanding the intra-
Alliance controversy over SDI. For investigating these questions
sheds light on why SDI was developed by the Reagan Administration
and why it was presented to NATO as a fait accompli? Also, why,
despite constituting only a research programme, SDI aroused such
strong reactions in Britain, West Germany and France? And why
the controversy over SDI was characterized by such enduring
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intensity?
Throughout this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate that 
the significance of SDI for transatlantic politics can be found 
not so much in the fact that it held out the prospect of 
comprehensive BMD deployments, but rather in the rationale that 
the Reagan Administration forwarded to substantiate its claim of 
SDI's necessity. In explaining why he believed that SDI was 
necessary, Reagan argued that the disappearance of US nuclear 
superiority had greatly circumscribed the ability of the United 
States to employ the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter 
Soviet military actions - a theme that, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, had formed the basis for past changes in NATO doctrine.
The SDI, or more precisely the rationale employed to justify 
SDI, can, therefore, be seen as a continuation of a trend in US 
strategic thinking that goes back to the earliest days of the 
Alliance. And given the fact that it was this trend in US 
strategic thinking that drove past transatlantic disputes (as 
discussed in Chapter two), SDI, as the latest manifestation of US 
strategic thinking, should be seen as the vehicle through which 
long-standing differences in strategy were debated within the 
Alliance. This explains, to a large extent, why SDI, while only a 
research programme, aroused such pronounced controversy within 
the Alliance.
This chapter is divided into five major sections: Reagan's 
early views on BMDs; the Reagan Administration's initial military 
programme; the precipitating factors which led to SDI; the March
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23, 1983 "Star Wars" speech; and the objectives of SDI. The West 
European reaction to SDI is analyzed in the next chapter.
II. REAGAN'S EARLY VIEWS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCES
Examining the views about ballistic missile defences that 
Ronald Reagan brought to office is essential to understanding the 
origins of SDI, because more than perhaps any initiative of his 
Administration, SDI bore his imprimatur. Reagan entered the 
White House with a clear and rather long-standing interest in 
BMDs, an interest that far exceeded that of any of the senior 
officials within his Administration. Thus in many respects, as 
this chapter will demonstrate, Reagan was himself the driving 
force behind SDI. These issues are particularly relevant to the 
manner in which the transatlantic debate unfolded because it 
explains both the objectives that Reagan wanted SDI to serve as 
well as the intensity of his commitment to these objectives.
Reagan's interest in ballistic missile defences long pre­
dated his ascension to the Presidency. Shortly after becoming 
Governor of California in 1967, Reagan was tendered and accepted 
an invitation from Edward Teller, a founder of the Lawrence 
Livermore Weapons Laboratory, to visit the laboratory. Reagan 
was shown "all the complex projects"^ and Teller relates that:
He listened carefully; not to a highly technical 
presentation, but to one that must have contained a host of 
completely novel ideas. He asked maybe ten or twelve 
questions which clearly showed that he followed - that he
William A. Broad, "Reagan's 'Star Wars' Bid: Many Ideas 
Converging," The New York Times. 4 March 1985, p. A-8.
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comprehended. Indeed, he was the only Governor who ever 
visited our laboratory.^
Teller believed that following this visit, "it must have been
clear" to Reagan "that to emphasize defence was my [Teller's]
desire."4 Reagan's initial contact with Teller, seemingly
insignificant at the time, later had far-reaching consequences.
When he ran for the Republican nomination for President in
1976, Reagan spoke often about his abhorrence of nuclear weapons.
When he addressed the convention after having lost the nomination
to Gerald R. Ford, Reagan, in what many considered a speech that
was crucial to the launching of his successful bid for the
Presidency in 1980, stated that he believed that eliminating
nuclear weapons was essential to the survival of civilization.^
During his 1980 Presidential campaign, Reagan had an
experience that reinforced his aversion to nuclear weapons. On
July 31, 1979, he visited the North American Defense Command
(NORAD) in Colorado where the future President experienced a
"personal e p i p h a n y . General James Hill, the NORAD commander,
briefed Reagan and his policy advisor, Martin Anderson, on the
Edward Teller, interview by Michael Charlton, in Michael 
Charlton, The Star Wars Historv. (London: BBC
Publications, 1986), p. 95.
* Ibid.
5 See Martin Anderson, Revolution, (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1990), pp. 63-79.
Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: (New York: Random House,
1988), p. 604.
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United States*s detection and tracking capabilities.? Reagan
was clearly impressed with what he saw and later recounted: "They
actually are tracking several thousand objects in space, meaning
satellites of ours and everyone else's, even down to the point
that they are tracking a glove lost by an astronaut."® At the
same time, he was deeply disturbed by what he learned during his
tour. Anderson had asked General Hill what would happen if the
Soviet Union were to launch an SS-18 missile at the United
States. Hill explained that:
we would pick it up right after it was launched, and the 
officials of the city would be alerted that their city would 
be hit by a nuclear bomb in ten or fifteen minutes. That's 
all we can do. We can't stop it.®
According to one account, upon hearing this, "disbelief spread 
over Reagan's face."^® Contemplating the implications of 
Hill's answer for an American President who could be confronted 
with such a scenario, Reagan turned to Anderson and said: "The 
policy options he would have would be to press the button or do 
nothing." Reagan remarked that, "They're both bad. We should 
have something in the way of defending ourselves against nuclear 
missiles."11 And later Reagan recalled: "I think the thing
Ibid.
8 The New York Times. 4 March 1985, p. A-8. See also 
Anderson, pp. pit., pp. 80-85.
® Smith, pp. pit., p. 604. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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that struck me was the irony that here, with this great 
technology of ours, we can do all this [tracking objects in 
space], yet we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at 
us. "12
Following Reagan's visit to NORAD, Anderson prepared a 
memorandum suggesting that Reagan include a proposal for "a 
protective missile defense system" in his campaign platform. 
Despite Reagan's enthusiasm for this proposal, senior Reagan 
campaign officials Michael Deaver and John Sears vetoed it. They
feared that if Reagan were to advocate the development of
ballistic missile defences, it would merely supply ammunition to 
his political opponents who had already begun to brand him as a 
warmonger. As Deaver admonished Anderson, "Ronald Reagan does 
not go out and talk about nuclear weapons."i*
The issue of ballistic missile defences did not, however, 
disappear completely from view in the 1980 campaign. While it 
primarily emphasized the need to increase spending on strategic 
nuclear weapons and conventional forces, the Republican Party 
platform, in a little noticed section, also included a call for 
"vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic 
missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet Union,
as well as more modern ABM technologies."^^ Moreover, the
2^ The New York Times. 4 March 1985, p. A-8.
2^ Smith, pp. pit., p. 605.
Ibid.
The New York Times. 4 March 1985, p. A-8.
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platform stated that the United States should achieve "overall 
military and technological superiority over the Soviet 
Union."IG
From this brief examination of Reagan's views on SDI before
entering office it is clear that he harboured a clear and
passionate interest in BMD that was rooted in his opposition to a 
US-Soviet relationship based on mutual terror. Reagan contended 
that given the consequences of a failure of deterrence, it was 
unwise to rely on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in perpetuity.
Moreover, he believed that this relationship based as it was on
threats of annihilation constituted a hinderance to improved 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, 
Reagan's opposition to MAD and his interest in changing the 
strategic situation that defined this doctrine was firmly 
entrenched, and as we shall see, was waiting primarily for the 
pfoper opportunity and circumstances to transform an inclination 
into a policy.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REAGAN ADMINSTRATION*S MILITARY PROGRAMME
Despite Reagan's long-standing interest in HMD's, when his 
Administration entered office it concentrated on a substantial 
build up of U.S. offensive nuclear forces. The new American 
President believed that his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had 
neglected to procure sufficient offensive nuclear forces to match 
those of the Soviet Union. Reagan maintained, and indeed
Ibid.
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campaigned on the platform that this neglect had left the United 
States in a perilous strategic situation. During the 1980 
Presidential campaign Reagan asserted that the United States 
faced a "window of vulnerability" arising from the ability of the 
Soviet Union to destroy a large portion of US ICBM silo's in a 
preemptive nuclear strike, and the corresponding inability of US 
strategic nuclear forces to inflict the similar damage on the 
Soviet ICBM force. While many experts claimed that this window 
was vastly exaggerated and in many respects irrelevant given the 
unquestioned ability of US nuclear forces stationed aboard 
submarines to retaliate with devastating effect should the Soviet 
attempt to preempt US land based ballistic missiles, Reagan was 
determined to "close the window of vulnerability." He proposed 
to do so by deploying MX missiles (which carried warheads of 
sufficient accuracy and destructive power to destroy Soviet 
ICBM's in their silos) in a basing mode that would render them 
relatively invulnerable to Soviet attack.
Reagan viewed the closing of this window of vulnerability as 
one the most urgent challenges confronting the United States. He 
contended that if the Soviet Union were allowed to enjoy an 
advantage in this crucial aspect of military power it would not 
only place the United States in an untenable military situation 
but could have wider political and diplomatic repercussions as 
well. Reagan believed that if the United States were seen as
Reagan never revealed how he proposed to base the MX so 
that it would indeed be invulnerable.
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lacking the will to match the Soviet Union in ICBM's, which he 
viewed as the most important indication of military power, the 
American government would be perceived as weak. Accordingly, 
when he came to office Reagan accorded the highest priority to 
closing this window of vulnerability. As we shall see the Reagan 
Administration found it extremely difficult to close the window 
of vulnerability both for technical and political reasons.
Keeping in mind the importance that the Reagan Administration 
attached to closing the window of vulnerability and the 
difficultly they encountered in doing so is essential to 
understanding the precipitating factors that led to the March 23, 
1983 speech. Shortly after the Republican election victory, 
senior intelligence officials briefed Reagan and his top advisors 
on the state of US defences. The new administration received a 
picture of the military balance that they interpreted as even 
more alarming than the one they had portrayed in the election 
campaign. As Caspar Weinberger later testified, the Reagan 
Administration believed that it was "confronted with a serious 
deterioration in our strategic nuclear capabilities"^® and a 
concomitant and dangerous decline in the credibility of the US 
nuclear deterrent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the 
following sobering assessment of the strategic situation at the 
beginning of the Reagan Administration:
®^ Testimony of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, 
Commitments. Consensus and U.S. Foreign Policv. Hearings 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, October 31, 
1985, p. 413.
135
The steady modernization of Soviet strategic offensive and 
defensive capabilities has continued for more than two 
decades. This trend, coupled with the failure of US 
modernization efforts to keep pace, has resulted in the loss 
of US strategic nuclear superiority and increased 
uncertainty in US capabilities to deter both nuclear and 
non-nuclear conflict. The relative decline in US strategic 
and theater nuclear capabilities has reduced the ability of
the US to deter or control lower level conflicts by the
threat of nuclear escalation.
Thus while public attention was focused primarily on the
increased dangers of strategic nuclear war due to ICBM
vulnerability and the growing US-Soviet disparities in
counterforce capability, defence officials were deeply concerned
about the potential effect of weaknesses in the strategic nuclear
posture on US extended deterrent duties.
Reagan regarded his election victory as a mandate to reverse
the decline in US strategic nuclear capabilities. The Reagan
Administration believed that in order "to enhance the deterrence
of both non-nuclear and nuclear conflict, the US must modernize
the strategic TRIAD and associated 03 (command, control, and
communications) systems and upgrade homeland defense
capabilities. A sustained commitment is required to correct
asymmetries in the strategic balance and create a more stable and
secure deterrent."2° While American defence officials did "not
regard nuclear strength as a substitute for conventional
strength," Weinberger stressed that the Administration must
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United 
States Militarv Posture for FY 1983. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 26.
20 Ibid.
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"place the highest priority on the long overdo [sic] 
modernization of our strategic forces.
While the Reagan Administration intended the strategic 
modernization programme to set the course of the defence agenda 
"well into the next century" it regarded "the mid-1980s when 
major and critical components of our present strategic deterrent 
forces could be destroyed by an enemy surprise attack," "as our 
most vulnerable period."^2 Therefore, portions of the 
strategic modernization programme were, in Weinberger's words, 
"specially designed to secure additional strength for the near 
term, while at the same time we build the long-term strategic 
forces we need but cannot deploy until the end of the 1980s.
Thus in addition to plans to build ICO B-IB bombers, to deploy 
100 MX missiles in survivable basing modes, and to accelerate the 
production of Trident submarines and its Trident II missile, the 
Reagan Administration recommended a number of near-term measures 
to provide rapid improvements in the US strategic nuclear force 
posture while more fundamental changes were being implemented:
1. Modernization of "a selected portion" of the B-52
bomber fleet "to carry cruise missiles," leading to the 
deployment of 3800 cruise missiles at the beginning of 
1983. In addition, KC-135 aerial tankers were to be 
"retrofitted with new engines to increase our airborne
21
22
Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, 
Fiscal Year 1983. (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1982), p. 1-17.
Ibid., p. 1-39.
23 Ibid.
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refuelling capabilities.”^^
2. The deployment of "several hundred nuclear-armed sea- 
launched cruise missiles on our general purpose 
submarines beginning in 1 9 8 4 .
3. The deployment of at least 40 MX missiles in existing 
silos, a step that would provide more immediate hard- 
target kill capability.26
More importantly, the administration proposed a number of 
measures designed to provide long-term solutions to the 
inadequacies confronting the US strategic nuclear posture. In 
their Militarv Posture statement for Fiscal Year 1983, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff explained the nature of these deficiencies:
Our primary concerns with the US TRIAD of strategic 
offensive forces are ICBM vulnerability and declining 
effectiveness against increasingly hard Soviet targets, SLBM 
limitations against hard targets, and decreasing ability of 
US manned bombers to penetrate Soviet defenses. A fourth 
concern, which affects all elements of the TRIAD, is the 
problem of assured C3 connectivity between the NCA and the 
strategic nuclear forces.2?
To overcome these deficiencies the United States proposed a 
modernization programme encompassing "five segments, three of 
which directly concern elements of the TRIAD. The remaining 
segments concern C3 connectivity and strategic defense..."2®
24 Ibid.. p. 1-41.
2® Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 1-42.
2^  The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit.. 
p. 21.
2® Ibid.
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The Reagan Administration contended that when it entered 
office the US "strategic command, control and communications 
network had become highly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear 
attack."29 They characterized C3 improvements as "perhaps the 
most urgently needed element of our entire strategic 
program."30 They argued that the United States "must have 
survivable systems that would, under all circumstances detect, 
identify and report a nuclear attack" as well as "communicate 
with our strategic forces before and after such an attack, so as 
to control and coordinate our response."31 The proposed 
improvements included "numerous measures for improving the 
timeliness and clarity of assured tactical warning and attack 
assessment, and for enhancing communications connectivity from 
the NCA to the strategic forces."3% These changes were 
considered particularly important for the submarine leg of the 
strategic triad; as SLBMs became increasingly useful as 
counterforce weapons, the requirements for secure and prompt 
communication increased and specific improvements in the command 
and control of SSBN's was authorized.33 The administration 
regarded improvements in 03 as the sine quo non for the success
29 Weinberger, Commitments. Consensus and U.S. Foreign
Policv. pp. cit.. p. 413.
3° Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, pp. pit., p. 1-39.
31 Ibid.
32 The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. pit. , 
p. 25.
33 Ibid.
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of the entire modernization effort, for without the ability to 
control nuclear forces their modernization would be of little 
practical significance.
The Administration also proposed that the United States 
reverse the Carter Administration's cancellation and build 100 B- 
IB bombers; it was recommended that the first planes come into 
operation in 1986. The Pentagon stated that the B-IB would have 
the capacity to penetrate Soviet air defences well into the 
1990's and would provide "a more survivable and enduring cruise 
missile platform,"^4 as well an increased capacity for 
conventional missions. In addition the Defense Department 
declared that it intended "to deploy the ATB [Stealth bomber] as 
soon as possible.
The Reagan Administration also declared its intention to 
accelerate the procurement of Trident missile submarines and the 
D-5 warhead. The Administration planned to acquire one new 
Trident boat for each fiscal year and begin deployment of the 
Trident 11 missile in 1989. The Defense Department attached 
particular importance to the development of the Trident 11 
missile and its D-5 warhead as they were regarded as a survivable 
and highly accurate force that would enable American strategic 
planners to enhance substantially US hard-target kill capability.
With respect to the land-based deterrent, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff declared in January 1982 that "the increasing
4^ Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, o p . cit.. p. 1-41. 
Ibid.
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vulnerability of the ICBM force to a Soviet first strike is the 
most serious problem facing US strategic nuclear forces."^6 
Caspar Weinberger testified that the Soviet Union "had built a 
force of SS-18*s and SS-19's, with sufficient numbers of highly 
accurate warheads to pose, at the very least, a major threat 
against our ICBM force."3? The Reagan Administration did not 
believe that this problem could be easily solved: "The quest for 
a satisfactory solution to the increasing vulnerability of our 
existing land-based ICBMs has been a particularly vexing 
o n e . T h e  multiple protective shelter (MPS) basing scheme 
inherited from the Carter Administration was rejected on the 
grounds that "an MPS system would not be adequately survivable 
over the long term, since the Soviets could deploy additional 
warheads as fast as we could build shelters."3* Instead, they 
declared their intention to postpone an immediate decision and 
"pursue research and development on three promising programs 
that would enable the MX missile to achieve survivability on a 
long-term basis. The first two were deep basing and continuous
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit. , 
p. 71.
Weinberger, Commitments, Consensus and U.S. Foreign 
Policv. O P . cit.. p. 413.
38 Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, pp. pit., p. 1-41.
Ibid.. p. III-57. Also this scheme encountered 
opposition from powerful, conservative senators whose 
states were sites for the MPS basing.
40 Ibid., p. 1-42.
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patrol aircraft (CPA)^^. As a final option, the Reagan 
Administration proposed investigating "ballistic missile defense 
to protect our land-based missiles from incoming Soviet missiles 
and thus improve the survivability of our m i s s i l e s .
"The fifth aspect of the US strategic modernization 
addresses the major deficiencies in strategic d e f e n s e . I n  
its Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1983. the 
Defense Department stated: "We have virtually ignored our 
strategic defensive systems for more than a decade. As a result, 
we have large gaps in the North American air defense warning 
network; our strategic air defense interceptors are obsolete; and 
our anti-satellite and ballistic missile defense programs have 
lagged behind the Soviets'. Our program ends these years of 
neglect."44 The Administration recommended improving North 
American strategic air defences, procuring "an operational anti­
satellite system45, and conducting "a vigorous R&D program for 
ballistic missile defense."46 Weinberger stated that "the Low 
Altitude Defense (LoAD) program will be restructured to
41
42
43
44
45
Later the Reagan Administration proposed "dense pack" 
which did not receive adequate support from Congress and 
was subsequently shelved.
Ibid.. p. 1-42.
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit.. p. 
26.
Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, pp. cit.. p. III-63. 
Ibid.. p. III-63.
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accelerate development of an advanced terminal defense for 
ICBMs."47 In addition the Reagan Administration indicated its 
intent to "continue on the exoatmospheric overlay program to 
provide a 1990s response to unconstrained growth in Soviet 
reentry vehicles."4® And the Defense Department stated that 
the BMD programme also emphasized the "advancement of the BMD 
technology base to support future system concepts"4® and that 
they were "assessing the technical feasibility of space-based 
laser weapons.
While the administration believed that "strategic defense 
capabilities contribute to deterrence in ways frequently 
overlooked,"51 by helping to "deter nuclear attack, and to 
degrade its effectiveness if it is attempted,"5% their attitude 
was far from one of unalloyed enthusiasm:
Although ground-based deployment of MX ultimately may 
require a BMD for survivability, today's BMD technology is 
not adequate to defend against Soviet missiles. For the 
future, we are not yet sure how well ballistic missile 
defenses will work; what they will cost; whether they would 
require changes to the ABM Treaty; and how additional Soviet 
ballistic missile defenses - which would almost certainly be
47 Ibid., It was specifically stated that LoAD development 
would be conducted within the confines of the ABM Treaty.
4® Ibid.
49
50
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit 
p. 77.
Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, o p . cit.. p. 1-40.
5^  The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. cit 
p. 25.
52 Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, pp. pit., p. 1-40.
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deployed in response to any U.S. BMD system - would affect 
U.S. and allied offensive capabilities. 3^
Thus while the Reagan Administration's Defense Department 
demonstrated an early interest in BMDs, it was not prepared, 
initially, to effect a fundamental change in the policies pursued 
by its predecessors with respect to BMDs. In short, at the 
beginning of the Reagan Administration, strategic defences were 
accelerated along with other facets of the strategic 
modernization programme, and increased attention was given to the 
possibility of using ballistic missile defences to solve the 
problem of ICBM vulnerability; but there was little to suggest 
that it would soon depart radically from the United States's 
traditional evolutionary approach to BMD research. Why the 
Reagan Administration eventually abandoned this approach and 
opted for a new policy with respect to BMDs can be explained by 
examining the purposes behind the Reagan Administration's defence 
build-up and how, by late 1982, they believed it to be faltering.
The Reagan Administration proposed the strategic 
modernization programme in the expectation that it would effect a 
substantial reduction in ICBM vulnerability and augment US 
counterforce capabilities. These objectives were deemed of 
salient importance to the success of the modernization effort 
because it was perceived inadequacies in these categories to 
which the Reagan Administration attributed the instability in the
53 Ibid.. p. III-65.
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strategic nuclear balance. Specifically, the United States 
feared that the combination of highly accurate Soviet ICBM's and 
the vulnerability of the US land-based forces created dangerous 
first-strike incentives during a crisis. The Reagan 
Administration thus indicated its commitment to rebuilding US 
forces in order to ensure that they "will be capable under all 
conditions of war initiation to survive a Soviet first strike and 
retaliate in a way that permits the United States to achieve its 
objectives."54 Moreover, American defence officials deemed it 
essential to ensure adequate time urgent hard-target kill 
capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that in the 
early 1980*s, the United States would lose its advantage in hard- 
target kill capability, "but that the trend would move back 
toward parity as the US deploys ALCM, MX, and the TRIDENT D-5 
SLBM."55 Moreover, "during the same period, the Soviets will 
continue to enjoy a significant advantage in time-urgent hard- 
target kill potential, chiefly a result of the increasing 
accuracy of their modern ICBMs."56 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
however, expected this trend to "reverse sharply by the late 
1980s as the US deploys the highly accurate MX and TRIDENT D-5 
missiles."57 Thus while the Reagan Administration saw the
54
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Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op. cit. p. 
22.
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United States at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, it was confident that the successful completion of its
strategic modernization programme would restore the strategic
nuclear balance.
More broadly, the Reagan Administration believed that these
changes would allow the United States to "eliminate some
dangerous contradictions between the capabilities of our nuclear
forces and the objectives of our policy."^® The objectives of
US nuclear strategy were, according to the Defense Department:
(1) to deter nuclear attack on the United States or its 
allies: (2) to help deter major conventional attack against
U.S. forces and our allies, especially in NATO: (3) to
impose termination of a major war - on terms favorable to 
the United States and our allies - even if nuclear weapons 
have been used - and in particular to deter escalation in 
the level of hostilities; and (4) to negate possible Soviet 
nuclear blackmail against the United States or our 
allies.
In a further effort to give concrete expression to these 
objectives, the Reagan Administration took steps to revise 
American nuclear strategy. In early 1982, defence planners 
produced a five-year defence plan that provided "the first 
complete defense guidance" of the Reagan Administration.®® The 
salient feature of this "guidance" was the belief that the United 
States needed to plan for a nuclear war of a potentially extended 
duration. Caspar Weinberger began the process of endowing this
Weinberger, FY 1983 Annual Report, o p . cit., p. 1-18. 
Ibid.. p. 1-18.
®® Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For 
Fighting a Long Nuclear War," The New York Times. 30 May 
1982, p. 1.
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assessment with operational significance in July 1982 when he 
signed Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP) 82 which directed 
military planners to design a new (Single Integrated Operational 
Plan) STOP, "in which increased attention was accorded the 
requirements of nuclear weapons employment in a situation of 
prolonged or protracted nuclear conflict.
In accordance with its emphasis on protracted conflict, the 
"defense guidance" document also stated that the "development of 
ballistic missile defence systems to defend the United States 
against Soviet nuclear attack would be accelerated."^2 
Furthermore, it recommended that the United States should 
consider revising the 1972 ABM Treaty if MX survivability could 
not be otherwise achieved. The document also proposed the 
"prototype development of space-based weapons systems"®^ as 
part of a strategy of engaging the Soviet Union in new areas of 
military competition.
The document also recommended that the United States exploit 
its economic and technological advantages vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. It stated that the United States should procure weapons 
systems that "are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose 
disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military
Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," 
in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.), Strategic 
Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986), p. 80.
62 Halloran, op. cit.. p. 12.
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competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment."^4 
Furthermore the "defense guidance" recommends that the United 
States impose "costs on the Soviets by raising uncertainty 
regarding their ability to accomplish some of their high-priority 
missions."^5
Thus some of the ideas that later became prominently 
associated with SDI existed in inchoate form in earlier 
initiatives, though it would be incorrect to trace the genesis of 
SDI to the Reagan Administration's early enthusiasm for 
accelerated research in ballistic missile defences and other high 
technology weapons. These early efforts were part of an overall 
strategic modernization programme, while Reagan's idea to render 
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" was developed outside of 
the channels that were guiding US defence policy on ballistic 
missile defences. On the other hand, the doctrinal changes 
effected in the early Reagan years were a response to the 
difficulties which the Reagan Administration believed Soviet 
strategic nuclear capabilities posed for the continued ability of 
United States nuclear forces to extend the nuclear guarantee to 
Western Europe.
The Effect of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities on Extended Deterrence
While many in the Reagan Administration believed that Soviet 
counterforce capabilities eroded the ability of US strategic
Ibid.
Ibid.
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nuclear forces to deter conventional attacks against NATO, it is 
difficult to see how this was really the case. For as we have 
seen in the previous chapter it was the vulnerability of the 
United States to strategic nuclear attack, not the disparities in 
counterforce capability, which created doubts both in the United 
States and Western Europe about the credibility of the US nuclear 
guarantee to Europe. Thus even when the United States possessed 
overwhelming superiority in counterforce capabilities during the 
1960's, the Kennedy and Johnson Adminstration concentrated their 
primary efforts on augmenting conventional forces because they 
concluded that US nuclear superiority conferred few if any 
concrete military advantages.
It follows that even if one accepts the Reagan 
Adminstration*s view that the Soviet Union possessed substantial 
counterforce capability advantages, it is difficult to see how 
these would provide the Soviet Union with greater or lesser 
ability to deter the US from using its nuclear weapons to stop an 
attack on Western Europe. For, it was the Soviet Union's ability 
to deliver thousands of nuclear warheads against the United 
States in retaliation and not the accuracy with which they could 
be delivered that made the United States leery about initiating 
nuclear use against the Soviet Union, a point that was borne out 
by the fact that during the sixties the United States felt 
deterred even in the absence of substantial Soviet counterforce 
capabilities.
The concern that US officials showed about the effect of US-
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Soviet differences in counterforce capability, while generally 
misplaced, did point to the significant role that thinking about 
counterforce weapons had played in US nuclear strategy. Since it 
became apparent that the Soviet Union possessed the ability to 
retaliate against the US should the US attack the Soviet Union in 
response to a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, 
American planners have been driven to find a means of extracting 
some advantage from the use of nuclear weapons both at the 
tactical and strategic level. The need to do so stemmed from the 
fact that NATO had to have a credible means of threatening 
nuclear use in order to compensate for what it saw as its 
conventional inferiority. It was this dynamic that was the 
primary impetus for counterforce capabilities in the US arsenal. 
As American nuclear superiority gave way to US-Soviet parity in 
the early 1970's, the ability of the United States to derive even 
theoretical benefit from counterforce vanished. Still, the 
mission of extending deterrence to Western Europe remained and 
the drive to acquire counterforce capability (or superiority) 
outlived the circumstances that made it credible.
IV. PRECIPITATING FACTORS LEADING TO THE MARCH 23, 1983
SPEECH
Throughout his first two years in office, Reagan was lobbied 
by proponents of strategic defence. In January 1982, Reagan and 
Dr. Edward Teller met in what was the first of four meetings 
before the March 23, 1983 speech. Teller informed Reagan that
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recent technological advances in ballistic missile defence 
technology meant that an effective defence against nuclear 
missiles was now a distinct possibility. Reagan was also lobbied 
by members of his "Kitchen Cabinet" such as Karl R. Bendetsen, a 
former undersecretary of the Army and the chairman of the 
Champion International Corporation. Bendetsen and other members 
of the Kitchen Cabinet, with the approval of National Security 
Advisor William Clark and Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese, 
met twice with Reagan in 1982 and advocated that the US pursue 
comprehensive ballistic missile defences. Although Reagan asked 
various questions concerning the programme, "he was 
noncommittal.
Reagan's interest in ballistic missile defence increased 
dramatically as support for his strategic modernization programme 
began to erode. By the end of 1982 the Reagan Administration 
faced burgeoning public opposition to continued expenditure on 
nuclear arms, pressure from the Catholic Bishops who were 
preparing to present a document condemning the entire doctrine of 
deterrence as immoral, and, most importantly, growing 
Congressional reluctance to continue supporting nuclear 
modernization. Reagan regarded his increasing difficulty in 
garnering Congressional support for a new ICBM as a serious 
matter, for while he continued to receive support for 
modernization of the other two legs of the TRIAD, he attached 
greatest importance to matching the Soviet Union in land-based
66 Smith, op. cit., p. 605.
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missiles which he considered the most important index of
strategic nuclear capability.
The House of Representatives' vote in December 1982 to block
funding for the MX missile was thus a decisive event in the road
toward Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech. The vote emphasized how
difficult it would be for the Reagan Administration, in the face
of Congressional opposition, to compete with the Soviet Union in
the production of offensive nuclear arms: for in addition to
failing to receive adequate funding for the MX, the Reagan
Administration still faced the vexing problem of deploying it in
a survivable basing mode. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was not
only continuing to produce heavy ICBMs at a rapid pace, but was
also beginning mobile deployments of such heavy missiles, thus
rendering them relatively invulnerable to US counterforce
strikes. Reagan therefore concluded that unless these trends
were reversed, he would be unable to achieve his objective of
arresting the dangerous trends in the strategic nuclear balance.
As George Keyworth, Reagan's science adviser, stated:
I think there is no question what was the stimulus [for 
SOI]. It was the fact that the President had just completed 
two years immersed in the complexities of modernizing our 
own strategic forces and realizing the limitations which his 
successors would confront on a curve of simply eroding 
nuclear stability. It is quite logical, I think, that the 
SDI proposal came at the conclusion of pur two-year-long 
debate on strategic modernization.G?
In essence, Reagan feared "his successors not possessing
sufficient tools with which to manage their challenges in the
George Keyworth, interview with Michael Charlton, in 
Charlton, op. cit.. p. 102.
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future" and consequently "saw the need to restore a stable 
b a l a n c e . .."68 while these factors impressed upon Reagan the 
need for change, it was his growing conviction that emerging 
technology could provide alternative means of deterrence that led 
ultimately to his decision to pursue strategic defences. As 
Keyworth explained: "What made him decide that 'now' was the time 
to begin this initiative was the state of technology and the rate 
of progress, in the last few years, underlying those 
technologies."69 Thus it was the confluence of the perceived 
consequences of a sputtering strategic modernization programme, 
advances in key technologies, and Reagan's long-standing interest 
in ballistic missile defences that created the conditions which 
eventually led to the March 23 speech.
Once Reagan decided to pursue seriously the option of 
placing greater reliance on BMDs, he entrusted the formulation of 
his new policy to his National Security Adviser, William Clark, 
and his deputy, Robert McFarlane. McFarlane, who, as deputy to 
the inexperienced Clark, wielded unusual authority, believed that 
"the traditional concept of offensive deterrence was becoming 
less stable" and that "defense was conceptually an answer."^0 
With the help of Admiral John Poindexter, then the third most 
important person on the National Security Council Staff, 
McFarlane, working through unofficial channels, sought support
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.. pp. 102-103. 
Smith, op. cit.. p. 606.
153
from the military. This was considered vital, for while it was 
possible to launch such an initiative without garnering support 
from, let alone informing, other relevant bureaucracies, without 
at least the acquiescence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would 
have been difficult to proceed with the idea of strategic 
defences. McFarlane "found a willing ally"^^ in the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins. Watkins, had for some 
time believed "that the nation was near a dead end in the 
offensive arms race."?^ And on January 20, 1983 Watkins met 
with Dr. Teller, whose optimism about new technologies and his 
description of Soviet efforts in strategic defence convinced the 
Admiral that there were viable alternatives. Poindexter and 
McFarlane urged Watkins to "push his views with the other 
Chiefs.
The Joint Chiefs were scheduled to meet with Reagan on 
February 11, and Watkins used the Joint Chiefs' February 5 dress 
rehearsal to promote increased US efforts in the field of 
strategic defence. He was careful, however, to emphasize that he 
was not advocating an abandonment of offensive nuclear weapons; 
he merely wanted greater attention given to investigating "how 
defenses could be combined with offensive deterrence.
Watkins also employed a moral argument to support his ideas.
Ibid. . p. 607. 
■^2 Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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asserting that "we should protect the American people, not avenge 
them. "75
During the February 11 meeting between the President and the 
Joint Chiefs, Clark and Poindexter were eager to get the nation's 
top military officers on record as supporting the President's 
desire to proceed with strategic defences. The meeting began 
with the customary military briefing on strategic trends. Then 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Vessey, began to 
explain Watkins ideas, "telling Reagan the Chiefs felt the time 
had come to take another look at d e f e n s e . Reagan turned to 
the other Chiefs and asked, "Do you all feel that way?"^^ The 
room fell silent as Reagan looked at each Service Chief 
individually. The Army Chief of Staff, General Meyer, averred 
that "the historic balance between offense and defense had gotten 
'out of kilter' - whether you're talking about defense against 
tanks, defense against aircraft, or defense against 
m i s s i l e s . "78 Watkins remarked that new technologies offered 
great promise for the defensive options. McFarlane replied, "Are 
you saying that you think it is possible, not probable but 
possible, that we might be able to develop an effective defense 
against ballistics missiles?"?^ Watkins affirmed the thrust of
75 Ibid.
75 Ibid.. p. 608.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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McFarlane's question, stating, "Yes, that's exactly what I am 
saying."8° McFarlane, seeing in Watkins' statement the 
endorsement of strategic defences that the President needed, 
turned to Reagan and said that "the implications of this are 
very, very far-reaching. If it were feasible to find an 
alternative basis for maintaining our security against nuclear 
ballistic missile weapons, that would be a substantial change, 
obviously." Reagan responded, "I understand that."®^
Both Reagan and McFarlane saw in Watkins' statement an 
opportunity to claim endorsement by the Joint Chiefs in order to 
later fend off criticism that they had not solicited military 
advice. What the Chiefs had in fact endorsed, however, was 
little more than the idea that the United States should "check 
possibilities for combining strategic defense with the existing 
strategy of deterrence through offensive nuclear weapons."®^ 
Nevertheless, "Reagan was exhilarated by his meeting with the 
Joint Chiefs and eager to declare a brand new national 
strategy."®® He indicated to his staff his "desire to proclaim 
a radical shift of doctrine away from nuclear deterrence"®* 
toward a defensive strategy. Clark was particularly enthusiastic 
about the idea of such a bold stroke, seeing in strategic
®° Ibid.
®^  Ibid.
®2 Ibid.. p. 609. 
®® Ibid.
®* Ibid.
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defences an opportunity for Reagan to leave a lasting legacy. 
Clark, however, needed the assistance of McFarlane who possessed 
the foreign and defence policy knowledge that he lacked. While 
McFarlane supported a greater emphasis on BMDs, he became 
somewhat uncomfortable with the more sweeping formulation which 
Reagan favoured. He therefore tried to convince Reagan to wait 
for the Scowcroft Commission Report on Strategic Forces and then 
proceed on a bipartisan basis with Speaker of the House, Thomas 
P. (Tip) O'Neill. Reagan rejected this approach, preferring 
instead to have his initiative developed secretly with only a 
small number of NSC aides even aware of his intentions. 
Accordingly, Clark directed the NSC to keep their planning on a 
"close-hold" basis, which precluded informing even the relevant 
Cabinet members.®^ The staff work was entrusted to McFarlane, 
Poindexter, Air Force Colonel Robert Linhard, and Ray Pollock, a 
civilian arms specialist on the NSC staff. Thus, the concept 
proceeded with practically the entire US national security 
apparatus unaware that the President was interested in initiating 
a fundamental shift in US defence policy.
By mid-March however, McFarlane felt that he needed to widen 
the circle of those involved in the deliberations. He went to 
the President's science adviser George Keyworth to seek his 
counsel and enlist his support. Keyworth, after some initial
Ibid.. p. 610. Weinberger, however, because of his close 
personal relationship with Clark was kept abreast of 
these developments.
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hesitations, agreed to support Reagan's initiative.
Subsequently, both Keyworth and McFarlane attempted to explain to 
Reagan some the complications that would attend such a radial 
proposal. And privately McFarlane attempted to get Reagan to 
abandon his "utopian view"®^ of rendering nuclear weapons 
impotent and obsolete, as well as to consult with America's 
European Allies. The NSC's Col. Linhard also cautioned that it 
could be dangerous to announce the intention to increase reliance 
on defensive weapons before the weapons were themselves on hand, 
as this would undermine the credibility of NATO's flexible 
response doctrine, which, after all, depended on the offensive 
nuclear potential of the United States. Despite these warnings, 
Reagan clung tenaciously to his proposal and told his advisors to 
proceed in the strictest secrecy. Accordingly, McFarlane began 
drafting a secret "annex" to a long-planned speech designed to 
garner support for the Reagan Administration's stalled defence
build-up.
A mere forty-eight hours before the speech was to be given, 
the White House distributed copies of Reagan's proposed speech to 
the State and Defense Departments. Shock waves moved through the 
bureaucracy. Shultz opposed Reagan's far-reaching proposals.
The Joint Chiefs who thought that Reagan had far exceeded what 
they had envisaged in terms of increased emphasis on defensive
Ibid.. p. 612. 
Ibid. . p. 610.
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technology, also expressed reservations about the advisability of 
proceeding with the speech. Secretary of State Shultz was 
reportedly enraged that he had not been informed earlier and 
tried desperately to convince Reagan to abandon his proposal. In 
an uncharacteristic agreement with the State Department, 
Weinberger directed Richard Perle and Fred Ikle to do what they 
could to stop Reagan from giving the speech.
Pentagon officials argued that the ideas contained in 
Reagan's proposed speech required more detailed study. Admiral 
Watkins, who was the strongest supporter among the Joint Chiefs, 
opposed giving the speech because "the necessary political 
groundwork had not been laid."®® General Vessey, who was as 
surprised as any upon seeing the speech, believed that while the 
concept of strategic defence showed promise, "more study had to 
be done."®® General Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, would have 
preferred at least "six or seven months to study it 
internally."®® He contended that this would have allowed the 
idea of strategic defences to be "started out in a more organized 
way. We could have outlined the technologies we wanted to go 
after and the benchmarks five and ten years out."®^
Civilian officials in both the State and Defense departments 
were primarily concerned about the impact that Reagan's speech
Ibid.■ p. 613. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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would have on relations with the Soviet Union and Western Europe 
Fred Ikle and Richard Perle argued that the speech would evoke 
apprehension in Europe: Reagan's proposals would inevitably be 
seen as an American attempt to retreat behind a Fortress America 
and disengage itself from European a f f a i r s . They maintained 
that Reagan's proposal would engender great anxiety in Europe, 
for it would be interpreted as an attempt to jettison the 
offensive nuclear guarantee that had ensured European security 
since World War II. McFarlane shared these reservations and 
urged Reagan to consult with European Allies before giving the 
speech, but Reagan refused.
The US Failure to Consult NATO About the March 23. 1983 Speech 
The question naturally arises as to why Reagan decided 
against informing or consulting West European governments before 
delivering a speech that he knew would have the profoundest 
implications for West European security. Reagan was deeply 
committed to pursuing his ideas about BMDs and realized that 
neither in his own government or abroad did others share this
See D. Hoffman and L. Cannon, "President Overruled 
Advisers on Announcing Defense Plan," The Washington 
Post. 26 March 1983, p. 1.
Weinberger, who was attending a meeting of NATO defence 
ministers at the time, was expressly forbidden to 
forewarn, let alone consult them, and reportedly delayed 
his departure following the speech in order to apologize 
to his colleagues for not being allowed to inform them in 
advance of Reagan's speech. See Smith, op. cit., p. 614.
160
commitment.9* Given these basic realities, to have consulted 
with the United States' NATO Allies would merely have invited 
strong criticism about a programme that Reagan was committed to 
pursuing with or without their support.
In many respects the very nature of the initiative precluded 
prior consultation. NATO's consultative mechanisms were designed 
to achieve consensus within an existing strategic framework, yet 
Reagan had conceived SDI as revolutionary proposal that sought, 
in many ways, to overthrow the old consensus. Under these 
circumstances, consultation would have merely led to rejection, 
while at the same time endangering the secrecy surrounding the
s p e e c h . 9 5
Thus while much was made of the fact that SDI was presented 
unilaterally,96 the manner in which SDI was presented has been 
accorded far more importance than it deserves. To be sure, in 
presenting SDI as a fait accompli the Reagan Administration 
disregarded the established procedures by which important 
strategic initiatives were supposed to be presented to NATO. But 
even had the Reagan Adminstration informed West European Allies
94 See Martin Anderson, Revolution, o p . cit.. pp. 97-98.
95 Reportedly Margaret Thatcher was informed about the 
contents of the speech a few hours before its delivery. 
It is unclear, however, how detailed a briefing she was 
given or whether the most dramatic aspects of the speech 
were divulged to the British Prime Minister. See The 
Guardian. March 30, 1983.
96 See for instance Ivo H. Daalder, The SDI Challenge to 
Europe. (Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), 
p. 7.
161
well in advance and solicited their opinions before delivering 
the speech, it is difficult to see how this would have affected 
the West European disposition toward SDI or Reagan's 
determination to proceed with SDI. For, what Reagan's insistence 
on pursuing SDI demonstrated was that Western Europe and the 
United States harboured substantially different visions of what 
constituted a credible nuclear strategy and a stable nuclear 
regime. Prior consultations would not have changed that reality. 
Despite his refusal to authorize prior consultation with West 
European Allies, Reagan, at the behest of the State Department, 
did allow McFarlane to insert passages into the speech designed 
to reassure West European government's about the central place 
they occupied in American defence strategy.
State Department Concerns About the Effect of Reaaan's Speech on 
East-West Relations
Concerns about the impact of Reagan's proposed speech on 
NATO were matched by the State Department's fear that it could 
exacerbate US-Soviet relations by further complicating arms 
control negotiations. Shultz contended that the Soviet Union 
would view Reagan's proposals as a provocation designed to allow 
the United States to develop a first-strike capability: if the 
United States could develop a reasonably effective defence, it 
would then be in a position to launch an attack on Soviet 
offensive forces while using the defensive shield to ward off the
97 Smith, OP. cit.. p. 614.
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a reduced Soviet retaliatory response. In order to alleviate 
these concerns, Shultz convinced Reagan to broach this potential 
problem and state that this was not the United States's 
objective.
While these arguments failed to dissuade Reagan from going 
forward with his speech, he was persuaded to delay its 
presentation for a day to allow for revision of the text. 
Administration officials also convinced Reagan to scale down the 
scope of his project. Originally, Reagan had planned to include 
in his speech a proposal to protect the United States against 
Soviet nuclear-armed bombers and cruise missiles as well as 
ballistic missiles, but he was persuaded to confine his plan to 
defending against "strategic ballistic missiles". What Reagan 
refused to do, however, was to change the basic and revolutionary 
thrust of his speech.
V. THE 23 MARCH 1983 SPEECH
In his March 23, 1983 speech Reagan declared "the necessity 
to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive 
retaliation for our security,"^® and advocated creating a 
strategic regime "that did not rest upon the threat of instant 
U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, "^9 but one that was 
predicated on the ability to "intercept and destroy strategic 
ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of
Reagan, pp., pit., p. 218. 
Ibid.. p. 219.
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our allies?"i°° If implemented, this concept would effect a 
strategic revolution by breaking sharply with prior doctrinal 
revisions; While past Presidents had also underlined the need to 
adapt US doctrine to changing strategic circumstances, they had 
done so by effecting modifications within the prior conceptual 
framework of offensive retaliation - in essence, refining the 
manner and timing in which it was to be applied while avoiding 
fundamental doctrinal changes. But Reagan argued that it was 
precisely these fundamental changes that were most required and 
that strategic defences would provide the means by which to 
effect the required changes.
Reagan also argued that it was imperative to "take steps to 
reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to 
nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.
While statements of this nature had constituted a veritable 
staple in NATO declarations, its juxtaposition with proposals 
advocating eliminating the United States's reliance on 
retaliation was seen as further evidence that the United States 
intended to withdraw its nuclear guarantee to Europe. For this 
reason Europeans were only moderately appeased by Reagan's 
assurance that:
As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we 
recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive 
power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests
Ibid.
Ibid.
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and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are 
one. And no change in technology can or will alter that 
reality. We must and shall continue to honor our 
commitments.
While these assurances were not unwelcome, Europeans argued that 
regardless of Reagan's intentions, the weapons systems he was 
proposing would eliminate the objective conditions that allowed 
the United States to endow these assurances with operational 
significance.
At the same time, Reagan maintained that a shift to a new
strategy would take time and be technically demanding:
I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may 
not be accomplished before the end of the century. Yet, 
current technology has attained a level of sophistication 
where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will 
take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts.
There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be 
successes and breakthroughs.^^*
Precisely because these capabilities would take so long to build,
Reagan emphasized that "as we proceed, we must remain constant in
preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid
capability for flexible r e s p o n s e . Thus Reagan was not
advocating an immediate shift in strategy. In fact he stressed
that his goal would probably not be achieved before the end of
the century and could take " d e c a d e s .
Reagan realized that his proposals could easily be
Ibid., p. 220. 
Ibid.. p. 219. 
Ibid.
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interpreted as dangerous or provocative and thus he attempted to
anticipate and defuse prospective criticism. He stressed that in
pursuing this programme the United States would proceed in a
manner "consistent with our obligations of the ABM Treaty"
and emphasized that "we seek neither military superiority nor
political advantage."107 In an effort to preempt anticipated
criticism and demonstrate that he understood how his proposals
might be misconstrued, Reagan stated:
I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations 
and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with 
offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an 
aggressive policy; and no one wants that.^°®
"But with these considerations firmly in mind," said Reagan, "I
call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave
us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause
of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering
these nuclear weapons impotent and o b s o l e t e . "1°^
Reaaan's Offer to Share SDI With the Soviet Union
In his March 23 speech, Reagan outlined approaches that his 
Administration was to pursue later with respect to strategic 
defences. For instance, Reagan stated that his proposals "could 
pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the [nuclear]
Ibid. ■ p. 220 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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weapons t h e m s e l v e s . I n  a press conference shortly after
his speech, Reagan elaborated on this idea and presented his
conception of how, in the future, if robust defensive
technologies were developed, they could facilitate disarmament:
In my opinion, if a defensive weapon could be found and 
developed that would reduce the utility of these or maybe 
even make them obsolete, then whenever that time came, a 
President of the United States would be able to say, "Now, 
we have both the deterrent, the missiles - as we have had in 
the past, but now this other thing that has altered this 
And he could follow any one of a number of courses. He 
could offer to give that same defensive weapon to them to 
prove to them that there was no longer any need for keeping 
these missiles. Or with that defense, he could then say to 
them, "I am willing to do away with all my missiles. You do 
away with yours.
It is difficult to assess the seriousness of Reagan's offer 
to share the fruits of SDI research with the Soviet Union. On 
the face of it, it seemed absurd to imagine that the United 
States would hand over to the Soviet Union its most highly 
guarded secrets, especially since doing so would help Soviet 
scientists not only develop their own SDI (the putative purpose 
of Reagan's offer), but also to defeat any proposed US SDI 
system. Yet, it is possible that Reagan, blissfully unaware of 
these practical restraints, genuinely believed that such an offer 
made sense. In any event, the Reagan Administration could hardly 
have been surprised that the Soviet Union reacted with 
incredulity upon being presented with such an offer. Nor could
Reagan, pp. pit., p. 220.
New York Times. 30 March 1983, p. A-14.
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they have been unaware of the fact that in offering to share SDI 
technology, the US could defuse at least some of the negative 
perceptions surrounding SDI. In the end, however, whether or not 
Reagan's offer was sincere or not was largely irrelevant since by 
the time such sharing would occur he would no longer be President 
and his successor was unlikely to be either as enthusiastic about 
SDI or about sharing some of the United States' most closely 
guarded secrets.
VI. THE OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE OF SDI
While attention was primarily focused on the radical 
proposals articulated in the speech and the potentially far- 
reaching implications of their implementation, the most striking 
and lastingly significant aspect of the President's speech 
pertained to the rationale he employed to justify his proposals. 
Reagan believed that the United States confronted a strategic 
balance that had been steadily changing to the detriment of the 
West and that this necessitated a fundamental change in American 
military doctrine. While conceding that the strategy of 
deterrence based on retaliation had "succeeded in preventing 
nuclear war for more than three d e c a d e s , R e a g a n  declared 
candidly that:
what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. It took 
one kind of military force to deter an attack when we had 
far more nuclear weapons than any other power; it takes 
another kind now that the Soviets, for example, have enough 
accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually
112 Reagan, pp. pit., p. 218.
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all of our missiles on the ground.
The implications of this assertion were profound. Reagan's 
remarks constituted a scarcely veiled admission by a sitting US 
President that the growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities and the 
subsequent disappearance of US nuclear superiority had eliminated 
the conceptual and strategic foundation upon which Western 
deterrence strategy had been predicated. In Reagan's eyes these 
circumstances dictated a fundamental reappraisal of American 
strategy. Implying that US nuclear strategy, conceived during an 
era of US superiority and near invulnerability, had failed to 
adjust to the reality of radically different strategic 
circumstances, Reagan declared that in the future American 
strategy "must be based on recognition and awareness of the 
weaponry possessed by other nations in the nuclear age."^^^
The Reagan Administration contended that SDI was a necessary 
response to the deterioration in the strategic nuclear balance 
since the signing of the SALT I and ABM treaties. The United 
States had entered these agreements in the expectation that they 
would provide the conceptual and legal foundation for a stable 
strategic regime based on mutual vulnerability. The key 
component of this assumption was the belief that in the absence 
of defences "the nuclear relationship would be stable if each 
side had survivable retaliatory offensive forces roughly equal in 
capability to those of the other side and was, at the same time.
Ibid. ■ p. 211. 
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virtually defenseless against ballistic missile attack - and,
therefore, open to the other's retaliatory blow. In such a
situation, neither side would have an incentive to strike first,
even in the most dire circumstances. Furthermore it was
assumed that the absence of defences would eliminate the need for
further offensive deployments and lay the foundation for
offensive reductions. Reagan Administration officials eagerly
emphasized that these goals were the sine quo non upon which the
success of the regime was predicated at the time it was conceived
and that a failure to fulfil these objectives was viewed by the
Nixon Administration as grounds for reassessing the absence of
defences. Reagan Administration officials therefore often cited
Ambassador Gerard Smith's Unilateral Statement in 1972, which was
made in order to assuage the anxieties of US Senators who were
dubious of the potential efficacy of a regime without defences:
The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. 
Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete 
limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement 
on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain 
measures with respect to the limitation of strategic 
offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an 
objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to 
constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the 
survivability of our respective retaliatory forces. The 
USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of 
SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an 
agreement providing for more complete limitations on 
strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the 
initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of 
more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an 
agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive 
arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S.
Paul Nitze, "SDI: Its Nature and Rationale," Current
Policv No. 751 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1985), p. 1.
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supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, 
it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty.
While the Reagan Administration did not call for the immediate
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it clearly believed that the
worst fears of the opponents of the ABM and SALT I Treaties had
been realized. It argued that the "the Soviet Union has failed
to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and
defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process
b e g a n . P a u l  Nitze emphasized that since 1972 the Soviet
Union has "showed little genuine readiness to discuss meaningful
limits on or cuts in offensive arms. Instead, strategic
offensive arsenals have expanded greatly since 1972."^^®
Specifically, Nitze cited the alarming combination of highly
accurate MIRV's situated atop large Soviet missiles which gave
the Soviet Union "a ballistic missile force capable of
threatening virtually the entire range of targets in the United
States that comprise the fixed land-based portion of our
retaliatory f o r c e s . A n d  Nitze stated that:
The number of warheads on Soviet strategic ballistic 
missiles today is four times the number when SALT I was
Gerard Smith, "Agreed Statements," 26 May 1972, in Steven 
E. Miller and Stephen Van Ever a (eds.). The Star Wars 
Controversv (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1986), p. 267.
U.S. Department of State, The Strategic Defense 
Initiative. Special Report No. 129, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, June 1985), p. 2.
Nitze, "SDI: Its Nature and Rationale," op. cit.. p. 1.
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concluded. Furthermore, the Soviet capability to destroy 
hard targets quickly has increased by a factor of more than 
ten. This growth in offensive capabilities is contrary to 
what we had in mind in 1972.120
The Reagan Administration was also concerned about the 
substantial Soviet programme in ballistic missile defences. They 
cited the major investments that the Soviet Union had made in 
both traditional and advanced ABM technology. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union continued its substantial investment in air 
defences, upgraded its ballistic missile defences around Moscow, 
and undertook major efforts to harden command centres against the 
effects of nuclear blasts. In short, the Reagan Administration 
believed that the Soviet Union's military activity since 1972 
posed a grave danger to America security. As a key policy 
document stated, "In fact, should these trends be permitted to 
continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and 
defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the 
resultant condition could destroy the theoretical and empirical 
foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation.
More importantly still, the Reagan Administration interpreted the 
Soviet actions as "persuasive evidence that they did not accept 
the concept of stable mutual deterrence on which we believed the 
ABM Treaty to be p r e m i s e d .  "^22 Accordingly, the Reagan
2^0 Ibid.
2^1 U.S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 3.
2^2 Nitze, "SDI: Its Nature and Rationale," pp. pit., p. 2.
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Administration believed that a change in American defence policy 
was necessary:
over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern 
of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that 
pattern of activity, suggest that continued long-term 
dependence on offensive forces may not provide a stable 
basis for deterrence... Therefore, we must now also take 
steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and 
stability over the long term, and we must do so in a way 
that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of 
Soviet offensive forces and to channel longstanding Soviet 
propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and 
mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative 
is specifically aimed toward these g o a l s . 2^3
More fundamentally, however, SDI was the logical result of 
the Reagan Administration's conviction that the doctrinal 
underpinnings of US nuclear strategy required reexamination. The 
key policy makers in the Reagan Administration maintained that 
the strategic regime that US negotiators attempted to construct 
on the edifice of the SALT I and ABM treaties was incompatible 
with the specifically American requirements for strategic 
stability because it neglected the implications of mutual 
vulnerability for US extended deterrent duties. For the United 
States, strategic stability was historically associated with 
virtual invulnerability to nuclear attack, a condition which 
allowed the extension of nuclear guarantees to theatres in which 
American and allied conventional forces confronted Soviet 
preponderance. Thus, even if the absence of defences led to the 
type of regime envisaged in 1972 - in which each side accepted
123 The U.S. Department of State, pp. pit., p. 3.
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mutual vulnerability and eschewed efforts to render retaliatory
forces vulnerable - the resultant regime would still have been
incompatible with strategic stability. What was required,
according to Fred Ikle, was:
a long-term transformation of our nuclear strategy, the 
armaments serving it, and our arms control policy. To begin 
with, we must disenthral ourselves of the dogma of 
consensual vulnerability - the notion that unrelieved 
vulnerability of the United States and the Soviet Union to 
each other's nuclear forces is essential for halting the 
competition in offensive arms, and is the best guarantee 
against the outbreak of nuclear war.^24
The Reagan Administration viewed SDI as an integral part of 
an overall policy designed "to address the most important changes 
in the strategic environment that have occurred since the 
1 9 6 0 s .  "125 Caspar Weinberger stated, "strategic defense
represents a change of strategy, but it is motivated by the 
search for a more secure deterrent." Indeed, "strategic defence 
represents a natural extension, the capstone of an array of 
changes in our strategic nuclear forces, motivated by the search 
for a more secure d e t e r r e n t .  "126 the same time, he asserted
that: "The President's SDI is not only a natural extension of the 
search for alternative ways to ensure deterrence; it is the
124 Fred Ikle, "Nuclear Strategy," Foreign Affairs Vol. 63, 
No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 824.
125 Caspar Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign 
Affairs Vol. 64, No. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 679.
12^  Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to 
the Congress on the FY 1987 Defense Budget (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 74.
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logical culmination of that search.
Thus, while the Reagan Administration, upon entering office 
"moved decisively to restore military parity with the Soviet 
Union, [it] also began to reassess those strategic concepts 
inherited from past policy m a k e r s . T h e  most important 
conceptual change that emerged was the "recognition that the 
reality of nuclear parity means reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons" and that prior modifications in US nuclear strategy had 
failed to grasp fully the doctrinal implications, first of US 
vulnerability to Soviet nuclear retaliation and later the loss of 
US nuclear superiority. As a result, past policy changes merely 
refined rather than fundamentally altered US nuclear strategy. 
Weinberger ascribed this failure to an inadequate appreciation of 
the premises upon which US nuclear strategy was originally 
predicated and the degree to which they had been vitiated over 
time:
Most of the conceptual apparatus that shapes our thinking 
about what forces we need and how they would be used was 
formulated in the 1950s and early 1960s. Consider the list: 
nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, escalation control, 
strategic stability, offense dominance, flexible response, 
counterinsurgency, limited war, and escalation ladders.
These concepts have not only shaped the main lines of 
forces, doctrines and plans we manage today, but they 
continue to shape our thinking about the uses of these 
forces and about what forces we need for the future.
Ibid., p. 40. 
2^8 Ibid.. p. 13. 
2^9 Ibid.. p. 73.
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Weinberger stressed that it was important to remember that the 
strategic circumstance that existed when these doctrines and 
strategies were formulated differed from those which obtained by 
the early 1980*s:
The dominant features of the 1950s, when most of these ideas 
were first formulated and applied, can be summarized in two 
phrases: American nuclear preeminence and American military 
superiority. In the nuclear arena we had a decisive 
advantage. Across the board in military forces we invested 
more than the Soviets and had a margin of superiority in 
most military dimensions.
That era has vanished. The Soviet Union has become a 
military superpower through an effort that has consumed more 
than twice as large a percentage of its gross national 
product as U.S. defense spending does.^^o
Accordingly, Weinberger asked: "What does this transformation of
the military balance between the United States and the Soviet
Union imply for the relevance of our basic strategic concepts?
Should ideas formulated in an era of American military
predominance apply with equal validity in an era of parity?
Weinberger clearly did not think so:
Now that Soviet nuclear forces are at least equal to our 
own, and in many dimensions superior, some earlier ideas are 
outmoded. The Reagan Administration has therefore given 
highest priority to reducing the threat of nuclear war, 
reducing reliance upon nuclear weapons, and continuing the 
development of options that provide the President a range of 
choices other than surrender in response to a Soviet attack.
The President's SDI is not only a natural extension of 
the search for alternative ways to ensure deterrence; it is 
the logical culmination of that search. This research 
program is going well enough now to make it seem unlikely 
that our security in the 21st century will depend on benign
Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," op. cit.. p. 676. 
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acceptance of mutual vulnerability.
In short, the Reagan Administration believed that while prior
attempts to ensure the credibility of US nuclear strategy through
increased targeting flexibility was necessary so long as no
better way existed, it was profoundly unsatisfying and ultimately
required abandonment; for although "limited options pose a more
credible threat to meet any level of Soviet attack and increase
the likelihood that escalation could be controlled," it is not
"possible to be certain that our efforts to limit escalation and
terminate a conflict once begun would s u c c e e d . T h e r e f o r e ,
the knowledge that any conflict between the United States 
and the Soviet Union might escalate to nuclear catastrophe 
is certainly part of deterrence today. But that knowledge 
also impels us to ask whether there is not a better way to 
provide for the defense of the West. Because nuclear 
deterrence is necessary today, we must seek to make it 
secure, yet because it poses dangers, we must seek better 
alternatives for the future. The President and I believe 
that the answer lies in the Strategic Defence 
Initiative.
Weinberger's analysis had particularly profound implication 
for NATO strategy, which depended critically upon the concepts 
which the United States believed were no longer valid. Indeed, 
as Weinberger opined, while NATO doctrine holds "that it might 
indeed be necessary to escalate to battlefield nuclear weapons or
Weinberger, FY 1987 Annual Report, p. 40. 
Ibid. . p. 75.
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other kinds of nuclear w e a p o n s , t h e  United States did not
deem this "a very satisfactory way to keep the p e a c e . in
Congressional testimony Weinberger explained why the Reagan
Administration no longer felt confident that it could rely on
official NATO policy:
We have always planned to use nuclear weapons because during 
the time the plans were formulated , we had a very clear 
advantage in tactical battlefield as well as other types of 
nuclear weapons. And the idea was that you would have this 
conventional exchange and then we would we have to escalate 
it to nuclear and we would prevail and that would end 
things... But I think that you cannot say that you have at 
this point an ability to rely on a strategy that in effect 
says we will escalate to nuclear weapons and that will end 
the matter.
The Soviets have an enormous capability here, and they 
have built it up during a long period of time when we did 
not. 137
Fred Ikle, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, echoed 
these sentiments and elaborated in greater detail how the Untied 
States came to rely on nuclear weapons, how this advantage was 
originally exploited, and finally why, in light of the 
disappearance of US strategic nuclear superiority, these nuclear 
threats were of dubious credibility. He explained that 
originally the United States depended on its nuclear monopoly to
Caspar Weinberger, The MX Missile and The Strategic 
Defense Initiative - Their Implications on Arms Control 
Negotiations. Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel of 
the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, 
February 27, 28, March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 1985, p. 205.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.. p. 207.
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threaten the Soviet Union with devastating retaliation in the 
event of a conventional conflict. When the Soviet Union acquired 
the capacity to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, 
the United States shifted to a strategy of defence with tactical 
nuclear weapons in the European theatre, which allowed US 
military forces to capitalize on the nuclear superiority that the 
United States still enjoyed even after its monopoly had 
disappeared. As Ikle explained:
As long as the United States enjoyed an effective advantage 
in nuclear forces, these two concepts [defence and 
retaliation] could lend coherence to the overall strategy.
In the jargon of the nuclear theorists, we enjoyed 
"escalation dominance": we thought we had more, or more 
effective, tactical nuclear weapons, so we could expect to 
deter, or if necessary defeat, a Soviet invasion by using 
tactical nuclear weapons; and we had superior global nuclear 
forces, so we could expect to deter the Soviet Union from 
using its intercontinental nuclear forces against us.
Today, this "escalation dominance" has been overtaken 
by the massive changes in the nuclear arsenals. Indeed, on 
both sides of the Atlantic, it is no longer judged to be a 
solution. The United States patently has no plans to regain 
its former advantage in global nuclear arms, or to restore 
the West's superiority in tactical nuclear arms.^^®
These statements constituted a rejection of the proposition that 
NATO defence strategy could remain credible in the absence of 
nuclear superiority. This analysis implied that NATO would have 
to rely increasingly on conventional rather than nuclear weapons
Ikle, "Nuclear Strategy," pp. pit., pp. 819-820. Ikle's 
disquiet with NATO strategy long predated his appointment 
in the Pentagon. In 1980 he wrote an article questioning 
the continued wisdom of NATO's reliance on a doctrine of 
first-use. See Fred Charles Ikle, "NATO's 'First Nuclear 
Use': A Deepening Trap?" Strategic Review. Vol. 8
(Winter 1980), pp. 18-23.
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to protect Europe, a fact confirmed in Congressional testimony by 
Weinberger.1^ 9
These conclusions had enormous implications for European 
security. Interestingly, however, these frank admissions of the 
incredibility of official NATO strategy evoked little 
transatlantic disagreement, primarily because by then the SDI 
debate was fixated on the potential effect that prospective 
deployment of BMDs would have on NATO strategy, while oblivious 
to the fact that it was the Reagan Administration's belief in the 
incredibility of these very concepts that was a major 
contributing factor in leading it to propose SDI in the first 
place. Thus, what many failed to understand was that the 
significance of SDI lay not in the ability of BMD deployments to 
alter radically nuclear strategy, but the fact that SDI's 
presentation reflected the US belief that the strategy which West 
European officials believed SDI would vitiate had long ago been 
rendered incredible by the disappearance of US nuclear 
superiority.
In calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Reagan 
was implicitly rejecting the belief that nuclear weapons could 
remain the ultima ratio of Western security. SDI also 
represented, at least in its intermediate stages, an attempt to 
endow current US nuclear strategy with far greater credibility by 
providing a physical capability to enhance the US's capacity to
Weinberger, The MX Missile and the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, pp., cit.. p. 208.
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enforce such concepts as damage limitation and escalation 
control. These latter improvements would allow the United States 
to rectify the often remarked mismatch between US operational 
policy. Thus SDI embraced two trends that have dominated US 
strategy. First, given the fact of nuclear reliance, to limit 
the risks associated with such reliance by possessing survivable 
forces that are endowed with sufficient accuracy and flexibility 
to enable the United States to limit damage and thereby hold out 
the prospect of ending a conflict short of an all out nuclear 
exchange. Second, SDI also reflected an American desire, given 
the inherent dangers of nuclear guarantees, to reduce 
substantially and eventually eliminate the US reliance on nuclear 
weapons as a means of deterring aggression.
VII. CONCLUSION
SDI contained both elements of continuity and change in 
American thinking. Doctrinally, it can be seen as a logical 
conclusion to long-standing American efforts to reduce reliance 
on nuclear weapons. In terms of implementing this desire, SDI 
represented a change, insofar as the American initiative held out 
the prospect of physically preventing nuclear use. Yet, it must 
be stressed that Reagan repeatedly emphasized that the actual 
implementation of a comprehensive system of defence could not be 
immediately realized as it would take many years of sustained 
effort to determine if it were indeed feasible. But the mere 
prospect of such comprehensive deployment and, even more
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importantly, the rationale provided to justify SDI exercised a 
profound impact on NATO because it demonstrated in stark terms 
just how far the strategic thinking of the United States and its 
Allies had diverged. But it also demonstrated how Reagan could 
change official policy so quickly.
Upon assuming office the Reagan Administration regarded as 
its primary military priority the task of closing what it 
regarded as the "window of vulnerability." This "window of 
vulnerability" was thought to stem from the ability of Soviet 
ICBM's to destroy the vast majority of US ICBM's and the 
corresponding inability of the United States to hold Soviet 
ICBM's at risk. The primary means by which the Reagan 
Administration proposed "closing" the "window of vulnerability" 
was to build the MX missile and deploy it in a survivable basing 
mode. This would give the United States the ability to place 
Soviet ICBM's at risk, since the MX would possess both the 
accuracy and yield for such a mission, while at the same time 
preventing the Soviet Union from being able to destroy the MX 
since Reagan officials assumed that they would be able to design
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a survivable basing mode for the new m i s s i l e . T h i s ,  
however, proved difficult.
By the end of 1982 the Reagan Adminstration, therefore, 
found itself stymied in an effort to which it attached the 
highest importance: reversing what it regarded as dangerous 
erosion in US strategic nuclear capabilities. As we have seen, 
this inability to gain Congressional or public support for MX 
deployment proved the catalyst for reconsidering the policy of 
giving primary importance to offensive modernization - the course 
that the Reagan Administration had followed during its first two 
years in office. Moreover, Reagan began to believe that the 
burgeoning opposition to building ever larger stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons when the US public was convinced that both sides 
already possessed vastly excessive arsenals, would prevent the 
United States from being able to garner support for substantial 
offensive build-ups in the future.
The realisation that he would be unable to garner sufficient 
support for offensive modernization proved to be the catalyst for
US officials never made it clear why, if it was 
undesirable for the United States to be in a position in 
which its ICBMs were vulnerable to attack, the Soviet 
Union - which depended far more on land-based missiles 
than did the United States- would find it acceptable to 
be placed in a position that the United States found 
unacceptable for itself. The Soviet Union, of course, 
had no intention of allowing this to happen and was by 
the early 1980's already developing mobile ICBMs to 
ensure the survivability of Soviet land-based missiles 
against both the MX and the Trident II missiles. See, 
for instance. Report of the Secretary of the Defense 
Caspar Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983, o p . 
cit.
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deepening Reagan's interest in ballistic missile defences. As we 
have seen, Reagan had a long-standing interest in this area, an 
interest that had been heightened by advisors such as Edward 
Teller who had been telling Reagan since early 1982 that 
technological breakthroughs had increased the effectiveness of 
BMDs. Thus the convergence of the failure of nuclear 
modernization and what Reagan believed were the growing 
possibilities in BMD research set the stage for a substantial 
shift in the Reagan Administration's defence programme.
Despite the substantial changes that a shift to emphasizing 
BMDs represented, there were elements of continuity as well as 
change in shifting from a policy of attempting to close the 
window of vulnerability to a policy advocating SDI. In 
attempting to close the window of vulnerability one, if not the 
primary, mission was to reduce the vulnerability of the United 
States' retaliatory forces to nuclear attack. While Reagan 
presented SDI's mission as far more ambitious, it was clear that 
SDI addressed this task, for while there was vehement 
disagreement about whether SDI could succeed in providing 
comprehensive defences, few doubted that it could defend isolated 
military targets such as ICBM missile silos.
Indeed, Reagan's military advisors, including the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane 
(a former military officer), at first viewed BMD as a means of
See for instance Harold Brown, "Is SDI Technically 
Feasible," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 435-454.
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protecting US ICBM forces and thus creating a more stable regime, 
but one still based on nuclear deterrence. It was Reagan who 
insisted that any proposed BMD system not only protect military 
targets but the US population as well. Thus while the failure to 
close the window of vulnerability provided the catalyst for the 
serious consideration of BMD's, it was Reagan's own long-standing 
interest not only in BMDs but also in eliminating nuclear weapons 
entirely that led to such a dramatic change in p o l i c y .
Yet, while in many respects unique, SDI was in many ways the 
culmination of a long-standing trend in US doctrine toward the 
reduction in reliance on nuclear weapons. As such SDI 
constituted the most recent in a long line of US initiatives that 
proved controversial within NATO. Where SDI differed from past 
changes was that in articulating the reasons why it believed 
change was necessary, the Reagan Administration was far more 
forthright in indicating its reluctance to rely on nuclear 
weapons. Moreover, SDI combined the attributes of both a new 
weapons system and a change in doctrine, thereby indicating not 
only the intention to change but the weapons system with which to 
effect such change.
Thus, the significance of the Reagan Administration's desire 
to deploy BMD was only one part of the overall import of SDI. It 
was the strategic ideas that underpinned SDI that ultimately 
exercised the most significant, if least appreciated, influence
^^ 2 gee Ronald Reagan, An American Life. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1990).
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on the SDI debate. For, deployment was even by the most 
optimistic forecasts of the Reagan Administration decades away; 
thus it was the rationale employed to justify SDI that exercised 
a decisive influence on NATO, explaining why although only a 
research programme SDI caused such controversy within the 
Alliance.
The other significant feature of SDI was the manner in which 
it was presented to the Alliance. Unlike the INF initiative 
which was jointly formulated within NATO's consultative 
mechanisms - primarily the NPG - SDI was presented to the 
Alliance as a fait accompli. While it was scant consolation to 
the United States' West European Allies, the American Departments 
of State and Defense received hardly more warning than they did. 
The reason that SDI was launched in the manner that it was 
reflected SDI to the Alliance before the March 23, 1983 speech, 
every effort would have been made to strangle the initiative in 
its cradle. Finally, while Reagan recognized the dramatic impact 
that SDI would have on the Alliance, he believed that the United 
States could, if it so chose, embark on SDI without the approval 
of its Allies. Yet as we shall see, the Reagan Administration 
soon realized that securing at least the acquiesence of its 
European partners would be essential to enabling it to achieve 
its SDI objectives.
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IV. THE BRITISH, WEST GERMAN AND FRENCH REACTION TO SDI AND THE 
U.S. EFFORT TO PERSUADE
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I . INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the British, West 
German and French governments' reactions to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative as well as the US governments attempt to respond to 
these reactions. This will entail analyzing the specific 
positions of the British, West German and French governments 
concerning the effect of SDI on flexible response, strategic 
stability, arms control and East-West relations. Most 
importantly, however, I will seek to determine why the Western 
European countries under study reacted to SDI in the manner that 
they did and through this analysis ascertain the underlying 
nature of the controversy between the United States and its key 
West European allies over SDI. Comparing the rationale 
underlying the British, West German and French positions toward 
SDI with the reasons that the Reagan Administration forwarded in 
the previous chapter to justify SDI should enable us to determine 
the underlying cause of the intra-Alliance disagreement over SDI. 
Moreover, in analyzing the Reagan Administration's attempt to 
mitigate West European concerns about SDI, we will examine the 
beginnings of attempts to manage the SDI dispute - a process that 
will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.
This chapter is crucial to determining the validity of a 
central thesis being forwarded in this study. For it is the 
contention of this analysis that the United States and its 
European Allies harboured substantially different views on the 
implications of BMD deployment not because deployment would
188
necessarily affect Western Europe and the United States 
differently but because each side harboured substantially 
different views about what constituted a credible nuclear 
strategy and a stable strategic nuclear regime. Therefore, the 
primary proposition investigated in this chapter is to what 
extent the differences between the United States and Western 
Europe over SDI were attributable to the prospect of deployment 
and to what extent they were attributable to respective 
differences in what constituted a credible and stable strategic 
regime.
II. THE BRITISH REACTION TO SDI
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative placed the British 
government in a vexing position, for it made it far more 
difficult to simultaneously continue pursuit of the twin pillars 
of Thatcher's defence policy - reliance on nuclear deterrence and 
close partnership with the United States. Accordingly, the 
Thatcher government attempted to combine support for the SDI 
research programme with reservations about the implications of 
deployment. Two factors facilitated the pursuit of this 
seemingly contradictory British approach. First, the Reagan 
Administration, fully cognizant of British, West German and 
French reservations concerning the objectives of SDI, sought to 
play down the rationale and ultimate goals of SDI, focusing 
instead on the fact that until such time that decisions regarding 
deployment were made, SDI would remain strictly a research
189
programme. This American approach dovetailed with, and 
complemented, the British government's policy toward SDI which 
was to emphasize, that while it harboured reservations about 
deployment, a decision on deployment was not imminent as any 
decision on deployment would have to await the outcome of the 
research phase. Nevertheless, the British government did make 
its scepticism about SDI known though, significantly, it was done 
in a manner deliberately designed to prevent differences from 
becoming central to the US-British dialogue on SDI.
While this approach was of course highly conducive to 
avoiding direct and open conflict on SDI, it prevented resolving 
what was after all one of the most important issues which SDI's 
launching engendered, namely, the strategic rationale for 
deployment and thus the desirability of deploying BMDs. This 
effort to avoid any attempt to resolve, as opposed to merely 
state, the full nature of US-British disagreements had important 
consequences. By discouraging a more extensive and searching 
discussion of why they disagreed, it obscured the underlying 
cause of the disagreement, leading to the misleading assumption 
both in Washington and London that their differences derived 
primarily from disagreements over the implications of deployment 
and not on what would be required to maintain the credibility of 
flexible response and strategic stability. Yet, the significance 
of SDI extended far beyond the issue of deployment, because the 
very factors that led the Reagan Administration to advocate SDI 
(with its implicit support for eventual deployment) would
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exercise a decisive influence over NATO strategy, strategic 
stability and the other issues irrespective of whether the 
deployment occurred or not.
Analyzing the British government's position toward SDI will 
entail, first, examining the reasons why the British government 
adopted the positions it did. And, second, these reasons will be 
juxtaposed against those that the US advanced in support of SDI. 
The two respective positions are then compared in order to obtain 
a more thorough understanding of the underlying cause of the US- 
British disagreement. It is hoped that in doing so it will be 
possible to determine the extent to which these disagreements are 
attributable to the prospect of deployment and to what extent 
they are attributable to differing conception of strategy.
Margaret Thatcher's government had determined through 
extensive internal debates during 1984 that SDI was an issue that 
did not constitute a passing whim of Reagan. They concluded that 
Reagan's commitment to the concept and subsequent creation of the 
SDIO meant that SDI would not remain at the periphery of 
international and transatlantic policies - as it had during 1983 
and the beginning of 1984. The British Cabinet, determined to 
prevent SDI from becoming an issue that damaged British-American 
relations, wanted to prevent gratuitously antagonizing the United 
States.1 Not only was open opposition regarded as unwise in
For example the Defence White Paper on Defence, published 
in the Spring of 1984 made no mention of SDI. See 
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1984. Vol. 1 
(LondoniHMSO, 1984), Cmnd. 9227-1, paragraphs 117-124.
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view of the high value that Thatcher attached to the special 
relationship with Washington, but it was reasoned in Whitehall 
that opposing SDI directly would diminish British influence, was 
unlikely to have much effect, and would only benefit the Soviet 
Union which was, Thatcher believed, eager to exploit differences 
between the United States and its West European allies.^
Moreover, Thatcher also envisaged Britain as a possible mediator 
between continental Europe and the United States (as well as 
between the United States and the Soviet Union).
These considerations help explain why, with rare exceptions, 
Britain, when broaching the subject of SDI in public, continually 
reiterated its support for SDI research, and when articulating 
its reservations did so in a manner that made clear its desire to 
minimize rather than highlight its differences with the United 
States. This general reluctance to criticize SDI publicly should 
not, however, be construed as indicative of the British 
government's support for the strategic philosophy animating SDI. 
Irideed, in one of the rare public statements about SDI prior to 
December 1984, Thatcher provided a glimpse of British thinking on 
SDI to the European Atlantic group when she urged that we 
"address ourselves to the new and urgent challenge of arms 
control in outer space. Otherwise we may see our own peaceful 
use of space endangered. We may see space turned into a new and
Trevor Taylor, "Britain's Response to the Strategic 
Defence Initiative," International Affairs. (Spring 
1986), Vol. 62, No. 2, p. 218.
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terrible theatre of war."^ She was careful, however, to insert 
this statement in a speech that was primarily devoted to 
extolling the virtues of close relations with the United States, 
thus perhaps unwittingly providing a metaphor for Britain's 
stance in the SDI debate: muted opposition within the context of 
emphasis on Britain's general support for US policy, a position 
that differed more in form than substance from the West German 
and French positions. These differences were, however, to have a 
major impact in the ability of Europe to speak with a single 
voice on SDI and consequently constituted a reason which 
diminished the influence of Europe on the SDI debate.
The Reaaan-Thatcher Camp David Meeting
The first detailed articulation of the British position on 
SDI occurred in December 1984 at a meeting between Thatcher and 
Reagan at Camp David, Maryland. In an effort to establish some 
mutually agreed upon parameters for the SDI programme, the United 
States agreed to four conditions forwarded by Britain*:
1. The U.S. and Western aim is not to achieve
superiority, but to maintain balance, taking
Margaret Thatcher, "The Transatlantic Partnership," 
Speech to the European Atlantic Group at Guildhall, 
London, 11 July 1984; New York: British Information
Service, Policy Statement 42/84, p. 4.
Officially, of course, it was a joint communique meant to 
convey mutually agreement but it was widely, and in the 
opinion of this author, correctly interpreted as a list 
of British conditions that it convinced the United States 
to accept.
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account of Soviet developments.
2. SDI-related deployments would, in view of treaty 
obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations.
3. The overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, 
deterrence.
4. East-West negotiations should aim to achieve 
security with reduced levels of offensive systems 
on both sides.5
These Camp David criteria, as they were to be known, were 
important with respect to what they revealed about the nature of 
the disagreement between Britain and the United States, but also 
with respect to the manner in which the two governments decided 
to go about handling their differences. Significantly, this 
first joint statement of the United States and a West European 
country arose from a bilateral meeting between the United States 
and Britain. Although the Camp David statement had wide-ranging 
implications for other European countries, especially West 
Germany and France, there was no concerted effort to coordinate a 
joint West European position vis-a-vis the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. Consequently, the Camp David meeting set a precedent 
for managing the SDI issue on a bilateral basis, leading to a 
pattern that was to dominate transatlantic deliberations on SDI.
This proclivity to deal with SDI on a bilateral basis 
outside of the mechanisms of the NATO Alliance, and in the 
absence of formal joint European positions, reflected both US and 
British priorities. The United States was only too pleased to
John Goschko, "Thatcher, Reagan Agree on 'Star Wars' 
Talks," Washington Post, 23 December 1985.
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deal bilaterally with its major West European allies, reasoning 
that such arrangements would prove far more conducive to 
preventing a joint, and therefore more formidable, opposition to 
SDI; furthermore, a joint European position would dilute the 
technological and economic enticements that the Reagan 
Administration would later offer to render the SDI research 
programme more attractive to West European countries (this 
subject will be dealt with in the next chapter). The British 
government, and particularly Margaret Thatcher, were equally 
eager to prevent a united West European position on SDI, even if 
it would coincide with British views of SDI, for the British 
Prime Minster was eager to prevent the creation of defence 
entities within Europe outside of NATO. Moreover, maintaining 
the special relationship was deemed of far greater importance 
than effecting greater European cooperation on foreign policy.
The special relationship was also considered important for 
the successful management of the SDI issue within the Alliance. 
Thatcher believed that Reagan was firmly committed to SDI and 
that strong West European opposition to his programme would not 
only be counterproductive but ineffective as well because, unlike 
INF, the development of SDI did not require West European 
approval. The British government believed that it could 
influence the direction and scope of Reagan's initiative far more 
effectively by adopting a positive attitude, working bilaterally, 
and attempting to attach conditions that steered the programme in 
directions more compatible with British and West European
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interests.G
By working bilaterally with the United States in an 
atmosphere of cooperation, Thatcher believed that she could not 
only more effectively bridge the differences between the United 
States and Western Europe but also between the Reagan 
Administration and the Soviet Union. Thatcher contended that 
this latter consideration was of particular concern given the 
then imminent resumption of the Geneva arms talks where the topic 
of space weapons was to become a major issue. In short, British 
policymakers sought to prevent SDI from becoming an issue that 
would cause serious and open disagreement between the United 
States and its key West European allies and become an instrument 
through which the Soviet Union could attempt to divide Western 
Europe and the United States.
Equally, if not more, important than what the Camp David 
meeting revealed about the manner in which SDI was being handled 
was what it revealed about Britain's strategic reservations about 
SDI. Despite the deliberate ambiguity with which these concerns 
were phrased, the accord revealed that the British government was 
primarily concerned with the implications of SDI for strategic 
stability. Thatcher was determined above all to prevent SDI from 
undermining the condition of mutual vulnerability that she 
believed had maintained the validity of nuclear deterrence. The 
British government clearly hoped that the need for deployment 
could be obviated through arms control.
Taylor, op. cit.. p. 218.
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The issue of the desirability of deployment, despite forming 
the crux of the SDI issue, was not addressed in the Camp David 
statement. Instead, this issue was obscured behind the agreement 
that SDI's objective was to enhance rather than undercut 
deterrence. But the respective and widely divergent positions of 
the two governments regarding the meaning of "deterrence" became 
immediately apparent following the meeting. Reagan stated that, 
"Today the only defensive weapons we have is to threaten that if 
they [the Soviet Union] kill millions of our people, we'll kill 
millions of theirs. I don't think that there's any morality in 
that at all, and we're trying to look for something that will 
make those weapons obsolete and they can be eliminated once and 
for a l l . O n  the same day, a senior advisor speaking for the 
Prime Minister reiterated the British position which could not be 
more different from that expounded by the American President:
"It could be argued that the existing basis of deterrence has 
indeed been brilliantly successful not merely in preventing 
nuclear war but in preventing conventional war. Therefore, we 
would argue that the current balance of terror is extremely 
successful in keeping the peace for 40 years."® While this 
fundamental disagreement concerning the need to change Western 
doctrine remained a ubiquitous feature of the US-British (and US- 
West European) disagreement, little systematic attempt was made
As quoted by Norman Sandler, United Press International 
News Service, Dialogue Information Services Inc. . 
December 22, 1984.
Ibid.
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to determine why each side harboured such radically different 
notions regarding the requirements of deterrence.
Howe's Speech of March 15. 1985
While the Camp David four points provided some insight into 
the nature of British concerns, it was not until March 15, 1985 
that the British government presented a detailed exposition of 
its views on SDI. The occasion for this presentation was a 
speech by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Geoffry Howe^. This 
speech was significant for a number of reasons. First, it 
constituted the first public and explicit articulation of British 
concerns about SDI. Second, it was a rare departure from British 
general practice of avoiding public criticism of SDI. Third, 
despite its critical tone, Howe made efforts to praise SDI in 
some manner and addressed his concerns in the form of questions. 
Finally, the fact that it was Howe, rather than Thatcher, who 
voiced these concerns reflected both Howe's greater reservations 
as well as the fact that Thatcher wanted to distance herself 
personally from any criticism of SDI. Apart from Reagan's March 
23, 1983 speech, Howe's speech to the Royal United Services 
Institute in London became the most widely quoted speech of the 
SDI controversy.
Sir Geoffry was concerned that SDI could have a profoundly
Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Defense and Security in the Nuclear 
Age," Journal of the Roval United Services Institute For 
Defense Studies (RUSI), vol. 130, No. 2, June 1985, pp. 
3-8. Text of lecture given at the RUSI on 15 March 1985.
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destabilizing impact on Western security and international 
stability. Howe was particularly concerned that, given the 
considerable funds devoted to ballistic missile defence research 
and the evident enthusiasm with which the White House regarded 
the programme, that "research may acquire an unstoppable momentum 
of its own, " leading to deployment decisions before the wider 
implications could be considered.
In any event, Howe gave voice to British scepticism 
concerning the technological feasibility of achieving the 
objectives which Reagan had articulated in his March 23, 1983 
speech. Furthermore, he was uncertain whether even limited 
deployments could meet the exacting criteria concerning 
survivability and cost effective vis-a-vis the inevitable Soviet 
countermeasures. Even if these considerable impediments could be 
satisfactorily mastered, would not, queried Howe, the West be in 
danger of "creating a new Maginot Line of the twenty-first 
century, liable to be outflanked by relatively simpler and 
demonstrably cheaper counter-measures"^^ How, for instance, 
demanded the Foreign Secretary, would SDI propose to cope with 
the myriad of alternate nuclear delivery vehicles such as 
aircraft or Cruise missiles, or battlefield nuclear weapons? 
"Finally," asked Howe, "could we be certain that the new systems 
would permit adequate political control over both nuclear weapons 
and defensive systems, or might we find ourselves in a situation
Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid.
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where the peace of the world rested solely upon computers and 
automatic decision-making?"^^
Howe was particularly concerned that even if these daunting 
technological difficulties could be resolved, the transition to a 
regime in which defences would play a prominent role could itself 
create destabilizing consequences. Sir Geoffrey argued that the 
deployment of limited defences and the retention of offensive 
forces could be seen by the Soviet Union as "fostering an 
aggressive p o l i c y . S u c h  a configuration of offensive and 
defensive deployments could be viewed as an attempt to obtain a 
first strike capacity that would allow the United States to use 
its offensive forces to destroy the majority of Soviet ballistic 
nuclear missiles while using its own defensive deployment to 
intercept the drastically reduced Soviet retaliatory response. 
Moreover, was it not likely, wondered Howe, that limited 
deployments could, because of their greater susceptibility to 
Soviet countermeasures, coupled with the perception of their 
potentially aggressive use, "produce holes in the nuclear dike 
that would encourage a nuclear flood?" But even if these dangers 
could be avoided, would not limited deployments and their ability 
to protect military assets, asked Howe, engender "a return to the 
targeting policies of the 1 9 5 0 s ? w h e n  populations were the
Ibid.
Ibid. Howe quotes from Reagan's 1983 speech when he 
refers to "fostering an aggressive policy."
Ibid.
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main targets of nuclear strikes.
Howe expressed the fear that a transition to a regime of 
strategic defences would produce not only an arms race in space 
but a radical increase in offensive deployments, leading to 
dangerous instabilities. "Would the prospect of new defences 
being deployed inexorably crank up the levels of offensive 
nuclear systems designed to overwhelm them?"^^ Sir Geoffrey 
allowed that this prospect was not one that "History and the 
present state of technology" suggest that this risk cannot be 
ignored. "17 Nor was it a prospect that the British government 
entertained with alacrity: "Many years of insecurity and 
instability cannot be our objective," Howe asserted.i® Britain 
implored the United States "to consider what might be the 
offsetting developments on the Soviet side, if unconstrained 
competition in ballistic missile defences beyond the ABM Treaty 
limits were to be provoked."i®
Howe stated that the British government believed that such 
potential instabilities could be avoided if SDI were embedded
1® This was a particularly interesting criticism of SDI 
given the fact that Britain favoured targeting counter 
value, i.e. civilian targets and indeed itself enshrined 
the Moscow criteria as its official policy for British 
nuclear targeting.
1® Howe, Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, o p . 
cit.. p. 7.
17 Ibid.
1® Ibid.
1® Ibid.
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firmly within an arms control structure. This necessitated, 
according to London, establishing a "linkage between offensive 
and defensive systems," that would facilitate "controlling both 
the offensive and defensive developments and deployments on both 
sides."20 Ideally, the British government hoped to obviate 
deployment altogether, as the following juxtaposition suggests;
If defensive systems are to be deployed, they will be 
directed against the then levels of offensive forces. If 
the latter can be lowered dramatically, then the case for 
active defences may be correspondingly strengthened. 
Conversely, radical cuts in offensive missiles might make 
the need for active defences superfluous.21
Britain's preference for avoiding the deployment of BMDs
dovetailed with what it considered the primary objective of the
Geneva negotiations, namely "to achieve security with reduced
levels of offensive systems on both s i d e s ."22 Pursuant to this
objective, British officials considered it vital that the United
States continue to recognize the "integral relationship between
measures to control offensive forces and any decisions to move to
the development of active defences."23
British Concerns About Strategic Stabilitv
If the United States nevertheless opted for the deployment
2° Ibid.. pp. 7-8.
21 Ibid.. p. 8.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 8.
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of strategic defences, Britain insisted that such a move not only 
be a matter for negotiation with the Soviet Union but 
consultation with the allies as well:
President Reagan has made it clear that in such 
circumstances he would see any actual deployment of new 
systems as a matter for negotiation with the Soviet Union. 
And that, if deployment were found good and the necessary 
conditions were met, it should be a cooperative endeavour 
between the two great powers. These commitments and aims 
are of crucial importance. 4^
Britain considered these criteria important for she believed that 
they would not only make deployment less likely, but would ensure 
that if deployment were to occur, it would be less destabilizing. 
Despite British satisfaction with these assurances, the 
eventuality of deployment, even given the US willingness to make 
it cooperative, was clearly less desirable than the status quo, 
not least because of British doubts concerning the willingness of 
the Soviet Union to participate in a cooperative transition. 
Accordingly, "One of the keys to progress at Geneva," stated 
Howe, "could be actively to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
ABM Treaty. Confidence as to the nature of the relationship 
between offence and defence might help to encourage the big cuts 
in offensive missiles which we all want the super powers to
^4 George Younger, Parliamentarv Debates, Sixth Series, 19 
February 1986. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 
p. 336.
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m a k e . "25 i t  would be difficult to overstate the importance 
which Britain attached to the ABM Treaty; for her it "represents 
a political and military keystone in the still shaky arch of 
security we have constructed with the East over the past decade 
and a half."2®
In expressing its fear that SDI would lead to the demise of 
the ABM treaty, the British government revealed the extent to 
which it disagreed with the United States concerning what 
constituted strategic stability. While British officials 
maintained that the ABM treaty ensured "strategic stability," the 
Reagan Administration contended that it was precisely the failure 
of the ABM treaty to maintain stability that made it necessary to 
propose the SDI. American officials maintained that in the 
absence of BMD deployments the Soviet Union was able to deploy 
ICBM's that threatened the survivability of US ICBM's, contrary 
to the intent of the ABM treaty. British officials took a more 
sanguine view of developments, maintaining that while the ABM 
treaty did not lead to the type of offensive reduction originally 
envisaged it had enabled the Soviet Union and the United States 
to limit offensive deployments and prevent a destabilizing arms 
race. This disagreement existed independent of the question 
about the implications of deployment. Indeed, the reasons for
25 sir Geoffrey Howe, "Defence, Deterrence, and Arms 
Control," Speech by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary, Foreign Press Association, 17 March 1986, p. 
6.
25 Howe, Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, o p . 
cit., p. 7.
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the disagreement were those that led to differing conceptions of 
the implications of BMD deployment.
SDI and the Threat to Flexible Response
Furthermore, Britain was concerned that an American decision 
to deploy strategic defences could vitiate the credibility of the 
US nuclear guarantee to Europe- a guarantee that constituted the 
essence of flexible response. Sir Geoffrey therefore cautioned 
that in considering the desirability of SDI "we must be sure that 
the US nuclear guarantee to Europe would indeed be enhanced as a 
result of defensive deployments."2? Before proceeding with 
deployment, Britain admonished the United States to contemplate 
the effects of a long transition period on the credibility of 
extended deterrence. For while it was conceivable, though in the 
opinion of the British government unlikely, that the perfect 
defences envisaged by the United States could enhance the 
credibility of extended deterrence, during the long transition 
period - when NATO would still be dependent on US nuclear 
protection - the United States would still be vulnerable to 
Soviet retaliation.28 The West would also have to consider, 
intoned the Foreign Secretary, "the offsetting developments on 
the Soviet side, if unconstrained competition in ballistic
27 Ibid.
28 By the United States' own admission, the day when the 
Alliance would be able to eliminate its reliance on 
nuclear weapons was decades away and during this interim 
period nuclear deterrence would play and steadily 
diminishing though still crucial role.
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missile defences beyond the ABM Treaty limits were to be 
p r o v o k e d . "29 Britain feared that Soviet BMD counter 
deployments would severely attenuate the ability of Western 
nuclear missiles to penetrate their targets -a capability that 
constituted the sine qua non of Western deterrence credibility. 
Thus with respect to "NATO’s policy of forward defence and 
flexible response," asked Howe, "would we lose on the swings 
whatever might be gained on the roundabouts?
Britain therefore demanded that if ballistic missile 
defences were to be deployed that the US nuclear guarantee be, 
"Not only enhanced at the end of the process, but from its very 
inception."31 Leaving little doubt that he questioned that 
this could be done, Howe warned that "many years of insecurity 
and instability cannot be our objective."3% Thus Sir Geoffrey 
considered it imperative that "All the allies must continue at 
every stage to share the same sense that the security of NATO 
territory is indivisible. Otherwise the twin pillars of the 
Alliance might begin to fall apart."33
The British government was forthright in explaining why it 
feared that SDI would undermine flexible response. Unlike the
2^  Howe, Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, o p . 
cit., p. 7.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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United States, Britain did not perceive a need to alter the
nuclear orientation of flexible response. Defence Minister
George Younger, speaking before the House Committee on Defence,
testified that Her Majesty's Government retained full confidence
in the validity of NATO's established doctrine, pointing out that
flexible response had, since its adoption in 1967, "provided a
sound basis for Alliance policy" and "will continue to do so for
many years to come."^* Britain thus remained "a convinced
supporter of flexible response" and saw no need "for a radical
change in NATO's s t r a t e g y . I n  short, British officials were
keen to see NATO retain its reliance on the US strategic nuclear
guarantee that constituted the essence of the Alliance's flexible
response doctrine.
Britain therefore opposed US efforts to shift deterrence
doctrine from the emphasis on retaliation to one of denial- the
objective of SDI- for she viewed such a posture as incompatible
with European security. Britain believed that:
deterrence, if it is to be effective, requires a second 
essential element. A potential aggressor must calculate 
that he would run real risk of himself suffering 
unacceptable damage to his own territory, to his own 
people, if he attacks. Deterrence in not just 
dissuasion.... The threat of retaliation, to punish 
aggression, is essential. The would-be aggressor must 
be as conscious of the prospect of punishment as of the 
risk of failure. In the face of the geographical 
handicap and the present imbalance in conventional 
military strength, a purely conventional defence of 
Western Europe cannot achieve this. That is why, for 
the foreseeable future, the nuclear contribution to our
Younger, op. cit.. p. 335.
Howe, Speech to IFRI, Paris, 21 March 1985, p. 8.
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defence is essential to effective deterrence of the 
threat of war.^G
A more candid or emphatic rejection of the idea of abandoning 
reliance on nuclear retaliation as the primary means of 
deterrence could hardly be set forth. The British government 
believed that the US strategic nuclear guarantee was 
irreplaceable, and deemed it essential that nuclear weapons be 
used for the purpose of inflicting unacceptable damage on Soviet 
society. London did not believe that using nuclear weapons to 
deny the Soviet Union certain military objectives would suffice 
to deter Soviet leaders from contemplating an attack. Thus while 
the United States was attempting to use SDI to reduce the West's 
reliance on nuclear weapons, Britain considered it just as vital 
that they be maintained. Underlying these opposing positions 
that the United States and Britain held with respect to the 
advisability of deploying strategic defences, there lay a 
fundamental difference in strategic philosophy.
SDI and the British Nuclear Deterrent
Concern about the impact of BMD deployments on the 
credibility of the British nuclear deterrent did not fit
Howe, "Defence, Deterrence and Arms Control," o p . cit.. 
paragraph 15. Contrast this to the Reagan 
Administration's desire to abandon retaliation as the 
driving force of the policy.
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prominently in the British government's reaction to SDI.3?
Given the importance that Thatcher attached to ensuring the 
credibility of the British nuclear deterrent, this neglect was 
somewhat striking. Yet, the fact that British officials did not 
publicly articulate their concerns on this question to the same 
degree that they did about other implications of SDI did not mean 
that they were not troubled. It reflected, instead, the 
political sensitivity of this issue and the potential domestic 
difficulties that it could cause.
British officials were concerned that should the issue of 
SDI's impact on the credibility of the British deterrent be 
accorded a high profile, it could undermine support for her 
government's decision to purchase the Trident submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLMB) from the United States and to construct 
four new submarines for carrying these missiles. For this reason 
British officials usually refrained from publicly stressing the 
potential effects of an American decision to begin BMD deployment 
(which would provoke Soviet counterdeployments), lest this 
undermine support for Trident.
Despite the Government's attempt to play down the potential 
effect of BMD deployments, it was clear that British defence 
officials were indeed concerned about the potential impact of 
Soviet BMD deployments on the credibility of the British nuclear
For instance Geoffrey Howe does not allude to the 
possible implications for the British deterrent in his 
landmark RUSI address of March 15, 1985. See Howe,
Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, o p . cit.. 
pp. 3-8.
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deterrent. In questioning Defence Minister Michael Heseltine 
about the effect of Soviet BMD deployments on the credibility of 
the planned Trident missile force, Conservative MP Winston 
Churchill remarked that "we are about to invest very substantial 
resources in a new generation ballistic missile system. In the 
event that both super powers were to proceed down this road of 
defensive space-based systems, this not only could be 
destabilising as between the super powers but, if effective, it 
could negate what we have in mind to do. Heseltine did not 
rebut this statement nor did he disagree when Churchill argued 
that "it is of vital importance to Britain, surely, [to] secure 
an agreement that would forestall deployment by both sides."3* 
Thus, British officials, although reluctant to emphasize their 
concern publicly, clearly preferred a strategic regime without 
significant BMD deployments.4°
In short, Britain rejected the Reagan Administration's claim 
that Western security could be enhanced by pursuing SDI. In 
contrast to the United States, the British government believed 
that continued reliance on nuclear weapons within the context of
38 First Report from the Defence Committee, Statement on the 
Defence Estimates, 1984. House of Commons, Session 1983- 
1984 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 22 May
1984), p. ix.
Ibid.
40 Unlike their French counterparts, the British government 
gave no indication that they were planning to accelerate 
research on penetration aids technology as a precaution 
should it need to overcome significant Soviet defences.
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mutual vulnerability constituted the sine qua non for Western 
security. Conversely, it was clear that the United States 
considered continued reliance on nuclear deterrence increasingly 
undesirable. Britain attributed the long peace following World 
War II to nuclear deterrence and was extremely reluctant to give 
it up. Britain feared that the United States, in its desire to 
escape the dangers inherent in NATO's reliance on nuclear 
weapons, was looking for a new strategy without giving full 
consideration to whether it was also a better strategy. In the 
peroration to his oft cited RUSI Speech, Sir Geoffrey 
encapsulated the British government's position on SDI by invoking 
the words of Winston Churchill: "Be careful above all things not 
to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more than 
sure, that other means of preserving peace are in your 
hands.
III. THE WEST GERMAN RESPONSE TO SDI
The initial inclination of the West German government was to 
minimize the significance of Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech. 
Government spokesman Juergen Sudhoff stated that Reagan's plans 
were "dreams for the future" and that they would not affect 
Alliance strategy for 10 to 15 y e a r s . *2 And Defence Minister 
Manfred Wdrner stressed that what Reagan was talking about was "a
Howe, Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, o p . 
cit.. p. 7.
See Hamburg DPA dispatch, 25 March, 1983, in FBIS-WE. 
Daily Report, 25 March 1983, p. J5.
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very long-term matter. It is a program for the next century and 
not for the security problems of tomorrow or the day after 
tomorrow.
At the same time, West German officials resented both the 
lack of consultation surrounding Reagan's announcement as well as 
its timing. The West German government, like its European 
counterparts, had not been informed or consulted prior to the 
March 23, 1983 speech. This was regarded as an egregious breach 
of the long-established procedures governing the manner in which 
major strategic changes were presented. Perhaps of more 
immediate concerns to West German officials, however, was the 
extent to which the ideas articulated in Reagan's speech could 
undermine the rational for the deployment of the Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles. For, in his speech, Reagan criticized 
nuclear deterrence, the very concept which INF deployment was 
ostensibly indispensable in upholding. Nonetheless, in the end, 
the West German government's fears about the effect of Reagan's 
speech on the ability of NATO to deploy the Cruise and Pershing 
II missiles were not realized and the deployments proceeded on 
schedule in December 1983.
West German officials had hoped that SDI would not become a 
central issue in international politics. The West German polity 
had been placed under considerable strain as a result of the 
contentious and often violent nature of the internal debate over
Manfred Worner, ZDF Television Network, 24 March 1983, in 
FBIS-WE. 25 March 1983, p. J4.
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the INF deployments. The West German government was therefore 
understandably reluctant to see West Germany embroiled in another 
controversy concerning the controversial issues of nuclear 
weapons and East-West relations.
Given the Federal Republic's geopolitical position, West 
German officials realized that SDI would be a particularly 
contentious issue in Bonn. As a non-nuclear power that directly 
abutted the major Warsaw Pact forces, West Germany was in a 
particularly vulnerable position and was therefore dependent on 
other countries, primarily the United States, for its security. 
This dependence meant that maintaining its relationship with the 
United States was one of the two overriding imperatives of West 
German foreign policy. The other imperative, which was 
frequently at odds with the first, was to foster improved 
relations with the Soviet Union. West German officials deemed 
this essential both to ameliorate the tensions that could lead to 
conflict as well the key to overcoming the division of Germany. 
Given the Reagan Administration's demonstrable enthusiasm for SDI 
and the Soviet Union's immediate and vehement opposition to the 
March 23, 1983 speech, it was clear in Bonn that should SDI 
become a central issue in international relations, it would 
create considerable difficulties for the Federal Republic of 
Germany.
West German hopes that SDI would not become an important 
issue within the Alliance were dashed in 1984. In January 1984, 
Reagan signed a directive establishing the SDIO, and directed
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U.S. officials to brief U.S. allies on SDI. These briefings, 
while partially successful in compensating for the initial lack 
of consultation, did not leave West German officials enamoured of 
the SDI. Following the April 3-4, 1984, NPG meeting at which US 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger briefed his colleagues on 
SDI, the West German Defence Minister Manfred Worner stated in 
unambiguous terms how he and his European colleagues felt about 
SDI: "My impression is the Europeans were broadly united in their 
critical questions. I can't see that [SDI] would provide greater 
protection or stability."** Worner complained that the 
proposed system would fail to offer comprehensive protection; 
that partial defences were destabilizing because they created 
first strike incentives; that an arms race in space was certain 
to result; that Europe would always be afforded less protection 
than the Soviet Union and the United States; and that most 
worrying of all, SDI could decouple the United States and West 
European security and could "even lead to a splitting apart of 
the Western Alliance."*s
** Fred Hiatt, "U.S. Antisatellite Plan Draws Fire, NATO
Ministers Reportedly Express Scepticism, Anxiety," 
Washington Post (4 April 1984), 18, cited in Hans Gunter 
Brauch, "SDI - The Political Debate in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in H.G. Brauch (ed.). Star Wars and 
European Defence (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1987), p. 190.
*^  Walter Pincus, "Star Wars Defense Plan Broadened, with
Protection for European Allies," Washington Post (25 
April 1984), p. 1.
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The Official West German Response: Qualified Support
Once it became apparent, however, that Reagan was almost 
certain to gain reelection and that he was unlikely to be 
persuaded to abandon SDI, the West German government decided that 
it would adopt a less negative stance toward SDI and attempt to 
gain influence through cooperation rather than confrontation.
The first documented evidence of this shift in the West German 
position occurred in the late summer of 1984 when the West German 
Security Council convened to discuss SDI and "recommended, 
despite some misgivings, that the FRG should adopt an attitude of 
cooperation towards S D I . T h e  specific points they made 
were:
1. Since the Soviet Union was engaged in research in 
advanced BMD technology, the United States should 
continue with research.
2. The capabilities achieved thereby should be used to 
promote arms control.
3. BMD is no replacement for nuclear deterrence.
4. If BMD proves to be feasible, Europe should have equal
protection. This means the need to develop defences 
against shorter-range systems (anti-tactical ballistic 
missiles-ATBMs). Furthermore, the development of BMD 
must not make Europe safe for conventional war.
5. Europe must be able to participate in SDI research.
6. The effect on the ABM Treaty must be considered.
After Reagan was reelected to a second term, the West German
Christoph Bluth, "SDI: The Challenge to West Germany," 
International Affairs 62:2 (Spring 1986), p. 249.
Ibid.
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government began to articulate its policy toward SDI more 
publicly. On March 27, 1985 the Federal Security Council issued 
an official statement on SDI which was followed on April 18 by 
statements before the Bundestag by both Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
and Foreign Minister Hans Detriech Genscher which also addressed 
the American initiative. These three statements set forth the 
West German government's position and became the guideposts of 
Bonn's position toward SDI. In his statement Kohl maintained 
that "President Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI) will 
be the dominant security issue in the years ahead and greatly 
influence both East-West relations and the relationship between 
the United States and Europe."*® While he stated that "the 
American research programme" is "justified, politically 
necessary, and in the interest of overall Western security,"*® 
it was clear that the West German government harboured serious 
reservations about SDI. Indeed, the above formulation itself 
indicated the degree to which Kohl wished to distance himself 
from SDI itself, preferring to voice his support for "the 
American research programme" rather than "SDI". There can be 
little doubt that this locution was a deliberate effort to 
distinguish between support for SDI research and the possibility 
of deployment.
Yet in articulating his reservations about SDI, Kohl was
*® Helmut Kohl, Policy Statement to the Bundestag in Bonn on 
the Strategic Defense Initiative, 18 April 1985, 
Statements & Speeches VII, 10 (19 April 1985), p. 1.
*® Ibid.. p. 2.
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careful to avoid antagonizing the United States and thereby 
create disunity within the Alliance. This intention to avoid 
division within the Alliance must be kept firmly in mind as we 
examine the West German government's position on SDI because it 
will help to explain why, despite harbouring such serious doubts 
about the implications of SDI, West German officials couched 
their opposition to SDI in rather mild terms.
The West German government had three main and interrelated 
concerns about SDI. West German officials feared that the 
deployment of ballistic missiles defences would (a) vitiate 
flexible response, (b) undermine strategic stability arms control 
negotiations, and (c) damage East-West relations. While these 
concerns also occupied the British and French governments. West 
Germany, because of its geopolitical position, was affected more 
deeply by the prospect of SDI. Thus not only did West Germany 
express greater concern about the effects of SDI on flexible 
response but they were far more concerned than the British or 
French governments about the implications of SDI for East-West 
relations.
Analysing the West German government's position on SDI will 
entail first examining the concerns as well as the demands and 
recommendations that Kohl's centre-right coalition made 
concerning SDI, and second, the reasons why the Bonn government 
adopted the positions toward SDI that they did will be examined. 
By focusing on why Bonn objected to SDI, we will create a 
framework for explaining why the Reagan Administration and the
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West German government harboured such different views about the 
implications of BMD deployment, and thus ascertain the underlying 
causes of the differences between the respective governments. 
Through this method of analysis we will attempt to determine to 
what extent these US-German differences were attributable to 
differing perceptions of what circumstances were necessary to 
ensure the credibility of flexible response and the stability of 
the strategic nuclear regime.
West German Concerns About the Strategic Implications of SDI
The West German Chancellor argued that SDI's "political and 
strategic implications inevitably have the greatest impact. They 
have a direct bearing on our vital political interests —  our 
external s e c u r i t y . A c c o r d i n g l y ,  Kohl stated that the West 
German government "must from the outset voice a number of 
strategic demands deriving not least from our geostrategic 
situation."51 These demands were:
1. Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of 
the United States. There must be no zones of differing 
security within the NATO area.
2. NATO's strategy of flexible response must remain fully 
valid as along as no more promising alternative is 
found for preventing war.
3. Instability must be avoided during any transition from
50 Helmut Kohl, Policy Statement to the Bundestag in Bonn on 
the Strategic Defense Initiative, 18 April 1985, 
Statements & Speeches VII, 10 (19 April 1985), p. 1.
51 Ibid.
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a purely deterrent strategy to a new form of strategic 
stability that is more reliant on defensive systems.
4. Disparities must be eliminated, and the emergence of 
new threats below the nuclear level avoided.
While it was not explicitly stated, one can assume from 
prior West German statements, including those of the West German 
Defence Minister cited above, that Chancellor Kohl believed that 
the deployment of ballistic missile defences would decouple US 
and European security, create zones of differing security, 
invalidate flexible response, lead to instability during the 
transition period, and accentuate disparities below the nuclear 
level. With respect to the first West German demand, while the 
possibility of US and European security becoming decoupled 
certainly existed, that danger did not derive from the "zones of 
differing security in the NATO area," for these already existed. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that while the West German 
government believed that the deployment of BMDs would lead to the 
decoupling of European and American security, the United States 
believed that European and American security was already 
decoupled because the United States's vulnerability to Soviet 
nuclear retaliations rendered American nuclear threats on behalf 
of Europe incredible. This had enormous significance because it 
revealed that irrespective of whether SDI was deployed or not the 
United States and Western Europe harboured such differing 
conceptions of what was necessary to couple European and American
“  Ibid.
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security that these would themselves have enormous implications 
for the transatlantic debate about SDI. Indeed, the idea that 
separate zones of insecurity are themselves a threat to security 
reflects once again a differing conception of what conditions are 
necessary for a credible strategy. While Europeans believed that 
unequal zones of security fostered American isolationism and a 
reluctance to defend Europe, American officials contended that to 
the extent that the United States could become less vulnerable, 
irrespective of whether Europe was more vulnerable, deterrence of 
an attack on Europe would be increased because the US could use 
nuclear weapons with a reduced risk of itself suffering 
unacceptable damage from Soviet retaliation. Given these quite 
divergent conceptions of strategy, it becomes clear that on a 
more fundamental level SDI evoked and exacerbated long-standing 
disagreements about strategy that existed independent of 
considerations of BMD deployment.
The West German government was especially concerned that SDI 
would undermine the credibility of flexible response. They were 
satisfied with the current strategic doctrine, did not share the 
United States's assessment of its waning credibility, and, in any 
event, believed that any proffered alternative would suffer from 
greater problems than flexible response. These assessments 
derived from the implicit assumption that SDI, if implemented, 
would not merely change but invalidate flexible response.
German opposition to SDI was also rooted in a firmly held 
conviction that even if the strategic defences were accompanied
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by an improved conventional balance, "a conventional 
'alternative' to nuclear deterrence in Europe cannot be taken 
into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . "S3 Germans argued that nuclear weapons had 
given the European continent its longest period of peace in 
modern times; they placed little faith in the efficacy of a 
regime shorn of the spectre of nuclear annihilation. Thus for 
the West Germans, nuclear options (which a Soviet SDI would 
presumably vitiate) were irreplaceable. West Germany considered 
the ability of the Alliance to maintain the link between 
conventional conflict and the initiation of strategic nuclear 
strikes as essential to European security; anything that weakened 
that link was undesirable. Germany deemed it essential that the 
Alliance indicate its intention to bring a war to Soviet 
territory and threaten the aggressor with annihilation in the 
event of a European conflict. German officials argued that 
ballistic missile defence deployments would impede the employment 
of medium-range and long-range ballistic missiles and thereby 
vitiate the capacity of the Alliance to maintain the escalatory 
link between conventional conflict and general nuclear war. This 
capacity was deemed especially important in view of the generally 
recognized impossibility of erecting defences against the 
shortest range systems that would fall mainly on German 
territory. West Germany thus expressed its demand that "flexible
Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Dr. Manfred 
Worner, 22nd Wehrkundetagung in Munich, Der 
Bundesminister der Verteidigung Informations - und 
Pressestab, Bonn, 7 Februar 1985, p. 13. Emphasis in the 
original.
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response must remain fully valid for the Alliance as long as 
there is no more effective alternative for achieving the goal of 
preventing war.
What is striking about this demand is that it ignores the 
significance of the fact that the United States' regarded 
flexible response as already incredible. This had enormous 
implications, for it meant that even without the deployment of 
BMDs, the credibility of flexible response would not remain valid 
because the United States regarded the conditions necessary for 
its effectiveness to be absent. For the credibility of flexible 
response rested ultimately on the willingness of the United 
States to use nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional 
attack on Western Europe and if Reagan Administration officials 
believed that Soviet nuclear capabilities precluded taking such 
action then it did not matter whether HMD's were deployed or not 
because the United States would not be inclined to use nuclear 
weapons. Thus, West German officials were attributing to 
prospective BMD deployment what American officials believed 
already existed, demonstrating that what divided Washington and 
Bonn was not so much the prospect of deployment but radically 
different conceptions of the nature of a credible military 
strategy.
Comments by The Government of The Federal Republic of 
Germany on President Reagan's Strategic Defense 
Initiative, Statements & Speeches VII, 8 (28 March 1985), 
p. 3.
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The Special Importance of East-West Relations
The implications of SDI for arms control and East-West 
relations were of particular concern to the West German 
government. Genscher explained clearly the salience of these 
considerations in determining his governments stance toward SDI: 
"The political and strategic issues connected with the SDI and 
the corresponding Soviet endeavours must be seen in their context 
and be placed in the framework of East-West relations and our 
security and arms control p o l i c y . Accordingly, Bonn 
attached great significance to the then recently resumed arms 
control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The Federal Republic believed that these negotiations 
would facilitate an improvement in the superpowers' "overall 
relationship and open up new vistas for East-West relations in 
g e n e r a l . "56 For West Germany, improved US-Soviet relations 
were "of decisive importance for fruitful developments in 
Europe."57 Bonn thus attached great significance to the 
January 8, 1985 US-Soviet agreement which defined the objectives 
of the Geneva negotiations, stating that it was a document of 
"outstanding political importance." According to Genscher it 
meant that the negotiations were "not just new, but of a new
55 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Speech in Bundestag Debate on the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, 18 April 1985, Statements 
& Speeches VII, 12 (22 April 1985), p. 1.
56 Comments by The Government of The Federal Republic of 
Germany, op. cit., p. 1.
Ibid.
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kind,” because the talks were not only concerned with specific 
types of weapons but they were designed to negotiate ”a concept 
for lastingly safeguarding peace- this is the great opportunity 
afforded by the negotiations.”®®
West Germany was therefore particularly sensitive to SDI's 
potential impact on the Geneva negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Chancellor Kohl stated in his April 
18, 1985 Bundestag speech on SDI that "The arms control function 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative is of central importance to 
us. We shall steadfastly promote this view in our dealings with 
our American allies.”®* Through its desire to place SDI so 
clearly within the context of US-Soviet arms control 
negotiations. Kohl's centre-right coalition hoped both to 
legitimate the American research programme within the Federal 
Republic®® and to promote a cooperative solution to SDI through 
arms control- an approach that would increase the chance that SDI 
deployment would be either governed by agreement or altogether 
avoided.
The Importance of Strategic Stabilitv
Underlying the Federal Republic's desire to see SDI dealt 
with through arms control was its overriding interest in
®® Genscher, pp. cit., p. 2.
®* Kohl, pp. pit., p. 6.
®® The Soviet agreement to discuss space weapons, while a
coup for them, also constituted a de facto admission of 
the Soviet Union's own efforts in this area.
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strategic stability. It is difficult to overestimate the 
importance that the FRG attached to the maintenance and 
strengthening of strategic stability as well as the contribution 
they hoped that the Geneva negotiations could make to the 
achievement of these objectives. As Foreign Minister Genscher 
remarked, "Strategic stability is the key term of the US-Soviet 
agreement of January 8, 1 9 8 5 . The West Germans believed 
that an essential precondition to achieving greater strategic 
stability was a mutual renunciation of any claims to superiority 
as well as a recognition that security "must be jointly defined 
and specified."^2 Moreover, it entailed accepting that 
"reliable security in this nuclear age cannot rest solely on 
autonomous decisions. Cooperation in security matters is also 
needed.
By emphasizing its emphatic preference for cooperative 
solutions to the questions raised by the introduction of SDI, the 
West German Government was expressing its opposition to 
unilateral US action with respect to strategic defences. In the 
view of the Federal Republic, this would lead both to an "arms 
race in outerspace" and a dramatic increase in offensive nuclear 
deployments by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus 
for Bonn, "the prime objective of the Geneva negotiations must be 
a major reduction in existing nuclear arsenals, i.e. to seek
Genscher, op. cit.. p. 2. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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fewer intercontinental and fewer intermediate-range weapons. 
Because this goal was viewed as incompatible with the unilateral 
deployment of strategic defences by the United States, the 
greatest importance was attached to "the substantive link between 
offensive and defensive weapons."^5 It was hoped that 
establishing the "definite shape" of this link would enable the 
United States and the Soviet Union to "guarantee the largest 
degree of stability at the lowest possible level of 
armaments.
The West German government ultimately hoped that the 
establishment of a mutually agreed upon link between defence and 
offence would lead to such deep reductions in offensive forces 
that actual deployment of SDI could be obviated. As Horst 
Teltschik, Chancellor Kohl's national security advisor, argued: 
"If the project can now contribute in Geneva towards deep cuts in 
the arsenals of strategic and intermediate - range systems , it 
might be possible to give effect to the option of completely 
dispensing with the deployment of defense systems in space."G? 
Avoiding or sharply limiting deployment of strategic defences was
Ibid.
65
66
Ibid.. p. 3. Genscher makes clear, however, that INF 
should not be held hostage to agreement in the space or 
strategic nuclear talks.
Kohl, op. cit.. p. 3.
Horst Teltschik, "Western Relations with the Soviet Union 
and Other Countries of Eastern Europe," speech delivered 
29 March 1985, Statements & Speeches. VII, 9 (1 April
1985), p. 6.
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deemed a preferable option because it enabled the West German 
government to achieve its primary goal of deep reductions in 
offensive forces of the superpowers while removing the necessity 
of having to endorse or reject an American decision to deploy 
ballistic missile defences. Still, as the German government 
realized, any such prospective agreement was far-off and the 
likelihood of its consummation was far from assured.
In the interim. West Germany deemed continued US and Soviet 
adherence to the ABM Treaty as essential. Bonn stressed that "in 
the short and medium term, observance of the ABM Treaty has 
p r i o r i t y , a n d  urged the United States "to reaffirm the ABM 
Treaty as long as no other bilateral agreements have been 
reached."69 West Germany's desire to safeguard the integrity 
of the ABM Treaty was attributable both to its opposition to 
deployment of strategic defences and to its calculation that any 
erosion of the ABM Treaty during the research phase would provide 
a useful pretext for American withdrawal from the ABM treaty.
The United States' disagreement with the West German 
government was predicated on substantially different ideas about 
what constituted strategic stability. First, the Reagan 
Administration claimed that the Soviet Union rejected the concept 
of MAD. It maintained that the Soviet offensive nuclear build up 
since the signing of the 1972 ABM treaty had borne out this
6® Kohl, op. cit.. p. 3.
6® Comments bv The Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germanv. pp. cit., p. 2.
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assumption.
Second, American officials argued that given the 
requirements of extended deterrence, a condition of mutual 
vulnerability was essentially incompatible with US commitments to 
use nuclear weapons on behalf of Western Europe. If, as 
Europeans maintained, the willingness of the United States to 
escalate nuclear war to Soviet territory was essential to prevent 
war in Europe, how, argued the Reagan Administration, could this 
be plausibly done if the United States was itself open to 
devastating retaliation should they decide to do so. Indeed, 
American officials maintained that the deployment of strategic 
defences would enable the United States to extend its nuclear 
guarantee to Europe with far greater credibility than it would 
under conditions of mutual vulnerability. Moreover, the Reagan 
Administration rejected the desirability of mutual vulnerability 
because the consequences of failure would simply be too high.
What the disagreement about SDI revealed was not so much 
that the United States and West Germany were pursuing opposite 
objectives, but that they had starkly divergent beliefs in what 
constituted strategic stability and therefore what circumstances 
would be required to ensure it. What is significant about this 
aspect of the SDI controversy is not only that broaching the 
issue of deployment revealed the underlying nature of the 
differences and therefore the driving force of the controversy, 
but that the differences were so wide that whether deployment 
were to occur or not the United States was so clearly concerned
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about the strategic situation that its desire to change the 
strategic regime would exercise a decisive influence on the 
Alliance, irrespective of the issue of deployment.
IV. THE FRENCH REACTION TO SDI
While the French government placed far greater emphasis than 
others on the economic and technological implications of SDI, it 
was primarily the strategic ramifications of SDI that aroused 
concern in Paris. French officials were more forthright and 
unambiguous in expressing their reservation about SDI than their 
British or West German counterparts. Thus in reacting to SDI, 
French officials generally did not attempt to condition their 
reservations concerning the implications of SDI by stating their 
support for SDI research. Instead, the French government reacted 
by launching initiatives of its own designed to garner West 
European support for a joint position toward SDI. This included 
technological and economic initiatives that would spur West 
European countries toward greater economic cooperation and would 
enable Europe to become more independent from what Paris 
considered the military and technological domination of the 
United States. The Mitterrand government's reaction to SDI thus 
reflected the independent foreign and defence policy that had 
been the hallmark of French governments since the time of de 
Gaulle.
While it distinguished itself primarily with respect to the 
manner in which it reacted, the French government was also a
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leading voice in the debate about the strategic implications of 
SDI. France was firmly and unequivocally wedded to the policy of 
nuclear deterrence. Moreover, and for the purpose of this study 
perhaps even more importantly, the French government was 
particularly candid in explaining why it favoured continued 
reliance on nuclear deterrence. Thus as we follow the procedure 
of examining precisely what French officials feared about SDI, 
and why they held these objections, we can ascertain the 
rationale underpinning the French position. When the French 
rationale is then compared to the United States's reasons for 
pursuing SDI we should be able to gain insight into the 
underlying causes of the disagreement between France and the 
United States; this finding will, then, afford a means of 
determining whether this disagreement can be attributed to 
differences concerning the implications of prospective deployment 
or to what extent it can be attributed to different conceptions 
of deterrence and strategic stability.
Initial French Opposition to SDI
As early as September 1983, Mitterrand, addressing the U.N. 
General Assembly, left little doubt concerning his opinion of 
SDI. He argued against "the higher and higher bidding of anti­
missile, anti-submarine, and anti-satellite weapons. Warning 
people of the dangers coming from space is another imperative. 
Will space become one more field where ancient terrestrial 
antagonisms can develop without limit? Space is in its very
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essence the common heritage of h u m a n i t y . I n  June 1984, at 
the Disarmament conference in Geneva, France set forth specific 
proposals designed to avoid the dangers it saw arising from the 
development of BMDs. The French Ambassador, Francios de la Gorce 
rejected the strategic philosophy underpinning SDI and urged that 
the ABM Treaty be upheld: "A situation in which each of the two 
main powers sought to render its territory completely 
invulnerable, that is, to escape all reprisals while at the same 
time being uncertain of success, would 
be full of dangers (...)"^^ He proposed:
1. anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) restrictions, especially 
concerning high orbit;
2. a ban on the testing and development of directed-energy 
weapons, for an initial period of five years...;
3. strengthening of the registration and verification
provisions of the 14 June 1975 UN convention on outer­
space objects;
4. extension of the bilateral United States-Soviet Union
agreement on the inviolability of reconnaissance
satellites to include other nations' satellites (the 
national technical means of Article XII, ABM Treaty).
French Counter-Proposals to SDI
At the same time, the French government, realizing that its
70
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Le Monde. 30 September, 1983, p. 4, as quoted by John 
Fenske, "France and the Strategic Defence Initiative: 
speeding up or putting on the brakes?" International 
Affairs. Vol. 62, No. 2, p. 232.
Politique Etrangère 49:2 (Summer 1984), 377-380 as quoted 
by Fenske, o p . cit.. p. 233.
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efforts to prevent BMD deployment through arms control might not 
be successful, pursued a parallel path that entailed proposing a 
European alternative to SDI that would not only meet the 
technological challenge that the American initiative posed but 
also provide Europe with the option of pursuing its own space 
initiative. Mitterrand envisaged the EC as the logical base for 
such an initiative and unveiled his thinking at the Hague:
We must look beyond the nuclear realm if we wish not to 
fall behind with regard to a future closer than is 
generally believed. Europe should be capable of 
launching a manned space station, which will allow us 
to observe, to transmit, and thus to take action 
against any menace-then Europe will have taken a big 
step towards its own defence.(...) A European Space 
Community would be to my thinking the most appropriate 
response to the military realities of t o m o r r o w .
France was clearly concerned about the technological and 
economic challenge which it believed SDI posed. French officials 
believed that SDI would act as a catalyst to a great 
technological boost to American industry, leaving France and the 
rest of Europe further behind the United States and Japan. 
President Mitterrand regarded this as a direct threat to the 
creation of a united Europe. He contended that without a 
technological, scientific and economic structure that was fully 
competitive, Europe would be unable to achieve political unity 
and independence. In response, France attempted to create an 
exclusively European answer to SDI by proposing the creation of a
Le Monde (9 February 1984) as quoted in Fenske, o p . cit. . 
p. 233.
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European technological consortium which they named Eureka (this 
will be discussed in detail in the following chapter).
Mitterrand argued that unless Europe pooled its resources and 
undertook high technology research of its own, a brain drain 
would occur whereby the United States would lure away Europe's 
brightest scientific minds and widen its technological lead over 
France and other West European countries.
French Strategic Concerns: Conceptual Destabilization
The specificity and frequency with which the French 
government articulated its concerns increased once it became 
apparent in 1984 that Reagan was to serve four more years in 
office. French officials therefore began articulating their 
concerns about SDI in greater detail. The overriding strategic 
concern that SDI evoked was that SDI could undermine the efficacy 
of nuclear deterrence and thus the credibility of the French 
nuclear deterrent.
France did not believe that overturning a strategic regime 
predicated on nuclear deterrence was either technologically 
feasible or militarily desirable. The French government 
contended that not only would such efforts prove ultimately 
futile due to technological realities, but they would also lead 
to an arms race in space with incalculable ramifications for 
strategic stability. And in the end, such efforts would not 
fundamentally alter the vulnerability of the Soviet Union or the 
United States to nuclear attack. Despite her conviction that SDI
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would not succeed in changing the fundamental character of the 
strategic regime, France feared that in attempting to do so, the 
United States would create the illusion that nuclear deterrence 
could be transcended. This could lead to a situation in which 
the credibility and therefore the effectiveness of nuclear 
deterrence could be undermined without altering the strategic 
realities upon which the credibility of nuclear deterrence had 
previously rested.
Despite France's concerns about the technological spinoffs 
that would result from SDI research, French officials reposed 
little confidence in the technological feasibility of SDI itself. 
Upon returning from a trip to Washington in the spring of 1985, 
French Defence Minister Charles Hernu expressed his views that 
the SDI defence envisaged by the Reagan Administration could, in 
15 to 20 years time, be, at best, only 90 percent reliable. 
"Therefore," he remarked, "the system is not reliable.
Hernu's successor as Defence Minister, Paul Quiles, noted that 
even if the many technological difficulties inherent in 
intercepting thousands of warheads could be successfully 
mastered, many means of circumventing or defeating a space based 
defence would present themselves. American planners would have 
to contend with the extreme vulnerability of the satellites which 
would form the core of the American defence system, a 
vulnerability already demonstrated by the ability of both the
Hernu Discusses SDI, French Deterrent in Interview, in 
FBIS-WE, Daily Report, 19 April 1985, p. K2.
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United States and the Soviet Union to track and destroy existing 
satellites. Moreover, such a system would have to contend with 
advances in "penetration aids" for ballistic missile warheads, as 
well as attempts to circumvent space-based defences by shifting 
the means of delivery to air breathing carriers such as cruise 
missiles and "stealth" b o m b e r s . F i n a l l y ,  the Soviet Union 
could merely overwhelm any system by deploying ever greater 
numbers of offensive systems. Indeed, the French foreign 
minister Roland Dumas noted that despite expressing considerable 
confidence in the eventual success of SDI, the United States 
continued and in fact had accelerated its offensive modernization
programme.75
French officials therefore concluded that an attempt to 
deploy strategic defences would not only fail to provide 
comprehensive defences, but would lead to an arms race in which 
strategic stability would be severely undermined. As Dumas 
argued, "the prospect of the American project leads, albeit in 
the long-term, to a militarization of space and hence to an 
excessive arms build-up, and that, on this basis, we cannot
74 "Defense Minister Quiles Doubts SDI," Interview with 
Defence Minister Paul Quiles in Le Monde, 18 December 
1985, in FBIS-WE, Daily Report, 19 December 1985, p. K3.
75 Excerpt From The Press Conference of M. Roland Dumas, 
Minister for External Relations, Helsinki, 22 March 1985, 
in Strategic Defence Initiative. Ambassade de France a 
Londres, Service de Presse et d'information, 29 March 
1985, p. 1.
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endorse it as such.” ®^ France was also less than enamoured by 
proposals recommending that the United States and the Soviet 
Union agree to mutual levels of defence deployments. As Hernu 
argued:
We cannot be certain that the balance achieved by deploying 
defensive systems and reducing offensive weapons would 
really be stable. Who can believe, indeed, that the two 
protagonists would not agree on at least a sufficient number 
of offensive weapons to saturate the enemy's defences? If 
such were the case, would the factors of stability really be 
any different, since, when all is said and done, each power 
would retain the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on 
the enemy?
France was, in short, concerned that SDI could lead, in the 
words of Defence Minister, Paul Quiles, to a "conceptual 
destabilization, which may rapidly call into question the defense 
policies of the Western world, although there is not yet anything 
to replace them with."^® In other words, French officials were 
concerned that while SDI would be unable to change the reality of 
mutual vulnerability, it would create the illusion that this was
77
Excerpt for the Statements of M. Roland Dumas During a 
Luncheon with the Diplomatic Press, 26 March 1985, in 
Strategic Defence Initiative. Ambassade De France a 
Londres, Service de Presse et d'information, 29 March 
1985, p. 2.
Speech of M. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, at the 
International Wehrkundetagung, Munich, 9 February 1985, 
Ambassade de France a Londres, Service de Presse et 
d'information, 14 February 1985, p. 4. Such a strategic 
regime while unable to alter the ultimate effectiveness 
of US and Soviet systems could, of course, have quite 
different effect on the nuclear deterrents of other 
countries such as France who do not possess arsenals of 
size that could easily overwhelm a limited defence.
®^ "Defense Minister Quiles Doubts Credibility of SDI," o p . 
cit.. p. K4.
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possible and thereby undermine the perception upon which the 
credibility of nuclear deterrence was predicated. Indeed, Fabius 
believed that the manipulations of perceptions was central to 
SDI:
The two superpowers, who have reached a historically 
unprecedented level of arms and destructive capability, 
certainly confront each on the ideological front, but they 
do so above all in the desire for power. They are now 
directing all their energies into trying to achieve a 
credible advance in both their arsenals and scientific 
quality of their weapons and to occupy a dominant position 
in the dialectic of deterrence in which the perception of 
the threat the other party poses takes precedence over its 
reality.7*
France viewed this strategy as particularly dangerous because SDI 
would be unable to provide what it promised, namely, 
comprehensive protection against ballistic missile attacks.
Fabius thus stated with great candour that:
The importance of technologies which, in some cases, don't 
yet exist, must not be a reason for a brutal change in 
strategic concept. There are no grounds for thinking that 
the offensive capabilities could disappear in the 
foreseeable future. We also think it questionable whether 
one should seed to base a current strategic concept on 
remote technological possibilities. It is above all 
dangerous to seek support for a problematical strategy by 
holding forth in terms that in effect devalue what 
constitutes, and will do so for a very long time to come, 
the very basis of our security: the nuclear deterrent.
Speech of M. Laurent Fabius, Prime Minister, At the 
Institute of Higher Defence Studies (IHEDN) , 13 September 
1985, Speeches and Statements. 19 September 1985,
Ambassade de France a Londres, Service de Presse et 
d'information, p. 3.
80 Ibid.. p. 4.
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France therefore believed that "SDI must not lead us to believe 
that nuclear deterrent [sic] is obsolete."®^
Above all, the French government did not believe that it was 
desirable, even if it were possible, to "render nuclear weapons 
impotent or obsolete." France was firmly of the belief that it 
was precisely the existence of nuclear weapons and the knowledge 
that war could lead to incalculable consequences which had 
secured peace since the second world war. Dumas maintained that 
"world security has rested on nuclear deterrence for forty years 
and therefore careful thought should be given to anything that 
might upset the balance of forces and thus put world security in 
jeopardy.
French officials also pointed out that nuclear weapons 
enabled Europe to counterbalance Soviet advantages in 
conventional forces.®® Therefore, should SDI devalue the 
effectiveness of nuclear weapons, Europe would once again be 
faced with a situation in which conventional war could become a 
serious possibility. Moreover, the deployment of strategic 
defences would lead to a perception that nuclear weapons could be 
employed without leading to uncontrolled destruction. Hernu 
expressed this in February 1985 when he argued that: "Were such
®^ Hernu Discusses SDI, French Deterrent in Interview, o p . 
cit., p. K2.
®^  Excerpt from the Statements of M. Roland Dumas During a 
Luncheon with the Diplomatic Press, pp. cit.. p. 2.
®® Defense Minister Doubts Credibility of SDI, pp. pit., p. 
K3.
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systems to be deployed, there is every reason to think that the 
old dialectic of the cannon ball and the armour would then apply 
to nuclear weapons, which until now have been spared from it, 
precisely because any show of force involving them was 
unthinkable."®*
Furthermore, France was concerned that a U.S. decision to 
deploy strategic defences would decouple European and American 
security. According to Quiles, this danger derived from the 
disparity in protection which SDI would provide the United States 
and Europe:
The space shield envisaged in the SDI project is adapted to 
long-range and intermediate range missiles. This shield 
would therefore have to be capable of intercepting SS-20 
missiles. On the other hand it is ineffectual against 
short-range ballistic missiles (the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 
missiles), not to mention planes and cruise missiles which 
remain in the atmosphere throughout their trajectory. 
Consequently, even if a space shield corresponds perfectly 
to the need to protect the United States from 
intercontinental ballistic threat, its contribution to the 
protection of Europe will be very limited and entirely 
dependent on the political authority that controls it.
In Europe's case, only defense on the ground can be 
envisaged. But an excessively large number of systems would 
be necessary to protect the population. In reality, a 
European system could only aim to defend military 
targets.
Such disparities in protection would lead to "unequal zones of
Speech of M. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, at the 
Wehrekundetagung, op. cit. . p. 4. This point contradicts 
the assertion that nuclear weapons are essential for 
deterring conventional conflict, for if indeed, the use 
of nuclear weapons were "unthinkable" this would vitiate 
their capacity to deter conventional conflict.
Defense Minister Quiles Doubts the Credibility of SDI, 
pp. pit., p. K5.
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security” in which European "public opinion is likely to be 
divided between those who will put their fate in the superpowers' 
and those who will take refuge in neutralism and pacifism."®®
SDI and the French Nuclear Deterrent
Despite occasional expressions of concern that SDI "might 
break the nuclear consensus in France," French officials 
consistently maintained that "France will always have the means 
of ensuring deterrence of the strong against the weak." In order 
to ensure this, however, France implemented a number of weapons 
programmes designed to enable the French deterrent to remain 
credible in the face of possible Soviet ballistic missile defence 
deployments. Quiles revealed that the French government had 
decided to:
considerably speed up our program to "aid the penetration" 
of missiles. The aim is to ensure that our deterrent 
remains credible even if the potential enemy improves its 
ABM defenses. Another important decision is the launching 
of a program to develop a new nuclear warhead which is 
"invisible" to radar, intended to equip the M4 missiles on 
submarines.®7
Thus despite expressing its doubts about SDI's technical 
feasibility, France's concrete reaction indicated that she was 
not nearly so sanguine about the implications of US and Soviet 
ballistic missile defences for the French deterrent as statements 
by French officials indicated. Nevertheless, Quiles contended
86 Ibid., p. K4.
®^  Defense Minister Quiles Discusses SDI, Eureka, Interview 
with Defense Minister Paul Quiles, reprinted in FBIS-WE, 
Daily Report, 20 December 1985, p. Kl.
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that the "sword would always triumph over the shield." Yet, for 
a country like France, ensuring the continued credibility of its 
deterrent would entail greater relative expenditure than it would 
for the superpowers whose arsenals were, of course, much larger.
In order to forestall ballistic missile defence deployments 
and thus the concerns that would attend such action, France 
recommended that the development of "space weapons" be prevented 
through arms control. Dumas implored the United States and the 
Soviet Union to reach agreement at the Geneva talks to prevent 
the militarization of space, in order to prevent "at all costs, 
when the time comes, the move from research to deployment."®®
This could best be accomplished by strictly adhering to the ABM 
treaty, which France regarded as the guarantor of strategic 
stability (as well as the credibility of the French deterrent, 
two concepts that were inseparable in French minds). France thus 
argued that the Geneva talks must lead to "stronger deterrence 
and preservation of the quantitative and qualitative balance of 
capabilities between the two superpowers,"®* and on this basis 
strategic stability could be ensured.
In sum, what emerges from an analysis of the French 
government's position on SDI is the crucial point that underlying
88
89
Excerpt From the Press Conference of M. Roland Dumas, 
Minister for External Relations, 22 March 1985, pp. cit., 
p. 1.
Statement of M. Roland Dumas, Minister for External 
Relations, at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Bonn, 23 
April 1985, Ambassade de France a Londres, Service de 
Presse et d'information, 24 April 1985, p. 1.
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the differences that French and American officials harboured 
about deployment was a far more fundamental disagreement about 
what constituted a credible deterrent and what threatened the 
credibility of deterrence. As Fabius* statement demonstrates, 
the French government believed that deterrence was functioning 
effectively and that SDI could lead **us to believe that nuclear 
deterrent [sic] is obsolete." Yet it was precisely the Reagan 
Administration's belief that nuclear deterrence was already 
obsolete (see Chapter 3) that led it to propose SDI. What this 
Franco-American disagreement reveals is a profoundly different 
conception of what is necessary to ensure deterrence. While 
France, as did Britain and West Germany, believed that only by 
ensuring vulnerability could deterrence be assured Reagan 
contended that it was precisely this vulnerability that rendered 
deterrence incredible both because of the constraints that 
vulnerability placed on US extended deterrence commitments and 
because the dominance of offense created dangers of a first- 
strike in a crisis.
Through examining the French position, it becomes apparent 
that the underlying cause of the French and American disagreement 
about SDI is not the prospect of deployment, but the differing 
conceptions of what constitutes a credible nuclear strategy and 
what conditions are necessary for ensuring strategic stability. 
French officials were far more cognizant than their British and 
West German counterparts in recognizing that the dangers 
associated with SDI did not derive only from the prospect of
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deployment but also from the ideas that led the United States to 
launch SDI. Consequently, when French officials spoke about 
"conceptual destabilization" they indicated a recognition of the 
effect that SDI could have even in the absence of deployment.
As we shall see in chapter six, the French government concluded 
toward the beginning of 1986 that the Reagan Administration's SDI 
policy had shifted away from overturning the doctrine of MAD and 
this had a significant impact on France's disposition toward SDI. 
French officials maintained that this shift in the American 
position (which turned out to be illusory) meant that deployment, 
if it were to occur, would not seek to create perfect defences 
and therefore would not undermine nuclear deterrence. But as the 
Reykjavik summit was to demonstrate (see chapter 7), tying the 
implication of SDI to the prospect of deployment placed far too 
much importance on actual deployment as the means by which the 
ideas animating SDI would be effected. As France was itself to 
argue after Reykjavik, it was the ideas that underpinned the 
American initiative that were decisive because they would make 
their influence felt irrespective of whether BMD were deployed or 
not.
In sum, France regarded SDI as both a conceptual challenge 
to the doctrine of deterrence as well as a technological and 
political challenge to the future of Europe. Both of these 
issues were intimately entwined with France's conception of her 
role in the world as an independent and largely autonomous power 
and her determination to maintain this status. SDI threatened to
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diminish France's independence both strategically and 
technologically and thus, ultimately, politically. For these 
reasons France was a consistent and unambiguous critic of the 
SDI.
V. THE US EFFORT TO ASSUAGE WEST EUROPEAN ANXIETIES
Throughout the first six months of 1985, the United States 
engaged in strenuous efforts to address and accommodate European 
concerns about the Strategic Defence Initiative. Through 
intensified consultations, public speeches and Congressional 
testimony, the Reagan Administration attempted to present SDI in 
a light that Europeans would find more palatable. The United 
States hoped that these efforts would ease the transatlantic 
tension that Reagan's initiative had engendered and produce a 
more positive European disposition toward SDI. European support 
was deemed essential to the Reagan Administration's efforts to 
prevent the Soviet Union from sowing disunity within NATO as well 
as to garner Congressional support for SDI.
The US attempt to mitigate West European opposition to SDI 
centred on the following main points: that the US does not seek 
superiority; that SDI constituted a prudent hedge against Soviet 
BMD efforts; that SDI is a research not a deployment programme; 
that strict criteria would have to be met before deployment would 
be considered; that should deployment be decided on the US would 
attempt to engage the Soviet Union in a cooperative transition; 
and that NATO's strategy of flexible response remained valid for
244
the foreseeable future.
In response to European concerns that SDI could be seen by 
the Soviet Union as an attempt by the United States to regain 
strategic superiority, the Reagan Administration stressed the 
defensive nature of the programme. It characterized Soviet 
charges that the United States was seeking unilateral advantage 
through SDI as propaganda designed to obscure the substantial 
Soviet activity in ballistic missile defence research. The 
United States emphasized that in
the near term, the SDI program also responds 
directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet 
antiballistic missile effort, including the 
existing Soviet deployments permitted under the 
ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a 
necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term 
Soviet decision to expand rapidly its 
antiballistic missile capability beyond that 
contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, 
is a critical task.*°
The United States stressed that this effort to investigate 
the possible contribution that defences could make to security 
would take many years to complete, during which time the ABM 
Treaty would be strictly o b s e r v e d . T h e  United States 
explained that it was "conducting a broad-based research program 
in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made
The Strategic Defense Initiative. June 1985, Special 
Report No. 129, US Department of State Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Washington, D.C., p. 3.
Ibid.. p. 4.
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to proceed beyond r e s e a r c h . The United States rejected the 
proposition that SDI would take on a "technological momentum" 
that would "somehow automatically force the United States to 
deploy a strategic defence s y s t e m . G e n e r a l  Abrahamson thus 
emphasized that "SDI is a research program geared to provide a 
future President and Congress the technical knowledge required to 
support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy 
advanced defensive systems."9* He stressed that "as a research 
program, the SDI is not a weapons development program, nor is it 
a program with preconceived notions of what a potential defensive 
system against ballistic missiles should entail."^® The Reagan 
Administration took great pains to emphasize that SDI was, in the 
words of George Bush, "purely and simply a research program, a 
research program designed to explore whether a more stable basis 
for deterrence exists.
2^ Ibid.
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Strict Criteria For Deployment
The United States stated that it would decide to proceed 
with deployment only if defensive deployments could meet 
extremely strict criteria of survivability and cost effectiveness 
as well as offer the prospect of a strategic regime that had 
clear advantages over the one it proposed to replace. The Reagan 
Administration stressed that it did "not have any preconceived 
notions about the defensive options the research may generate.
We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the 
research indicates that defenses meet strict criteria."9? Paul 
Nitze articulated these criteria in great detail:
technologies must produce defensive systems that are 
reasonably survivable. If not, the defenses would 
themselves be tempting targets for a first strike.
This would decrease rather than enhance stability.
Moreover, new defenses should be cost effective at the 
margin. That is, effective enough and cheap enough to 
add additional defensive capability so that the other 
side has no incentive to add additional offensive 
capability to overcome the defense.
Instead of a redirection of effort from offense to defense.
If the new technologies cannot meet these standards, we 
would not deploy them. We would then continue to base 
deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear 
retaliation.*®
The Strategic Defence Initiative. June 1985, p. 4.
Paul Nitze, Commitments. Consensus and US Foreign Policv, 
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First 
Session, February 26, 1985, p. 368.
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For Europeans, these were welcomed yardsticks which they believed 
created a substantial impediment to deployment (they regarded the 
criteria as almost impossible to fulfil). To Europeans these 
Nitze criteria lent greater credence to American assertion that 
SDI would only be deployed if it was determined that deterrence 
would be enhanced. Thus in articulating these criteria so 
precisely and openly, the United States attempted to convince its 
European allies that the Reagan Administration was prepared to 
think seriously about the potentially destabilizing consequences 
of strategic defence deployments, thereby strengthening the 
perception that deployment was by no means assured.
American officials stressed that if these strict criteria 
could be met, SDI, far from stimulating an arms race, would 
enhance the prospects of a successful outcome to US-Soviet arms 
talks. The Reagan Administration maintained that:
To the extent that the SDI research proves successful 
and leads to the capability to defend against ballistic 
missiles, then those missiles could lose much of their 
offensive value. That, in turn, would increase 
incentives for both sides to reduce the numbers of 
ballistic missiles greatly.**
The American government placed great emphasis on the relationship 
between offence and defence and believed that it would enable SDI 
to be used as a tool of arms control. The United States thus 
argued that "Rather than stimulating a new arms race, the U.S. 
Strategic Defense Initiative could complement our efforts to seek
** The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, o p . cit.,
p. 10.
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equitable and verifiable reduction in offensive nuclear 
arsenals."100
Implicit in this conception of the relationship between 
offensive and defensive reduction was the desire to engage the 
Soviet Union in a cooperative transition to a strategic regime in 
which ballistic missile defences would play an increasingly 
prominent and eventually dominant role. As part of the Geneva 
negotiations the United States attempted "to initiate a 
discussion of the offense-defense relationship and 
stability"ioi with the Soviet Union in order to prepare for 
eventual negotiations on a cooperative transition. If the 
deployment of strategic defences was deemed desirable, the United 
States would "consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the 
Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide 
for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced 
through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive 
systems. "1°^ It was hoped that this approach would allow the 
United States "to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet 
Union".1°^
The United States was keen to stress that, before it would 
begin its effort to enlist the Soviet Union in a cooperative 
transition, it would consult its European allies. Washington
Ibid.
The Strategic Defense Initiative, o p . cit.. p. 5. 
Ibid.
Ibid. , p. 5.
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pledged to "work with our European partners to ensure that the 
Alliance as a whole benefits."!^* In early 1985, Robert 
MacFarlane articulated the importance which the United States 
attached to ensuring that SDI address the security concerns of 
its European allies.
The U.S. is actively consulting our allies to respond 
to their concerns and questions regarding SDI. Since 
this is a research program, their thoughts are 
essential as we examine the capabilities and set 
performance criteria for the defensive technology.
Further, no step away from an offensive deterrent structure 
which has so effectively kept the peace in Europe can or 
will ignore the voice of our allies. Our own national 
survival depends on our allies' security from attack and 
safety from all wars.
The administration was careful, however, not to imply that these
considerations of transatlantic fealty would enable Europe to
exercise a veto over American deployment decisions.
The US rejected assertions by European and domestic critics
that a transition to a more defensive strategic regime would be
destabilizing. Weinberger consistently assailed the validity of
this proposition:
It has been said that even if a fully deployed and 
effective strategic defense might be a good thing, the 
transition to it would be destabilizing. This is not 
the case. On the contrary, the initial phases of a 
missile defense on the road to a more complete 
deployment would enhance stability, the stability of 
our present deterrent forces, because as a growing 
fraction of the Soviet missiles could no longer reach 
their targets, Soviet planners would face increasing
104 Bush, pp. pit., p. 3.
Robert McFarlane, Official Text. USIA, US Embassy, 55/56 
Upper Brook St., p. 5.
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uncertainties and difficulties in designing a first
s t r i k e . 106
The Reagan Administration also asserted that a recognition by the 
Soviet Union of the diminishing utility of offensive forces would 
render the Politburo more amenable to the consideration of a 
cooperative transition with the United States. However, the 
decrease in the utility of offensive forces that SDI could 
engender, convinced the United States that SDI would exercise a 
stabilizing influence on the strategic regime irrespective of the 
Soviet disposition toward cooperative solution with the United 
States.
The Reagan Administration's SDI's policy was predicated upon 
the idea that the strategic regime would pass through three 
phases: first, the approximately ten year period during which 
research would be conducted to determine the feasibility of 
deployment; second, provided the determination is made that the 
concept of comprehensive defences is viable, a transition period 
of decades, preferably conducted in cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, during which defences would play an increasingly dominant 
role; and, finally, in the third phase, the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons. Only during the third phase would the threat of
Statement by Caspar Weinberger, Department of Defense 
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, 
Hearings before Committee on Armed Services, United 
States Senate, Ninety Ninth Congress, First Session on 
S.674, Part 7, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, 
February 21, 1985, p. 3438.
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offensive nuclear retaliation be completely abandoned.
In response to West European concerns that the United States 
was hastily discarding established alliance doctrine before an 
adequate substitute had been developed, the Reagan Administration 
sought to reassure its European allies by stating that "NATO's 
existing strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid, 
and must be fully supported, as long as there is no more 
effective alternative for preventing war."^°® European 
anxieties regarding this point had been unwittingly exacerbated 
by some American officials whose enthusiasm for SDI often created 
the unwarranted impression that the promised benefits of 
comprehensive defences were far closer to realization than was 
actually the case. The United States did, however, assert from 
the beginning, through public speeches. Congressional testimony 
and frequent consultations with European allies that it had no 
intention of prematurely abandoning the Alliance's reliance on 
nuclear weapons to deter conflict in Western Europe.
Deterrence to be Maintained
At the beginning of 1985 the White House issued a report 
entitled, "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative" which 
articulated the administration's policy on how offensive nuclear
Paul H. Nitze, Statement on The MX Missile and the 
Strategic Defense Initiative - Their Implications on Arms 
Control Negotiations, Hearings Before the Defense Policy 
Panel of the Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, March 
13, 1985, p. 211.
108 The Strategic Defense Initiative, pp. pit., p. 5.
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forces fit into the administration's SDI policy. This report 
stated that, "Today, deterrence against Soviet aggression is 
grounded almost exclusively in the capabilities of our offensive 
retaliatory forces, and this is likely to remain true for some 
t i m e . T h e  administration made clear that nuclear 
deterrence has kept the peace for over forty years by relying on 
the threat of retaliatory nuclear threats, and that it would 
continue to do so until a better way could be found to deter war. 
Furthermore, as Weinberger remarked, "not only are we not 
abandoning our offensive nuclear deterrence, but we are 
strengthening and modernizing it as we have to do. Therefore,
the SDI program in no way signals a near-term shift 
away from the modernization of our strategic and 
intermediate-range nuclear system and our conventional 
military forces. Such modernization is essential to the 
maintenance of deterrence while we are pursuing the 
generation of technologically feasible defensive 
options.m
Thus during the initial phases of the SDI programme, US 
strategy would, according to Nitze, remain essentially unchanged:
During the period until the SDI research program has
109 The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, o p . cit., 
p. 5.
Caspar Weinberger, "SDI Offers New Avenues of 
Cooperation," Text: Remarks at NATO Roundtable, Bonn, 
United States Information Service, U.S. Embassy, 55/56 
Upper Brooke Street, London WlA 2LH, p. 6.
The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, o p . cit., 
p. 5.
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demonstrated that it is possible to have cost-effective 
and survivable SDI, up until that time there is no way 
in which we can get way from the current method of 
deterrence, which is partially deterrence by denying 
the enemy, the potential enemy, any hope of being able 
to aspire to a successful military strategy, and in 
part a threat, an ultimate threat of devastating 
nuclear destruction, in the event he nevertheless were 
to try such a strategy.
If at the end of the first phase, it was determined that the
research had yielded sufficiently robust and cost-effective means
of defeating Soviet offensive missiles, the United States would
begin a transition to a regime in which defences would play an
increasingly prominent role. This would involve negotiations
with the Soviet Union "to increase the security of both sides
through a combination of radical reductions of offensive systems
combined with the introduction of effective defensive
systems. This period would last for at least twenty years
and perhaps as long as half a century, during which time
defensive weapons would play an ever more dominant role.
Deterrence would thus progressively increase its reliance on
deterrence by denial; but "still during this process of
transition, one would still need to maintain a reliable
devastating retaliatory capability.
It would only be in the third phase of the transition, 
which envisaged the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in
Nitze, op. cit.. p. 211.
While a cooperative transition is clear the preference of 
the United States, it does not imply a Soviet veto over 
US deployments. Ibid., p. 212.
Ibid.
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which the United States would give up the threat of employing its 
"devastating retaliatory capability." Under these circumstances, 
the "opportunity for backing up security of Europe through the 
threat of nuclear devastation would not be p r e s e n t . T h e  
United States believed, however, that by the time that this were 
to occur the problems associated with erecting a credible 
defensive posture would be vastly diminished. Moreover, 
rendering ballistic missiles obsolete would remove what the 
United States regarded as one of the most dangerous threats to 
European security.
The United States contended that SDI did not represent an 
attempt to create a fortress America in which only the United 
States would be protected. American officials emphasized that 
the SDI research programme was "charged with examining the 
feasibility of defenses against all ballistic missiles, no matter 
what their range or a r m a m e n t . T o  give concrete expression 
to this intention the Reagan Administration set up a separate 
division of SDIO to investigate the special problems associated 
with intercepting ballistic missiles of intermediate and short 
range. Some members of the administration even contended that 
the development of BMD's for Europe would be easier than that for
Ibid.
Supplemental Questions Submitted by the Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East to the Department of State and 
Responses thereto. Developments in Europe. November 1985, 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 
East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, 
November 12, 1985, p. 40.
255
the United States because of the flatter trajectory and slower 
velocities of the missiles targeted at Western Europe.
Indeed, as early as October of 1983 President Reagan's Panel on 
the strategic implications of BMD's stated that the option of 
deploying ATBM's was one of the first that might be available.
The United States believed that Europe faced serious 
threats to its security as a result of Soviet ballistic missile 
capabilities. The Reagan Administration contended that "One of 
the central challenges to NATO's flexible response strategy is 
the Soviet Union's increasing intercontinental- and shorter-range 
ballistic missile c a p a b i l i t y . T h i s  capability, according 
to the United States, "threatens NATO's ability to retaliate 
effectively to a potential Soviet first-strike a t t a c k . T h e  
United states argued that "Soviet SS-20's and other shorter range 
ballistic missiles provided overlapping capabilities to initiate 
nuclear or conventional strikes throughout all of NATO 
E u r o p e . O f  particular concern was the prospect that the 
Soviet Union would, in the event of conflict, employ highly 
accurate conventionally armed ballistic missiles against NATO's
This of course would not apply to the variable range 
ICBM's that form a major if not decisive portion of the 
nuclear threat to Europe. This is particularly true after 
the INF agreement as many of the targeting duties that 
were assigned to the SS-20's have been replaced by the 
SS-24 and SS-25 as well as the SS-19's.
Report to Congress on SDI. 1985. o p . cit.. p. A-6.
Ibid.. pp. A-6,7.
^20 Ibid.. p. A-7.
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critical conventional and nuclear assets in an effort to cripple 
the alliance's military capacity before the main hostilities 
commenced. NATO would find itself, feared the United States, 
unable to hold the Soviet Union's initial conventional assault or 
bring in reinforcements from the United States. Moreover, the 
nuclear capabilities of the alliance would have been similarly 
diminished so that the option of a nuclear response to a 
deteriorating conventional situation would be of dubious 
validity. This would allow the Soviet Union to endow its long­
standing desire to achieve a capacity for a quick victory over 
NATO with potentially decisive operational significance. The 
United States believed that the deployment of ballistic missile 
defences could rectify the grave instabilities arising from this 
emerging capability and thus "reduce or eliminate the 
destabilizing threat of first-strike attack.
The United States argued that far from undermining the 
integrity of extended deterrence, protecting the United States 
from ballistic missile attack would render the US nuclear 
guarantee to Europe more credible. The United States also 
believed that the deployment of strategic defences endow 
American extended deterrent commitments with greater credibility. 
Richard Burt, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Canadian Affairs, explained in Congressional testimony how the 
Reagan Administration thought SDI could contribute to Europe's 
security: "if we can achieve a better capability to defend
Ibid.
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ourselves against Soviet nuclear blackmail, [then] the U.S. 
guaranty, the strategy of deterrence, will be strengthened.
The United States reasoned that if it were to deploy strategic 
defences, it would be more likely to use nuclear weapons in 
response to a Soviet attack upon Western Europe because it would 
have less to fear by way of a Soviet attempt to retaliate against 
American territory.
The Reagan Administration pointed out that the credibility 
of extended deterrence was highest during the 1950's and early 
1960's "when the Soviet Union had very little capacity to strike 
the United States with nuclear weapons. Even after
America's invulnerability disappeared, it relied on its 
overwhelming nuclear superiority to retain a measure of 
escalation dominance over the Soviet Union. It was thought that 
possession of this capability deterred the Soviet Union from 
responding to US first use out of a fear that any subsequent use 
on their part would lead to a series of escalatory employments by 
the United States to a stage of nuclear conflict at which they 
would find themselves at a decided disadvantage and be forced to 
back down. Whatever the validity of this conception, the United 
States maintained that this capability was now lost and, if 
anything, it was the Soviet Union that now possessed such a
Richard Burt, Developments in Europe. Mav 1985. Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, 
May 22, 1985, p. 24.
2^3 Ibid.
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capability thus confronting the United States with possibility 
that it would be subject to nuclear blackmail.
The United States argued that the Soviet Union's ability to
exercise escalation control constituted a danger to the security
of the NATO alliance. US officials deemed it essential that the
Soviet Union be deprived of its ability to control the escalation
process, lest it encourage Soviet leaders to engage in aggressive
behaviour. For
the willingness of the Soviets to embark on an 
adventure of some particular kind, one that might 
be the start of a series of escalation crises that 
build up more and more to a point where it becomes 
difficult to control, relies a great deal on their 
confidence that they in the end retreat to nuclear 
blackmail or using the offensive nuclear 
capability of the Soviet Union in a way that they 
could always control that escalation.
This capability, thought the United States, would increase the
likelihood that the Soviet Union would embark upon a conflict for
it would possess the confidence that even if the conflict were to
reach the nuclear level the United States would either refrain
from nuclear use or desist from matching the Soviet Union in
escalatory employments. The Reagan Administration contended that
denying the Soviet Union the option of exercising escalatory
coercion vis-a-vis the United States would deter the Soviet Union
from engaging in action that may lead to the use of nuclear
weapons.
Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, The MX Missile and the 
Strategic Defense Initiative - Their Implications on Arms 
Control Negotiations, pp. pit., p. 26.
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The Significance of the US Effort to Persuade
The US effort to assuage West European anxieties culminated 
with the promulgation of Presidential Directive 172, which 
codified many of the positions that senior Administration 
officials had articulated throughout the first half of 1985.125 
Although this document gave a presidential primateur to official 
statements that had been made throughout the first six months of 
1985 and reflected an explicit effort to mitigate West European 
opposition to SDI, it is important to stress that PD-172 did not 
constitute a true convergence of opinion within the Alliance on 
SDI. To the extent that differences within the Alliance were 
reduced, it was primarily due to the fact that both the Reagan 
Adminstration and West European governments realised that, 
irrespective of one's views about the implications of deployment, 
a decision to begin deployment would not be reached - at the 
earliest - until the early 1990s. This meant that flexible 
response and reliance on nuclear deterrence would, for the 
foreseeable future, continue to be the mainstay of NATO's 
security. Given this reality, it made little sense for the 
Reagan Administration to undermine a strategy upon which it had 
no choice but to rely in the immediate future.
A related reason that the Alliance achieved a greater degree 
of consensus over SDI was agreement on the point that if BMD
125 The declassified version of this Presidential Directive 
can be found in The Strategic Defense Initiative. June 
1985, Special Report No. 129, US Department of State 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C., p. 3.
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deployment were to occur, these deployments would not lead 
immediately to the end of nuclear deterrence since it would, in 
Reagan's own estimation, take decades to build a BMD system that 
would render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. While West 
European government's did not favour deployment of any kind,
Nitze's statement that it would take at last 50 years until 
reliance on nuclear weapons was completely eliminated reassured 
West European governments. They believed that this scenario 
ensured that nuclear deterrence would remain at the centre of US 
defence policy for such a long time that the original goal of 
rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete was for all 
intents and purposes being abandoned.
It is important, however, to emphasize that while the Reagan 
Administration indeed agreed to support NATO's continued reliance 
on nuclear deterrence, it did so for significantly different 
reasons from those of West European governments. Reagan remained 
committed not only to his original goal of a comprehensive 
defence but also to eliminating nuclear weapons entirely. His 
acceptance of flexible response in the interim did not reflect a 
reduced commitment to achieving his objectives, but rather the 
realisation that time would be required to achieve them. West 
European officials, on the other hand, viewed flexible response 
as a strategy that should be maintained permanently, not as 
something to be retained until the technology existed to deploy 
comprehensive HMDs.
A similar difference existed between the US and West
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European officials on the question of limited defences. West 
European governments interpreted the Reagan Adminstration*s 
support for limited BMD deployments as indicative of a policy 
supporting the enhancement of nuclear deterrence by protecting 
retaliatory forces. While the Reagan Administration stated that 
limited BMD deployments would indeed have this effect, in US 
thinking this was not an end in itself but rather a stage through 
which the strategic regime would pass on the path toward 
comprehensive deployments. Thus, despite a public narrowing of 
differences, the Reagan Administration and West European Allies 
remained divided on SDI, specifically, and most importantly, with 
regard to the desirability of replacing nuclear deterrence.
In many respects the US effort to assuage West European 
anxieties obscured the fact that this salient difference 
remained. To a large extent differences within the Reagan 
Administration about what objectives SDI should serve were 
responsible for this misunderstanding. While the State 
Department and, in particular, Paul Nitze, who was Secretary of 
State Shultz's primary advisor on SDI, were sceptical about SDI, 
Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger remained committed 
to the objective of deploying comprehensive defences.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTRA-ALLIANCE DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE
IMPLICATIONS OF BMD DEPLOYMENT
West European government's had three primary concerns about 
the implications of BMD deployment. First, that the deployment
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of BMDs would create unequal zones of security for the United 
States and Western Europe, thereby decoupling American and 
European security. Second, that if the United States were to 
deploy BMDs, the Soviet Union would deploy a BMD system of its 
own that would prevent Western nuclear forces from being able to 
strike specific targets. And third, that the deployment of BMDs 
would lead to an arms race. How valid were each of these 
concerns?
The concern that a United States that is protected from 
nuclear attack would be less likely to come to the defense of 
Western Europe is problematic. Indeed, it would seem that the 
less vulnerable the United States was to nuclear retaliation from 
the Soviet Union the more, not less, likely it was that US 
leaders would be willing to countenance the use of nuclear 
weapons against the Soviet Union in the event of a Warsaw Pact 
conventional attack against NATO. It was, after all, when the 
United States became vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack that 
doubts about the credibility of extended deterrence arose, so to 
take steps to reduce that vulnerability would not decrease the 
likelihood of an American nuclear response. At the same time, 
assertions by the Reagan Adminstration about the beneficial 
effects that the deployment of BMDs would have on the credibility 
of extended deterrence are equally questionable. Even if one 
assumes that eventually it would be possible to deploy a BMD 
system that was 99% effective, this would still leave the United 
States vulnerable to scores of Soviet nuclear weapons capable of
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inflicting unimaginable harm on American society. When one adds 
to this the fact that the Soviet Union would augment its aircraft 
based and cruise missile delivery capability, it is virtually 
inconceivable how, even if SDI were able to achieve its maximum 
objectives, this would confer much added credibility to extended 
deterrence, since the Soviet Union would still be able to inflict 
damage on the United States that American political leaders would 
find unacceptable. In short, nothing short of an absolutely 
leak-proof defence (including defence against aircraft and cruise 
missiles) would seem able to increase in a meaningful way the 
willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons in 
response to a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe.
The validity of the second concern about the effect of BMD 
deployment on West European security - that US BMD deployments 
would prompt Soviet BMD deployments that would prevent Western 
limited nuclear strikes - is far more difficult to assess. If 
the Soviet Union were, in response to American BMD deployments, 
to deploy its own BMDs around specific military targets both in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union this would complicate the 
ability of NATO to destroy certain important military targets. 
Some West European officials argued that "The Soviets would be 
happy to have BMD at that level, because it would neutralize the 
limited strategic nuclear options of the United States and cut
264
off extended d e t e r r e n c e .
According to this line of reasoning the reduced ability of 
the US strategic nuclear forces to engage in limited nuclear 
attacks against Soviet territory made conventional war more 
likely because the United States would be less likely to use its 
strategic nuclear arsenal if it could not do so in a limited 
fashion (and thus in a manner that would be likely to elicit 
corresponding Soviet restraint). There are three main reasons to 
doubt the validity of the above mentioned assertion. First, it 
is far from clear that the United States would be more likely to 
use nuclear weapons against Soviet territory even if it could do 
so in a limited fashion. Since limited nuclear attacks against 
Soviet territory would lead to corresponding nuclear strikes 
against US territory, there was a high probability that US 
leaders would be reluctant to initiate such attacks. Not only 
would they fear the damage from "limited a t t a c k s b u t  such 
an exchange of "limited" strikes could easily escalate to 
unrestrained nuclear attacks by both sides. Second, even if one 
assumes that limited nuclear strikes were essential to extended 
deterrence, it is unlikely that these options could be 
significantly vitiated by Soviet BMD deployments. And third, it
As quoted by David S. Yost in "Policy Implications of 
West European Reactions to the March 1983 U.S. Proposals 
for Ballistic Missile Defense." (Prepared for Pan 
Heuristics, Marina del Rey, CA: August 1985).
As will be discussed below it is not at all clear wether 
the Soviet Union would respond with a limited attack or 
a full scale attack.
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is questionable whether the ability of Western nuclear forces to 
destroy specific military targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe was an important element of the credibility of extended 
deterrence; it would seem far more important to the credibility 
of extended deterrence that the perception that nuclear weapons 
would be used at all, since once this was done it was uncertain 
(given the multiple dangers of escalation) that nuclear 
employment could be terminated before a general nuclear war were 
to occur.
While West European concerns about the effect of limited BMD 
deployments were somewhat exaggerated, so were the benefits that 
some US officials believed that mutual deployment of limited 
ballistic missile defences would confer. For instance, the 
assertion that limited US defences would render US nuclear 
guarantees more credible because the Soviet Union would have to 
engage in massive, rather than (ineffective) limited, nuclear 
strikes in response to US use of nuclear weapons^^® is hard to 
reconcile with what is known about Soviet military strategy.
For, Soviet military strategy stresses that if NATO were to use 
tactical nuclear weapons against its forces in Eastern Europe 
this would lead to the theatre-wide employment of nuclear weapons 
in order to prevent further use of nuclear weapons against Soviet 
forces. If the United States were to employ nuclear weapons 
against Soviet territory, Soviet military doctrine stresses
^28 See for instance Jan Lodal, "Deterrence and Nuclear 
Strategy," Daedalus vol. 109, no. 4, p. 167.
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massive retaliation both to prevent the use of further nuclear 
weapons against it as well as using Soviet nuclear weapons before 
they could be preempted. Thus the Soviet decision to use nuclear 
weapons against the United States was far more dependent on the 
extent of NATO's possible use of nuclear weapons than on the 
scope of Western BMD deployments that Soviet nuclear missiles 
would have to overcome.
Consequently, the deployment of BMDs would not seem to 
effect -one way or the other- either the willingness or the 
ability of the United States to extend its nuclear guarantee to 
Western Europe. The protection of the United States through the 
deployment of BMDs would neither increase nor decrease the 
willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons in 
response to a Soviet attack against Western Europe because it is 
not the degree of US vulnerability to retaliation but rather the 
fact of vulnerability at all that made US leaders hesitant about 
using nuclear weapons in response to Soviet conventional attacks. 
Similarly, Soviet BMD's would be unlikely to effect the ability 
of the US to retaliate since it is not the ability to hit 
specific targets in the Soviet Union that gives credence to 
extended deterrence threats but rather the Soviet belief that the 
US was willing to use nuclear weapons at all which in turn could
2^9 For an excellent discussion of the Soviet nuclear 
doctrine, strategy, and operational art, especially as 
they apply to contingencies arising from a war in Europe, 
see Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, 
Part II: Capabilities and Implications" Adelohi Papers. 
No. 188, 1984.
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lead to further escalation. In the end, then, the prospect of 
deployment did not seem to affect the credibility of deterrence 
one way or another. What it did do, however, was to expose the 
differences within the Alliance about nuclear strategy and the 
conditions that would affect credibility.
Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that because the 
deployment of BMD's would have little effect on the credibility 
of extended deterrence that the introduction of SDI did not have 
important consequences for extended deterrence, because SDI was 
about far more than the deployment of ballistic missile defences. 
In part, SDI aroused opposition in Western Europe because of what 
it indicated about the intentions of the Reagan Administration. 
While West European concerns focused primarily on the 
implications of deployment, in many respects the concerns that 
were attributed to the prospect of deployment were more properly 
ascribable to the intentions that were revealed through Reagan's 
advocacy of SDI. For it was the reasons that the Reagan 
Adminstration believed that SDI was necessary that were 
important, for ultimately the credibility of extended deterrence 
rested on the willingness of the US President to risk nuclear war 
on behalf of Western Europe. And by advocating the elimination 
of nuclear weapons in his March 23, 1983 Reagan undermined the 
perception that he was willing to do so and also gave an 
indication of where he wanted NATO strategy to go, irrespective 
of the ultimate fate of deployment.
In addition to concerns about how the deployment of BMDs
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(both US and Soviet) would affect the credibility of extended 
deterrence, West European officials were deeply troubled by the 
possible implications of BMD deployment for strategic stability. 
Specifically, they were concerned that the deployment of BMD's 
would lead not only to counter deployments but also to massive 
increases in offensive forces thus leading to an accelerated arms 
race. This was by far the most powerful argument that existed 
against SDI, especially by those who believed that SDI could not 
create perfect defences. As we have seen in this chapter, the 
Reagan Administration attempted to address this concern by 
insisting that it would not deploy BMD's unless it could 
determine that it would be more expensive for the Soviet Union to 
counter US BMD deployments than it would be for the United States 
to add additional defensive d e p l o y m e n t . indeed, the Reagan 
Administration claimed that if such a relationship between the 
cost of offensive and defensive deployments could be established 
then not only would an arms race be avoided but that it could act 
as a spur to offensive reductions.
While the Reagan Administration's arguments had merit when 
viewed from a purely economic perspective - assuming, of course, 
that defensive weapons could be procured more cheaply than 
offensive weapons - it is far from clear that Soviet calculations
130 This became known as the "Nitze criteria".
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would be driven by purely economic c a l c u l a t i o n s . I f  the 
Soviet Union believed that US BMD deployments threatened their 
most fundamental security concerns, they would, despite economic 
hardship, have attempted to overcome such a system or found 
alternate means of delivering nuclear weapons. Thus, unless the 
United States and the Soviet Union were to agree to a cooperative 
transition to a strategic regime that incorporated BMD 
deployments, it is difficult to see how the deployment of BMDs 
could enhance strategic stability. At the same time, it should 
be noted that in the absence of significant BMD deployments from 
the beginning of the nuclear era both the United States and the 
Soviet Union engaged in an enormous expansion of their strategic 
nuclear arsenals, despite the expectation at the time the ABM 
treaty was signed that the absence of BMD deployments would lead 
to a reduction in offensive deployments. Thus, it would appear 
that while the deployment of BMDs was unlikely to lead to a 
reduction in offensive arsenals, as the Reagan Administration 
claimed, neither would the absence of BMDs necessarily have led 
to a halt in the offensive arms race between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Therefore, while the deployment of 
ballistic missile defences would have been unlikely to have 
contributed to strategic stability, nor would it have been its
It was also far from clear whether the Reagan 
Adminstration itself would be driven by such factors. US 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the civilian 
leadership of the Pentagon rejected the "Nitze Criteria" 
because they were determined to deploy SDI irrespective 
of whether the Soviet Union could counter US defence 
deployments more cheaply or not.
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bane either, given the tremendous arms race that was occurring in 
the absence of BMD deployments.
VII. THE ROLE OF NATO
The Reagan Administration's attempt to assuage West European 
anxieties about the implications of SDI had an important impact 
on the extent to which it was possible to demonstrate Alliance 
unity on the question of SDI. While the role of NATO as an 
institution will be more fully addressed in the next chapter, it 
is worth noting briefly here that when the Reagan Administration, 
primarily in response to West European concerns, publicly stated 
that flexible response would remain valid until it could be 
replaced with something better that this marked a turning point 
in the SDI debate. By publicly and repeatedly articulating its 
adherence to official NATO strategy, the Reagan Administration 
alleviated West European concerns about their immediate security 
and led to far less acrimony with the Alliance. After all, the 
raison d'etre of NATO was to ensure the security of its members 
and unless their was a minimum of agreement on the strategy that 
undergirded that security. Alliance unity became questionable. 
Thus this shift in the US position on SDI enabled NATO to 
publicly reaffirm its commitment to flexible response.
The extent to which maintaining flexible response was 
central to the Alliance consensus was made clear at two major 
Alliance meetings. The first was a meeting of the Defence 
Planning Committee on May 22, 1985. At this meeting the
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participants issued a communique that stated that NATO members 
"are resolved to sustain the credibility of NATO's strategy of 
flexible response and forward defence. Nuclear weapons play an 
essential part in our objective of deterring war and... we are 
determined to maintain the effectiveness of NATO's nuclear 
f o r c e s . A  similar statement appeared after a meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council (of which France is a member) on 6-7 
June 1985. Their final communique noted that "Our strategy of 
deterrence has proved its value in safeguarding peace; it remains 
fully valid. Its purpose is to prevent war and to enable us to 
resist intimidation. The security of the North American and 
European Allies is i n s e p a r a b l e . " ^ ^ *
What is perhaps most noteworthy about these statements 
affirming the continued validity of nuclear deterrence was the 
frequency with which they appeared in NATO communiques. At the 
October 29-30, 1985 NPG meeting the final communique stated that 
"NATO's strategic forces are the ultimate deterrent in preserving 
security, peace, and freedom. And just a month later at
the December 3, 1985 Defence Planning Committee meeting in 
Brussels, where the participants agreed that "The objective of 
the NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defence is the
132 Final Communique, NATO Defence Planning Committee, 
Brussels, 22 May 1985, paragraph 1.
133 Final communique. North Atlantic Council, Lisbon 7 June 
1985, paragraphs 3-4.
Final Communique, Nuclear Planning Group, 29-30 October 
1985, paragraph 3.
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prevention of all war. Nuclear weapons play an essential part in 
achieving this o b j e c t i v e . That West European members of 
the Alliance felt compelled to include such explicit reiterations 
of NATO's commitment to nuclear deterrence despite the Reagan 
Adminstration's assurances indicated an underlying uneasiness 
about the Reagan Administration's commitment to the strategy of 
flexible response.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While there were differences in the British, West German and 
French reactions to SDI, they were primarily differences in 
emphasis. These three major countries agreed that the deployment 
of BMD's would vitiate flexible response, damage strategic 
stability, and hinder the improvement in East-West relations. At 
the same time, the emphasis that they gave to each of these 
issues differed, as did the manner in which they expressed their 
concerns. The British government was most concerned about the 
effects of BMD deployment on flexible response and strategic 
stability, although these concerns were expressed in a manner 
designed to minimize tensions with Washington and thus set the 
stage for compromises that would prevent SDI from doing undue 
damage to Alliance unity.
The West German government was far more concerned than its 
British counterpart about the potential impact of SDI on East-
Final Communique, Defence Planning Committee, 3 December 
1985, paragraph 6.
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West relations, although it was equally as concerned as the 
British government about SDI's potential impact on flexible 
response, given the Federal Republic's geographical proximity to 
the Warsaw Pact conventional forces. While the government of 
Chancellor Kohl, and in particular his Foreign Minister Hans 
Dietrich Genscher, were somewhat more open in expressing their 
concerns about SDI than the British government, the general tenor 
of their policy was one designed to avoid the appearance of wide 
gulfs with Washington. The French government, while sharing the 
substantive evaluations of the British and West German 
governments, was far less reticent to portray their disagreements 
with Washington in ways that would avoid public differences with 
the Reagan Administration. Moreover, Mitterrand and his 
government were more concerned than either the British or West 
German government about the effect that SDI would have on the 
credibility of deterrence, irrespective of whether the BMD 
deployments were to occur or not. Despite the differing emphases 
in the British, West German and French governments' position on 
SDI, all three remained fundamentally opposed to SDI.
What a careful analysis of the US-West European disagreement 
about SDI demonstrates is that the issue of BMD deployment was a 
vehicle through which the underlying differences between the 
United States and Western Europe about what conditions were 
necessary to ensure the credibility of extended deterrence and a 
stable strategic nuclear regime were revealed. It was found, for 
instance, that any technologically feasible deployment of BMDs in
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the foreseeable future would have little fundamental impact on 
either flexible response or strategic stability. Therefore, what 
the reactions to SDI revealed was that, while West European 
governments believed that extended deterrence rested on the 
vulnerability of the United States and the Soviet Union to 
nuclear attack as a means of ensuring the political and strategic 
unity of the Alliance, the United States believed that the 
absence of such vulnerability would reestablish the credibility 
of extended deterrence. Similarly, with respect to strategic 
stability West European governments believed that the absence of 
BMD deployments ensured a stable regime that was conducive to 
arms control, while the United States government argued that in 
the absence of defences, the offensive arms race would continue 
unabated.
That the Reagan Administration and West European governments 
held such widely divergent views about what conditions were 
necessary to ensure the credibility of flexible response and 
strategic stability was significant because it meant that even in 
the absence of deployment SDI could have a profound effect on the 
Alliance. For if the Reagan Administration believed that the 
vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack rendered the 
US nuclear guarantee to Europe no longer credible, then, 
irrespective of whether BMD deployment occurred or not. West 
European officials could be justifiably concerned about whether 
the United States under Reagan was prepared to honour its 
security commitments to its Allies. Understanding this critical
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dimension of the SDI dispute helps to explain why, despite the 
perception that BMD deployments were far off, SDI had such an 
immediate impact on the Alliance. It also explains why West 
European governments were so keen to elicit public declarations 
from the Reagan Administration reaffirming the US government's 
commitment to nuclear deterrence.
But the fact that the reasons that Reagan gave for wanting 
to remove NATO's reliance on nuclear deterrence were so strongly 
held meant that despite US assurances to the contrary. West 
European officials doubted the sincerity of these statements. If 
Reagan believed that the United States' reliance on nuclear 
deterrence was so dangerous, logically he would be less likely to 
initiate the use of nuclear weapons in defence of Western Europe. 
In other words, the very reasons that Reagan forwarded for 
wanting to change the strategic regime undermined the credibility 
of the (then) current regime.
At the same time, there was little that West European 
officials could do to change Reagan's beliefs about deterrence. 
Attention, therefore, gravitated toward the issue of deployment 
which, while not central to the dispute, was the most visible 
manifestation of the underlying disagreement. Moreover, the 
issue of deployment, because it was less abstract than competing 
conceptions of strategy, lent itself to solutions and compromise. 
Indeed, this explains why the issue of deployment occupied such a 
prominent place in the debate over SDI, while the underlying 
differences in strategy usually only manifested themselves
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against the backdrop of the controversy about the implications of 
deployment.
Although the Alliance did not attempt to resolve the 
underlying strategic differences that so clearly existed, it did, 
as we have seen, attempt to narrow the differences over SDI.
This process was begun in earnest at Thatcher and Reagan's Camp 
David meeting where the US and British governments agreed to four 
main points about SDI. Beyond the substantive importance of 
these four points, the US-British agreement indicated a mutual 
desire to find some common position on SDI within the Alliance 
despite the clear differences in perspective that existed. This 
desire to find common ground extended to the West German 
government as well. Although highly sceptical of the 
implications of SDI deployment, in his Bundestag speech. Kohl 
indicated his political support for SDI, although, significantly, 
he predicated further West German support on a number of 
conditions. Thus, the British and West German governments 
pursued a policy of providing political support for SDI, while 
voicing strong reservations about the implications of moving from 
research to deployment.
Following the Reagan Adminstration*s efforts to assuage West 
European anxieties about NATO strategy, a tenuous, yet 
discernable, consensus emerged within the Alliance about SDI.
This consensus was reached primarily as a result of the Reagan 
Administration's statement that NATO's strategy of flexible 
response would remain valid and the British and West German
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governments* support for SDI research. The existence of this 
consensus was codified in official NATO communiques throughout 
the latter part of 1985 which constantly reiterated both the 
Alliance's support for flexible response and SDI research. While 
this consensus within NATO was conducive to reducing intra- 
Alliance tensions on SDI, it could not obscure the fact that the 
SDI debate had revealed significant disagreements about US and 
West European conceptions of strategy. Indeed the different 
reasons that the Reagan Administration and its West European 
Allies advanced reflected this disagreement.
The United States supported flexible response despite the 
fact that the rationale it employed to justify SDI revealed that 
flexible response was no longer credible. Conversely, the West 
Europeans supported SDI research despite the fact that they 
disagreed fundamentally with the rationale that lay behind the 
programme. Two factors, both of which will figure prominently in 
the next chapter, explain how this preliminary consensus on SDI 
was reached. First, the US, British and West German governments 
were intent upon preventing SDI from splitting the Alliance and 
thus desired an accommodation on SDI research. The second reason 
was that the US government did not envisage being in a position 
to decide on deployment until the early 1990*s. This meant that 
the Reagan Administration could support the continuation of 
flexible response without prejudicing its ultimate objectives.
And West Europeans despite holding distinctly negative views 
about the BMD deployment could support SDI research since it did
278
not necessarily imply support for d e p l o y m e n t .
The next chapter will deal with the distinction between 
research and deployment in greater detail.
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V. THE DEBATE ABOUT WEST EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH
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I. INTRODUCTION
While the previous chapter offered an analysis of British, 
West German and French positions on the implications of SDI and 
why they differed from those of the United States, the purpose of 
this chapter is to determine how these countries attempted to 
manage these disagreements. This will entail analyzing the 
debate that was sparked by the United States government's efforts 
to involve its NATO Allies in SDI research. This issue will 
dominate the chapter as participation in research was the primary 
means by which the United States attempted to mitigate European 
concerns about SDI and to create greater unity on this issue 
within the Alliance. In this connection, the domestic debates 
within Britain, West Germany, and France are considered in order 
to determine the context in which the government decisions about 
participation were made as well as the influence, if any, that 
the opposition parties had in the participation debates.
While the subsequent chapters also deal with the role of the 
opposition parties in the debate, they will be dealt with in 
greater detail in this chapter. The reason that the opposition 
parties views are analysed in detail in this chapter is that the 
debate about participation in SDI research provoked far greater 
parliamentary debate and comments about SDI than did other 
aspects of the debate. These debates also became the occasion 
not only for opinions about participation in SDI research but 
also for a more detailed articulation of their opinions about the 
implications of SDI in general.
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Particular attention will be directed toward answering 
fundamental questions about the management of the transatlantic 
controversy over SDI: Why did the Reagan Administration make
efforts to solicit European support for SDI by inviting its 
Allies to participate in the SDI research programme? What 
influence did the desire for allied unity have on the European 
response to the invitation? What influence did the desire to 
reap technological and economic benefits from participation in 
SDI research have on the European response? What was the 
significance of the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) that 
Britain and West Germany signed with the United States? What was 
the relationship of Eureka to SDI? Why did European countries 
have such difficulty in fashioning a united response to SDI 
despite holding similar positions? What role did NATO as an 
institution play in managing the SDI controversy? What effect 
did the improvement in East-West relations, brought about as a 
result of thé Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit, have on the debate 
about participation in SDI research? In seeking answers to these 
fundamental questions about the management of the intra-Alliance 
SDI dispute, issues relevant to the thesis being forwarded will 
be investigated.
In this chapter we will attempt to demonstrate that in 
managing the SDI the major participants in the SDI controversy 
purposely ignored the fundamental strategic issues that lay at 
the heart of this dispute. Instead of attempting to resolve 
these important strategic differences, Washington, London, Bonn
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and Paris made a conscious effort to avoid these issues and 
focused instead on issues that would minimize disagreement, 
establish common ground, and lead to a consensus on SDI research.
Although they welcomed the Reagan Administration's efforts 
to allay their concerns about SDI by agreeing to criteria 
governing research as well as any prospective deployment. West 
European governments^ remained fundamentally opposed to the 
Strategic Defense Initiative and particularly the concepts that 
engendered its promulgation. Despite the British, West German 
and French governments' reluctance to embrace the strategic 
rationale undergirding the United States's position on SDI, 
political and, to a lesser extent, economic calculations 
eventually predominated and dictated a less overtly hostile 
stance toward the American research programme.
West European governments recognized that their ability to 
influence the ultimate course of SDI was limited. Because the 
deployment of strategic defences, unlike LRINF, did not require 
European approval, the United States could proceed with SDI even 
in the face of outright European opposition. West European 
officials were cognizant of their limited influence and realized 
that any leverage that they hoped to exercise would mainly be 
possible through participation in SDI research. Thus, while West 
European governments reacted negatively to Defense Secretary 
Weinberger's March 26, 1985 invitation to participate in SDI
When I refer to "West European governments" I am, of 
course, refering to the British, West German, and French 
governments.
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research, this was as much due to the preemptory manner in which 
he demanded a reply in 60 days as it did to the contents of his 
letter. West European officials realized that SDI research was 
going foreward in any event and that a refusal to participate 
would not alter this reality. They were, however, keen to avoid 
seeing SDI become an issue that would cause undue transatlantic 
friction or public controversy.
Indeed, one striking feature of the SDI controversy within 
the Alliance was the extent to which it aroused relatively little 
public interest or protest; the controversy, while certainly 
deep, was primarily one between governments. While reasons for 
the absence of a phenomenon are often difficult to ascertain, it 
would appear that the most important factor was that, unlike the 
INF controversy where the focus of attention was on weapons 
systems that were to be deployed on Western European territory, 
the public perception of SDI focused on space-based defences that 
would, of course, not be based on West European soil.
Furthermore, the peace movement appeared to be both exhausted and 
discouraged after its battle against the INF deployments.
Finally, what seemed to militate against a public reaction to SDI 
was the nature of the initiative itself.
Despite the opposition that SDI engendered within West 
European governments and the generally negative opinion that 
military experts in Europe held about SDI, the publics were less 
inclined to attack a system that, whatever the reality, was 
advertised as defensive. Indeed an opinion poll taken in France,
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whose government was the most critical of the major West European 
countries, indicated that the French public was evenly divided 
between those who opposed deployment (39%) and those who favoured 
deployment (39%), while a further 22% had no opinion.^ 
Interestingly, the opinion of the French public differed little 
from that of the United States where 43% approved of deployment 
while 35% opposed^ - a result that was statistically 
insignificant.* In Britain, SDI aroused relatively little 
public interest, especially when compared to the Cruise Missile 
controversy. Public opinion was therefore not a major concern of 
the government, although opinion polls suggested that had SDI 
become an issue of public concern, public reaction would have 
been generally negative.  ^ in West Germany public opinion polls 
indicated that the electorate was strongly opposed deployment of 
HMDs. Fully 60 percent of the population opposed deployment, 
while only 13 percent supported it, and 23 percent remained
Poll conducted for Le Monde by the French polling company 
SOFRES. See Le Monde. 19 November 1985, pp. 1,4., as 
reported in John Fenske, "France and the Strategic 
Defence Initiative," International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 
2, p. 239.
This poll was conduced by the Roper Institute and cited 
in Ibid.
The polls had a margin of error of plus or minus 4 
percent.
See Trever Taylor, "SDI - The British Response," in Hans 
Gunther Brauch, Star Wars and European Defence. (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 129.
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undecided.® Despite the negative view of SDI in Federal 
Republic, SDI was far from the forfront of the concerns of the 
West German public. Indeed, the lack of a strong public reaction 
to SDI was a characteristic of all three West European countries 
under study.
In addition to the lack of public outcry over SDI, a number 
of stipulations to which the US government agreed alleviated some 
of the more salient concerns about the American research 
programme and enabled West Europeans to offer political support 
of SDI research. West European governments, in considering their 
stance toward SDI, were extremely concerned that research would 
automatically lead to development and deployment. Thus, 
assurances from the United States that SDI research would be 
conducted according to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty 
and that any deployment decisions would be subject to prior 
negotiations eased European concerns about SDI, for these 
conditions represented a clear commitment to a firebreak between 
research and deployment. This distinction between support for 
SDI research and advocacy of deployment enabled European 
governments to participate in SDI research without being subject 
to the charge that by participating in research they would in 
essence be contributing to an erosion of the ABM Treaty and the 
possible deployment of BMDs. West European governments' 
resistance to participation was weakened still further by an
"Mehrheit gogen SDI," Frankfurter Bundschau. 6 April 
1985.
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assessment that the prospects for actual deployment of strategic 
defences were receding.
West European officials also realized the enormous leverage 
thiat the SDI research programme provided the United States in its 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Europeans came to view SDI 
as the ultimate bargaining chip: in exchange for a US pledge to 
eschew strategic defence deployments, the Soviet Union would 
agree to deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces. 
Consequently, an active and robust research programme which would 
present the Soviet Union with the prospect of actual deployments 
would be advantages in these negotiations.
Economic and technological considerations, although not 
nearly as important as other considerations, also influenced West 
European governments' disposition toward SDI. While Europeans 
were dubious of both the feasibility and the strategic 
advisability of SDI, they were considerably less uncertain 
regarding the implications of such a large US investment in the 
cutting edge of high technology. Europeans feared that even if 
the SDI research programme did not result in a single deployment, 
the technological benefits that the United States could derive 
from the civilian exploitation of the technologies involved in 
SDI research could further exacerbate what they perceived as a 
widening technological gap between Europe and the United States. 
European governments were therefore eager for access to the 
technological advances that they believed SDI research would 
produce. At the same time, they were aware that the United
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States was using the prospect of access to high technology to 
encourage its otherwise reluctant Allies to participate in SDI 
research and thereby appease its own domestic critics of SDI. 
While these technological considerations affected European 
calculations concerning the advisability of participation, it was 
the desire to maintain allied unity that ultimately led the 
British and West German government to sign MoUs and thus sanction 
their countries pariticaption in SDI research.?
Still, SDI remained a controversial issue both within the 
Alliance and within the United States, Britain, West Germany and 
France. Despite the establishment of criteria specifically 
designed to separate the issue of SDI research from that of 
deployment, the prospect of participation in SDI research 
remained a contentious issue. While technically participation in 
SDI research did not entail endorsement for the concepts that 
animated SDI, politically, such participation was seen as a tacit 
endorsement of an American initiative that most West European 
believed to be highly detrimental to European interests.
Consequently, as the British, West German and French 
governments were confronted with the decision as to whether or 
not to participate in SDI research, factors essentially unrelated 
to SDI itself came to dominate debate in these nations. A 
primary factor that influenced the position of each country was
The French government did not sign an MoU governing 
manner in which French firms could participate in SDI 
research, but they did allow French firms, including 
those that were government owned, to participate in SDI 
research.
288
the desire to avoid seeing SDI become an issue that would split 
the Alliance. While this consideration was in itself important, 
it was deemed especially important in light of the arms control 
talks that had begun in Geneva on March 12, 1985. While there 
were clear differences in the American and West European 
governments on SDI, both sides had a common interest in ensuring 
that the Soviet Union could not exploit these differences.
Yet neither SDI's importance in the Geneva arms control 
negotiations or the potential technological benefits of 
participation addressed the strategic issues that remained at the 
heart of the dispute. As a consequence the management of the SDI 
dispute had little to do with resolving the differening 
conceptions of strategy and stability that lay at the heart of 
the SDI dipsute within the Alliance. Instead, the United States 
and its West European Allies papered over these disagreements in 
order to preserve Alliance unity and concentrated on stipulations 
that would govern the manner in which research would be conducted 
in order to prevent immediate BMD deployments and established 
strict criteria that would determine the basis on which 
deployment decisions would be made.
II. THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE US PARTICIPATION OFFER
Probably no British Prime Minister since Winston Churchill 
has attached greater importance to fostering close transatlantic 
ties than Margaret Thatcher. While Anglo-American relations were 
strained in the early seventies during the Heath government and
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many had denigrated the seriousness with which the United States 
regarded the "special relationship", Thatcher was a fervent 
proponent of close relations with Washington. The intimacy of 
the special relationship was enhanced when Reagan entered office. 
The American President and the British Prime Minister shared an 
ideological kinship and saw each other as fellow combatants in 
the effort to transform the Western political landscape.
Thatcher believed that the special relationship accorded Britain 
a role in international decision-making that exceeded what she 
could achieve on her own. Moreover, it allowed London to mediate 
disputes between the United States and her continental European 
Allies. Thatcher was therefore eager both to maintain the 
special relationship and use it to moderate the Reagan 
Administration's stance on SDI.
Accordingly, the British government's response to the 
American invitation to participate in SDI research was influenced 
by Thatcher's determination to maintain Britain's special 
relationship with the United States. Britain became the first 
country to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the United 
States, a step that not only signified Britain determination to 
avoid SDI becoming an issue that could split the Alliance, but 
also one that facilitated the West German government's decision 
to participate in SDI research and ultimately precluded a joint 
West European response to SDI.
The reasons behind the British government's decision to 
accept the Reagan Administration's offer to participate were
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intimately connected with Thatcher's view of the type of 
relationship that she believed should exist between Britain and 
the United States. Thatcher was quite reluctant to be seen as 
opposing an initiative that the American Secretary of Defense 
characterized as central to the US defence effort and to which 
the American President was so deeply committed. A British stance 
of opposition would not only jeopardize the highly prized special 
relationship but it would diminish British influence over SDI - 
influence that, after all, supplied the primary rationale for the 
special relationship to begin with. Thatcher reasoned that 
adopting a public stance of support for SDI research while at the 
same time privately expressing her concerns would be more 
effective in influencing the American government than public 
displays of reservation.® Thus, while the British government 
harboured serious reservations about the strategic philosophy 
that animated Reagan's espousal of SDI, these concerns were 
superseded by political considerations.
Thatcher intended to use her close relationship with Reagan 
in order to prevent SDI from causing a serious and possibly 
irreparable split between the United States and Europe. She 
hoped to use her influence in Washington to modify the Reagan 
Administration's policy on SDI and render it more palatable to 
European governments. This process had begun as early as 
December 1984 when Thatcher and Reagan agreed to a four point
The exception to this policy was, of course. Sir Geoffrey 
Howe's March 15, 1985 speech in which he voiced British 
concerns about SDI as a series of "questions".
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agreement that would constitute the primary foundation upon which 
all future compromise was to be based.
Given Thatcher's policy of fostering close ties with the 
United States while offering to be a bridge between Washington 
and European capitals less favourably disposed toward SDI than 
London, eschewing participation in SDI did not present itself as 
a realistic option. Thatcher believed that her influence over 
the direction of US SDI policy and her ability to secure European 
acquiescence depended on British participation in SDI research. 
Moreover, she realised that a British decision to participate 
would make it much easier for other European countries to opt for 
participation without fearing singularization. Not surprisingly, 
Britain was the first European country to express an interest in 
participating in SDI research - an interest that predated the 
official US offer to participate.
It is important, however, not to construe the British 
government's generally favourable public position toward SDI as 
an endorsement of the strategic rationale that animated its 
promulgation. Britain's support for SDI was primarily political 
in nature. While Thatcher harboured serious misgivings about the 
implications of deploying ballistic missile defences, like her 
opposite numbers on the continent, she had few illusions about 
her ability to influence the ultimate direction of SDI. While 
European governments realized that the United States, too, was 
determined to avoid seeing SDI split the Alliance, and, 
furthermore, that Reagan saw the value of European participation
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in assuaging Congressional opposition, in the end European 
governments could do little to prevent the United States from 
deploying strategic defences.
Because the Defence Ministry was to conduct negotiations 
with the United States Department of Defense on the terms of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Defence Minster Michael 
Heseltine and his successor George Younger* were the primarly 
spokesman for the British government and its stance toward 
participation in SDI research. In the course of defending the 
British governments decision to participate in SDI research 
Heseltine and Younger stressed the SDI was primarily justified as 
a respons to Soviet BMD effforts, that the ABM treaty had to be 
adhered to during the research phase of deployment, that Britain 
expected to derive technological benefits from partipation 
including acquiring means to ensure the credibility of the 
British nuclear deterrent, and that there was a clear distinction 
between research and deployment.
Britain and the Need for Alliance Unitv
In examining the British government's position toward 
participation in SDI research, it is important to stress that its 
disposition was informed by an overwhelming desire to maintain 
Alliance unity. In his widely noted speech about SDI to the 
Royal United Services Institute, Sir Geoffrey Howe ended his
Heseltine resigned shortly after the MoU with the United 
States was signed on December 6, 1985.
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address by stating that despite differences with the US 
government over SDI:
our efforts must not slacken in maintaining cohesion of the 
Alliance. The debate over the deployment of Cruise missiles 
in Europe proved one thing at least. Alliance unity can not 
only enhance our security. It can provide a new incentive 
to our adversaries to meet us around the negotiating 
table.
Thus, despite the obvious differences between the Reagan 
Administration and the British government on SDI, Howe was 
concerned that these disagreements not obscure the overriding 
commonality of interest between the United States and Western 
Europe. "Certain differences of perception across the Atlantic," 
he argued, "are a fact of life. They do not negate the 
fundamental community of interest and belief between our 
continents."11 Nor, remarked Howe, less than a week later, did 
these differences alter the fact that "The North Atlantic remains 
vital for Europe's defence, "i^ Howe was not reticent to 
articulate the indispenisbility of the Alliance. He argured that 
NATO "is not just important. It is the only way of preserving 
Western freedoms in a divided Europe: of coping with the Soviet 
Union's nuclear strength and marked conventional dominance... 
without US backing, we might indeed find ourselves taking some
1° Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Defence and Security in the Nuclear 
Age," Journal of the Roval United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies (RUSI). Vol. 30, no. 2, June 1985, p. 8.
11 Ibid.
12 sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State's Speech to IFRI, 
Paris, 21 March 1985, paragraph 5.
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short cut to some *pan-European solution.* But I strongly doubt 
whether it would be one that respected Western European interests 
and values. Still less the hopes which those values have helped 
to keep alive among the Europeans of the East.”^^  The British 
government's belief that NATO was indispensible to Europe's 
security explains why British officials were determined to avoid 
seeing SDI split the Alliance and why they regarded British 
pariticipation in SDI research as essential to demonstrating 
Alliance unity.
The British government also contended that Alliance unity 
was essential if the arms control negotations were to succeed. 
Howe argued that:
Geneva has shown that the Russians have realised when the 
self-imposed policy of isolation was self-deafting. But 
Allied cohesion must be sustained... It will be all the more 
important in the face of the concerted campaign we must 
expect from Moscow in the months to come... If they feel 
confident that they can attain their objectives without 
making the concessions necessary in any negotiations, they 
will not hesitate to see all the propaganda at their 
undoubted disposal... And if they can in the process split 
the Alliance, even if this means forfeiting an agreement, 
they may be tempted to rate this a greater prize. They 
tried on INF. And they failed. We can be sure they will 
try again. United as we have been so often in the past, the 
West must stand together. We cannot afford to fall divided.
The British government's belief in the overiding importance of 
Alliance unity - both for West European security and the 
prospects for success in arms control negotations - was the most
Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Europe, East and West," Speech to the 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The 
Hague, 17 June 1985, paragraph 11.
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important determinant in its stance toward participation in SDI 
research. This point is particularly important to keep in mind 
because a substantial portion of the debate about participation 
in research focused on the possible economic and technological 
benefits that could be enjoyed by British firms that could obtain 
SDI research contracts. The economic and technological arguments 
were not, however, central to the British government's decision 
to sign an MoU with the United States. The British government's 
decision to agree to participation was fundamentally a political 
one, a sign that whatever difference they had about SDI, these 
would not be allowed to divide the Alliance in a fundamental way.
In an interview with the German weekly Der Soeiael. Thatcher 
stated bluntly the central reason why she had decided to accept 
the Reagan Administration's offer to participate in SDI research. 
In response to a question as to whether bilateral technological 
agreements with the United States had, in the past, failed to 
provide Western European with the expected benefits, the British 
Prime Minister brushed aside these concerns and stated 
emphatically what she believed to be the central rationale for 
participation in SDI research. "I do not think that we would 
help anybody," she averred, "by trying to seperate the United 
States from Europe, or by seperating one of our countries from 
the United States."i* Thatcher was similarly blunt when the 
interviewer queried whether a civilian research under joint
14 "Thatcher Discusses SDI, Bonn Summit in Interview," Der 
Spiegel, 29 April 1985, reprinted in FBIS-WE, 10 May 
1985, p. Q-6.
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European auspicies might not be preferable to SDI. "There must 
be no nonsense here. We are not nonaligned, we are not neutral, 
we are part of the defense of the free world, and we are 
a l l i e s . "IS This sentiment became the leitmotif for the British 
government's reaction and explains why the British government, 
despite harbouring serious reservations about SDI, supported SDI 
research.
Although the West German, and to a far lesser extent the 
French, government also manifested a desire to maintain Alliance 
unity, the British government was most adamant about this point 
and it was for this reason that they were the first to indicate a 
willingness to sign an MoU with the US government. Thatcher's 
policy of placing Alliance unity above other considerations meant 
that the British government would prevent the establishiment of a 
united West European position and also, as we shall, see make it 
easier for advocates of West German participation in SDI research 
to prevail becasue they could argue that since Britain was not 
willing to forge a united West European position the West German 
government's decision to reach bilateral arrangments did not harm 
West European unity.
SDI Research as a Response to Soviet BMD Efforts
In justifying its support for SDI research, the British 
government portrayed the American research programme as primarily 
a response to substantial Soviet efforts in BMD research that
Ibid.
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long predated SDI. The British government consistently 
emphasized that, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had 
taken full advantage of the provisions of the ABM Treaty "by 
deploying an ABM system around Moscow - a system which it is 
currently modernizing and e x p a n d i n g . Furthermore, the 
government stressed that the Soviet Union had been conducting 
sustained and substantial ballistic missile defence research not 
only in the traditional realms of ballistic missile interception 
but in "lasers, particle beam and radio frequency weapons, 
kinetic energy weapons, surveillance and target detection and so 
on."17 The government pointed out that these activities long 
predated SDI and therefore could not be seen as a response to the 
American programme. Younger argued that: "The key point is that 
this [high tech BMD research] is not a new Soviet programme: it 
is not a response to the SDI - far from it, it long pre-dates it 
- it is not something peripheral to the Soviet effort in defence 
research; it is a key component of it."^®
The Thatcher government argued that these Soviet efforts in 
BMD research legitimated the American research programme and 
necessitated further SDI research lest the Soviet Union "gain a 
unilateral advantage in this essential area."^® Moreover,
Ibid.. col. 336.
Ibid. . col. 377.
®^ Ibid.. col. 337.
Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State's Speech to IISS.
19 November 1986, p. 16.
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Britain contended that Soviet BMD research reflected a long
standing commitment to territorial defence that was firmly rooted
in Soviet doctrinal preferences and procurement policies and that
would continue regardless of the course of Western BMD research.
Younger argued that:
The Soviet Union wishes to explore the scope that new 
technologies might offer for an effective, active 
defence of the Soviet homeland against nuclear attack, 
defences against ballistic missiles which would 
complement the substantial effort which - unlike the 
West - the Soviet Union has already been putting into 
civil defence and defence against a i r c r a f t .
While the Government did not maintain that these activities 
constituted evidence of a Soviet desire to deploy BMDs in the 
near future, they indicated that the Soviet Union "has not 
accepted for all time the existing relationship between offensive 
and defensive forces at the nuclear l e v e l . Given these 
circumstances, Britain viewed SDI as "above all a prudent hedge 
against the substantial Soviet activity"^^ in ballistic missile 
defence research. "It is for that reason that the Government 
support the SDI research programme. It would be irresponsible to 
do otherwise."23
By predicating the British government's support for SDI on 
the existence of Soviet BMD research. Younger underlined the
2° Younger, op. cit.. cols. 337-338.
21 Ibid.. col. 338.
22 Ibid., col. 339.
23 Ibid.
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essential difference that underlay the rationale behind the 
British and American support for SDI research. While the Reagan 
Administration also stated that the Soviet Union's own research 
on HMD technology was a factor in justifying SDI research it was 
not, as in the case of the British government, the primary reason 
for the existence of SDI. Indeed, Reagan did not mention Soviet 
BMD research in his March 23, 1983 speech, and, much to the 
consternation of West European governments, only belatedely began 
emphasizing the substantial Soviet efforts in precisely the type 
of technologies being investigated under the auspicies of SDI.
SDI Research Would Adhere to the ABM Treatv
Britain emphasised that SDI research would be conducted in
full conformity with the ABM Treaty. The British Government
attached great importance to the sanctity of this treaty, which
it regarded as the guardian of strategic stability and the 
primary impediment to US ambitions to move beyond research to 
deployment. They believed that if the United States could be 
kept within the bounds of the ABM Treaty during the research 
phase, it would complicate future American attempts to deploy 
strategic defences, entailing as it would withdrawal from an 
existing treaty. Consequently, they believed that the ABM Treaty 
"should be strictly complied with"^^ and they "very much 
welcomed the US commitment to pursue its SDI research programme 
in accordance with a strict interpretation of the ABM treaty and
24 Ibid., col. 336.
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not to undercut the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the 
Soviet Union exercised equal r e s t r a i n t . T h e s e  assurances 
allowed the government to express confidence that it would not be 
party to any activities that "would be in any breach of treaty 
obligations.
The importance that the British Government attached to the 
ABM Treaty could be seen in its unwillingness, unlike the United 
States, to characterize the Soviet phased array radar near 
Krasnoyarsk as a violation of the 1972 treaty; instead Britain 
claimed not to be in possession of sufficient information to 
render a reliable judgment on this matter. This explanation is, 
however, questionable. The well-known closeness of British and 
American intelligence communities meant that Whitehall almost 
certainly had access to the reconnaissance photography that 
Washington did, but refrained from proffering its view, lest a 
public admission of Soviet violations provide a pretext for the 
United States to stray from adherence to the treaty.
The Economic and Technological Factors Influencing British Policy
The British government held that participation in the SDI 
research programme was important for Britain, both economically 
and technologically. In explaining the British government's 
position on SDI, George Younger, the Secretary of State for 
Defence, stressed that:
25 Ibid.
25 Heseltine, op. cit.. paragraph 36.
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Neither the British Government, nor our high technology 
companies, could afford to stand apart from such 
research. Nor have they done so. Within our defence 
research establishments and within other research 
institutions outside the Government, work has been 
under way in areas relevant to the SDI because these 
are areas relevant to our own defence effort and to the 
civil economy in the future.2?
The Thatcher government contended that through the US-UK 
Memorandum of Understanding, Britain would derive considerable 
economic and technological benefits. Mr. Oscar Roith, Chief 
Engineer and Scientist, at the Department of Trade and Industry 
asserted that "participation by the United Kingdom will 
undoubtedly have important implications and give rise to 
important opportunities to industry, both civil and defence."^® 
Younger believed that it was essential for Britain to exploit 
these opportunities; he regarded Britain's technological 
competitiveness as vital to the future of the British economy and 
believed that SDI would help ensure that "this country has a 
research base capable of underpinning both its defence effort and 
the civil economy of the future."2® Younger asserted that 
these were opportunities that Britain would be unable to exploit 
in the absences of participation in SDI research. His
George Younger, Parliamentarv Debates (House of Commons) 
Vol. 92, No. 61 (19 February 1986), col. 341.
Oscar Roith, "The Implications for the United Kingdom of 
Ballistic-Missile Defence," Report From the Defence 
Committee. 5 December 1985, paragraph 136.
29 Younger, pp. pit., col. 342.
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predecessor, Michael Heseltine, concurred, characterizing the 
American invitation as "a remarkable opportunity to pool British 
excellence and expertise with the most advanced technological 
country in the w o r l d . H e s e l t i n e  summarized the government's 
economic calculations concerning participation in SDI research 
most succinctly when he testified:
The opportunity having been given to us, we having been 
convinced that we can make a contribution commensurate 
with our smaller but nevertheless substantial 
industrial base, it would be pointless -indeed, I think 
culpable - not to grasp the very constructive 
opportunity the United States has given us.^^
Heseltine also argued that SDI research was important for 
the British defence industry because, in the course of 
determining the feasibility of strategic defences, the SDI 
research programme would be creating innovations in technologies 
"that, in practice, will be the centre of the weapons systems of 
the future, whether there is a Strategic Defence Initiative or 
n o t . Y o u n g e r  thus maintained that "neither the British 
government, nor our high technology companies could afford to 
stand apart from such r e s e a r c h . T h e  Department of Trade and 
Industry concurred with this judgment asserting that
Heseltine, pp. pit., p. 2, paragraph 8.
Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 2.
Younger, pp. pit., col. 341.
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participation in SDI research was "important to key industries."
In the 1986 Defence estimates, the Government specified how SDI
research would help British industry:
Participation in the SDI research programme will enhance the 
United Kingdom's ability to sustain an effective British 
research capability in areas of high technology relevant to 
both defence and civil programmes. It opens the way for 
research possibilities that we could not afford on our own, 
in technologies that will be at the forefront of tomorrow's 
world.34
Conversely, Britain believed that had the US offer to participate 
been rejected she "would have forgone the opportunity of an 
information exchange with the United States of immense potential 
benefit to our future defence programme."3® Such a course, 
asserted Younger, would have meant rejecting the "approach of 
Anglo-American defence cooperation which, under succesive [sic] 
Governments, has served us so well."3®
SDI Research and the Credibilitv of the British Nuclear Deterrent 
The Thatcher government saw participation in SDI research as 
a means of maintaining credibility of the British nuclear 
deterrent. Ensuring the penetrability of the British deterrent 
had been a major concern in Whitehall at least since the early 
seventies. Indeed, the Soviet Union's deployment of a ballistic 
missile defence around Moscow in the early 1970's led Britain to 
develop - at considerable expense - the Chevaline programme of
34 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986. o p . cit.. p. 5.
33 Younger, op cit., col. 341.
33 Ibid.
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offensive countermeasures designed to overwhelm the Soviet 
defences. The Trident programme was also in no small part chosen 
for its ability to penetrate Soviet defences. By participating 
in SDI research, the British Government would be able to keep 
abreast of Soviet BMD activities so that they could be 
"countered in whatever way is necessary to maintain the 
credibility of the British deterrent."3? In the words of the 
Defence Committee report:
This may be the more necessary given the distinct 
possibility that at some stage within the expected 30- 
year lifetime of Trident the superpowers may, for 
whatever reason, cease to consider themselves bound by 
the provisions of the ABM Treaty.^®
The British Contribution to SDI Research
The Ministry of Defence had determined, soon after receiving
the American invitation to participate, that Britain and all
advanced industrial countries were already conducting research in
these areas of high technology that would be essential to the
success of SDI. For Heseltine these realizations
led, first, to the very obvious conclusion that the research 
was inevitable, would go on and was permitted within the ABM 
Treaty; and secondly to the conclusion that Britain, 
commensurate with its industrial base, was already deeply 
involved and had many areas of excellence and expertise.
This enabled us to draw up lists of areas where, on a 
technological basis, a degree of co-operation with the 
United States would be possible; and a longer list where, in 
rather more project-oriented way, our industrial capability
37 "The Implications for the United Kingdom of
Ballistic-Missile Defence," Report From the Defence 
Committee. Session 1986-87, p. xvii.
Ibid.
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would be able to meet some of the requirements of the United 
States in pursuing their research programme. 9^
Heseltine also asserted that in some areas of high technology 
British industries and research laboratories were ahead of their 
American counterparts. "Therefore," according to Heseltine, the 
United States "wish to involve us in their endeavour, which is in 
the joint defence interests of everybody involved.
Heseltine argued that this would ensure that there would be no 
one-sided technology transfer.
Indeed, the British Government argued it could not prevent 
British industry, universities or scientists from participating 
in such a way that maximized the benefits to both the relevant 
industries and the economy as a whole. The concern about 
regulating the participation was particularly acute in light of 
the fear of a brain drain to the United States, a problem that 
predated SDI and encompassed the wider issue of Britain's ability 
to remain technologically competitive. Younger contended that an 
MoU would help to stem this movement and that, in the absence of 
an agreement, participation of British industry in SDI research 
would have "inevitably" occurred "solely on United States' 
terms."*! The defence ministry argued that these problems 
could be partially mitigated by the MoU which would "provide a
Heseltine, op cit., paragraph 3. 
Ibid.. paragraph 13.
*! Younger, pp. cit., col. 341.
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substantial opportunity for British companies and institutions to
compete on equal terms with their United States
c o u n t e r p a r t s . Moreover, it would afford British
participants in SDI research
the opportunity to compete on a clearly defined basis for 
the research contracts on offer from the US Government, as 
well as to participate in the information exchange programme 
on a fully reciprocal basis for the mutual benefit of the 
United Kingdom and the United States.*3
Heseltine argued that participation in SDI research was also
necessary as part of a wider requirement to ensure the
technological competitiveness of Europe:
If one hopes to play a role in maintaining and developing 
the technological base of this country, I have no doubt, as 
members of the Committee will know, that Europe had to get a 
much more coherent approach to its own technological 
harmonisation and that we have to try and do deals with the 
Americans across the Atlantic that allow for a scale of 
activity in Europe to ensure that the facilities and the 
technology are maintained here. That is a very powerful 
argument for doing the research partnership under the 
influence of the Strategic Defence Initiative Participation 
Office which is being set up in the Ministry of Defence.**
Despite the British Defence Ministy's arguments about the 
technological benefits that British industry could derive from 
participation in SDI research, economic and technological 
considerations did not play a dominant role in the determining
2^ Ibid.
43
44
statement on the Defence Estimates 1986. pp. cit., 
paragraph 13.
Heseltine, pp. cit., paragraph 11.
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the British government's stance toward SDI. Indeed, Heseltine's 
failure to ensure that British companies could be assured at 
least one billion dollars of SDI research contracts, while 
dissapointing, never placed in doubt the British government's 
willingness to sign an MoU with the US government because the 
decision to seek participation was a political not an economic 
decision. The British government saw its pariticpation in SDI 
research as a means of ensuring the SDI did not split the 
Alliance and as a means of imposing conditions on the conduct of 
research that would lessen the chance the SDI would move from 
research to deployment.
The Research/Deolovment Distinction
British Government officials took great pains to emphasize 
that the US government's decision to engage in SDI research did 
not represent anything more than a commitment to investigate 
whether it was technologically feasible to consider deploying 
strategic defences, and that it did not constitute a decision to 
deploy ballistic missile defences. Younger stated that 
deployments "might or might not result from future research into 
that sort of t e c h n o l o g y .  Heseltine testified to the House
Defence committee on December 5, 1985, one day before the MoU was 
signed, that SDI research would attempt "to establish if such a 
concept of strategic defence was feasible and what particular 
combination of technologies would be necessary in order to bring
45 Younger, pp. cit., col. 339.
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feasibility a b o u t . T h e  government stated that with respect 
to decisions regarding deployment: "It has been made clear that 
not only is that miles off in time, but that it may never 
happen."*? Indeed, London claimed that it would be "premature" 
to render judgments on deployment because "We do not know, nor 
can we know, what sort of results will emerge, or what kind of 
conclusions might be reached."*®
Britain insisted that in reaching a conclusion about the 
technological feasibility of deploying ballistic missile 
defences, the United States would use exacting standards. The 
British government stressed that:
The US Administration has no preconceived notions about 
the outcome of SDI research, although it has made clear 
that any defensive systems must meet strict criteria of 
survivability and cost - effectiveness before 
development and deployment could proceed.**
Furthermore, the British Government stated that even if these 
demanding criteria could be met, the United States had made no 
decision as to "what options they wish to pursue when they know 
what capabilities they have."®®
Britain was particularly adamant in asserting that a
*® Heseltine, pp. pit., paragraph 2. Emphasis in the 
original.
*? Younger, pp. pit., col. 338.
*® Ibid.. col. 339.
** Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986. o p . pit., p. 5.
®® Heseltine, pp. cit..paragraph 105.
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successful outcome of the research phase would not lead 
automatically to deployment of strategic defences. The Thatcher 
government emphasized that the ultimate decision whether to 
proceed with deployment would not be made on the basis of 
technological considerations; strategic and arms control concerns 
would be paramount. Thus, Younger emphasized that: "it is not 
appropriate to make the assumption that because the research 
programme has finished and has proved it can do certain things, 
we can proceed with development and deployment".
In defending its decision to participate in SDI research the 
British Government repeatedly stressed that it viewed the 
American initiative as purely a research p r o g r a m m e . T h e  
Thatcher Government was anxious to portray SDI in this manner in 
order to underline that its support for SDI research did not 
constitute an endorsement of eventual deployment. Whitehall 
therefore attempted to dispel the notion that the strategic 
defence initiative represented an a priori decision to proceed 
beyond research to actual deployment of strategic defences: "The
strategic defence initiative is not a strategy or an operational 
concept which is about to be implemented. It is a research 
programme looking at the feasibility of developing cost effective 
strategic defences". 3^
51 Younger, op. cit.. col., 338.
Michael Heseltine, "The Implications for the United 
Kingdom of Ballistic-Missile Defence," Report From the 
Defence Committee. 5 December 1985, paragraph 35.
53 Younger, pp. cit.. col. 339.
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This statement is extremely important because it 
demonstrates the strong tendency on the part of the British 
government and the US State Department to believe that SDI's 
signficance was primarily attributable to the prospects of 
deployment and that as long as deployment could be prevented the 
issue of SDI would remain relativly uncontroversial and of little 
threat to Alliance unity. This perception was assiduously 
fostered by the US State Department which correctly calculated 
that portraying SDI in this manner would be far more conducive to 
fostering intra-Alliance harmony on SDI. Yet, the US Defense 
Department, and more importantly Ronald Reagan, did not view SDI 
in this way. Weinberger stated that "strategic defense 
represents a change in strategy. "S* Thus the US and British 
governments had a fundamentally different perception about the 
objectives of SDI. This was significant because it indicated 
that managing the issue of deployment would not suffice to keep 
the SDI controversy under control. For if SDI represented a 
change in strategy it meant that the Reagan Administration had 
already come to conclusions about the credibility of flexible 
response that could have a signfleant impact on the Alliance 
irrespective of whether deployment occured or not.
Perhaps even more important than the disagreement about the 
pursposes and significance of SDI was the disagreement about what 
constituted a credible or desirable strategic regime. In
Caspar Weinberger, "US Defense Strategy," Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 64, No. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 679.
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defending the government's decision to participate in SDI 
research before Parliament, George Younger stated that "the 
Government believe that the current structure of mutual 
deterrence provides a sound and effective basis for providing 
that degree of stability in international relations which is an 
essentail prerequisite to continuing peace and s e c u r i t y . I n  
contrast a leading defence Département official, Fred Ikle, 
stated that "we must disenthrall ourselves of the dogma of 
consensual vulnerability - the notion that unrelieved 
vulnerability of the United States and the Soviet Union to each 
other's nuclear forces is essential for halting the competition 
in offensive arms, and is the best guarantee against the outbreak 
of nuclear w a r . T h u s ,  the participation debate revealed 
once again the overiding importance of the differing conceptions 
of strategy in determining the disagreement between the United 
States and Western Europe on SDI, as well as both sides 
determination to paper over these differences for the sake of 
Alliance unity.
The Labour Partv and the Strategic Defense Initiative
While the Conservative Party possessed a substantial 
majority in the House of Commons, the British government was keen 
to prevent seeing SDI become an issue of public controversy.
Younger, on. cit.. col. 342.
Fred Charles Ikle, "Nuclear Strategy," Foreign Affairs. 
Vol. 63, No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 824.
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fearing a repeat of the dispute about the deployment of Cruise 
Missiles on British territory. Government spokesman, therefore, 
were keen to rebut the charges of the Labour Party, lest the 
Opposition succeed in making the Conservatives' policy toward SDI 
a political liability. The position of the Labour Party 
therefore warrants consideration because it provides us with an 
idea of the domestic political context in which the British 
government operated as it advocated participation in SDI 
research. Moreover, in analysing the Labour Party's policies, we 
are made aware of how different Britain's reaction to SDI would 
have been had the Labour Party been in power.
The Labour Party was an early and consistent critic of the 
Strategic Defence Initiative. Denis Healey condemned the 
Thatcher Government for lending support to what he considered a 
dangerous and ill-advised venture that would destabilise the 
strategic balance, dash hopes for arms control, and strain even 
further East-West relations. He characterized the Reagan 
initiative as an attempt to effect "a fundamental change in the 
basic policy upon which Western security has been built since the 
second world war, and chastised the Reagan Administration 
for failing to consult its Allies in advance on a matter that so 
vitally effected European security. Healey was scathing in his 
condemnation of the British Government's SDI policy, proclaiming 
Thatcher's stance a sell-out to American foreign policy and
Denis Healey, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of Commons), 
Vol. 92, No. 61 (19 February 1986), col. 327.
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commercial interests. Furthermore, he reposed little confidence 
in the MoU as a means of safeguarding British interest, remarking 
that it was "scarcely worth the paper on which it was 
written.
The Labour Party rejected the Government's assertions that 
British support for SDI research would in no way hasten the 
eventual deployment of strategic defences. Denzil Davies argued 
that "tests, demonstrations and developments.... should be 
stopped before they gather an unstoppable m o m e n t u m . D e n i s  
Healey contended that British efforts in late 1984 at Camp David 
to ensure that there be no automatic succession of research, 
development and deployment, had been less than successful in 
tempering the Reagan Administration's enthusiasm for deploying 
strategic defences. He argued that the United States had largely 
ignored the points agreed to by Thatcher and Reagan at Camp 
David. Healey maintained that Weinberger's assertions that SDI 
would enable the US regain the advantages it enjoyed when the 
United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, contradicted US 
assurances that it was not seeking superiority. He stated that 
Reagan had personally indicated that the United States would 
proceed with deployment, even in the face of a Soviet refusal to 
sanction a cooperative solution, an intention that Healey 
believed contradicted the United States' assurances to Britain at
58 Ibid., col. 333.
Denzil Davies, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of Commons), 
Vol. 92, No. 61 (19 February 1986), col. 367.
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Camp David. Finally, Healey pointed out that the 
administration's refusal to discuss limitations on SDI had made 
"nonsense of the fourth undertaking, that East-West negotiations 
should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive 
systems on both sides."^0
The Labour Party believed that if the United States were to 
deploy strategic defences, they could be used just as easily for 
aggressive as for defensive purposes. Healey contended that this 
was particularly so in light of the fact that the Reagan 
Administration's "aim for the next 30 years at least will be to 
protect not the peoples of the world, but American land-based 
missiles, which are one of the components in America's strategic 
nuclear t r i a d . H e a l e y  contended that the United States' 
commitment to continue its reliance on nuclear weapons, to expand 
its strategic nuclear arsenal and possibly deploy ballistic 
missile defences constituted a dangerous combination that could 
easily be construed by the Soviet Union, as Reagan himself 
admitted, as an attempt to secure a first strike capability.
Healey insisted that the Soviet Union could not be expected 
to accept these developments without mounting a serious response. 
He enumerated a number of likely Soviet countermeasures to SDI 
and argued that the Soviet Union would attempt to overwhelm 
ballistic missile defences by utilizing its superior capacity for 
missile production. Furthermore, he contended that it was
Healey, op. cit.. col. 330. 
Ibid.. col. 327.
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probable that, in response to American efforts to attain the 
capacity to destroy Soviet missiles in their boost phase, Soviet 
planners would design fast boost rockets that would reduce flight 
times from five minutes to 50 seconds. Healey warned that the 
Soviet Union was unlikely to confine its countermeasures to 
offensive systems alone. Instead, they would design systems to 
destroy space-based defence, citing as the most likely option the 
deployment of space bombs "that would circle the world 
permanently."62 Moreover, he stated that "the Russians have 
made it clear tha[sic] they would plan to develop their own 
space-based defensive systems."63
Healey saw SDI as a driving force behind a new round in the 
arms race. He characterized the American initiative as the major 
impediment to arms control and stated that the combination of SDI 
and US offensive force improvements would contribute to "a 
stupendous acceleration of the arms race, greatly increasing the 
risk of nuclear war and making disarmament more difficult."6* 
Healey argued that continued pursuit of SDI would not only dash 
hopes for arms reduction, it would also preclude an improvement 
in "political tensions that have been the cause of the arms 
r a c e . "65 Healey maintained that continued adherence to the ABM
62 Ibid.. col. 328.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
66 Ibid.. col. 327.
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Treaty was the sine quo non for continued stability and implored 
the Government to see that the Reagan Administration strictly 
uphold the provisions of this treaty.
The Labour Party argued that the deployment of strategic 
defences would harm European security. Healey contended that the 
Reagan Administration's decision to initiate the strategic 
defence initiative represented "a new sense of America's 
vulnerability and a desire to reduce America's liabilities in 
extending nuclear deterrence to Western E u r o p e . Yet he 
argued that in espousing SDI, Reagan did not explain how 
"abolishing nuclear weapons would control conventional forces, 
which in all-out war could inflict horrific damage."G? Healey 
insisted that it would be much wiser to use the enormous sums of 
money that were being diverted to SDI research to make 
improvements in NATO's conventional forces, which he believed 
could, with some minor improvements, be brought to a level where 
NATO would no longer have to rely on nuclear weapons for its 
defence.
Given what it saw as the dangerous consequences of 
proceeding with SDI, the Labour Party was critical of the 
Thatcher Government's decision to participate in SDI research. 
Healey remarked that instead of encouraging further progress of 
SDI, it should be doing everything in its power to arrest its
Denis Healey, Foreword to Jane Stromseth, The Origins of 
Flexible Response. (St. Martin's Press: New York), 1988, 
page x.
Healey, Parliamentarv Debates, op. cit.. col. 327.
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progress lest it develop an unstoppable momentum. He rejected 
Government claims that to abjure research would be foolish; 
instead, he claimed that while research was indeed unverifiable, 
testing was not; hence, since testing was easily verifiable, 
breakthroughs would be possible without being easily detected. 
Healey thus recommended that the Government encourage the United 
States to accept the Soviet Union's offer to ban all testing for 
SDI related components.
The objections raised by the Labour Party did not have a 
significant impact on the government's disposition toward SDI 
participation in SDI research or the eventual form that the MoU 
took. These debates did, however, reveal an interesting aspect 
of SDI debate within Britain and by extension about what 
motivated Thatcher to seek the MoU's. The objections that the 
Labour Party voiced against SDI were similar to the earlier 
concerns that the government expressed about SDI (as delineated 
in the prior chapter). While the tone with which Labour Party 
spokesmen articulated their opinions varied from that employed by 
the government, their concerns were remarkably similar. The 
Labour Party argued that the deployment of HMDs would cause an 
arms race, vitiate the credibity of nuclear deterrence, and 
damage East-West relations. The government essentially shared 
this assessment of the implications of BMD deployment, even if 
these concerns were, as in the case of Howe's RUSI speech, posed 
in the form of questions. Yet, as we have seen, the government 
was a keen exponent of participation in SDI research, whereas the
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Labour Party was opposed to such particiation with equal fervor.
Understanding why, despite sharing such similar positions on 
the implications of BMD deployment, the Labour Party and the 
Concervative Party reacted so differently to the issue of 
participation provides valuable insight into what drove the 
British government to sign an MoU with the US government. The 
government claimed that, given Soviet BMD research, it was only 
prudent for Britain to support - and participate in - US BMD 
research; and given the reality of the US reserach programme, 
Britain could gain some technolgical and economic benefits 
through particpation. Moreover, the government argued that given 
US assurances that the ABM treaty would be adhered to during the 
research phase, and that there would be no automatic succession 
from research to deployment, it could support SDI rearch without 
necessarily endorsing the goals of SDI or taking responsibility 
for the consequences of deployment.
While these reasons for supporting SDI research were 
logical, in themselves they did not consitute a sufficient 
rational for participation, especially in light of the failure of 
Heseltine to secure a predetermined share of SDI research 
contracts. What ultimately determined the British government's 
decision to participate in SDI research was the desire to forge a 
united position on an initiave that the Reagan Administration 
deemed central to its defence effort. This proclivity to 
accomade American concern, was in turn, rooted in Thatcher's firm 
conviction that the maintaining both the "special relationship"
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with Washingtion and the unity of the Alliance were of paramount 
importance.
III. THE WEST GERMAN REACTION TO THE US PARTICIPATION OFFER
The Federal Republic's response to the Reagan 
Administration's offer to participate in SDI research should be 
seen in the context of West Germany's dependence on the United 
States for its security. While Kohl's centre-right coalition had 
expressed severe misgivings about SDI, it realized that West 
Germany's ability to influence US policy was severely 
circumscribed. As Alfred Dregger, the floor leader of the 
CDU/CSU, reminded the Bundestag in explaining the coalition's 
stance toward participation in SDI research, "Whether it comes to 
deployment of ballistic missile defence systems in the East and 
West will not be decided here [in Bonn], but rather in Moscow or 
Washington."®® It followed that the German government saw its 
role as largely reactive. Since it was unable to influence 
directly the ultimate direction of SDI, it opted for pursuing a 
pragmatic policy of attempting to maximize its influence by 
channelling SDI in directions most compatible with West Germany's 
interests.
West Germanv and Alliance Unitv
The West German government's position was also informed by
®® Alfred Dregger, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. 
10. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokoll 10/1985, 13 December
1985, p. 14092.
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its desire to maintain Alliance unity. In his April 18, 1985 
speech in which he outlined his government's stance toward SDI, 
Chancellor Kohl stated that "The alliance's cohesion and 
solidarity must from the outset deny the Soviet Union any 
possibility of exploiting SDI to split the alliance and sow 
public mistrust in the West." Alliance solidarity was deemed 
important for two reasons. First, because the Federal Republic 
was dependent on the United States for its security. And second 
because Alliance unity was essential to the success of the Geneva 
arms control negotiations. As Horst Telschik, Kohl's national 
security advisor^*, stated "We must be prepared for a difficult 
and protracted negotiating process. Setbacks will occur in [the] 
future, too. We need to be patient and must not arouse 
expectations that we cannot fulfill. The prerequisite for 
success is alliance solidarity..."
Kohl's government contended that a realistic decision on SDI 
participation was possible only if West Germany remained 
cognizant of the salient geopolitical realities that defined its 
security predicament. The Federal Republic was, according to 
Dregger, a "Middle power" that stood on "the border between East 
and West" in an "exposed position."7° He maintained that this 
vulnerability was rendered even more acute because, unlike her 
main adversary. West Germany did not possess nuclear weapons and
His official title was Director for Security and 
International Relations, Office of the Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
Ibid.
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could therefore only be the victim, and not the initiator, of a 
nuclear war. The German government explained that the United 
States guaranteed German security by risking "its own national 
existence, with her states and her p e o p l e . D r e g g e r  argued 
that in doing so the United States exposed itself to at least as 
great a risk as that to which West Germany herself was subject: 
"our situation is by nature full of risks because of our 
geographical proximity to the centre of E u r o p e , w h i l e  the 
United States voluntarily exposes itself to destruction in order 
to protect West Germany.
Nevertheless, vulnerability, argued Dregger, was a condition 
with which the United States was far from comfortable. It was 
therefore necessary to see Reagan's interest in SDI in its wider 
historical context. He reminded the Bundestag that until the 
advent of nuclear weapons, the United States was itself immune to 
physical threats to its survival, and he pointed out that this 
risk of destruction was even greater because she "guarantees our 
security with her troops and her atomic weapons on German 
soil"73 - a point, Dregger admonished, it would behoove his 
countrymen to consider occasionally. Under these circumstances 
Dregger saw it as only natural that the United States would 
pursue all available options to reestablish at least a modicum of 
its former invulnerability. In any event, he viewed SDI as a
Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
■^2 Ibid.
Ibid. . p. 14093.
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phenomenon over which the Federal Republic (and others) had 
little influence: "Neither we nor the Soviets can change it; it
is a fact from which we must start."?*
While the West German government opposed BMD deployment, it 
welcomed the Reagan Administration's assurances that should BMD 
deployment nevertheless occur the United States would attempt to 
engage the Soviet Union in a cooperative transition to a nuclear 
regime in which strategic defences would play a prominent role.
It believed that the American offer, if accepted by the Soviet 
Union, could eliminate some of the potential instabilities that 
would attend such a transition. Moreover, Bonn welcomed American 
proposals to open its laboratories to inspection, if the Soviet 
Union would agree to do likewise. It expressed disappointment 
with the Soviet Union's response to these proposals, but was 
pleased that the US had offered an arms control proposal that the 
Soviet Union had spurned.
Influence Through Involvement
Regardless of the Soviet Union's ultimate disposition toward 
a cooperative transition, the German government believed that the 
deployment of strategic defences "would fundamentally alter our 
strategic situation."?s And in the event of deployment, it 
would, above all, be necessary to avoid a situation in which 
European territory would be left unprotected while the
Ibid.
Ibid.
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superpowers would enjoy reduced vulnerability. To forestall such 
an eventuality was "in the existential interest of Europe,"^® 
and constituted a primary responsibility of the Federal 
Government. It was a responsibility that could not be exercised 
by merely standing on the sidelines of the SDI debate; it 
required obtaining "influence through involvement"?? in order 
to prevent the decoupling of European and American security 
through the establishment of zones of unequal security. Thus, 
given the need for increased German influence, eschewing 
participation was not seen as a serious option, for as Chancellor 
Kohl remarked, "he who participates has influence."^®
The West German government's stance toward participation was 
also influenced by what it deemed the growing vulnerability of 
Western Europe to ballistic missile attack. While Germany 
contended that this was a threat that required attention 
irrespective of the ultimate fate of SDI, it also allowed that it 
would be particularly important to counter theatre threats in the 
event of US and Soviet ballistic missile defence deployments. 
Through participation. West Germany believed that it would have 
access to technologies that would enable it to build an anti- 
tactical ballistic missile defence to counter the ballistic 
missile threat to Western Europe. The Federal government hoped
Ibid.
Ibid. Emphasis in original.
Helmut Kohl, Policy Statement to the Bundestag in Bonn, 
on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 18 April 1985, 
Statements & Speeches VII. 10 (19 April 1985), p. 4.
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that by spurring the development of such a system it could 
alleviate some of the decoupling effects that would attend the 
deployment of BMD*s on US and Soviet territory.
Most important, however, the West German government's 
believed that participating in SDI research would not unduly 
strain Soviet-German r e l a t i o n s . T h e  West German government 
had been subjected to a veritable barrage of Soviet threats 
concerning the consequences of its involvement in the US research 
programme. They were initially effective, especially at the 
Foreign Ministry, in evoking considerable concern. But in the 
aftermath of the November 1985 Geneva summit and the subsequent 
improvement in East-West relations these concerns subsided. West 
German officials maintained that the Soviet Union required 
cooperation with West Germany because she confronted the 
challenge of enhancing the productivity of her economy in order 
to maintain her position as a superpower. If the Soviet Union 
wished to achieve these objectives, she would have no choice but 
to continue her relationship with the West.8°
While the West German government continued to believe that 
the deployment of BMD's would cause increased offensive 
deployments and dash hopes for arms control agreements, they also 
contended that SDI was instrumental in bringing the Soviet Union
Dregger, op cit., p. 14094. 
Ibid.
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back to the negotiating table®^ and eliciting Soviet agreement 
to the principle of deep reductions in offensive forces.
Therefore it was reluctant to undermine the US negotiating 
position by making SDI a contentious transatlantic issue. West 
Germany was eager to express its support for the American 
research programme as a means of countering Soviet attempts to 
split the US and Europe. Thus, although the German government 
was far from sanguine about the implications of actual 
deployment, it was clearly eager for research to continue as it 
viewed this as essential to the success of a potential tradeoff 
between offensive and defensive weapons that could establish a 
more stable basis for mutual deterrence.®^ In this regard,
German officials were reassured by the Reagan Administration's 
statements concerning its intention to conduct research within 
the confines of the ABM Treaty. Further, they were pleased by 
the American guarantee that research did not imply an automatic 
commitment to deploy ballistic missile defences.
The West German government believed that whatever the 
ultimate fate of SDI, research into advanced ballistic missile 
defence concepts would produce potentially decisive technological 
innovations which it could ill afford to ignore. West Germany, 
whose economy was highly dependent on exports, was already 
fearful of falling behind the United States and Japan
®^  Manfred Worner, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. 
10 Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokoll 10/1985, 13 December
1985, p. 14101.
®2 Ibid.
326
technologically; consequently, it was particularly eager to 
enhance its access to the results of SDI research -something 
which they thought only participation would enable them to do. 
Chancellor Kohl voiced his government's concerns as early as 
April 1985 when he stated that "we must ensure that the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Western Europe do not lose touch with 
technological developments and thereby become second-class 
powers."83
The West German decision to participate was facilitated by 
Britain's decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
United States, for this allayed concerns within the Federal 
Republic concerning singularization. The West German government 
was reluctant to expose itself to the charge that it was being 
made to shoulder burdens that no other West European country was 
being asked to bear. This was particularly important for Kohl 
who had often been pilloried by SPD for his alacrity in 
accomadating American wishes.
The SPD's Opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative
The SPD was extremely critical of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. As early as 1979, the SPD proposed that negotiations 
be joined on the question of space weapons, with a view to their 
eventual banishment. The SPD's position on space weapons 
remained negative in the ensuing four years. Not surprisingly.
83 Kohl, Policy Statement to the Bundestag on the SDI, 18 
April 1985, pp. cit., p. 5.
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then, the SPD was critical of the Reagan Administration's 
initiative. They believed that SDI would destabilize the current 
strategic situation, render agreement at Geneva exceedingly 
difficult, damage European security, and jeopardize the ABM 
Treaty. The Party leadership naturally opposed German 
participation in the research programme. They argued that a 
decision to participate in research was indistinguishable from 
endorsement of deployment, that European research would be 
needlessly militarized, that technology transfer would favour the 
United States, that the US-German agreement would stifle trade 
with the East. And, finally, they held that Europe, rather than 
respond to the technological challenge posed by SDI by jointly 
improving the European technological base, was foreclosing this 
option by agreeing to cooperation with the United States.
Initially, the SPD reacted favourably to the views about 
nuclear deterrence that Reagan articulated in his March 23, 1983 
speech. They interpreted his statement as a rejection of the 
deterrence doctrine that they, too, had been opposing and saw 
many similarities between their and his views on nuclear 
weapons®*:
The remark made by President Reagan in March 1983 that the 
strategy of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction 
must be superseded was read with both the understanding and 
support of the SPD. What President Reagan said then and in 
subsequent speeches could be viewed as being directly 
connected with the demands of the peace movement: the need
This fact was not lost on the government. In fact one of 
the criticisms that Kohl's government had of SDI was that 
it tended to support the views of the peace movement.
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to replace the strategy of mutual destruction with a 
strategy of mutual assured security, the goal of making 
nuclear weapons superfluous with the aid of conventional 
weapons, the demand for offensive weapons to be superseded 
by defensive systems, and the need to elaborate joint 
security concepts with the Soviet Union;®®
The SPD even claimed to see in Reagan's speech an endorsement for 
their proposal to develop a "security partnership between the 
East and the West" through which a "partnership for survival" 
would replace the "balance of nuclear terror."®®
The SPD's approval of the goals articulated by the American 
President did not extend to the manner in which he proposed to 
realize them. While they agreed with Reagan's goal of 
transcending nuclear deterrence, "the solutions offered by 
President Reagan for attaining these goals are unsuitable, in the 
SPD's view. "®^ They believed that instead of promoting the 
objectives stated in the American President's speech, SDI would 
lead to increased instability, an arms build-up, and an increase, 
not a decrease in offensive deployments. More broadly, the SPD 
argued that in attempting to address security problems through a 
weapons programme, the Reagan Administration was falling prey to 
the fundamental fallacy of attempting to solve political problems
85
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through technical means.®® As the SPD Parliamentary group 
remarked:
Unlike the Social Democrats, who want to achieve stability, 
security and a defensive capability not through weapons but 
primarily through dialogue, treaties and confidence 
building, i.e. through political solutions, the US President 
relies on solving a political problem by technical means. 
This approach has never worked in the past, nor will it in 
the future.®®
The SPD insisted that in the face of "weapons of mass 
destruction," East and West could no longer achieve security 
"against one another, but only with one another."®® This was 
particularly true, they argued, given the impossibility of 
erecting perfect or near perfect defences.
The SPD opposed what they regarded as the Reagan 
Administration's departure from the original goals of the SDI 
programme. The Social Democrats lamented what they perceived as 
the virtual abandonment of Reagan's "original philosophy" of 
transcending mutual assured destruction and its replacement with 
the idea of making the "old strategy of deterrence" simply "more 
effective."®! Accordingly, the SPD was not enamoured by the 
notion that by denying the Soviet Union militarily plausible
88
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attack options, nuclear deterrence could be enhanced.
The Social Democrats feared that rather than enhance
deterrence, any American attempt to deploy strategic defences
would upset the equilibrium of the strategic regime of mutual
assured destruction. They stressed that:
The precarious stability of a system of assured retaliatory 
response would be vitiated if one of the two sides were to 
unilaterally preside over a functional strategic defence 
system while simultaneously possessing offensive weapons 
with which they could threaten the existence of the other 
side. The precarious stability would no longer mean mutual 
stability, rather the superiority of one side over the other 
and thereby instability with unforeseeable political and
military consequences.*2
A one-sided American deployment was not, however, an eventuality 
that the Social Democrats deemed likely. They believed that the 
Soviet Union would never allow the United States to obtain 
superiority through unilateral deployments: "The Soviets will
not await the outcome of the US programme, but step up their 
efforts to improve their offensive capacity once they feel that 
they are unable to keep abreast of the United States in space 
technology.
In addition to the offensive countermeasures, the Soviet 
Union would deploy defensive systems of its own the resulting, 
not in the abolition of nuclear weapons but in an offensive and
SPD Presidium Zur Strateaischen Verteidiaunasinitiative 
von President Reaaan. o p . cit., p. 7.
93 SDI and Europe's Interests, o p . cit., p. 7.
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defensive arms race.** Indeed if strategic defences were 
deployed, the Social Democrats foresaw the gravest consequences: 
in addition to the "termination of the ABM Treaty" a decision to 
deploy strategic defences would probably mean the end of the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in which case 
the Soviet Union "would be at liberty" to deploy nuclear weapons 
against the American space defence system."*^
Underlying the SPD's position on SDI was a fundamentally 
different approach to what the Germans refer to as security 
policy. The Social Democrats were convinced that SDI could not 
provide, especially in Europe, a perfect defence against nuclear 
weapons, and was therefore incapable of transcending the doctrine 
of nuclear deterrence. For the SPD this meant that, even if SDI 
were to succeed in enhancing deterrence, the outcome of a war 
between the United States and the Soviet Union would still be the 
nuclear destruction of West Germany. For this reason, the SPD 
opposed the entire concept of achieving security through nuclear 
deterrence and opted instead to "surmount the existing system of 
deterrence" by political means. This did not require that one 
love his political adversary, but he must at least try to 
understand his motives. The notion that the system of mutual 
deterrence can be rendered obsolete by introducing new weapons 
technologies is a technological fallacy. Reconciliation cannot
** SPD Presidium zur Strateaischen Verteidiaunasinitiative 
von President Reaaan. o p . cit., p. 7.
95 SDI and Europe's Interests, o p . cit.. p. 4.
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be enforced by means of technology.^® In short, the Social 
Democrats viewed the attainment of security as a "political and 
not military-technical task."*?
While the opposition of the SPD to the West German 
government's willingness to sign an MoU with the US government 
did not derail the government's plans, the opposition played a 
somewhat more significant role in the West German debate about 
participation in SDI research than it did in Britain. Kohl had 
to be particularly sensitive to the possibility that the SPD 
would succeed in arousing public opposition to his policy toward 
participation in SDI research. The government, therefore, made 
great efforts to refute the arguments of the SPD and ensure that 
they did not gain wide-spread public acceptance.
The SPD's stance toward participation in SDI research was 
important for another reason as well. Kohl had to consider the 
possibility that the FDP could form a coalition with the SPD.
The possibility that the FDP would abandon its coalition with the 
CDU/CSU meant that Kohl had to pay particular attention to the 
views of his Foreign Minister Genscher who saw himself and his 
party as guardians of Ostpolitik and detente within the 
coalition. Indeed, because of the opposition of the FDP, 
negotiations with the United States were delayed, the Economics 
Minister rather than the Defence Minister conducted the 
negotiations, and the MoU prohibited any direct West German
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governmental participation in SDI research. Yet despite the 
reluctance of the FDP to enter into an MoU with the Reagan 
Administration, they believed that to fail to do so would not 
only split the coalition but also could damage Alliance unity.
Opposition to Participation in SDI Research Within the Centre- 
Right Coalition
The German government's stance toward SDI participation was 
complicated by disagreements within the ruling Centre-Right 
coalition. While the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) were eager to sign a memorandum 
of understanding (MoU) that would allow government participation 
in SDI research, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) led by Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher advocated a more cautious 
approach. The Federal Government's decision to pursue 
participation in SDI research was thus conditional and limited - 
a reflection in no small measure of the wishes of the FDP.
The divisions within Kohl's coalition were prominently on 
display when the Bundestag debated the question of the Federal 
Republic's stance toward participation in SDI research. While 
both the FDP and the CDU/CSU speakers claimed to speak for the 
Government, the rationale they offered, as well as the differing 
emphasis that each party accorded to commonly held positions, 
revealed the extent of disagreement within the centre-right 
government.
The FDP was above all concerned to dispel the impression
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that a decision to negotiate terms for SDI research indicated a
deepening of German political support for SDI. The State
Minister in the Foreign Ministry, Mollemann, therefore stated
that the Federal Government's position, as articulated in March
and April of 1985, had not changed, though he avoided repeating
the staple formulation - "the SDI programme is politically
necessary and in the security interests of the West as a
whole."98 Instead, he emphasized the non-political nature of
any prospective negotiations with the United States:
The question whether collaboration of German firms and 
research Institutes in the SDI research programme requires 
safeguarding through government arrangements is first and 
foremost a question of technical, economic and legal 
usefulness. This is what the decision that the Federal 
Government will reach is about; not about a political 
statement, which was already made on March 27 and April 18 
of this year and, as I have already stated, remain 
valid.**
Thus for the FDP, the question of negotiations with the United 
States "solely concerned the decision whether the legal and 
technical fundamentals for the cooperation of German enterprises 
and Institutes" with their American counterparts "in the realm of 
technology and research are sufficient or whether they need to be 
improved (e.g.,actualized). Mischnik emphasized that under 
no circumstances would this entail government participation or 
funding for research efforts.
*® Helmut Kohl, Policy Statement to the Bundestag in Bonn on 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 18 April 1985, 
pp. cit., p. 2.
** Mollemann, pp. cit., p. 14106. Emphasis in the original. 
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Mollemann explained that the West German government 
supported SDI "especially in view of the Soviet research efforts 
and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union presides over, and 
is modernizing, the only functional ABM system. Despite
arguing that it would be irresponsible to neglect the 
possibilities offered by new technologies, Mollemann, unlike 
Worner, did not evince any genuine enthusiasm for a change in 
strategy or elaborate what advantages could accrue to the West 
through SDI. Indeed, his comments concerning the possible 
benefits to be derived from SDI seemed perfunctory and were 
largely designed to deflect SPD criticism about the FDP's support 
for SDI. In short, Mollemann saw nothing to indicate that 
strategic defences would offer benefits over the existing 
strategic regime. Accordingly, Mollemann stressed that "SDI is 
at this time nothing less, but also nothing more than a research 
programme. " He maintained that it was impossible to 
determine whether the vision of a perfect defence that animated 
Reagan's initiative would succeed in its objective in rendering 
nuclear weapons useless and redundant, or whether a more limited 
defence would be a more likely eventuality. In any event, he 
maintained that irrespective of whether either vision became a 
reality, SDI had affected profoundly the strategic discussion 
within the Alliance.
The FDP insisted that the strategic and political unity of
Ibid.
102 Mollemann, pp. pit., p. 14106. Emphasis in the original.
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the Alliance was essential to West German security. They argued 
that the strategy of flexible response had successfully fulfilled 
these requirements by creating a joint deterrent strategy. 
Therefore in contemplating changes in this strategy the FDP 
considered it essential that deliberations occur "within the 
Alliance as a whole." Mollemann argued that in this connection 
it "becomes all the more significant that the specifically 
European position in the WEU be discussed and tabled."
The FDP regarded the question of whether SDI would lead to 
greater East- West strategic stability as central to their 
evaluation of the American initiative. Essential to ensuring 
that SDI would indeed contribute to this objective were the 
Geneva negotiations which they regarded as providing a glimmer of 
hope. Mollemann contended that only through establishing a joint 
definition of the relationship between offence and defence could 
the Geneva negotiations fulfil their promise of establishing a 
new basis for strategic stability, and he stated that the 
negotiations must lead to cooperative solutions.
This preference for a cooperative solution reflected the 
FDP's belief that, in the nuclear age, attempts to achieve 
security through autonomous actions must be eschewed in favour of 
joint and mutually agreed upon solutions. The FDP saw in the 
Geneva negotiations the opportunity for not only achieving 
substantial agreements governing specific categories of weapons, 
but also for laying the foundation for a new security order. In
103 Mollemann, pp. pit., p. 14107. Emphasis added.
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essence, they viewed the approach being followed in the Geneva 
negotiations as the embodiment of the Harmel concept, which 
advocated simultaneously pursuing defence preparedness and 
improved East-West r e l a t i o n s . P r i m a r i l y  because of the 
importance that they accorded the Geneva talks, the FDP condemned 
the SPD's refusal to support SDI research on the grounds that it 
would weaken the Western negotiating position and reduce the 
possibilities for agreement. At the same time, however, the FDP 
viewed it as essential that SDI be regarded as negotiable at the 
Geneva talks.
The FDP insisted that the "ABM Treaty must be strictly 
observed, as long as no better regime can replace it."^°^ 
Mollemann also approvingly noted American statements that 
although a loose interpretation of the treaty was correct, the 
United States would abide by the strict interpretation. Mollemann 
reiterated that any move to go beyond the ABM Treaty should be a 
matter for "consultations between Alliance partners.
The Decision to Negotiate About Participation in SDI Research
As a result of disagreements within the German government, a 
decision regarding whether, or to what extent, the Federal 
Republic would participate was not immediately agreed upon. In 
deference to the wishes of the junior, yet vastly influential.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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coalition partner, the West German government announced that it 
would not seek an immediate agreement with the United States on 
German participation in SDI research; instead it would send 
Economics Minister, Martin Bangemann, to Washington, D.C. to 
negotiate a possible agreement. The choice of the economics 
minister to negotiate for the German government was significant. 
It reflected the coalition's intention - under strong pressure 
from Genscher -to emphasize the economic rather than the 
strategic or political nature of its decision to seek 
participation. The primacy afforded economic and technological 
considerations was evident in the opening paragraph explaining 
the government's decision to negotiate with the United States.
The Federal Government wants to reach an agreement with 
the United States on an improvement in the exchange of 
scientific research findings and technological 
discoveries. Private research should also be
enhanced.
The government's portrayal of the negotiations as primarily 
concerned with issues of technology transfer constituted a signal 
that the government was reluctant to associate itself too closely 
with SDI lest the decision to negotiate be misconstrued as an 
endorsement of the strategic concepts underlying the US 
initiative. The wording of the government's statement announcing 
its intention to enter into negotiations with the United States
Erklarung der Bundesregierung zum Kabinetts beschluss 
uber eine Deutsche Beteilung an der SDI - Forschung, 
abgegeben in Bonn um 18 December 1985, reprinted in 
Europe Archive. No. 12, 25 June 1986, p. D-321.
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reflected the limited nature of the coalitions support for SDI: 
"The Federal government announces its political support for the 
American research programme that was brought into being by 
SDI."108
The government's rather tortured attempt to distinguish 
between the SDI and the research programme itself underlined West 
Germany's desire to separate the issues of research and 
deployment. Moreover by qualifying the word "support" with 
"political" and indicating its support for research rather than 
for SDI itself, the Government managed to condemn the programme 
with faint praise. The importance that the German government 
attached to this distinction was emphasized again in a government 
statement in October: "The Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany firmly rejects the idea of SDI research automatically 
leading to development and deployment of a strategic defence 
system.
The German government emphasized that in entering into 
negotiations with the United States it was not contemplating any 
governmental participation in SDI research. Bonn would therefore 
not place any of its own assets at the disposal of the United
108 Ibid.. p. D-320.
188 Herr Friedhelm Ost, Government Spokesman, Statement on 
the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), issued 
in Bonn on October 14, 1985, Press Department Embassy of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 Belgrave Square, 
London, p. 1.
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S t a t e s . T h i s  represented another concession to the Free 
Democrats who, worried about the effect of German governmental 
participation on relations with the Soviet Union, pressed 
successfully its demands that the Federal Government not directly 
participate in the American research programme.
The German government reiterated the importance it attached 
to close consultation with the United States on all matters 
pertaining to the Strategic Defense Initiative. It regarded 
these consultations as "indispensable and emphasizes the 
significance that the United States attaches to agreement with 
its Allies. In this regard the strategic and arms control 
implications of SDI research are of the utmost importance." In 
this connection the Federal government reiterated its desire to 
see SDI research lead to cooperative solutions with the Soviet 
Union.Ill The German government also expressed its desire for
a joint European position on SDI.
The Bavarian-based CSU was critical of the compromise to 
which Chancellor Kohl agreed. Franz-Josef Strauss, the minister- 
president of Bavaria, publicly voiced his disapproval at the 
limited degree of support inherent in the government's statement. 
He opposed the naming of the economics minister to lead the 
German negotiating team, contending that as the negotiations 
would be conducted with the US Department of Defense, these
11° ErklcLrung der Bundesregierung zum Kabinettsbeschluss über 
eine Deutsche Beteilung an der SDI-Forschung op. cit., p. 
D-321.
Ill Ibid.
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matters were the appropriate preserve of the Federal Ministry of 
Defence. Strauss's position was consistent with his long­
standing criticism of Kohl's SDI policy. Strauss argued that the 
coalition's equivocation harmed German interests by creating an 
impression of unreliability that would undermine the significance 
of any prospective agreement on SDI participation.
The West German-US MoU
The negotiations between the Federal Republic and the United 
States on the proposed Memorandum of Understanding were prolonged 
as a result of disagreements about the degree of technological 
sharing between the United States and Germany. The West German 
goverment demanded that, as a price for their participation. West 
German firms should have the right of access to any research 
findings to which their expertise contributed. The United States 
government was most concerned to prevent the results of SDI 
research from reaching the Soviet Union via German firms. 
Eventually, these issues were satisfactorily resolved. After the 
personal intervention of the German Chancellor and the American 
Secretary of Defense, outstanding issues in the negotiations were 
resolved. On March 27, the United States and the Federal 
Republic signed a MoU governing the manner in which German firms 
would participate in SDI research as well as a general agreement
This is of course exactly what Strauss's rival, Genscher, 
hoped it would do.
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on technology t r a n s f e r A l t h o u g h  the terms of the agreement 
were to be kept secret, shortly following the signing, the 
contents of the agreement were leaked and published in a German 
newspaper.
In deference to German wishes, the MoU contained two 
separate agreements: one concerned an overall improvement in US-
German technology exchange; the other pertained to specific 
stipulations governing the participation of German firms in SDI 
research. The Federal Republic insisted on the former so that it 
could more plausibly emphasize the civilian nature of the 
agreement, while the United States, which was eager to show 
allied support for SDI, emphasized the agreement governing the 
participation of Germany industry in SDI research.
When Bangemann delivered the government's official statement 
on the negotiations, he stressed the importance of the common 
basic agreement. He argued that it had fulfilled the mandate he 
was given by the Federal Cabinet in December to promote "a mutual 
exchange of scientific research results and cooperation of 
science and the economy in research, production, and 
m a r k e t i n g . H e  stated that "those goals" had "been fully
115 Signing of U.S.-German SDI Agreement and Joint
Understanding of Principles News Release, March 27, 1986, 
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), Washington, D.C., p. 1.
11^ See Kolner Express. April 18, 1986.
115 Martin Bangemann, "Bangemann Briefs Bundestag on SDI
Agreement," 17 April 1986, in FBIS-WE, 18 April 1986, p. 
J-4.
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accepted by the U.S. Government and integrated into the common 
basic agreement." Bangemann emphasized that the agreement
does not - and I stress this expressly because it was the 
subject of discussion - envisage additional restrictions 
going beyond export limitations valid in the FRG. The 
Federal Government maintains that the foreign trade law, 
with its regulations, is the place where stipulations should 
be made that are necessary in the alliance's common security 
interests. That will remain as it is. The Federal 
Government will not stipulate foreign trade controls outside 
that legal framework.n*
This provision was accorded particular importance by the German 
government because it had been subjected to the charge that in 
establishing rules for maximizing the benefits to German industry 
with respect to technology transfer, it was sacrificing too much 
in the coin of export restrictions, a longstanding point of 
contention between Washington and Bonn.
Bangemann stressed that the agreement regulating the 
participation of German firms in SDI research did not involve 
governmental participation. He emphasized that the German 
government would not provide financial assistance for the 
American research programme, but that "the Federal Government 
does, however, support German industry in establishing contacts 
with the U.S. administration."117
Bangemann emphasized that the MoU did not constitute an 
endorsement of moving beyond the research phase. "Decisions about
11^ Ibid.. pp. J-4-5
117 Ibid.. p. J-6.
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developing and deploying strategic defence systems are not,” he 
stated, "the subject of the agreement, nor does the U.S. side 
expect them before the beginning of the next decade. The 
agreement does not detail any advance decision in that 
r e s p e c t . I n  order to stress the importance which the 
Federal Government attached to the distinction between research 
and deployment, the economics minster stated emphatically that 
"the so-called firewall between research and application of 
research results - a phrase Lord Carrington coined - has been set 
up. "119
The Federal Government went to great lengths to underline 
the conditional nature of its support for SDI research.
Bangemann reiterated the government's aversion to any automatic 
movement from research to deployment. He remarked that SDI 
research while certainly being pursued with a military intention, 
was nevertheless for the time being concerned with the 
"theoretical exploration of such military intentions. It does not 
proceed to application," and as such does not "stipulate the 
option of applying its results."i^°
The Federal Government, therefore, accorded enormous 
significance to the MoU's explicit reference to the Reagan 
Administration's policy of conducting SDI research in accordance 
with the ABM Treaty.
11® Ibid.. p. J-5.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
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This Agreement will be implemented in accordance with 
existing national and international laws and legal 
obligations of the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Government of the United States of 
America as well as on the part of the United States in 
compliance with the American-Soviet ABM Treaty of
1972.121
The German government argued that this statement "expressly
guaranteed" that SDI research would not necessarily "proceed to
a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s  was deemed particularly important by the
German government in its desire to see the research lead to
cooperative solutions with the Soviet Union.
Above all, Bangemann attempted to dispel the impression that
the Federal Government's decision to sign the MoU represented a
shift in the government's policy toward SDI.
In conclusion, I want to point out quite clearly that 
signing the accords on SDI research does not constitute a 
change in the policy consistently pursued by the Federal 
Government of actively contributing to East-West arms 
control and disarmament efforts. The statement by the 
Federal chancellor on 18 April 1985, that it is our goal to 
create peace with fewer and fewer weapons and to establish 
more stability in East-West relations still holds true.
That is also the guideline of our policy regarding the U.S.
SDI project.123
While ostensibly merely a reiteration of German SDI policy, this 
statement was a subtle attempt to indicate that considerations of 
arms control and East-West relations were paramount for the FDP 
and that "political support for SDI" would be jeopardized if SDI 
deployments would endanger the prospects of either. Accordingly,
121 This translation of the MoU appears in Ivo H. Daalder,
The SDI Challenge to Europe, o p . cit.. p. 113.
122 Bangemann, op. cit., p. J-5.
123 Ibid.. p. J-8.
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Bangemann, echoing Kohl's statements of April 18, 1985, stated 
that
the Federal Government believes it to be indispensable to 
find cooperative solutions, before decisions are made on 
matters other than research. Ladies and gentleman, we 
continue to hope for an implementation of the U.S.-Soviet 
joint statement in Geneva on 8 January, that both side [sic] 
strive for negotiations whose goal it is to draw up 
effective agreements to prevent the arms race in space and 
put an end to it on e a r t h . 2^4
Significantly, Bangemann, unlike CDU speakers, did not assert
that SDI could contribute to the success of these negotiations,
leaving the impression that only the abandonment of SDI could
achieve the FDP's desired objectives. This view was fully in
accordance with long standing FDP opposition to deployment.
In a further effort to dispel the impression that the
Federal government's decision to sign an MoU represented a
deepening German support for SDI, Bangemann emphasized that the
MoU did not involve agreement about "strategic SDI issues". The
FDP argued that these issues should not be discussed bilaterally
but in the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, in order to
"preserve the Alliance context and promote European security
interests." And, (in a sentence that was omitted from the
English language version of the speech that the Federal Economics
ministry issued), Bangemann stressed (to applause in the
Bundestag) that "Anyone who would prevent such a discussion in
the Alliance, or replace it with individual discussions between
Ibid.
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countries, would harm the interests of the Federal 
R e p u b l i c . T h i s  scarcely veiled reference to and criticism 
of the US SDI policy, reflected the FDP's opposition to American 
attempts to deal bilaterally on SDI issues and thus thwart 
European (and, specifically in Germany, Genscherite) efforts to 
forge a joint European positions. Under these circumstances the 
FDP was eager to see the MoU portrayed primarily as an agreement 
that would improve the conditions under which German firms would 
participate and not portrayed as an incipient US-German 
conceptual convergence on SDI itself, as this would interfere 
with efforts to forge a joint European position.
Kohl's Defence of the MoU
In defending the US-German MoU, Kohl placed greater emphasis 
on the political and strategic considerations that contributed to 
the Federal Republic's ultimate disposition vis-a-vis the 
American research programme. Kohl stressed the potentially 
profound impact of SDI. He pointed out that both the Soviet 
Union and the United States were pursuing strategic defence 
research, that it was a development that could not be stopped, 
that it would have profound implications for European security, 
and that it could have positive influences on the strategic 
balance. Under these circumstances the Chancellor characterized 
assertions that the Federal Republic should distance itself as 
far as possible from SDI, as irresponsible; instead he argued
Bangemann, op. cit., p. J-5.
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that participation would enhance German influence over the 
programme, allowing Germany to safeguard her security interests.
Kohl opposed making "strategic defense and especially the 
SDI program a focal point of East-West relations and to 
subordinate all other issues to this s u b j e c t . W h i l e  he 
conceded that "in view of the tension in the world it has a 
special effect on East-West r e l a t i o n s , K o h l  stated that he 
had "always maintained that East-West relations cannot be limited 
to disarmament and arms control or even merely SDI."^^® Kohl 
believed that "it is most important to point out repeatedly that 
East-West relations are of a manifold nature and that these 
relations contain political, military, economic, scientific - 
technological, and cultural elements of great importance to 
us."129 Kohl felt compelled to emphasize this point in order 
to refute assertions by his domestic critics that in signing the 
MoU with the United States, his government had badly damaged the 
prospects for improving German-Soviet relations. It also 
reflected a calculation that he would be able to effect an 
improvement in German Soviet relations even in the face of Soviet 
displeasure with the Federal Republic's stance toward SDI.
Kohl believed that a realistic policy for the Federal
Helmut Kohl, Speech to Bundestag in US-FRG MoU. 17 April 
1986, in FBIS-WE, 18 April 1986, P. J-8.
2^7 Ibid.
^28 Ibid.. p. J-9.
2^8 Ibid.
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Republic vis-a-vis SDI would have to begin by recognizing that no 
one could prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from 
conducting ballistic missile defence research. Furthermore, he 
held that the results of this research "will thoroughly change 
the strategic conditions which until now have preserved peace in 
freedom. German and European security interests are directly 
affected by it."^^° In this connection Kohl deemed it 
essential that SDI "not separate us Europeans from the United 
States —  not technologically, not strategically, not 
politically."131 Kohl conceded that with the development of 
strategic defences "there are, of course, risks that must be 
overcome," and that "Europe's security, including Germany's 
security, must not be of secondary importance."132 under these 
circumstances, he argued that "political common sense makes it 
absolutely necessary to prepare now for such foreseeable 
developments."133 Moreover, it requires not only a 
"cooperative attitude among the Alliance partners, but also 
making use of joint East-West interests."13*
Accordingly, Kohl attached the greatest importance to 
enhancing Bonn's influence over the direction of SDI and saw 
German participation in SDI as the only realistic means by which
130 Ibid.. p. J-11.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. J-10.
133 Ibid.. p. J-11.
134 Ibid.. p. J-13.
350
to exercise this influence. He stated that "information, 
consultation, and participation in research are indispensable 
elements of the Federal Government's long term policy aimed at 
the cohesion of the Alliance and ensuring peace in Europe.
He criticized the SPD's opposition to SDI research on the grounds 
that their opposition to participation would leave West Germany 
without a voice in the "decisionmaking process" that is vital to 
the future security of the Federal R e p u b l i c .
Kohl reiterated that his government's policy was still 
predicated on the contribution that SDI could make to "safeguard 
peace, reliably prevent wars, and drastically to reduce the 
armament level in general and in nuclear weapons in 
particular."137 He thus restated his government's support for 
"the joint U.S.-Soviet statement of 8 January 1985 which forms 
the basis of the present efforts to prevent an arms race on earth 
and in space. In that respect the Strategic Defense Initiative 
may well be an important v e h i c l e . "138
Kohl argued that, if anything, SDI had spurred progress at 
Geneva. He stated that "we cannot but find today that the Soviet 
Union has submitted drastic reduction proposals only after the 
U.S. President promulgated his initiative in March 1983;"13®
135 Ibid.. p. J-12. 
135 Ibid.
137 Ibid. . p. J-10.
138 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
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He voiced his conviction that "defense systems will provide the 
certainty that despite the remaining capability of building 
nuclear weapons, it would be nonsensical to do so."i*° This 
realization he believed could lay the foundation for an agreement 
that would allow the West to "pursue a reduction plan that would 
render offensive nuclear weapons increasingly more useless 
through defense s y s t e m s , e n a b l i n g  each side to establish a 
new basis for strategic stability
in which both sides come to terms on a drastic 
reduction of offensive nuclear systems, establish a 
limited number of strategic defense systems, maybe only 
ground-based, in a joint interpretation of strategic 
stability taking into account the overall military
power ratio.142
Kohl viewed this eventuality as increasingly realistic. He 
argued that the United States and Soviet Union "have parallel 
interests" that "could...lead to u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e  
stressed that both the United States and the Soviet Union had an 
interest in minimizing the "uncertainty about technological and 
strategic d e v e l o p m e n t s "144 and declared himself encouraged by 
signs of flexibility in Moscow.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
144 Ibid.
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IV. THE FRENCH REACTION TO THE US PARTICIPATION OFFER
French Rejection of Participation in SDI Research
Unlike the British and German governments, the French 
government quickly rejected the Reagan Administration's offer to 
participate in SDI research, stating that "there was no question 
of France joining in the program as it is conceived at this 
p o i n t . "145 Also, unlike its British and West German Allies,
French officials did not have to contend with an opposition which 
disagreed vehemently with its policy toward SDI. While Chirac 
and other opposition figures occasionally chided Mitterrand for 
his overly negative reaction to SDI, there was little substantive 
disagreement in France about SDI. Both the Left and the Right 
were opposed to the deployment of BMDs and official government 
participation in the SDI research programme.
Roland Dumas, French Minister of External Relations, 
elaborated on the rationale underlying France's refusal of the 
American participation offer when he asked the French Assembly 
during a foreign policy debate: "But how could we reply to the 
invitation to participate in carrying out something we don't know 
about, something whose importance we cannot judge, when nowhere 
is there any proposal for us to share in the decision-making.
4^5 Roland Dumas, Speech on French Television, 5 May 1985. 
Documents from France, French Embassy Press and 
Information Service, Washington D.C., Volume 85/11, p. 2.
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which in our eyes is c r u c i a l ? F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Francois 
Mitterrand, President of the Republic, stated that France would 
not participate in a project that "would put France in a 
subordinate position. I refuse, that's all. That's the reason, it 
is as simple as that."!*? This emphatic and characteristically 
Gaullist rejection of the American offer reflected the French 
President's view that the United States was not prepared to 
accept Europeans as full partners in its initiative. For the 
French President, this perception was confirmed at the May summit 
where, Reagan, attempting to solicit European support for SDI, 
infelicitously described the role he envisaged for Europeans as 
"sub-contractor"!*® to American firms. As Mitterrand said 
later, this "confirmed what I suspected."!*® Clearly, for 
Mitterrand's government, participation on this basis was 
incompatible with its conception of France and its role in world 
affairs, for it would place France in a position in which she 
"would not be on an equal footing"!®® with the United States.
!*® Roland Dumas, Speech during the foreign policy debate at 
the National Assembly (11 June 1985), Documents from 
France, French Embassy Press and Information Service, 
Washington D.C., Vol. 85/15, p. 5.
!*? Francois Mitterrand, Television Interview, 15 December 
1985, Speeches and Statements. Service de Presse et 
d'information. Ambassade de France a Londres, London, 24 
December 1985, p. 2.
^48 Ibid.
Ibid.
ISO "Mitterrand Discusses Bonn Summit, SDI, FRG Ties," FBIS- 
WE, 10 May 1985, p. K-1.
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Moreover, France feared that such iniquitous arrangements would 
only exacerbate the existing problem of the "brain drain" from 
Europe to the United States.
Eureka as a Counter to SDI
In order to forestall the various baleful effects that it 
believed would occur if other European nations decided to 
participate in SDI research, the French Government offered its 
European partners an alternative in the form of Eureka. While 
Mitterrand claimed that Eureka "is not a response to SDI,"^^^ 
the French Minister of Research and Technology, Hurbert Curien 
conceded that SDI "induced us to submit our proposals more 
r a p i d l y . F r e n c h  officials also contended that while it 
involved research in many of the same areas that were being 
investigated by SDI, Eureka "is not comparable to SDI and is not 
meant to compete with i t . O n  the other hand, the French 
government allowed; "It is likely that a competition for the 
allocation of these resources will actually take place in those 
European countries that consider participating in the American
Ibid.
Francois Mitterrand, Interview published in the Japanese 
Daily "Yomiuri Shimbun," 27 April 1986, Statements and 
Speeches. Service de Presse et d*Information, London, 2 
May 1986, p. 4.
Hurbert Curien, Interview on Eureka, Frankfurter 
Rundschau. 12 June 1985, p. 2.
154 Eureka. Documents from France, French Embassy Press and 
Information Service, Vol.21, September 1985, p. 1.
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p r o g r a m . I n  any event, the French government contended 
that "With or without the SDI, the European technological 
community is vital to u s . "1^6 Dumas related:
the challenge represented by the greatly increased 
importance of the high technology around which the future of 
our industrial civilizations is being built. The 
Community's autonomy - and thus ours - will, between now and 
the end of the century, depend on the extent of its skills 
in these new areas.iS'
Thus, as Mitterrand argued, "if Europe wants a secure future in
the nineties and beyond, it is right now that a great
technological surge is n e e d e d . "1^8 indeed, a major "challenge
for Europe," according to France, was "to bring European
technology up to the level of the know-how and technological
capabilities that have been attained by the United States and
Japan."159 Mitterrand maintained that this was imperative:
155 Ibid.
155 See The Observer. 2 June 85, p. 1, reprinted in FBIS-WE, 
3 June 1985, Similarly Charles Hernu remarked: "A
technologically advanced Europe is necessary, with or 
without the Strategic Defense Initiative." as quoted in 
International Defense Review June 1985, p. 858.
15^  Roland Dumas, Speech during the Foreign policy debate at 
National Assembly, op. cit.. p. 5.
15® Francois Mitterrand, Interview in Europep, 13 June 1985, 
as reprinted in Eureka. Documents from France, French 
Embassy Press and Information Service, Vol. 21, September 
1985. p. 4.
159 Eureka, Documents from France, French Embassy Press and 
Information Service, Vol. 21, September 1985, p. 1.
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"Otherwise we will simply lose control of our destiny.
While Eureka may have found its origins in the Versailles 
conference of 1982, it was the presentation of SDI that clarified 
the importance of technology and provided the impetus for 
Eureka*s speedy and forceful articulation.
The French government saw Eureka as "a mechanism designed by 
the Europeans to pool their scientific knowledge to carry out 
high technology projects in civilian s p h e r e s . M o r e  
specifically, Mitterrand conceived his initiative as "a 'variable 
geometry* federation of projects decided on by the industrialists 
and researched in liaison with the Governments and the 
Commission, in sectors of key importance for the future"^®^ 
with special emphasis given to "areas where European cooperation 
needs a boost."1^3 Mitterrand wanted to avoid Eureka becoming 
a large bureaucracy and preferred that it be financed 
"preferentially by the private s e c t o r . A c c o r d i n g l y ,  France 
insisted that "Each project will be carried out under the 
authority of industrial firms by research teams which will have
Francois Mitterrand, Interview by Giuliano Ferrieri, 22 
June 1985, p. 4, reprinted in FBIS-WE, 23 June 1985, p. 
J-4.
Paul Quiles, interview by Jean Guisnel, Liberation. 10 
December 1985, pp. 5, 6, reprinted in FBIS-WE, 20
December 1985, p. K-3.
Mitterrand, Interview in Eurooeo. o p . cit.. p. 4.
163 Eureka. o p . cit.. p. 1.
Jean-Bernard Raimond, Statements, 2 July 1986, Speeches 
and Statements. Ambassade de France a Londres, Service 
de Presse et d* Information, 8 July 1986, p. 9.
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sole responsibility for its completion." France hoped that this 
would promote "technological independence in vital sectors." and 
"facilitate the development of the latest technologies with 
economic or strategic s i g n i f i c a n c e .
While Eureka was conceived as primarily a civilian project, 
French officials were not oblivious to the possible military 
ramifications of the programme. As Dumas remarked:
The Eureka project is fundamentally directed to civil aims, 
but the results of advanced research in such areas as micro­
computing, opto-electronics, robotics and high-energy 
physics will also help make Europe more capable of taking 
responsibility for its own security. It will be up to it to 
make its choices in accordance with its interests at the 
appropriate time, if that is what it w a n t s .
The French government considered the attainment of autonomous 
capabilities in the domain of space essential for its security. 
Mitterrand argued that rather than enmesh itself in SDI research 
France "must first of all turn toward Europe to try and establish 
a space strategy, for civil ends - if necessary for military 
ends, that remains to be seen."^®^ French officials believed 
that it was only in the context of a joint position that Europe 
could react to SDI in a manner that could bring its full weight 
to bear; otherwise the United States would be in a position to 
divide and thereby dominate Europe.
Eureka. p. 1.
Speech by Dumas, 11 June 1985, pp. cit., p. 5. 
Mitterrand, 27 April 1986, pp. cit., p.2.
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More broadly, though, the French government viewed Eureka as 
a means to accelerate the process of European political 
integration. "The progress of a technological Europe will," 
stated the French President, "aid the progress of a political 
Europe and a commercial Europe."^®® This would enable Europe 
to "achieve the means of exercising a political influence 
measuring up to its past and its potential."i®* It is in the 
context of Mitterrand's conception of the unique role that he 
envisaged for France in a united Europe that his government's 
reaction to SDI and the presentation of Eureka must be viewed.
The French government's role as GDI's most vocal European 
critic did not, however, lead the French government to adopt a 
policy of gratuitous rejection of mutually beneficial cooperation 
with the SDIO. In fact, only days after France announced that it 
had rejected Weinberger's invitation to participate, LeMonde 
carried a story in which it was revealed that a state-owned 
French company would be the first European company to obtain a 
contract from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. 
Indeed, Mitterrand stated that he would not stand "like a 
bogeyman preventing French industry from w o r k i n g . F r e n c h  
officials even maintained that it was in no way disadvantaged by 
the fact that it had not signed an MoU, asserting that the 
British and German agreements were essentially political in
Mitterrand, Interview in Eurooeo. oo. cit.. p.4. 
Speech by Raimond, 27 May 1986, qp. cit., p. 1. 
Mitterrand, 24 December 1985, qp. cit.. p. 2.
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nature. They were concerned, however, that the British and West 
German decision to participate in SDI research would prevent 
Europe from effectively pooling its own technological resources.
The French government believed that uncoordinated and 
bilateral cooperation between European countries and the United 
States would "have only minimal spin-offs for E u r o p e " a n d  
would involve little real sharing of technology. As Dumas 
argued, "lasting and fruitful cooperation is not possible when 
the partners are too unequal. The experience of the last few 
decades has shown what difficulties are encountered in 
establishing better balanced technological exchanges between the 
two sides of the Atlantic - for instance in the weapons 
s e c t o r ."172 Furthermore, Hernu maintained that unless 
cooperation could be established on a more equitable basis, SDI 
could lead to "a sort of economic s u p e r - N A T O ."173
In order to forestall such a prospect, Dumas contended that 
Europe must rely on its own resources and talent and build a 
specifically European response to SDI: "Rather than give an
uncoordinated or negative answer to the American offer, we need a 
mobilization of the Europeans in order that such cooperation can
171 Statement of M. Roland Dumas, Minister for External
Relations to the WEU Meeting in Bonn, 23 April 1985, in
Rote D* Actualité. Ambassade de France a Londres,
Service et d'information, 24 April 1985, p. 2.
172 Ibid.
173 Hernu Discusses SDI, French Deterrent in Interview, in
FBIS-WE, Daily Report, 19 April 1985, p. Kl.
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be something more than surrender. In addition, he stated
that:
In our view, therefore, it is vital to consider a 
coordinated response to the challenge created for us by this 
American offer, as well as by the natural development of 
technological capabilities. This action should be taken 
very quickly, for unless, we succeed in orchestrating our 
policies without delay, nothing will prevent our research 
workers, our capital and our industrialists form giving way 
to the temptation of ad hoc cooperation, even if it means 
reducing the Europeans to a sub-contracting role.
The French government believed that if Europe could respond to 
the American technological challenge by energetically pursuing 
Eureka, it would be possible to build a fully competitive Europe 
in the 21st century.
Thus French officials argued that for technological, 
strategic and political reasons, it was unwise for West European 
countries to participate in SDI research. Strategically, it made 
little sense to contribute to a project, which threatened to 
overturn the strategy upon which French and West European 
security rested.Technologically, participation in research 
would merely distract Europe from the important task of 
increasing its own technological prowess. And politically.
Statement of M. Roland Dumas, Minister for External 
Relations, at the WEU Ministerial Meeting in Bonn, pp. 
pit., p.2.
Ibid.
Excerpt From the Press Conference of M. Roland Dumas, 
Minister of External Relations in Helsinki, 22 March 
1985, in Strategic Defence Initiative. Ambassade de 
France a Londres, Service de Presse et d'information, 
p. 1.
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France regarded it as unacceptable to involve itself in a 
programme that would severely undermine French independence and 
autonomy, both of which were regarded as central to France's 
conception of itself as a great power.
V. FAILURE OF THE WEU TO FORGE A CONSENSUS ON SDI
The attempt to forge a united European position vis-a-vis 
SDI focused on the Western European Union (WEU). After 
languishing in dormancy for many years the WEU was "revitalized" 
on 27 October 1984 at an unprecedented meeting attended by the 
foreign and defence ministers of the seven member countries. It 
was agreed that the WEU council would hold bi-annual meetings and 
increase the coordination between the Council and the Assembly. 
Because the primary impetus for the renewed importance of the 
WEU's role was a growing divergence between the United States and 
Europe on security issues and the conduct of East-West relations, 
the communique issued at the close of the meeting stated 
explicitly that in addition to handling "defence questions," they 
would focus on "arms control and disarmament" and "the effects of 
East-West relations on the security of E u r o p e . T h e  WEU 
therefore appeared to be the ideal forum for coordinating a joint 
European response to SDI. Indeed, SDI was expected to be at the 
forefront of the WEU's next ministerial meeting on April 22-23,
The Rome Declaration of the WEU meeting of 26-27 
October 1984 held in Rome, reprinted in Alfred Cahen, 
The Western European Union and NATO. (London: 
Brassey's, 1989, p. 84.
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1985 in Bonn.
The pressure for a joint European response to SDI came 
primarily from West Germany and France. West German foreign 
minister Hans Dietrich Genscher was highly sceptical of the US 
offer to participate in SDI research, believing that for West 
Germany to accept would lend unnecessary political support to a 
programme that the Soviet Union had made into a litmus test of 
the Federal Republic's commitment toward detente. Believing that 
a joint European response, whether negative or positive, would 
insulate the West German government from the charges of being an 
accomplice to the militarization of space, he constantly 
reiterated his desire for a joint European position.
The French government which was the most openly critical of 
SDI was also interested in forging a united European position 
toward SDI and thus Genscher found a willing ally in the French 
foreign minister Roland Dumas. Dumas was intent upon garnering 
Western European support for Eureka, which entailed a clear 
rejection of participation in SDI research.
The April 22-23, 1985 meeting of the WEU failed to produce a 
united position on SDI or Eureka (which had been announced a few 
days before the meeting), despite the strenuous efforts of 
Genscher and Dumas. British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffry Howe, 
and Defence Minster Michael Heseltine were unwilling to endorse a 
communique that called for a joint European response to the 
Reagan Administration's offer to participate in SDI research, 
believing that this would fracture NATO unity. Accordingly, the
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communique could only state that the members of the WEU "agreed 
to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as 
far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to 
the initiation of the United States to participate in the 
research programme and instructed the permanent Council 
a c c o r d i n g l y . I n d e e d ,  the British government seemed to take 
seriously the rather impertinent warning issued by US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs to avoid a 
separate position on security issues outside of the NATO 
framework. These American sentiments seemed to dovetail with 
those of Margaret Thatcher who stated:
What I think we have to watch is that there do not grow up 
sub-structures within Europe which could have unwittingly, 
unintentionally, the effect of undermining the links across 
the Atlantic Alliance... I think that it is important that 
those arrangements do not take on a wholly bigger life than 
their own.i^s
Thus, despite holding rather similar views about the implications 
of SDI as the West German and French governments, the British 
government was reluctant to take actions that would split the 
Alliance over SDI. Thatcher believed that maintaining close 
relations with the United States was not only necessary for 
European security but also crucial for the success of the Geneva
^7® Communique issued at the close of the ministerial
meeting of teh Council of Western European Union, Bonn,
22nd-23rd April 1985, Document 1011. (Paris, Western 
European Union: 24 April 1985).
^79 Margaret Thatcher, quoted in Leon Brittan, "Defence and
Arms Control in a Changing Era," PSI Discussion Paper
21 (London: Policy Studies Insitute, 1988), p. 14.
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arms control negotiations.
The failure of the WEU meeting to achieve a common European 
response to the question of participation in SDI research was not 
greeted with regret by all politicians in Bonn. Indeed, 
Chancellor Kohl was in fact quite relieved about the failure for 
he, unlike Genscher, believed that participation in SDI research 
was necessary in order to keep US-German relations on a firm 
footing and to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting 
differences within the Alliance over SDI. Indeed, Kohl, much to 
the consternation of President Mitterrand, took the occasion of 
the May 2-4, 1985 Western summit to announce that he was leaning 
towards participation in SDI research. At the same summit 
Mitterrand hardened his position against participation citing 
Reagan's statement that he envisaged European companies playing 
the role of subcontractors. Mitterrand later told the press, 
with obvious irritation; "Subcontractors. That's the word I 
heard. The word was said in English. It confirmed my 
intuitions."180
The primary result of the May summit was therefore to create 
a crises of sorts in Franco-German relations. In the process it 
revealed the dilemma that had often plagued Bonn when Washington 
and Paris were pursuing divergent courses on security issues, 
namely, the desire to please both simultaneously, something which 
SDI was making it difficult for the West German government to do. 
In an effort to bridge the obvious gaps that arose as a result of
18° International Herald Tribune. 6 May 1985.
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the Bonn summit meeting, Kohl and Mitterrand met on 28 May 1985 
in order to narrow their differences. While the meeting failed 
to produce agreement on SDI, Kohl partially mollified Mitterrand 
by warming to Eureka. And, indeed, at the June 28 1985 Milan 
summit all the EC governments gave their formal endorsement to 
Eureka.
While the European unanimity on Eureka led to a marked 
improvement in Franco-German relation, it did not obscure the 
differences that remained on SDI within the Alliance. Indeed, 
the inability of Western European governments to forge a united 
position on SDI reflected some fundamental differences between 
the three key countries in Western Europe.
The British government was, for reasons mentioned above, far 
from enthusiastic about greater European defence cooperation. 
Thatcher had a clear preference for dealing bilaterally with the 
United States, believing that this afforded Britain far more 
influence than it could otherwise achieve. Moreover, British 
officials believed that, despite what they regarded as the 
negative strategic implications of SDI, it was unwise to oppose 
an initiative that the Reagan Administration deemed central to 
its defence policy. For, British officials maintained that West 
European security depended on the United States' political 
commitment to Europe; and if the United States saw West European 
nations opposing it on something it considered vital to its 
security this could lead to a creeping estrangement between the
Financial Times. June 29, 1985.
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United States and Europe, leading eventually to the break up of 
the Alliance.
The West German government was even more dependent on the 
United States for its security and believed that it could not 
afford to jeopardize its relationship with the United States by 
opposing SDI. While this, of course, created difficulties for 
its relationship with the French government. West Germany 
maintained that while Franco-German ties were important, it was 
the United States*s nuclear guarantee on which it depended for 
its security. Thus the West German government chose to stay on 
good terms with Washington but also to propitiate Paris by 
enthusiastically endorsing Eureka.
The French government was, as we have seen, far more openly 
critical than either Britain or West Germany of SDI. Thus rather 
than concentrate its efforts on reaching a common position about 
SDI research with the Reagan Administration, French officials 
concentrated on obtaining West European support for Eureka, 
hoping to prevent SDI from widening the technological gap between 
the United States and Japan on the one hand, and Western Europe 
on the other. While they were successful in garnering support 
for Eureka, neither Britain or West Germany were prepared to 
participate in it as an alternative to participation in SDI 
research. And, in the end, neither was the French government 
willing to forgo participation in SDI research, although its 
participation, of course, was not governed by an MoU as was the 
British and West German participation. Thus, in the end, the
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West European attempt to fashion a common position on SDI was 
stymied by the unwillingness of the British and West German 
governments to openly oppose the United States, believing that 
their security required that they place Alliance unity above 
considerations of West European unity.
VI. THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE PARTICIPATION DEBATE
As we have seen in this chapter as well as the previous one, 
bilateral agreements, arangements and statements were the primary 
means by which the transatlantic controversy was managed.
Despite the primary bilateral nature of SDI diplomacy, NATO 
institutions played a role in managing the SDI controversy, for 
their dilibérâtions demonstrated not only the extent to which 
Alliance unity was considered important, but also the limits of 
this unity.
Following its initial failure to utilize the Nuclear Planing 
Group (NPG), the United States made strenuous efforts to consult 
with its Allies about SDI. While much of this occurred on a 
bilateral basis, SDI remained the central topic of deliberation 
within the NPG, the Defence Planning Committee and the North 
Atlantic Council throughout 1985 and 1986. These meetings were 
the occasion for extensive briefings by US defence and foreign 
policy officials about SDI as well as debate among Alliance 
members about the American initiative. Because these meetings 
occurred within the context of the Alliance and traditionally 
ended with the issuance of communiques, the focus was on
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attempting to demonstrate unity and agreement. Examining how the 
issue of SDI was handled within NATO forums is illuminating 
because it enables us to trace the development of the debate 
about SDI as well as the means by which agreement was sought. In 
analysing the role that NATO played attention will be directed at 
determining the extent of agreement as well as ascertaining the 
differences that remained behind the facade of unity.
The first NATO forum at which SDI became the dominant focus 
of discussion was the NPG meeting held in Luxembourg on 26-27 
March 1985. At this meeting US Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger briefed his colleagues on SDI and also formally 
invited the countries represented as the meeting (as well as 
Japan, Australia, and Israel) to participate in SDI research. 
While the European members of the Alliance resented the 60 day 
deadline contained in the letter, the communique stated that "we 
[the Alliance members] welcome the United States invitation for 
Allies to consider participation in the research p r o g r a m m e .
That they did so was significant because it indicated a desire to 
demonstrate unity on the question of SDI despite the obvious 
differences that existed within the Alliance on this topic.
Demonstrating unity was considered particularly important in 
light of the resumption of arms control negotiations between the
Final communique, NATO Nuclear Planning Group, 27 March 
1985, paragraph 4.
It should be noted, however, that because France was 
not a member of NATO's integrated military structure, 
it did not participate in NPG meetings.
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United States and the Soviet Union on March 12, 1985 in Geneva. 
Despite the reservations that Western European countries haboured 
about SDI, they were eager to avoid undermining the United 
States*s negotiating position at Geneva. Not only would a lack 
of support for SDI perhaps prevent the success of the continuing 
negotiations (and hopefully the obviation of defensive 
deployments), but they did not want to encourage the Soviet Union 
to exploit the obvious differences that did exist within the 
Alliance over SDI.
While NATO was eager to demonstrate a united position on 
SDI, it is important to stress the limited extent of agreement in 
the Alliance about this issue. The final communique of the 
Luxembourg NPG meeting made clear that as an alliance NATO did 
not support SDI because it wished to see BMD's deployed. Rather 
Soviet BMD research was given as the justification for SDI 
research:
We noted with concern the extensive and long-standing 
efforts in the strategic defence field by the Soviet Union 
which already deploys the world's only ABM and anti­
satellite systems. The United States research programme is 
prudent in light of these Soviet activities and is also 
clearly influenced by the treaty violations reported by the 
President of the United States.
While this statement did not explicitly reject deployment, it is
clear that the United States was only able to achieve European
acceptance for SDI research "in light" of Soviet activities.
Yet, in his March 23, 1983 speech Reagan did not once mention the
Ibid.. paragraph 5.
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Soviet Union's own research on BMD as a reason for justifying 
SDI. It was only after it became clear to Reagan Administration 
officials that Western European countries would find it much 
easier to support SDI if it were portrayed as a response to 
Soviet BMD activity that this justification was articulated.
While the United States and its West European Allies were able to 
agree that SDI research could be justified on these grounds, they 
could not mask the different importance that each accorded to 
this justification. While most West European governments 
believed that SDI research was justified only in light of Soviet 
activities, for the United States Soviet research was far from 
the central rationale for S D I . T o  be sure, the United 
States saw SDI research as a prudent hedge against a Soviet break 
out of the ABM treaty, but it was clear that Ronald Reagan wanted 
to accomplish a thorough transformation of the strategic regime, 
something which was anathema to the United States' West European 
Allies.
In order to ensure that deployment did not occur and that 
SDI research would not damage arms control, the Alliance 
concentrated its efforts to ensure that SDI research was 
conducted within the confines of the ABM treaty. It took more 
than a passing interest in the dispute that raged within the 
Reagan Administration about whether the so called "strict" or 
"loose" interpretation of the ABM treaty was valid. The United
See Reagan's March 23, 1983 and "SDI Its Nature and
Rationale," o p . cit.
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States' West European Allies believed that efforts by some within 
the Reagan Administration - primarily National Security Advisor 
McFarlane and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger - to endorse 
a "loose" interpretation was merely an effort to undermine the 
ABM treaty and make it easier eventually to abandon this treaty. 
This was deemed especially important in light of the planned 
summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva, where it 
was hoped that SDI would not lead to acrimonious disagreement.
The Geneva summit meeting in November 1985 exercised a 
salutary influence on Alliance cohesion and lessened the strains 
over SDI. Gorbachev and Reagan were perceived to have had a 
successful summit meeting in which SDI did not block a positive 
joint communique. Perhaps more important than the substantive 
results of the summit was the fact that Reagan and Gorbachev 
agreed to a further two meetings, thus creating the perception 
that the unyielding hostility that had characterized US-Soviet 
relations since December 1979 was coming to an end. The outcome 
of the Geneva summit, therefore, allayed West European fears that 
the SDI would block the improvement of East-West relations. This 
perception was an important factor in enabling the West German 
government to justify its participation in SDI research as not 
necessary inimical to improved East-West relations.
The other important result of the US-Soviet summit at Geneva 
was that it reinforced the belief within the Alliance of the 
importance of cohesion in contributing to the success of arms 
control negotiations. Following the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting the
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Defence Planning Committee issued a communique that stated:
We especially welcome the commitment of both sides to making 
early progress in the negotiations in Geneva, in particular 
in areas where there is common ground, including the idea of 
an interim INF agreement and the principle of 50 percent 
reduction in nuclear arms of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, appropriately applied. In this context we 
expressed strong support for the United States stance 
concerning intermediate range, strategic, and defence and 
space systems. Alliance solidarity and cohesion have played 
an important role in bringing these developments about and 
will remain equally vital for future progress.^®®
To conclude, the Alliance's approach to SDI was 
characterized by four main and related efforts, all designed to 
encourage the perception of unity. The first was to support the 
US negotiating position (especially on space weapons) in order to 
prevent the Soviet Union from sowing disunity within NATO. The 
second was to condition support for SDI research on strict 
criteria governing its conduct, so as to ensure that the ABM 
treaty was not violated. The third was to emphasize that SDI 
research was primarily necessary in light of Soviet BMD research.
But NATO's emphasis on Soviet BMD research as a rationale 
for SDI research also indicated the limited extent of support for 
SDI within the Alliance. For it indicated that West European 
governments were only willing to support SDI research. They 
clearly wanted to distance themselves from endorsement for 
anything beyond research. The reason that they did not want to 
do so was evident in the fourth major aspect of the Alliance's
Ibid.
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response to SDI, namely, the insistence that nuclear deterrence 
and specifically flexible response remained vital to the 
Alliance's security.
The public unity that NATO displayed on the issue of SDI 
could not obscure the fact that SDI was after all a unilateral 
American initiative. The nature of the consultation over SDI did 
not, therefore, resemble those which occurred over the INF issue. 
While joint statements were issued, they reflected the least 
common denominator of the respective US and West European 
positions. At the same time, the Alliance did succeed in 
fostering sufficient unity on SDI to support the US negotiating 
position at Geneva and to secure agreement to maintain flexible 
response. Consequently, NATO succeeded in preventing SDI from 
splitting the Alliance. At the same time, it was evident that 
the agreement reached was predicated on the fact that while SDI 
research was being conducted, the issue of deployment could be 
conveniently finessed, or that fundamental differences about the 
nature of credibility and stability were extant.
VII. CONCLUSION
The debate about participation in SDI research was important 
because it revealed how the Alliance went about managing the SDI 
dispute. The fact that the management of the issue of SDI 
focused primarily on the question of participation in SDI 
research was signficant because it indicated that rather than 
confront the disagrements about strategy that laid at the heart
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of the SDI dispute, the major participants focused on the 
secondary concern of research. That they did so indicated both 
that there was a common desire to avoid seeing the issue of SDI 
split the Alliance and that the best way to accomplish this was 
to ignore the strategic difference that SDI revealed.
As the findings of this chapter have demonstrated, the 
British and West German government, in their more candid moments, 
admitted that demonstrating Alliance unity on the issue of SDI 
was the driving force behind their decisions to sign MoUs with 
the US government. Yet the rationale that they employed in order 
to justify these bilateral agreements - to their domestic 
political audience and Parliamentry opponents - demonstrated the 
limited extent of this unity. Both the reasons that they used to 
justify their support as well as the conditions they insisted 
upon as the price of their agreement to participate were all 
indicative a teneous and narrow consensus on SDI.
The British and West German governments cited the existence 
of Soviet BMD research as the primary reason for their support of 
SDI research and the willingness to sign MoUs. While the Reagan 
Administration also pointed to Soviet SDI research as a reason 
why SDI research was necessary, it was, as American officials 
made clear, far from the raison d'etre for the programme.
Indeed, in his March 23, 1983 speech Reagan did not even mention 
Soviet BMD research as a reason for pursuing SDI. It was only 
later at West European prompting that the Reagan Adminstration 
began to justify its research on these grounds. West European
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officials on the other hand supported SDI research mainly on the 
basis of Soviet BMD research. While both the West European and 
American officials justified SDI research in light of Soviet BMD 
research efforts, the relative weight that they attached to this 
rationale varied greatly.
The differing importance that the Reagan Administration and 
its West European Allies accorded to Soviet research indicated 
the divergence of objectives that underlay West European and 
American support for SDI research. West European officials 
supported SDI research as a deterrent to Soviet deployment of 
BMD*s because they preferred a strategic regime without BMD*s. 
Conversely, the Reagan Adminstration supported SDI research 
because they believed that the current strategic regime based on 
mutual vulnerabilty must be altered and that the results of SDI 
research could provide the technologies with which to effect such 
a change. While these differing emphases coexisted, they could 
not obscure the underlying differences in US and West European 
objectives or the fact that ignoring these differences were 
essential to Alliance unity.
In order to make clear that their support for SDI extended 
only to support for research West German and British government's 
insisted that their support for, and participation in, SDI 
research was contingent on it being conducted within the confines 
of the ABM treaty. Moreover, both Thatcher and Kohl explicitly 
stated that their decision to participate did not consitute an 
endorsement of deployment, and that they did not envisage an
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automatic succession of research to deployment.
Because of their sensitivity to the charge that whatever 
they might say, their support for SDI research constituted a de 
facto endorsement of a programme that could lead to deployment, 
both the British and West German governments attempted to 
underline the economic and technological benefits that they hoped 
to derive throught participation. While there was indeed some 
concern that irrespective of the ultimate fate of the deployment 
question, SDI research would lead, in the words of Kohl to a 
"substantial push towards technological i n n o v a t i o n , t h e s e  
considerations were clearly secondary to those of demonstrating 
Alliance unity. Another indication that technological and 
economic factors were not decisive was demonstrated in the 
British debate with Michael Heseltine's failure to secure 
guaranteed access to large SDI contracts^®® (which incidentally 
indicated that the Reagan Adminstration had no intention of 
making SDI research an economic bonanza for its Allies).
Moreover, the failure of either the British or the West German 
governments to win significant SDI research contracts did not 
have a major impact on the SDI debate. This again demonstrated 
the relative unimportance that economic and technological factors 
played in the debate.
The relatively lukewarm response that Mitterrand's Eureka
®^^  Kohl, Speech to Wehrkunde Conference, 14 February 1985,
p. 6.
^®® Washington Post. 3 December 1985, p. 2.
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proposal (as well as the WEU's attempt to forge a united position 
vis-a-vis SDI) received attested to the secondary importance of 
technological and economic factors in the debate. Had the 
economic and technological competitiveness of West European 
industry been deemed of significant concern, then a more serious 
commitement to a joint European effort such as Eureka would have 
seemed a more effective response than helping the United States 
in its own research endevours. Yet, both the British and West 
German government, while agreeing to participate in Eureka, 
deemed the bilateral agreements with the United States to be of 
greater importance.
That Britain and West Germany attached greater importance to 
these negotiations with the US, despite their obvious and well 
documented opposition to BMD deployment, attested to the 
overwhelmingly political nature of the support for SDI research 
and the manifest desire to demonstrate Alliance unity. The 
willingness of the British and West German governments to lend 
political support to SDI did not, however, come without its 
price.
The British and West German governments' decision to sign 
MoU's did create the impression that they were lending support to 
a programmer that, if it went beyond research, could seriously 
harm Western European interests. Even as Thatcher and Kohl 
succeeded in creating a plausible seperation between the research 
programme and the prospect of deployment and thereby brunting the 
charge that in participating in SDI research that they were
378
supporting deployment, their support for SDI research did expose 
them to the charge that in doing so they were damaging the 
prospects for improved East-West relations since the Soviet Union 
had made clear its opposition to SDI research. These fears were 
allievated when Gorbachev and Reagan met at the Geneva summit in 
Novermber 1985. The fact that SDI had not led to an acrimous 
disagreement, that the meeting was perceived to have provided 
impetus to the arms control talks, and that Reagan and Gorbachev 
had agreed to a further two meetings, all led to the perception 
that while the United States and the Soviet Union remained 
divided on the issue of SDI, an improvement in East-West 
relations was not going to be held hostage to the issue of SDI.
The perception that SDI would not constitute an 
insurmountable obstacle to improved East-West relations made the 
British, and particularly the West German, decision to 
participate in SDI research much easier. It was far more 
difficult for opponents of the MoUs to claim that by 
participating in SDI research the governments were preventing the 
improvment of East-West relations. Thus the improvement in East- 
West relations in the aftermath of the Geneva summit meeting 
increased Alliance cohesion. This is significant because it 
indicates that contrary to what the alliance literature suggests 
the decreased threat increased and did not diminish Alliance 
cohesion.
Still, the primary reason that the Alliance was able to 
manage successfully the SDI dispute was that it ignored and
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papered over the underlying doctrinal issues and instead focused 
on the issue of research. The desire for unity provided the 
impetus to paper over these differences and the distinction 
between research and deployment supplied the means by which to do 
so in a plausible manner. While deployment was, of course, 
impossible without research and Reagan was clearly intent upon 
deployment should research prove successful, it was reasonable to 
assume that there was a clear "firebreak" between research and 
deployment. Three main reasons explain why it was reasonable to 
assume that a clear distinction between research and deployment 
existed.
First, a decision regarding deployment would be made by a 
future American president who was unlikely to have shared 
Reagan's enthusiasm for SDI. Second, unlike most military 
programmes, SDI was not foisted upon the political leadership of 
the United States by the scientific community and the military. 
Indeed, SDI was very much the opposite: Reagan was far more 
enthusiastic about SDI then either the scientific community or 
his own Department of Defense. Third, Congressional support 
would have been required and, given both the attachment to the 
ABM treaty and the extent to which most Démocrates and not a few 
Republicans regarded the prospect of deployment, such approval 
would have been unlikely. Thus for these reasons the distinction 
between research and deployment, while perhaps somewhat 
articifical in the minds of SDI supporters, did allay West 
European concerns about participation in SDI research and led to
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a limited, yet important, consensus on SDI.
It is, however, important not to misconstrue the nature of 
this consensus. The consensus rested more on the desire to 
maintain and demonstrate unity than it did upon any genuine 
agreement about the important issues surronding SDI. While the 
British and West German governments signed MoUs and the French 
government allowed state-owned countries to participate in SDI 
research, these were all means by which the transatlantic 
controversy over SDI was managed; they did not resolve the 
underlying issues of the dispute. The consequences, both 
positive and negative, of ignoring these differing conceptions of 
strategy that were hidden behind this consensus will be examined 
in the following chapters.
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VI. THE ATBM DEBATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SDI
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of ballistic missile defences for Europe became 
the overriding issue in the SDI debate after the British and West 
German governments decided to sign MoUs with the United States. 
While the issue of providing BMD coverage for Western Europe had 
been broached from the beginning of the transatlantic debate, it 
was not until the beginning of 1986 that it became an issue of 
salient importance within the Alliance. While Alliance 
deliberations continued to focus on ensuring that SDI research 
remained within the confines of the ABM treaty as well as 
assessing the effect of SDI on arms control, it was ATBMs^ that 
became the dominant issue of the SDI debate in early 1986. As 
such it occupied a central position in Alliance deliberations 
until the October 1986 Reykjavik summit, although it continued to 
be an issue of considerable concern during 1987 as well.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ATBM debate in 
the broader context of the SDI controversy and thereby consider 
issues addressed in this thesis. Accordingly, answers to the 
following questions will be sought: Why did the ATBM issue become 
important? What relationship did the various proposals for ATBM 
systems for Europe have to the SDI research programme conducted 
under the auspices of SDIO? How did the objectives for ATBM 
being pursued by West European governments differ from those of 
United States government? And why did the ATBM issue play a more
Throughout this chapter I will refer to ATBMs. These are 
ballistic missile defence systems designed to intercept 
short and medium range missiles.
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prominent role in Germany than in either Britain or France?
But most importantly, the ATBM debate will be analysed in 
order to determine what it can reveal about the underlying cause 
of the SDI contoversy as well as how the SDI issue was managed 
within the Alliance. In analysing the ATBM issue, we will 
investigate the significance of different objectives that the 
United States and Western European nations were pursuing through 
ATBM deployment and what these differences reveal about - In 
particular we will seek to determine what these differences in 
objectives reveals about the relative importance of differing 
conceptions of strategy in driving the transatlantic controversy 
over SDI.
ATBMs Become a Prominent Issue in 1986
ATBM's became a prominent issue within the SDI debate 
largely as the result of the efforts of the West German Defence 
Minister, Manfred Wdrner. During the latter part of 1985, Worner 
began advocating that Western Europe develope a ballistic missile 
defence against the emerging conventional armed short-range 
ballistic missile threat from the Soviet Union. Worner's widely 
quoted and extensively covered March 1986 Wehrkunde speech and 
his widely-read article in the Winter 1986 issue of Strategic 
Review were instrumental in placing the ATBM issue at the
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forefront of the transatlantic debate at the beginning of 1 9 8 6 . 2  
While ATBMs became prominent in early 1986, the issue of 
defending Western Europe against ballistic missiles had been a 
part of the SDI debate from its inception. In his March 23, 1983 
speech Reagan explicitly stated that Europe would be included in 
any prospective system that would emerge from SDI research. 
Moreover, French President Mitterrand, as discussed in chapter 4, 
had recommended that West European nations create a "European 
comminity of space"^ that would include the capability of space- 
based interception. Another proposal that received far more 
attention was the European Defence Initiative (EDI). This 
proposal was forwarded by a private organization (High Frontier 
Europe) that included various West Europeans, primarily former 
high defence officials as well as conservative politicians in 
West Germany, Holland, and France. It recommended that Western 
Europe develop in conjunction with the United States a 
comprehensive defence for Western Europe. This proposal was 
seen, and promoted as, an extension of the SDI system to 
Europe.* While there was some interest in this initiative
Manfred Worner, Strateaie im Wandel. Grundrichten und 
Eckwerte der Stratégie aus dem Blickwinkel der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, XXII. Internationale
Wehrkundetagung 1. March 1986, Munich, Bundesminister 
der Verteidigung Information's Pressestab. And Manfred 
Worner, "A Missile Defense for NATO Europe," Strategic 
Review. Volume 14, no. 1 (Winter 1986).
Le Monde, 9 February 1984.
The European Defence Initiative (EDI); Some Implications 
and Consequences (Rotterdam, Netherlands: High Frontier 
Europa, 1986).
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inside the West German defence ministry, Worner*s initiative 
differed in important ways from EDI and he was therefore careful 
to ensure that his proposal was not confused with EDI.
Worner recommended that Western Europe in conjunction with 
the United States, and working within NATO, develop a capability 
to intercept short and medium range Soviet ballistic missiles 
armed with conventional warheads.  ^ He argued that this task 
could be accomplished by upgrading NATO's existing air defence 
network by improving anti aircraft missiles such as the Patriot 
so that they could also intercept short-range ballistic missiles. 
Accordingly, Worner's proposal came to be known as an "extended 
air defence," although it was just as often refereed to as simply 
ATBM. He explicitly stated that his proposal was not designed to 
defend Western Europe against nuclear attack and was not an 
attempt to create a leak-proof defence for Europe. While Worner 
enthusiastically supported ATBMs, it is important to stress that 
his objectives differed in important ways from the primary 
objectives being pursued by the Reagan Adminsistration.
II. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND ATBMs
While the Reagan Administration welcomed European interest
Studies examining this threat had actually begun as early 
as 1982 within the West German defence ministry.
386
in ATBMs as part of an extended air defence concept®, it must be
stressed that American defence officials viewed the question of
extended air defence as quite separate from SDI. As General
Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO), emphasized, the SDI programme remained
dedicated to utilizing advanced technologies for the purpose of
developing a layered defence that would provide comprehensive
protection against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Extended
air defence, on the other hand, was concerned with addressing
solely the near term threat posed by conventionally armed
Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), a threat that fell under the
purview of the U.S. Army. As General Abrahamson explained.
The near-term is what the Army has already developed quite 
separate from the SDI program. We would like to answer that 
for the record.
I think the important thing is that it is a self- 
defense and a terminal type of system. So, it defends a 
very small area. It is not a layered defense concept which 
is quite fundamental to the theory of the SDI and I think in 
the end will be fundamental to the theory of a short-range 
ballistic missile threat not only in Europe, but in other 
theaters as well.?
Thus, the Reagan Administration's ultimate and most 
fundamental objective with respect to ballistic missile defences 
in Europe was to provide the type of comprehensive defences that 
it envisaged for the United States. Accordingly, SDI's global
Testimony by Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, Department 
of Defense Authorization for Appropriation for Fiscal 
Year 1987. Hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services, United States Senate, 99th Congress, 2nd 
Session, 6 May 1986, p. 1738.
Ibid.. pp. 1771-1772.
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architecture studies included assessments of the requirements for 
defending Europe "across the full geographic spectrum."® In the 
course of these studies, it was determined that while "the 
theater environment has unique requirements which must be 
addressed by specific theater defense architectures,"® many of 
the fundamental technologies that were being perused had 
strategic BMD research-wide applications for the defence of 
Europe as well."^® Indeed, Abrahamson stressed that, not only 
could these advanced technologies be applied to the defence of 
Europe, but that their application was deemed essential to 
constructing a ballistic missile defence for Western Europe that 
would be sufficiently comprehensive to meet European security 
interests.
Concurrently, the Reagan Administration believed that Europe 
confronted an emerging Soviet conventional TBM threat that 
required more immediate attention. American defence officials 
concurred with West German Defence Minister Worner's analysis 
that the Alliance needed to respond to this threat; otherwise 
NATO would confront an environment in the 1990*s in which the 
Soviet Union would possess the capability to use TBM's to destroy 
critical NATO targets and thereby hinder NATO's ability to mount 
a credible response to a Soviet conventional attack. The Reagan 
Administration agreed that this threat must either be removed
® Ibid.. p. 1745.
® Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 1743.
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through arms control or countered by the construction of an ATBM 
system, and that, furthermore, it should be done within the 
context of extended air defence. Above all, however, the Reagan 
Administration saw European interest in ATBMs as a means of 
gaining increased allied support for SDI, which was considered 
important for Allied unity and obtaining support within the US 
Congress for SDI funding.
It is, however, important to emphasize that while the Reagan 
Administration supported Worner*s extended air defence concept, 
they regarded it as peripheral to the main objectives of SDI. 
While Worner was concerned with countering the threat posed by 
short and medium range conventionally armed ballistic missiles, 
the Reagan Adminstration was continuing to investigate 
technologies and design systems that would provide a 
comprehensive defence of the United States and Western Europe 
against missiles of all ranges irrespective of whether they were 
armed with nuclear, conventional or chemical weapons. It is 
important to keep these differences in mind in analysing the ATBM 
debate because they are indicative of the underlying differences 
in the objectives that Western Europe and the United States were 
pursuing throughout the SDI and ATBM debates.
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III. WEST GERMAN SUPPORT FOR ATBMs
The West German governmental, ^nd in particular Defence 
Minister Manfred Worner, were the driving force behind the 
emergence of ATBMs as a major issue. While the rationale that 
Worner most often gave for his extended air defence concept was 
the growing accuracy of the conventionally armed short and medium 
range missiles, the reasons that prompted him to recommend the 
development of ATBMs can ultimately be traced to his evaluation 
of the strategic implications of SDI. Therefore, in order to 
understand the origins of Worner's ATBM proposals, it is 
necessary to examine his view of how SDI would affect West 
European security. This examination is particularly interesting 
because it indicates a signficant evolution in the West German 
government's position on SDI.
Before examining these views in detail, it is important to 
point out that Worner's views on the implications of SDI were 
complex and seemingly contrad ic tory.W or ne r was a serious 
student of military affairs who was exceptionally well informed 
about SDI. His statements on SDI's implications for West 
European security were some of the most comprehensive and
Because of the leading role that the West German 
government took in the ATBM dispute, the order in which 
each country is discussed has been altered in this 
chapter. The West German position will be discussed 
first. The French reaction to ATBMs, because it was far 
more detailed than that of the British government, is 
discussed second.
In this sense at least his position had much in common 
with that of the Reagan Administration.
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sophisticated governmental analyses to appear on either side of
the Atlantic.
Three years after Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech, West 
German defence officials became convinced that the possibility of 
strategic defence deployments necessitated a more detailed 
analysis of the implication of BMD deployment than had 
theretofore been undertaken. This task took on added urgency in 
light of the West German government's belief that HMDs would 
eventually be deployed. Worner stated in his Wehrkunde address 
that, "There can be no doubt; the tendency runs today clearly 
toward strategic defence and the probability is large that they 
will succeed in this rather than in the next t r y . F o r  
Worner this reality dictated that the Federal Republic analyze 
the probable implications of such developments and adjust the 
defence posture of the Federal Republic accordingly. Worner 
assumed for the purpose of his analysis that both the United 
Stats and the Soviet Union would possess BMD systems.
Worner's Changing View of SDI
Worner contended that ballistic missile defences would
3^ SDI: Fakten und Bewertunaen. Fraaen und Antworten.
Dokumentation. Herausgeber: Der Bundesminister der
Verteidigung, Informations- und Pressestab, 1986. And 
Worner, Strateaie im Wandel. o p . cit.
Manfred Worner, Strateaie im Wandel. Grundrichten und 
Eckwerte der Stratégie aus dem Blickwinkel der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, XXII. Internationale
Wehrkundetagung 1. March 1986, Munich, Bundesminister 
der Verteidigung Information's Pressestab, p. 17.
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reduce the likelihood of a nuclear first-strike and thus lead to 
greater strategic stability. The German defence minister argued 
that in the absence of incentives to strike first the dangers of 
preemptive or preventive attacks would be neutralized. The 
increase in strategic stability afforded would further reduce the 
likelihood of a global nuclear war as well as reduce the ability 
of the superpowers to exercise world wide influence by virtue of 
their possession of nuclear weapons.
Worner contended that Soviet strategic defence sytems would 
reduce the ability of US strategic nuclear forces as well as the 
Cruise and Pershing Missiles to carry out selective nuclear 
strikes on Soviet teritory. He maintained that this would 
diminish NATO capacity for controlled escalation and therefore 
weaken its ability to deter Soviet conventional attacks. If 
these circumstances were to obtain, Worner argued, then NATO's 
conventional forces would have to assume a greater burden for 
defending Western Europe.
Worner also believed that if the credibilility of US 
strategic nucler threats were diminished then the ability of the 
United States to deter Soviet theater nuclear attacks against 
Western Europe would be reduced. He therefore maintained that if 
the Reagan Administration were to go beyond SDI research to 
developement and deployment, it would be essential for Western 
European territory to be included in such a system lest European
SDI; Fakten und Bewertunaen. op. cit.. p. 15. 
Ibid.
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and American security be decoupled from one another. Worner 
warned that if any prospective defence shield did not include 
protection for Western Europe, superior Soviet capabilities in 
intermediate and short range missiles would take on a 
significance that they had theretofore lacked.
Worner's ATBM Proposal
The danger to Europe would be further heightened, argued 
Worner, if the Soviet Union were to build a ballistic missile 
defence system to counter NATO missiles stationed in Western 
Europe. Worner feared that such an eventuality would not only 
leave NATO naked to Soviet missile attack but would enable the 
Soviet Union to execute a missile attack on western Europe 
without fearing a serious response. If the Soviet Union could 
strike first, drastically reduce NATO's missile force, and then 
use its ballistic missile defence system to intercept NATO's 
remaining nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union would be able to 
effectively neutralize NATO's nuclear response.
Worner argued that irrespective of whether the Soviet Union 
and the United States decided to deploy ballistic missile 
defences. Western Europe would need to deploy an ATBM system. He 
maintained that US-Soviet nuclear parity had reduced the 
credibility of US strategic nuclear forces to deter conflict in 
Western Europe and that this dicated a greater reliance on 
theatre nuclear and conventional forces. At the same time that 
these NATO forces were becoming more important, they were also
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becoming more vulnerable, he argued.
He contended that the advent of highly accurate short range, 
conventionally-armed Soviet ballistic missiles (SS-21,22's, and 
to some extent SS-23's) constituted a new and dangerous threat to 
the Alliance. Worner argued that this threat was all the more 
important to address in light of nuclear parity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Worner pointed out that 
Soviet Marshal Orgarkov had clearly referred to this option in 
May of 1984 and that "already today most Soviet middle and short 
range missiles also possess conventional w a r h e a d s . T h i s  
growing capacity for the use of conventionally-armed ballistic 
missiles to threaten NATO's air defence systems, air bases, and 
nuclear weapon depots would enable the Soviet Union, in the 
"foreseeable future, to preside over a conventional first strike 
capacity in Europe."^® This would enable the Soviet Union to 
"cripple the defensive capacity of NATO with long range and 
precise fire strikes before the first tank rolled forward, and, 
above all, without having to cross over the threshold to nuclear 
war."19
Worner believed that this new threat posed by conventionally 
armed ballistic missiles represented a political as well as a 
military threat to the Alliance. He warned that if the Soviet 
Union were allowed to secure "unilateral advantage" through
1^  Worner, Strateaie im Wandel. o p . cit.. p. 22. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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asymmetrical ballistic missile defence deployments, the Soviet 
Union could "shatter the unity of the Alliance and undermine the 
resistance capacity of the West European states."2° Worner 
thus argued that the security of the Alliance required that this 
threat be neutralized; it was in "the vital interests of NATO, 
though especially its European members, to prevent this danger, 
lest it be used as a means of exercising political pressure and 
threat."21 Consequently, he characterized "the requirement for 
a European defence system" as "irrefutable ( u n a b w e i s b a r ) .
Worner maintained that the threat posed by Soviet short and 
medium range conventionally armed ballistic missiles could be 
countered through an extended air defence system. He emphasized 
that such a defence would not have to be capable of intercepting 
all of the Soviet short-range missiles and that it was designed 
neither to protect against nuclear armed missiles nor to provide 
a comprehensive defence of populations centers. Because its role 
would be merely to intercept enough missiles to ensure that 
Soviet planners would be uncertain about their ability to damage 
a substantial portion of NATO's vital targets, a less than 
perfect defence is all that would be required.23
The reason that a comprehensive defence was not sought was 
important for it reveals a vital difference in US and West
20 Ibid.. p. 21.
21 Ibid.. p. 22.
22 Worner, Strateaie im Wandel. o p . cit., p. 21. 
22 Ibid.
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European ATBM policy and thereby the diverse objectives that they 
were pursuing with respect to SDI. Worner viewed ATBMs as a 
means of ensuring the continued viability of flexible response. 
Significantly, he did not recommend a system that possessed the 
capability to intercept nuclear missiles, reasoning that these 
options were best dealt with by threatening nuclear 
counterstrikes. Rather, he was concerned that the emerging 
Soviet conventional TBM capability would endow the Soviet armed 
forces with the capacity of crippling NATO's conventional and 
nuclear forces at the very outset of a conflict. For Worner this 
constituted an unacceptable scenario; he viewed the viability of 
NATO's conventional forces as essential to ensuring that the 
Alliance's nuclear threats remained credible. He contended that 
the Alliance's "conventional defence must be strong enough so 
that from the very beginning of a conflict it demands from an 
attacker an application of force and a attack dimension that 
would force him to consider the risk of a nuclear conflict that 
extended beyond E u r o p e . W o r n e r ' s  analysis was significant 
for it revealed that far from reducing the Alliance's reliance on 
nuclear weapons to deter an attack, he envisaged ATBM deployments 
as a means of making the nuclear response more credible.
It was hardly surprising, then, that Worner, despite his 
enthusiastic support for ATBMs, was equally insistent on the 
proposition that "a replacement of nuclear weapons with 
conventional weapons is under the present and foreseeable
24 Worner, Speech on 7 February 1985, pp. pit., p. 19.
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circumstances hardly p o s s i b l e . "^5 Worner feared that removing 
the nuclear threat would give greater significance to the "Warsaw 
Pact's superior conventional capabilities"^® and thereby lead 
to "crisis instability, and even the danger of w a r . H e  
stated categorically therefore that "in the foreseeable future 
there will be no strategy without nuclear weapons, not globally 
and not in Europe."^®
Thus we see contradictory strains in Worner's thinking. On 
the one hand he maitains that the possibility of BMD deployments 
and the advent of nuclear parity means that NATO must place 
greater reliance on conventional forces in Europe; on the other 
hand he contends that nuclear weapons remain central to West 
European security. A partial explanaition for these seemingly 
inconsistent assertion can be found in Worner*s views on the 
effect of BMD deployments on the strategic nucler regime.
Worner's view of the role of nuclear deterrence in an 
environment of strategic defences was complex. While he argued 
that the superpowers would no longer be able to rely upon the 
absolute effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and that nuclear 
strategy would therefore have to reorient itself more along the 
lines of "classical strategy," he stated that:
Worner, Strateaie im Wandel. op. cit.. p. 14. 
2® Ibid.
Ibid.
2® Ibid.
397
Since no defence system can be perfect, the risk of nuclear 
destruction remains, which though no longer threatening to 
the existence of a state, still encompasses considerable 
damages for the population and the economy. The expected 
damages would no longer be guaranteed to be unbearable, 
though nevertheless hardly bearable, that the nuclear 
stalemate would continue to be in effect.2*
What Worner seemed to be implying was that while the dangers of 
unintended nuclear conflict would be diminished through BMD 
deployments, the existential threat of nuclear annihilation would 
continue to cast its shadow over strategic calculations, allowing 
the Alliance to dispense with the less desirable aspects of its 
reliance on nuclear weapons without abandoning nuclear deterrence 
altogether.
Opposition to Worner's Plan Within the Federal Republic of 
Germanv
The SPD was opposed to Worner*s ATBM proposal. They argued 
that the deployment of ATBMs would lead to an offensive and 
defensive arms race in Western Europe. The SPD reiterated its 
position that the threat posed by ballistic missiles, 
irrespective of their range, was a political problem that could 
not be solved by technical means. They argued that the issue 
would best be resolved through an arms control treaty with the 
Soviet Union.
But most importantly, the SPD contended that the ATBM 
proposal would lend political suport to SDI. This, they
29 Ibid., p. 19.
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believed, would place West Germany in a position of being party 
to a process that could lead to the demise of the ABM treaty. 
Moreover, it would create the impression of West German 
governmental support for the concept behind the SDI 
programme.^ 0
Unlike the issue of participation in SDI research, the ATBM 
debate did not create friction within the West German cabinet. 
While clearly not as enamoured of the ATBM proposal as the CDU, 
the FDP had no particular objection to it either. Genscher did 
not believe that Worner's ATBM proposal threatened the ABM treaty 
and might create difficulities for West German relations with 
Moscow. Above all, he viewed the deployment of ATBMs as 
envisaged by Worner, unlike the space-based comprehensive BMD 
deployment contemplated by the Reagan Administration, as fully 
compatible with NATO's doctrine of flexible response.
While the SPD and FDP views had little effect on the West 
German government's position on ATBM's, they did illuminate two 
important features of the ATBM issue within the Federal Republic. 
First, as Worner freely admitted, the ATBM proposal was not only 
a response to what the West German government regarded as a new 
threat from Soviet short-range missiles, but it also was a means
Europaische Verte id icfunas Initiative zur Abwehr 
Ballisticher Raketen. Antrag der Fraktion der SPD. 
Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 
10/4440, 4 December 1985.
Hans Gunther Brauch, "SDI - The West German Debate," in 
Brauch (ed), Star Wars and European Defence, (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 203.
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of gaining influence on the direction of SDI and demonstrating 
unity with the United States on SDI. As we remarked to the 
Bundestag "Anyone joining the game has more influence than an 
outsider who merely launches c r i t i c i s m . "^2
Second, Worner's ATBM proposal, while designed to provide 
political support for SDI, did not constitute an endorsement of 
the goals set forth in Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech. Rather, 
Worner viewed ATBMs as a means of ensuring the continued 
credibility of NATO's strategy of flexible response and thus 
reliance on nuclear deterrence. This view of ATBMs dovetailed 
with the West German perception that the goal of SDI had changed 
considerably since March 1983. No longer, argued Worner, was SDI 
designed to overturn deterrence but to establish it on a more 
stable basis by protecting retaitory forces from a first-strike. 
This perception of SDI rested not only on perceived shifts in the 
Reagan Administration's positions, but on the belief that the 
technical feasibility of creating a near perfect defence was many 
decades away.
Worner's view that SDI was no longer an instrument designed 
to overturn deterrence was important because it was essential to 
the strategic validity of his ATBM proposal. For without 
continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, it would make little 
sense to advocate ATBMs as a means to ensure the continued 
credibility of flexible response.
32 "Worner Discusses Government's SDI position," 13 December 
1985, Bonn, in FBIS-WE. December 20, p. K-5.
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Worner*s ATBM proposal therefore indicated that while the 
West German government was interested in certain forms of ATBM 
deployment and was eager to lend political support to SDI, it did 
not advocate using ATBM and BMD deployments as a means of 
eliminating the West's reliance on nuclear weapons. While Worner 
and other West Europeans continued to believe that the United 
States was commited to maintaining nuclear deterrence and that 
BMD deployment could not achieve perfect defences, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, this was far from an accurate perception 
- either about the Reagan Administration's objectives or about 
how they would go about achieving them.
IV. THE FRENCH REACTION TO ATBMs
The emergence of the ATBM issue coincided with the change in 
government in France. In March 1986, Jacques Chirac became Prime 
Minister following the defeat of President Mitterrand's Socialist 
government in Parliamentary elections. When he became Prime 
Minister, Chirac adopted a more positive disposition toward SDI 
than his predecessors. His stance was consistent with his policy 
pronouncements prior to becoming prime minister. While in 
opposition, Chirac had criticized Mitterrand for his negative 
stance toward SDI, asserting that it had unnecessarily damaged 
relations with the United States. Accordingly, he came to office 
determined to make clear that SDI was an area in which he 
disagreed with the French President. In fact, however, the 
differences between Chirac and Mitterrand were more rhetorical
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than substantive. While Chirac spoke more approvingly than 
Mitterrand about SDI, there were few real differences in their 
positions. To the extent that French policy toward the issue of 
BMDs changed in 1986, it was attributable to a perception of a 
shift in American SDI policy.
Chirac argued that SDI "is irreversible and it is 
justified"33 and therefore "France cannot afford not to be 
associated with this great research program."^4 Shortly after 
his appointment as Prime Minister, Chirac addressed the National 
Assembly and explained that while "the first task of our defence 
is to guarantee nuclear d e t e r r e n c e ,A me ri ca n research 
efforts required France to consider adjusting its defence policy 
to new technological and strategic realities. At the same time, 
Chirac declined to endorse the strategic rationale underlying 
SDI, declaring that he shared Mitterrand's concerns that the 
deployment of strategic defences could lead to the militarization 
of outer space. Moreover, Chirac did not favour signing an MoU 
with the United States, contending that it would endanger 
France's prized national independence in defence matters.
Chirac thus maintained that although France needed to take 
cognizance of the potential changes that SDI could engender, it
International Herald Tribune. 23 May 1986.
Ibid.
Jacques Chirac, "Speech before the National Assembly," 9 
April 1986, Speeches and Statements. Service de Presse et 
d'information. Ambassade de France a Londres, London, p. 
1.
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was important to realize that strategic defences "will not 
radically alter the basic factors of nuclear deterrence for many 
years yet; maybe it never will."^^ Nevertheless, the fact that 
the United States was actively perusing such technologies meant 
that "major changes may thus arise in the world balance, in the 
dialogue between the two great powers and in European 
defence."37 Under these circumstances, he contended that the 
government must keep abreast of the relevant developments, lest 
France fall behind technologically or strategically.
France's more positive disposition toward SDI was further 
strengthened by the perception that the United States had 
abandoned its quest to transcend nuclear deterrence by deploying 
leak proof defences. Foreign Minister Raimond contended in May 
1986 that: "The presentation of the American initiative has 
changed substantially over the last few months. There is no 
longer any talk of eliminating or replacing nuclear 
deterrence."3® Given this new American policy. Defence 
Minister Giraud argued that "space defense and nuclear 
deterrence, which remains the cornerstone of our security system.
3® Ibid.. p. 2. 
37 Ibid.
3® Jean-Bernard Raimond, Statements in The Senate, 27 May 
1986, Speeches and Statements. Service de Presse et 
d'information. Ambassade de France a Londres, London, pp. 
2—3.
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now seem more complementary than competitive."^9 Given these 
changes in US policy, Raimond declared that "one of the 
fundamental divergences between France and the United States, 
which rested on the role of deterrence, has disappeared.
The Role of ATBMs in French Strategic Thinking
It would be a mistake to ascribe this shift in France's 
perception of SDI merely to the existence of a more conservative 
government. As Paul Quiles remarked shortly after Raimond*s 
statement regarding the government's new assessment toward SDI, 
he saw little difference between Foreign Minister Raimond's 
statement and the position of the previous government. Indeed as 
early as December 1985, Quiles, who was Defence Minister before 
Chirac became Prime Minister, stated in an interview with Le 
Monde that in the medium term SDI goals "are essentially 
military. The aim is to propose solutions to the maintenance of 
the reprisal capability of American missiles in the framework of 
the present d o c t r i n e . H e  regarded the long-term goals of 
SDI as political, designed primarily to influence US public
40
Andre Giraud, Statement to U.S. Senate, 29 May 1986, 
reported in "Space Defense and Nuclear Deterrence Are 
Complementary," Jacques Isnard (Le Monde. 31 May 1986),
p. 10.
Jean-Bernard Raimond, Statements at luncheon with 
Diplomatic Press, 2 July 1986, Speeches and Statements. 
Service de Presse et d'information, Ambassade de France 
a Londres, London, p. 8.
Paul Quiles, "Defense Minister Quiles Doubts Credibility 
of SDI," Le Monde. 18 December 1985, reported in FBIS-WE 
20 December 1985, p. K-1.
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opinion. In short, he doubted the Reagan Administration's 
commitment to its proclaimed vision of "rendering nuclear weapons 
impotent and obsolete." This perception that SDI was no longer 
incompatible with nuclear deterrence emerged gradually and was 
shared by both the Socialists and the Gaullists.
France's more sanguine appraisal of SDI's potential impact 
on nuclear deterrence facilitated a more favourable consideration 
of ballistic missile defence options for the European theatre.
As SDI was no longer associated with the goal of transcending 
nuclear deterrence, the prospective introduction of ATMs into the 
European theatre was not necessarily seen as incompatible with 
French military doctrine. Moreover, Worner's advocacy of ATBMs 
on the grounds of preventing "Eurospecific" threat diminished the 
perception that ballistic missile defences for the European 
theatre merely constituted an extension of SDI, thus enabling 
Europeans and the French in particular to portray their efforts, 
if not independent of the United States, than at least 
supportable with a specifically European rationale.
France had previously expressed interest in studying the 
possibility of developing ballistic missile defence options for 
the European theatre. In April 1985, Defence Minister Charles 
Hernu suggested that in response to SDI, European countries 
should pool their resources "to see if there is a possibility... 
of a European strategic defense i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s  proposal
Charles Hernu, interview on Paris Television Service, 
transcription in "Hernu Discusses SDI, French Deterrent 
in Interview," FBIS-WE, 19 April 1985, p. K-1.
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did not materialize because civilian cooperation under Eureka 
superseded consideration of cooperation on a European ballistic 
missile defence system. In January 1986, however, France once 
again broached the idea of studying a ballistic missile defence 
system for Europe, only this time in the form of an extended air 
defence system along the lines advocated by Worner.*3
The most concrete expression of France's efforts in the area 
of ATMBs was a government backed study by Aerospatiale.** The 
French government provided funding for this study through the 
Direction des Engins section of the Delegation Generale pour 
l'Armement, though Aerospatiale contributed funds of its own as 
well. This study was designed to provide a preliminary 
examination of terminal defences for Western Europe against 
short-range Soviet missiles. Technologically, it was to build on 
advanced French air-to-surface missile designs, providing a 
capability for the interception of both short range ballistic 
missiles and cruise missiles. French officials viewed such a 
system as "complementing U.S. SDI designs that are being designed 
primarily to counter the longer-range strategic ballistic missile 
threat to the US..."*^
Aerospatiale officials also stressed that they would be in 
close contact with the Pentagon in order to inform American
See David S. Yost, "Western Europe and the U.S. Strategic 
Defense Initiative," Journal of International Affairs 
Vol. 41, No. 2. (Summer 1988), p. 309.
Abrahamson, op cit.. p. 1770. 
Ibid.. p. 1770.
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defence officials of the "potential relationship" between their 
study and SDI and to examine areas where Aerospatiale could 
participate in SDI research. At the same time, Aerospatiale 
Director Matre stated that "European defense efforts" took 
precedence over the possibility of "a company role in the U.S. 
p r o g r a m . "46 But fundamentally Matre believed that "European 
defense efforts and the U.S. SDI program are to be complementary 
and I expect there will be coordination between the two..."*?
In keeping with its perception of ballistic missile defences 
as a means of strengthening deterrence, France envisaged any 
system arising from the Aerospatiale studies as complementing 
ongoing French efforts to ensure the continued credibility of the 
French strategic nuclear deterrent. French officials feared that 
the growing accuracy of Soviet conventionally armed missiles 
would pose a particularly dangerous threat to the relatively 
small land based French ballistic missile force. Jean-Charles 
Poggi, director of the Space and Ballistic Systems Division of 
Aerospatiale, argued that "An ATBM system would be one key 
element in enhancing the force's survivability."*®
France also supported and participated in a NATO study 
conducted under the auspices of the Air Defence Committee 
(CAPADC) to examine the short range ballistic missile threat. 
France's decision to allow the Air Defence Committee to study
*® Ibid., p. 1771.
*? Ibid.
*® Ibid.. p. 1770.
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this matter was significant for it indicated her desire to see 
the question of "extended air defence" dealt with in coordination 
with both its European Allies and the United States. This forum 
enabled France to participate in a manner that allowed a degree 
of allied coordination - without which integrated air defences 
would be technologically infeasible - and, at the same time, 
still retain its freedom of manoeuvre. In this latter regard, 
France insisted on retaining ultimate control of the use of any 
prospective ATM components under French jurisdiction.
Despite France's willingness to entertain the possibility of 
ATBM deployments, ultimately she regarded them as peripheral to 
France's defence strategy. Her interest in ATBMs derived 
primarily from concerns that SDI would fail to provide Europe 
with adequate protection; and if it did, that SDI would be under 
American control thus compromising France's independence. Still, 
France believed that given SDI's salience and the increased 
attention given to ATBMs in early 1986, it was necessary for 
France to involve itself in the debate in a significant manner. 
But what mattered most to France was the continued validity of 
its nuclear forces and the strategy of deterrence. And for this 
purpose, ATBMs were regarded as only of marginal significance to 
France's primary defence requirements. In an address to the 
Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN) on 12 
September 1986, Chirac stressed that while it was important for 
France to "take part in the great effort of technological 
research that is likely to have a rapid effect on the
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technologies used for our offensive and defensive weapons,” it
would be unwise "to imagine that there is for our country, and
for a long time to come, an alternative to the nuclear
deterrent.”49 Chirac thus contended that:
Having regard to the efficacity of modern offensive weapons, 
the best chance of survival seems to have to be obtained 
through a variable deployment of major systems. That 
approach must be given precedence over that of developing a 
broader anti-aircraft defence, a path it seems reasonable to 
tread only with great caution, since ad hoc defensive 
systems, whose development and deployment cost would be very 
high, would in fact risk being saturated or neutralized by 
appropriate counter-measures. =0
Thus, the French government, while generally supportive of 
efforts to investigate the neccisity of countering the threat 
posed by Soviet short-range missiles armed with conventional 
warheads, veiwed the question of ATBMs within the context of the 
main goal of its defence policy, namely, to maintain the 
credibility of its nuclear deterrent. In this connection, the 
French reaction to ATBMs was signficant because it indicated that 
French officials were far more sanguine about the objectives of 
SDI. Moreover, French officials countenanced the NATO air 
defence committee to study the ATBM issue, thereby indicating a 
desire for Alliance unity. At the same time, French officials 
also forwarded a number of proposals that called for a 
specifically European system. But the overiding aspect of the
49 Jacques Chirac, Speech at Institute of Higher National 
Defence Studies, 12 September 1986, Speeches and 
Statements, Service de Presse et d'information. Ambassade 
de France a Londres, London, p. 3.
Ibld.
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French reaction to ATBMs was to ensure that they serve to enhance 
and not undermine nuclear deterrence.
V. THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO ATBMS
The British government, while supportive of SDI research, 
was far less enamoured of ATBMs than the West German government. 
While British defence officials believed that the threat posed by 
conventionally armed Soviet ballistic missiles warranted study, 
they did not believe that it was an issue that required the 
attention that Worner was according it. As was the case in West 
Germany, the British government's willingness to consider ATBM 
defences was influenced by the growing perception that the 
objectives of SDI were now far less ambitious than they had been 
originally. Despite this perception, the British government 
remained fundamentally opposed to any deployment of ballistic 
missile defences. British officials were above all concerned 
that neither SDI or ATBMs do anything to undermine the validity 
of nuclear deterrence, which Thatcher and her government beieved 
remained essential to Western security.
The British government's perception of SDI evolved in the 
aftermath of the participation debate. SDI was no longer viewed 
as a programme necessarily dedicated to overthrowing the 
deterrent regime through the deployment of comprehensive space- 
based strategic defences. As Michael Heseltine testified to the 
House Defence Committee:
I am not unaware of, and not uninfluenced by, the views of
Mr. Nitze - and we have discussed this before - which talk
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of more balanced arrangements of offensive and defensive 
systems, not the elimination of one and the replacement of 
another, but of a better balance, and that would, of course, 
have a very different implication.
Thus, at least for the foreseeable future, strategic calculations 
would not have to be made on the basis of the possibility that 
the United States would attempt to "render nuclear weapons 
impotent and obsolete" - an assessment that had important 
ramification for Britain. As the Chief Scientific Advisor to the 
Ministry of Defence stated:
in terms of a practical deployable system within the next 
twenty years, American thoughts are, I think, moving towards 
a centrally land-based terminal defence system as something 
which could be achieved in the short term, and I suspect are 
regarding a space-based system to enhance the overall 
capability as something which may well be receding further 
into the future. 2^
It should be noted that while this perception led to a more 
positive disposition toward SDI, it was engendered not by any 
change in the desirability of strategic defence deployment; it 
reflected the perception that if deployments were nevertheless 
decided upon, they would be more consistent with existing
Testimony by Michael Heseltine before the House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 5 December 1985, in The 
Implications for the United Kingdom of Ballistic Missile 
Defence. Second Report from the Defence Committee, 
Session 1986-1987, London, 1987, Her Majesty's Stationary 
Office, p. 9.
52 Testimony by Professor Norman before the House of Commons 
Defence Committee, 21 May 1986, in The Implications for 
the United Kingdom of Ballistic-Missile Defence, o p . , 
cit.. p. 196.
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deterrent arrangements. This more positive, although still 
guarded, assessment of SDI enabled Britain to consider ATBMs 
without necessarily subjecting itself to the criticism that in so 
doing it was jeopardizing the existing security regime. For while 
the British government strove to portray the question of Europe's 
requirement for an ATBM system as distinctly separate from SDI, 
the perception that they were indeed closely linked was held by 
many.
The House of Commons Defence Committee gave voice to a 
rather widely held assumption that SDI provided the driving force 
behind the discussion of the question of ballistic missile 
defences for Europe; "We are concerned that the issue of ATBMs 
has recently come to the fore, less because of the its intrinsic 
urgency than because of the climate of opinion created by SDI and 
the need to respond to the sort of issues raised in the American 
debate."S3 Thus, while it was considered proper to examine the 
possibility that emerging Soviet conventional TBM options could 
threaten key NATO assets, the Defence Committee articulated a 
"worry that this threat is at present being somewhat 
exaggerated."S4 Moreover, they maintained that the fascination 
with ballistic missile defences engendered by SDI also prejudiced 
the manner in which these threats were addressed. It was argued 
that even if the threat of conventionally armed TBMs were to be
The Implications for the United Kingdom of Ballistic- 
Missile Defence, op. cit.. p. xxvi.
Ibid.
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deemed sufficiently large to warrant countermeasures, it was not 
clear that the introduction of active defences in the form of 
ATBMs was necessarily the most appropriate response. Instead, 
the Defence Committee maintained that responding to the emerging 
threat through a combination of passive measures, new 
counterforce options ("as part of NATO's general counter-air 
c a p a b i l i t y " m a y  "lack the glamour and technological 
challenge of the active kind, but they will almost certainly 
prove more c o s t - e f f e c t i v e . What was considered even more 
desirable was to obviate additional military countermeasures 
altogether. Indeed, the Defence Committee regarded TBMs "to be 
an example of an area where a successful arms-control agreement 
could introduce a degree of predictability into force planning 
and prevent the premature commitment of substantial sums of 
money."S?
While Thatcher's government conceded that there were levels 
of inevitable overlap, SDI and ATBMs were portrayed as separate 
issues whose respective rationale arose from similar yet 
fundamentally different threats. According to the Ministry of 
Defence,
SDI and ATBM defence should be viewed as separate but 
overlapping issues; the former seeks to counter an 
established (nuclear) threat, the latter a postulated new 
threat. The question of how best to defend against the 
conventional threat from TBMs is therefore being addressed
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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in the context of Extended Air Defence.
Although there could be a linkage in some of the 
technologies involved, we see a clear conceptual difference 
between ATBM defence and SDI. Subject to the outcome of the 
NATO Air Defence Committee studies, there might be a 
requirement to provide an ATBM system irrespective of any 
decisions made on SDI.^®
At the same time, as Michael Heseltine testified, "it is 
inevitable that some of the sorts of technologies one is talking 
about in the Strategic Defence Initiative are very relevant to 
the capability to defend one-self against weapons that actually 
perhaps the Strategic Defence Initiative would not provide a 
capability against."^9 Moreover, the British government 
expected that through participation in SDI research projects 
under the terms of the MoU, British firms would glean information 
that would be applicable to constructing ballistic missile 
defences for Europe. 0^
British officials stressed however the inevitable overlap in 
technologies and ATBMs should not obsure then essential 
difference. The British government therefore emphasized that 
ATBMs were not merely an extension of SDI but should be 
considered in the light of threats specific to Western Europe. 
British officials contended though with notably less enthusiasm
Evidence provided to House of Commons Defence Committee 
by the MoD, 4 March 1987, in The Implications for the 
United Kingdom of Ballistic-Missile Defence, o p . cit., p. 
51.
59 Heseltine, pp. pit., p. 11.
Ibid.
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than their West German counterparts, that the consideration of 
ATBMs was justified on the grounds of the potential emergence of 
a conventional TBM threat to Europe. While they did not view 
this threat as imminent, British defence officials were concerned 
that the Soviet Union could acquire the capacity to employ 
conventionally armed TBMs against NATO air defence assets and 
thereby allow Soviet air forces to accomplish their mission with 
much greater ease. The British government was quick to stress, 
however, that the consideration of this threat should be kept 
separate from the type of missions which the Reagan 
Administration was investigating in its SDI programme. The 
rationale underlying the distinction between nuclear and 
conventional threats was provided by Brigadier T.P.J. Boyd- 
Carpenter, Director of Defence Policy in the Ministry of Defence:
The purpose of these studies [extended air defence] and the 
reason they are examining short-range missiles is the 
concern for the conventional threat which would be posed by 
them. The longer range systems do pose a nuclear threat to 
Europe, amongst other weapons, but they are currently 
deterred in the way all such missiles have been hitherto by 
the threat of NATO retaliation.
The British government did not therefore view the potential 
development of ATBMs as changing the Alliance's fundamental 
reliance on nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet attacks against 
NATO.
In sum, the British government's stance toward ATBMs must be
Testimony by Brigadier T P J Boyd-Carpenter, 4 March
1987, in The Implications for the United Kingdom of 
Ballistic-Missile Defence, o p . cit.. p. 63.
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seen in light of its determination to see nuclear deterrence 
remain the centerpiece of NATO strategy. Thus despite their 
support for investigating the need for ATBMs and their 
participation in SDI research, British officials remained weary 
of SDI's potential impact on nuclear deterrence. This fear was 
exacerbated in early 1986 by Mikhail Gorbachev's speech before 
the United Nations in which he advocated the complete abolition 
of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The British government 
feared that the confluence of Gorbachev's bold and explicit anti- 
nuclear proposals and the Reagan Administration's continued 
enthusiasm for SDI could contribute to the weakening of support 
for nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, the British officials 
believed that Gorbachev's proposals dovetailed with the Labour 
Party's defence policy, both of which the government regarded as 
dangerous, as they ignored the reality of a world in which 
nuclear weapons were necessary in order to deter aggression. As 
Geoffry Howe remarked, "Cheap slogans about weapons or welfare. 
Trident or treatment, cannot wish away that truth. No more can 
security be provided by a speciously attractive timetable for 
abolishing nuclear weapons by the end of the century. Security 
has to be worked for and it has to be paid f o r . I n  light of 
these developments and the general trend toward denigrating the 
contribution of nuclear weapons to international security,
Britain remained circumspectly weary of ATBMs, viewing them as a
Speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe on 17 March 1986, op. cit.,
paragraph 1.
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yet another development that tended to undermine the perception 
that only nuclear deterrence could provide Europe with security.
Thus, the British government's position on ATBMs reflected 
both the British government's continued desire to demonstrate 
unity on SDI-related questions such as ATBMs and the underlying 
differences in perceptions about strategy that separated it from 
the Reagan Adminstration. For while the British government was 
willing to contemplate the deployment of ATBMs against Soviet 
conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles, British 
officials made it clear that this question should be kept 
separate from SDI. Moreover, they emphasized that any envisaged 
ATBM deployment would not be designed to intercept nuclear armed 
missiles, since this would imply a desire to transcend the 
relationship of mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack upon which 
British officials believed that NATO's security rested. The 
Reagan Administration, as we have seen, while supporting defence 
against the conventionally armed short-range missiles saw as its 
ultimate objective the creation of comprehensive defence for 
Europe in order to transcend nuclear deterrence. Despite these 
clearly divergent objectives the British and American governments 
papered over these difference in order to present a face of unity 
on the question of ATBMs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most striking element of the ATBM debate was 
that unlike the other aspects of the SDI debate, it was an issue
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that did not become prominent because of American action. To be 
sure, the Reagan Administration had often stated that it would 
include Western Europe should BMD deployments occur, but the 
ascendence of ATBMS was due primarily to the efforts of the West 
German Defence Minister Manfred Worner. Thus, whereas in the 
case of the March 23, 1983 announcement as well as the Reagan 
Administration's offer to participate in SDI research, the West 
German government's role was largely reactive, with regard to the 
ATBM issue it took a leading role.
The British and French governments also played different 
roles in the ATBM debate than they had before. In responding to 
the March 23 speech and the offer to participate, British 
officials were the first to react and generally set the tone and 
created the context in which the West German and French 
governments responded. But in the case of the ATBM debate the 
British government was largely reactive. The French government's 
role also differed from that which it had theretofore played in 
the SDI debate. Indeed, Mitterrand's decision to support a NATO 
study - conducted under the auspices of the Air Defence Committee 
- indicated that despite its desire to remain independent, the 
French government was not averse to forging a united position on 
ATBMs.
The role that NATO played in the ATBM dispute reflected the 
remarkable degree of consensus on the issue of ATBMs among the 
US, British, West German, and French governments. Thus, the 
reaction of NATO as an institution to the ATBM issue was far more
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positive than it had been to the issue of SDI research, let alone 
to moving from research to deployment. The degree of consensus 
on ATBMs within the Alliance was reflected in NATO communiques. 
Whereas NATO communiques on SDI were limited to indicating 
Alliance support for SDI research, on the issue of ATBMs Alliance 
comminques demonstrated greater consensus on the need to consider 
seriously deployment of ATBMs. In May 1986 NATO defence 
ministers agreed, for instance, that it was necessary to consider 
"ways of enhancing NATO's integrated air defence to enable it to 
deal with the full spectrum of the Warsaw Pact air threat, 
including tactical missiles."^3 And at the December Defence 
Planning Committee meeting they called for "continued work on 
assessing the threat and possible ways to deal with it."G*
NATO's reaction to ATBMs therefore stood in stark contrast to the 
Alliance's official position on the question SDI research or the 
question of moving beyond research to deployment. Alliance 
comminques on SDI confined themselves to supporting SDI research 
mainly in relation to similar Soviet research; they did not 
mention the threat posed by long-range Soviet ballistic missiles 
as a reason to support SDI research. But with respect to ATBMs, 
there was a consensus that a genuine threat existed that may
Defence Planning Committee Comminique, Brussels, 22 May 
1986, paragraph 5.
Defence Planning Committee Communique, Brussels, 4-5 
December 1986, paragraph 6.
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require the deployment of ATBMs.
The consensus on ATBMs as reflected in the position of NATO 
had a salutary effect on the overall debate about SDI within the 
Alliance. For despite the extent to which ATBMs were viewed by 
some as separate from SDI, Worner stated from the outset that his 
proposal should be understood in the context of attempting to 
increase West European influence over the course of SDI. More 
importantly, however, the validity of his concept rested on a key 
assumption about SDI: that the Reagan Administration no longer 
envisaged SDI as an instrument for replacing nuclear deterrence, 
but rather of founding it on a more secure basis by eliminating 
the possibility of a first-strike. This implied an abandonment 
of the goal of comprehensive defences that informed Reagan's 
original vision and a greater emphasis on limited defences. This 
assumption about SDI's more limited objectives dovetailed with 
Worner's idea of ATBMs because his proposal also hinged on the 
desirability of limited defences (for Western Europe) to which he 
assumed that the Reagan Administration subscribed.
A careful analysis reveals, however, that the assumptions 
about SDI upon which Worner's ATBM concept was predicated and 
which in turn led to its acceptance within the Alliance were
65 Despite this consensus, because the INF Treaty (see 
chapter 7) led to the elimination of many short and 
medium range Soviet missiles targeted at Western Europe, 
the various proposals described in this chapter, 
particularly those forwarded by the French government did 
not lead to the deployment of an ATBM system. However, 
the U.S. did upgrade the patriot air defence missile to 
enable it to intercept short-range ballistic missiles.
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false. Despite US support for Worner's ATBM proposals it should 
have been clear that the Reagan Administration was intent on a 
defence against not only conventionally armed TBMs but nuclear 
armed TBMs as well. While the perception that the Reagan 
Administration was no longer intent upon deploying comprehensive 
defences that would attempt to render nuclear weapons impotent 
and obsolete was often voiced by Reagan Administration officials, 
this perception did not reflect the thinking at the highest level 
of the US government. Indeed, Reagan himself sought to dispel 
the notion that SDI research was becoming geared toward the 
deployment of limited defences that would serve to enhance rather 
than transcend deterrence; "to deploy systems of limited 
effectiveness now would divert limited funds and delay our main 
research. It could well erode support for the program before 
it's permitted to reach its potential.
Yet it was in large measure the perception that Reagan was 
no longer intent upon the maximal aims of SDI that laid the 
foundation for the consensus on ATBMs. Therefore, the ATBM 
debate demonstrated that underlying the apparent agreement on 
ATBMs, there was still a fundamental difference within the 
Alliance about the objectives of SDI and the requirements for a 
credible nuclear strategy. While ignoring these basic 
disagreements was conducive to fostering a united position on 
ATBMs and therefore increasing the overall unity within the
"Reagan Rejects Calls to Deploy Partial SDI," The Boston 
Globe. 7 August 1986, p. 10.
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Alliance on SDI, in the next chapter the pitfalls of ignoring 
these differences will be investigated. In the process of 
examining the Reykjavik summit we will see that not only did 
Reagan not abandon his original maximal objectives but that BMD 
deployment was not necessary to pursuing these objectives.
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VII. REYKJAVIK, DETENTE, THE INF TREATY AND THE DEMISE OF THE 
TRANSATLANTIC SDI DEBATE
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I. INTRODUCTION
The October 1986 summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and 
Mikhail Gorbachev, in Reykjavik Iceland, constituted a watershed 
in the transatlantic politics of SDI. By tabling proposals for 
the elimination of ballistic missiles and discussing the 
possibility of complete nuclear disarmament, the Soviet and 
American Presidents raised hopes as well as fears about the 
future. Although the US-Soviet meeting ended in acrimonious 
disagreement about SDI, the proposals that were tabled in Iceland 
had a far-reaching impact on the future course of US-Soviet arms 
control negotiations. They also had a profound effect on US 
relations with its West European Allies.
Because the US had contemplated proposals that would have 
essentially overturned the strategic regime upon which European 
security had rested in the post-war era without so much as 
informing its closest Allies, the Reykjavik summit came as a 
profound and unwelcome shock to most Europeans. Europeans 
believed that at Reykjavik the Reagan Administration had 
demonstrated utter disregard for the interests and views of its 
Allies and had gambled recklessly with Western security 
interests.
While in the end, SDI was responsible for blocking what, for 
West European governments, were unwanted agreements, Europe's 
disposition toward SDI did not change. In fact, many believed 
that it was the negotiating context created by SDI which led to 
both the Soviet offer of radical reductions in strategic
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ballistic missiles as well as the American counterproposals for 
their complete elimination. Moreover, at Reykjavik, West 
European governments realized that contrary to their earlier 
perceptions, the strategic concepts which Reagan had articulated 
when he launched SDI in 1983 had not been modified in the 
intervening three years. Indeed, Reagan's evident enthusiasm for 
"rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" was manifest at 
Reykjavik. It was the opportunity that he believed his meeting 
with Gorbachev offered to accomplish his long-cherished goals 
that led to Reagan's radical proposals at Reykjavik.
While these plans came to nought, Reykjavik provided a spur 
to progress on the INF negotiations and the implementation of 
NATO's long-standing zero-option proposal. However, this also 
created difficulties for West European governments. While they 
had initially welcomed the zero option^, it looked less 
attractive when considered within the context of the American 
strategic designs revealed at Reykjavik because many Europeans 
saw an INF agreement based on the zero option as the first step 
toward the denuclearization of Western strategy. Ironically, the 
fears generated by the implementation of the zero option - 
decoupling, denuclearization, and increased danger of 
conventional conflict - were precisely the fears which had been 
raised in connection with SDI. Yet, it was in the absence of 
strategic defence deployments that these fears were realised.
The elimination of all Soviet S-20, SS-4 and SS-5 in 
return for removing American, Pershing II and Cruise 
Missiles.
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Thus the circumstances under which SDI was eclipsed demonstrated 
that the strategic concerns that were often associated with SDI 
were in fact manifestations of fundamental differences in 
American and European strategic thinking.
But concerns about the credibility of NATO's military 
strategy were soon eclipsed by the rapid improvement in East-West 
relations that preceded and followed the signing of the INF 
treaty in December 1987. Moreover, improved relations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union further undermined 
Congressional support for SDI and convinced the Reagan 
Administration that the circumstances which had originally made 
SDI seem so imperative were changing radically.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the impact of 
the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath on the transatlantic 
debate about SDI. Accordingly, we will seek to answer the 
following questions. Why the British, West German, and French 
governments reacted to the Reykjavik proposals the way in which 
they did? What role did the WEU and NATO play in the aftermath 
of Reykjavik? In answering these questions, we also analyze the 
West European reaction to the INF treaty (to which the Reykjavik 
summit gave impetus) and how Reykjavik influenced their 
perception of that agreement. The reaction of the opposition 
parties to the Reykjavik summit will not be afforded the same 
attention that they were in the chapter on the debate about West 
European participation in SDI research. The primary reason for 
this is that there was no sustained internal dispute about the
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Reykjavik summit in either Britain, West Germany, or France. 
Moreover, because the governments were themselves so critical of 
the Reykjavik summit the opposition and the governments found 
themselves on the same side of the issue, although, as we shall 
see, for somewhat different reasons.
Analyzing the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath is 
important because it enables us to examine the validity of the 
propositions that have been forwarded in this thesis. The 
proposals tabled at Reykjavik and the agreement reached in its 
aftermath (the INF treaty) engendered strong West European 
reactions because they threatened to alter the basis of Western 
security. By comparing the British, West German, and French 
reactions to Reykjavik (and the INF treaty) to their positions on 
SDI should enable us to gain greater insight into the underlying 
cause of the transatlantic controversy about SDI. If the 
reaction to the Reykjavik proposals and INF were similar to the 
reactions to the prospect of BMD deployment, this would tend to 
confirm the hypothesis that the issue of deployment was not the 
primary cause of the SDI controversy. For if similar arguments 
were employed in both cases it would indicate that certain 
underlying differences manifested themselves irrespective of the 
nature of the proposals. On the other hand, if the reactions 
were substantially different, this would indicate that deployment 
was indeed the main issue separating the United States and 
Western Europe on SDI. Therefore, in this chapter we should be 
able to obtain further findings as to whether the SDI controversy
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was attributable primarily to the prospect of deployment or to 
differing conceptions of what constituted a credible and stable 
strategic regime.
Examining the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath also 
provides a means of analy the manner in which the Alliance 
managed the SDI dispute. Once again, the Reagan Administration 
presented a proposal as a fait accompli and then attempted to 
mitigate the severity of both the content of the proposals as 
well as the manner in which it was presented. Analy why this 
pattern repeated itself can provide valuable insight into why the 
compromises and agreed upon procedures that had been established 
within the Alliance with respect to SDI from late 1984 through 
1986 were suddenly jettisoned at the Reykjavik summit.
Finally, the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath enables us 
to determine the impact of East-West relations on the SDI debate. 
The dramatic improvement in US-Soviet relations that followed the 
initial acrimony surrounding the summit affords an opportunity to 
investigate the impact of the state of East-West relations on 
Alliance unity.
II. THE BRITISH REACTION TO REYKJAVIK AND ITS AFTERMATH
The proposals discussed at the Reykjavik summit came as a 
profound shock to the British government. While Thatcher's 
government was weary of SDI and the anti-nuclear trend that it 
had initiated, the scope and rapidity of change discussed at 
Reykjavik stunned the British government and generated wide-
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spread doubts about the competence and steadiness of the Reagan 
Administration. Thatcher took immediate - and largely 
successful- steps to minimize the impact of the Reykjavik 
revelations by travelling to Washington shortly following the US- 
Soviet summit and pressing Reagan to reaffirm publicly the 
fundamental tenets of Western defence strategy, tenets that were 
nearly jettisoned in Iceland. Despite her success in forcing the 
Reagan Administration to retreat from some of the more radical 
proposals broached at Reykjavik, doubts lingered about the long­
term impact of the US offer to change radically the Western 
security structure. That SDI, which had in so many ways 
contributed to the atmosphere in which such radical proposals 
could be tabled, should have in the end prevented the 
dismantlement of the Western security structure was ironic, but, 
in the end, did little to engender support for SDI. If anything, 
the Reykjavik summit reinforced the belief that SDI was a 
dangerous and unwelcome threat to the continued viability of the 
deterrent regime that, from the dominant European perspective at 
least, had ensured security successfully for over a generation.
Thatcher reported to Parliament that she and Reagan had 
reaffirmed "the need for effective nuclear deterrence as a 
cornerstone of NATO's s t r a t e g y . They agreed that the Alliance 
"would continue to need effective nuclear deterrence, based on a
Margaret Thatcher, Parliamentarv Debates (House of 
Commons) Vol. 105, (18 November 1986), col. 441.
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mix of systems"^ to ensure its security. She related that 
Reagan had reaffirmed that the United States would continue to 
modernize its strategic nuclear forces. Britain welcomed this 
latter assurance not only because it gave concrete expression to 
the Reagan Administration's commitment to continue basing Western 
security on nuclear deterrence but ensured the continued 
viability of the British deterrent. Thatcher informed Parliament 
that Reagan had "confirmed the United States' full support for 
the arrangements made to modernise Britain's independent nuclear 
deterrent with Trident.* That she could do so came as a relief 
insofar as the Labour Party had portrayed Reykjavik as a great 
blow to the Conservative government's nuclear modernization 
plans.
The Labour Party was critical of the Reagan Administration's 
refusal to abandon SDI at the Reykjavik summit. Denis Healey 
remarked that "It is tragic that [SDI] wrecked the whole thing at 
the last minute because President Reagan must have known this 
would be the central issue before he left for Reykjavik." Labour 
Party officials also argued that because Thatcher supported SDI 
she was at least partly to blame for the failure at Reykjavik, 
but the role that SDI played at Reykjavik was soon overshadowed 
by the Soviet Union's linking of SDI to the INF negotiations,
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987. Presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, 
London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, p. 8.
Thatcher, Parliamentarv Debates. 18 November 1986, o p .
cit., CO. 441.
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which they deplored.  ^ And on this issue Labour Party and the 
Government found themselves in accord.
Indeed, at their meeting in the United States Thatcher and 
Reagan agreed that US-Soviet arms negotiations should give 
priority "to an INF agreement with restraints on shorter-range 
systems, to a 50 per cent, reduction in strategic offensive 
weapons and to a ban on chemical w e a p o n s . Moreover, they 
emphasized that nuclear reductions should be considered in the 
context of the non-nuclear threats which they are designed to 
deter, stating that "nuclear weapons could not be dealt with in 
isolation, given the need for a stable balance at all times.
In addition Reagan and Thatcher reiterated their continued 
support for "the SDI research programme which is permitted by the 
ABM Treaty"® as well as their commitment to close Alliance 
consultation.
British Doubts About US Intentions
Despite Thatcher's success in formalizing the United States' 
commitment to traditional Alliance defence precepts, British 
officials believed that the Reykjavik summit was indicative of 
broad and disturbing trends in US defence policy. The British 
Government maintained that while the Reykjavik summit did not
® See The New York Times. 23 November 1986.
® Ibid.
 ^ Statement on the Defence Estimate 1987. o p . cit.. p. 8.
® Ibid.
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constitute evidence that the United States was about to retreat 
to "Fortress America," it was necessary, averred Howe, "to be 
alert to trends in American thinking which might diminish our 
security - perhaps not today or tomorrow, but possibly in the 
longer term.
The British government contended that there were "signs of 
resurgent neo-isolationism in America, and a shift in US 
attention towards the Pacific Basin, so that Europe is no longer 
the automatic first concern of many Americans today.
Geoffrey Howe argued that although American and European 
interests continued to be "inextricably linked both economically 
and strategically,"11 in fact "Europe no longer dominates 
American thinking as much as it did in the past."i^ He 
contended that the United States has devoted more and more 
attention to the Far East, South-West Asia and Central America. 
Militarily, these interests - manifested themselves in calls for 
a reallocation of resources from the US military's dominant 
mission of defending Europe to "more emphasis on world- wide 
maritime and air-lift capabilities"i^ that were better suited
 ^ Geoffrey Howe, Speech at Institute of International 
Relations, Brussels, 16 March 1987, p. 4.
1° Geoffrey Howe, Speech to International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 19 November 1986, p. 10. Emphasis 
in the original.
11 Speech by Howe, 16 March 1987, op. cit.. p. 4.
12 Ibid.
1^  Ibid.
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to support non-European commitments. Howe believed that US
interest in restructuring its armed forces toward the ability to
intervene effectively in the Third World was partially
attributable to the longstanding and growing American perception
that Europeans were capable of doing far more than they were to
defend themselves. It was therefore imperative, intoned Howe,
for Europeans to make clear the "sizable European defence
effort"!* lest the United States come to the conclusion that
their partners on the other side of the Atlantic were not pulling
their just weight.
Related to the fear that the United States was losing
interest in Europe was the British concern that the traditional
American "distaste for reliance on nuclear weapons"!^ was
becoming stronger. Howe argued:
It is not in the American nature to be happy when held 
hostage to an irresistible threat. Some have questioned 
whether the US would ever be prepared to use nuclear weapons 
in response to a Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe. 
Geographically, not being faced with an obvious conventional 
threat, many Americans see clear attractions in strategic
d e f e n c e s .
In addition to revealing the British government's perception that 
SDI was the most recent embodiment of historical US anti-nuclear 
proclivities, this statement provided insight into the conceptual 
chasm that, despite formal agreement on SDI research, still 
separated Britain and the United States on SDI. Britain
!* Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
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maintained that, while arguably beneficial to the United States, 
strategic defences were essentially incompatible with the 
continued American commitment to provide nuclear deterrence to 
Europe and this reflected, at least partially, another dimension 
of the United States' neo-isolationist impulse. In contrast, the 
United States viewed SDI as essential to extend credibility to 
the very commitments that Britain believed it would vitiate. 
Underlying this disagreement was a more fundamental difference in 
the respective conception of nuclear strategy, of which the 
dispute over SDI was but the latest manifestation.
Britain and the US Strategic Nuclear Guarantee
Britain maintained that "it is impossible to over-emphasise 
on this side of the Atlantic the importance of the American 
contribution to the defence of E u r o p e . I n d e e d ,  as Howe 
stated, "US nuclear protection, and the presence of US troops in 
Europe, is at the heart of our security strategy."^® Because 
these fundamental realities appeared to have been forgotten at 
Reykjavik, Howe thought it necessary to reaffirm old verities 
about the nature of the successful security regime that had 
obtained since World War II. To underline the importance which 
Britain attached to the US involvement in European affairs, Howe 
reminded his audience that, historically, deterrence
Speech by Howe, 19 November 1986, op. cit.. p. 20. 
Speech by Howe, 16 March 1987, pp. pit., p. 1.
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required a recognition by the countries of Western Europe 
and North America that only through unprecedented peacetime 
partnership could the common security of one and all be 
preserved.
The success of this partnership opened a new era of 
stability, the fruits of which we enjoy today.
And essential to this success was the enthusiastic 
involvement of the United States.
That such a public and explicit articulation of what was after
all the well-known basis for the Alliance was deemed necessary
indicated just how deeply the Reykjavik summit proposals had
threatened the very basis of the Atlantic Alliance and the
significance which Europeans ascribed to the fact that such
proposals were even contemplated.
Britain regarded "the American strategic nuclear guarantee"
as an " irreplaceable"element of the US contribution to
European security. The Thatcher government did not believe that
it was desirable or possible to replace this guarantee with
either a purely European deterrent or a shift from nuclear to
conventional deterrence. Howe argued that even with the
conventional commitment of the United States "there is no early
or practicable prospect of the Alliance getting rid of the
massive imbalance of conventional forces against u s . E v e n
if it were, this would not constitute a panacea for Western
security, for:
Let us assume, just for a moment, that the conventional
Speech by Howe, 19 November 1986, pp. cit., p. 9. 
Emphasis in the original.
Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
Speech by Howe, 16 March 1987, pp. cit., p. 3.
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imbalance could be remedied-and that is, of course, a 
massive assumption. Would this in itself prevent war?
History is full of disagreements and miscalculations of 
relative military strengths. All too often the true balance 
has been worked out only on the battlefield. And we must 
not forget that a war waged with modern conventional weapons 
would utterly devastate the European continent. 2^
Thatcher argued that only nuclear weapons could prevent conflict:
The nuclear deterrent has stopped both nuclear and 
conventional war. It has kept the peace, and this is the 
most important thing for the future-a peace with freedom and 
a peace with justice. To throw it away would be utterly 
futile and rash.^^
Accordingly, Britain preferred to maintain existing strategic
doctrine and believed that "flexible response is the only
credible strategy in the face of the Soviet threat as it now
stands.
The British government, however, was cognizant that the 
United States and Europe often held substantially different 
conceptions of flexible response and feared that these 
differences were being emphasized too much in the aftermath of 
Reykjavik. Howe argued that it was, in fact, one of the 
strengths of flexible response that it was able to accommodate 
both European and American views of nuclear strategy:
Geoffrey Howe, "The Foundations and Future of British 
Security," Speech given on 27 January 1987, reprinted 
in East-West Relations: Realism. Vigilance and an Open 
Mind, p. 8. Emphasis in original.
Thatcher, Parliamentarv Debates. 18 November 1986, o p . 
cit.. col. 443.
24 Speech by Howe, 19 November 1986, pp. cit.. p. 19.
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NATO's strategy of flexible response was a prime example of 
the Alliance's adapting to changed circumstances, and was 
developed in response to the new strategic situation when 
the tripwire strategy ceased to be credible.
It is a practical amalgam that meets the concerns of both 
pillars of the Alliance.
It satisfies the Americans, whose natural wish not to place 
the United States - a nuclear target only - at undue risk 
leads them to a preference for so-called 'deterrence by 
denial'.
While at the same time it meets the equally understandable 
preference of the European allies for pure deterrence, 
intended to prevent war of any description. 5^
Accordingly, Howe stated that: "We do not envisage fighting a 
battlefield or theatre nuclear war confined to Europe. And our 
concept of deterrence is not based on a pre-determined 
progression through specific layers of nuclear escalation.
In other words, he professed agnosticism concerning the actual 
manner in which NATO strategy should be implemented if deterrence 
were to fail. At the same time, Howe maintained that:
The Soviet Union is not likely to be deterred merely by the 
threat of wars which would be fought on the territory of its 
allies. Still less through wars on the territories of its 
opponents, as some "defensive defence" enthusiasts now 
advocate. The only sure deterrence is by the threat of 
weapons capable of inflicting massive and unacceptable 
damage on the Soviet Union itself.2?
Yet if Britain believed that it was only through the threat 
of "inflicting massive and unacceptable damage on the Soviet 
Union" that deterrence could be ensured, then the American
25 Ibid.
25 Speech by Howe, 16 March 1987, op. cit., p. 5.
2^  Ibid.. p. 3.
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predilection for deterrence by denial could not adequately 
prevent conflict; only the intention of inflicting devastating 
retaliation would seem capable of accomplishing the stated 
objective. But if, on the operational level, Britain eschewed a 
concept of deterrence that was not based on "pre-determined 
progression through specific layers of nuclear escalation," it 
was difficult to see how NATO could execute the threat against 
Soviet territory that Britain deemed essential for deterrence 
without embracing a strategy which envisaged immediate and 
unconstrained strategic nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union at 
the very beginning of a European conflict. It was, however, 
precisely the perceived incredibility of such threats that 
prompted the Alliance to adopt flexible response and Reagan to 
propose SDI.
In advocating reliance on a threat it did not know how to 
execute, Britain was in effect suggesting that the Alliance 
continue to ignore the difference in nuclear strategy that both 
Reykjavik and SDI had underlined. In short, the British 
Government wanted to apply its preference for continuity to the 
Alliance's longstanding reluctance to confront the shortcomings 
of flexible response as well as the transatlantic disagreement 
about how it should be resolved.
The British View of SDI After Revkiavik
The British government's efforts after Reykjavik to ensure 
that the United States commit itself to retaining existing
438
security arrangements dictated its approach to SDI as well.
George Younger reiterated the British Government's position that 
SDI was merely a research programme designed to investigate 
technologies that may have applications for ballistic missile 
defence. But he stressed that "British participation is based on 
the fact that it is research into that possibility and no 
further."28 Britain remained steadfast in her insistence that 
SDI research continue to be conducted in accordance with the 
strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty and warned that any 
change in this policy should be subject to negotiation since it 
would have such a profound affect on arms control 
negotiations.28
In order to refute opposition claims that the United States' 
pursuit of SDI had prevented historic agreements at Reykjavik, 
the British government reiterated its long-standing claim that 
SDI was primarily a response to Soviet BMD research. Younger 
stated that: "Nothing that happened at Reykjavik alters the fact 
that the Soviet Union has been engaged in research into strategic 
defence matters for a long time, and that its efforts at 
Reykjavik were aimed at trying to prevent the United States from 
doing the same thing while carrying on doing it itself, which 
seems wholly unreasonable."2° To further remove from the
28 George Younger, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of 
Commons), Vol. 103, (4 November 1986), col. 785.
28 Geoffrey Howe, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of 
Commons), Vol. 110 (18 February 1987), col. 898.
30 Younger, op. cit., col. 784.
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United States the onus of blocking anas agreements with the 
Soviet Union, the British Government reiterated its claim that 
SDI's origins could be found in the Soviet Union's own strategic 
defence programmes.
In justifying SDI by reference to Soviet BMD research, the 
British Government hoped to keep the entire issue of space 
weapons firmly within the arms control context, allowing British 
officials to argue that SDI could contribute to a successful 
outcome at the Geneva arms talks. Indeed, John Stanley, the 
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, argued in Parliament 
shortly following Reykjavik that: "If the American Administration 
had not persevered with the SDI research programme I doubt very 
much whether we would have under way the most comprehensive and 
radical arms control negotiations that have taken place for many 
y e a r s . "32 Hence, he maintained that "If the United States 
simply abandons this research programme it would set the arms 
control process back rather than take it forward."33 SDI's 
potential contribution to achieving offensive reduction was, 
however, contingent, according to the British government, on 
blocking its deployment.
Not surprisingly then, Britain opposed efforts by Caspar 
Weinberger and other senior American officials to effect an early
3^  John Stanley, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of
Commons), Vol. 102 (23 October 1986), cols. 1293 and 
1297.
32 Stanley, pp. pit., col. 1295.
33 Ibid.. col. 1296.
440
deployment of strategic defence systems. Thatcher believed, 
however, that the debate concerning early deployment was being 
played out through the rather arcane argument concerning the 
proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. She contended that;
we are not talking about deployment at the moment. We are 
talking about how far the research can go under the terms of 
the treaty. For that there are two interpretations. I must 
make it absolutely clear that in terms of common sense there 
is no point in talking about possible deployment until it is 
known whether something is feasible. 4^
Because she believed that such determinations had yet to be made,
she argued that there is "no reason to think that any decisions
on deployment of SDI are imminent.
At the same time, Britain realised that it may be necessary
to prepare for a future in which nuclear weapons would play a
decidedly less prominent role. Howe argued: "Technology does not
stand still. We cannot assume that the present relationship
between offence and defence will remain immutable for ever. To
abjure research would be to ignore change in quite an artificial
way. Even if the US were to do so, the Soviets would certainly
impose no such r e s t r a i n t . A s  the continued attempt to
justify SDI research with respect to Soviet BMD research
suggests, Britain did not wish to suggest that the possibility of
4^ Thatcher, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of Commons),
Vol. 110, (17 February 1987), col. 765.
Thatcher, Parliamentarv Debates. (House of Commons), 
Vol. 109, (5 February 1987), col. 1137.
Speech by Howe, 19 November 1986, pp. pit., p. 17.
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a "* less nuclear'" world was one by which they were particularly 
enamoured.
Indeed, Britain was less than circumspect in conveying its 
strong misgivings about the potential consequences of SDI 
deployment. Howe stated that in contemplating "a strategic 
relationship more reliant on defences, or even for the abolition 
of nuclear w eapo n s , "3? it was essential that the West:
not let technology drive policy. Nor must we allow it to 
undermine stability. The vision of a non-nuclear world, to 
which we should all aspire as an ultimate goal of general 
disarmament, should not be allowed to obscure what we need 
for effective deterrence now, or the modest but real steps 
that we can take to secure reductions in weapon levels and 
improve East/West relations. 8^
Britain's most profound reservations, however, concerned her deep
doctrinal opposition to the strategic vision which SDI embodied:
To replace the current situation of strategic stability with 
the unstable international environment that would result 
from a world made safe for conventional war is not, in my 
view, an attractive prospect. For the past forty years our 
security has depended on nuclear weapons. It still does.
In looking for an alternative, we must make sure that we 
look for a better way, not just a different one.^s
The sentiments expressed by the British Foreign Secretary 
echoed the concerns that the British government voiced when the 
Reagan Administrations originally launched the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. That this should be so was not at all surprising 
insofar as the implementation of the Reykjavik proposals would
Ibid.
Ibid.. pp. 17-18.
Ibid.
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have in essence achieved through bilateral agreement what the 
Reagan Administration had hoped could be achieved through SDI. 
Although West European governments and critics of Reagan's 
proposals within his own government persuaded him against 
implementing the Reykjavik proposals, the trends set in motion by 
the Iceland meeting as well as the INF treaty led to an 
appreciable change in European security structures that brought 
the continent closer to the type of reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons envisaged by SDI than most West Europeans would have 
liked.
III. THE WEST GERMAN RESPONSE TO REYKJAVIK AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Reykjavik summit placed the government of the Federal 
Republic in a difficult position. While the ruling centre-right 
coalition, like the British and French governments, believed that 
the United States had come dangerously close to signing 
agreements that would have seriously undermined West European 
security, other considerations influenced the manner in which the 
West German government reacted to the Iceland meeting. The mere 
fact that Gorbachev and Reagan could have contemplated such far 
reaching solutions to long-standing issues of contention 
indicated to many West Germans that the nature of the US-Soviet 
relationship was undergoing fundamental changes. The prospect 
that the United States and the Soviet Union could reach 
cooperative solutions to security issues led to the hope that the 
military confrontation in, and thus the political division of.
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Europe could be overcome. West Germany realised that for this to 
occur would require a delicate balancing of the need for 
continued security with encouraging the trend of better US-Soviet 
relations.
More immediately, however, the Reykjavik summit created 
political difficulties for the West German government. The SPD 
was highly critical of the Reagan Administration's refusal to 
abandon SDI at the Iceland meeting and did not share the relief 
felt by the government that the radical proposals tabled had 
failed to be agreed upon. This situation left the West German 
government in the position of denying that SDI had prevented an 
agreement with which they were in any case less than enamoured.
Kohl's government therefore praised the cooperative spirit 
in which the United States and the Soviet Union were conducting 
their negotiations, while distancing themselves and quietly 
trying to change some of the more radical proposals that had been 
broached. This stance they believed would enable West Germany to 
exploit the positive political direction of US-Soviet relations 
without encouraging agreements that undermined European security. 
Kohl and his government placed great emphasis on achieving an INF 
agreement, although the zero option was regarded sceptically by 
most security experts within the CDU, including Defence Minister 
Worner. In many respects the results of the Reykjavik summit 
highlighted the traditional dilemma of West German security 
policy, namely, attempting to maintain a strong military posture 
while attempting to foster an East-West climate conducive to
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overcoming the division of Europe.
The SPD attempted to exploit the fact that Reykjavik exposed 
this dilemma. SPD spokesman stated that they regretted that SDI 
had blocked what they regarded as desirable agreements. Horst 
Ehmke a leading figure in formulating SPD positions on 
disarmament argued that the Reykjavik summit was "a black Sunday 
for humanity."4° Moreover, Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of the 
SPD, attempted to lay the blame for the failure of Reykjavik 
partially on the West German government because they supported 
SDI.
In order to counter the claims of the SPD opposition and 
preserve allied unity, the Kohl government promoted the Reykjavik 
summit as a success. The centre-right coalition was particularly 
keen to dispel the widely held opinion that the Reagan 
Administration's refusal to abandon SDI was responsible for the 
US-Soviet impasse, lest the German government's support for SDI 
research be seen as having contributed to the failure to reach 
sweeping arms control proposals. The Kohl government, like its 
European counterparts, was, therefore, concerned that if 
Reykjavik was generally perceived as a failure, the United States 
would be seen as responsible for undermining the prospects for 
arms control.
On October 21-24, 1986, Kohl met with Reagan in Washington 
to discuss the Reykjavik summit. While privately he expressed
Karen DeYoung, "NATO Allies Avoid Criticism, but Seek 
SDI Compromise," The Washington Post. 14 October 1986, 
p. A-20.
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misgivings concerning the content of the US proposals at 
Reykjavik, including the fact that they had not been previously 
discussed within the Alliance, Kohl was primarily interested in 
demonstrating US-European unanimity concerning the Iceland 
meeting. Reporting to the Bundestag, he stated that he concurred 
with Shultz's contention "that now we could possibly reach a 
watershed that could lead to real disarmament."^^ Kohl argued 
that "the American President - as he indicated in his March 1983 
SDI speech - is ready for very wide ranging reductions of the 
offensive nuclear weapons. It is his goal to eliminate all 
offensive ballistic m i s s i l e s . Kohl hoped that drawing 
attention to these points would counter opposition claims that 
the United States was not sufficiently committed to disarmament.
Kohl also defended the Reagan Administration's refusal to 
bargain away SDI. In keeping with past efforts to emphasize 
Soviet activities in BMD research, the Chancellor side-stepped 
the issue of whether the Reykjavik summit indicated the Reagan 
Administration's commitment to SDI deployment, emphasizing 
instead that "The United States is not willing to introduce the 
core of the research programme of the American Strategic Defence 
Initiative into the Geneva Disarmament negotiations as an object 
that could be negotiated away. Washington will, like the Soviet
Helmut Kohl, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. 
10 Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokoll 10/227-10/244, 6 
November 1986, p. 18739.
Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
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Union on her part, conduct its research p r o g r a m m e . I n  a 
further effort to shift the focus of the debate away from the 
deployment issue. Kohl underlined that the Soviet Union had 
dropped its insistence on confining BMD research to the 
laboratory,44 hoping that highlighting greater US-Soviet 
agreement on research would both legitimate US SDI research and 
deflect attention from the existing disagreement on deployment. 
Moreover, he contended that the United States increasingly viewed 
SDI as a means of guaranteeing "against a possible misuse [of 
arms control] during the foreseen disarmament p r o c e s s . "45
Kohl argued that the Reagan Administration's offer of a ten- 
year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty constituted 
proof of American flexibility and augured well for future success 
at Geneva. Significantly, however, he did not mention what was 
implicit in this American offer, namely that following this ten- 
year period and subsequent negotiations, the United States (and 
the Soviet Union) would be free to deploy ballistic missiles 
defences. Instead, and in keeping with the desire to emphasize 
agreement. Kohl told the Bundestag that he and Reagan had reached 
similar conclusions concerning the significance of the summit: 
"Above all we agree that the meeting in Iceland represented a 
significant stage of East-West dialogue in which in the realm of 
arms control and disarmament considerable progress is being made
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.. p. 18740.
45 Ibid.. p. 18739.
447
and that the process should go forward on the basis of this 
p r o g r e s s . "46 Kohl also stressed that the proposals broached at 
Reykjavik remained on the negotiating table and that careful and 
meticulous deliberation between experts could enable the US and 
Soviet Union to transform general agreement into concrete 
achievements.
In explaining his governments post-Reykjavik position, Kohl 
emphasized that the West German government considered an INF 
agreement to be the top priority in US-Soviet negotiations. He 
supported an INF agreement that would eliminate all long range 
intermediate nuclear forces in Europe while allowing both the 
United States and the Soviet Union to maintain 100 missiles in 
Asia. Such an agreement could, according to Kohl, be quickly 
consummated if the Soviet Union were to abandon the linkage 
between SDI and INF which it once again introduced at Reykjavik. 
The Chancellor argued that "no arms control category should be 
held hostage to another category where no true relationship 
exists between the two."4^ He considered it particularly 
important to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was imposing an 
unrealistic and unnecessary linkage between SDI and INF, so that 
the Soviet Union could not successfully portray SDI to European 
publics as the only obstacle to an INF agreement, thereby 
generating pressure on the United States to abandon its research 
programme or risk a split with its European Allies. Kohl stated
46 Ibid., p. 18738.
47 Ibid.. p. 18740.
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that "a policy of all or nothing blocks all possible 
progress.
West German Concerns About the INF Negotiations
If, however, the Soviet Union were to unlink the INF 
negotiations from the other negotiations, the Federal Republic 
insisted that the establishment of grey zones, in which the 
Soviet Union enjoyed advantages, be avoided. Alfred Dregger 
remarked that German and European interests could only be secured 
if arms control negotiations were expanded to encompass areas 
previously not covered in the Geneva negotiations. He wanted to 
avoid a situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union 
would transfer their arms competition from LRINFs to SRINFs. At 
the same time, Dregger clearly rejected the Soviet proposal, 
broached at Reykjavik, to freeze the levels of shorter-range 
weapons. Instead, Dregger proposed*^ that the United States and 
the Soviet Union agree to reduce present levels and establish 
mutual ceilings, giving NATO the right to match Soviet levels of 
deployment. Moreover, foreshadowing an issue that was to take on 
increasing importance following the Soviet Union's eventual 
decision to unlink the INF negotiations from other arms control 
concerns, he stated that he was particularly keen to see the 
issue of the missiles with ranges between 100 and 500km resolved
Ibid.
Alfred Dregger, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen 
Bundestaaes. 10. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokol 10/227 
10/244, 6 November 1986, p. 18769.
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as they were targeted almost exclusively on West Germany and the 
Benelux countries.
This concern pointed to the conceptual and political 
problems that the Federal Republic believed were inherent in the 
implementation - as opposed to the advocacy - of the zero option. 
Eliminating LRINF deployments inevitably placed greater attention 
on the SRINF (500 to 1000km) and SNF (below 500km) weapons 
systems, particularly since the Soviet Union had increased the 
number and sophistication of these systems since the double track 
decision was announced. The German government was understandably 
reluctant to have these weapons now become the primary focus of 
the strategic equation in Europe, after having just recently 
survived the political crisis engendered by the Alliance's 
attempt to deny the Soviet Union an advantage in LRINF 
deployments. To have courted a similar episode would have, in 
all likelihood, strained domestic and transatlantic solidarity 
beyond the limits of prudence. This was particularly true since, 
unlike the case of the LRINF deployments, it was impossible for 
the West German government to argue that SRINF deployments could 
increase German security by ensuring that a nuclear conflict 
would not be confined to Europe, since their ranges dictated that 
they would be used only on East European territory.
The elimination of the LRINF forces severely undermined the 
rationale for the retention, let alone the modernization, of the 
SRINF and SNF forces by raising fears of singularization within 
the Federal Republic. Significantly, there was essential
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unanimity on this point in German political circles. While the 
SPD, consistent with its anti-nuclear philosophy, opposed all 
European land based nuclear missiles as a matter of principle, 
the Kohl Government, including (and especially) its most 
conservative elements, saw NATO's land based nuclear forces below 
the LRINF range as primarily justifiable as a means to link any 
nuclear use in the European theatre to the use of Pershing II and 
GLCM's and thus the escalation of conflict to Soviet territory - 
a link that they believed would prevent the Soviet Union from 
initiating any conflict. But with the imminent or prospective 
disappearance of the US LRINF deployments. West German officials 
believed that a vital rung in the escalation ladder would be 
removed. This development placed the shorter range weapons in a 
significantly different context. Therefore, instead of 
performing the role of a link to LRINF and eventually to US 
strategic forces, the shorter range weapons were seen as the last 
rung in a purely European escalation ladder - a condition that 
evoked fears of nuclear conflict being limited to Europe.
In fact, many West Germans maintained that it would have 
been far better had the sequence of arms control agreements been 
reversed. A leading CSU politician, Theo Waigel, stated that 
German interests "would have been better served - this has been 
repeatedly stated by speakers from different fractions - if the 
nuclear disarmament had not started with weapons over 1000 km, 
but instead with nuclear weapons with a range of under 150km, 
with the so called battlefield nuclear weapons and with
451
conventional weapons. We would have given preference to a 
different sequence for the disarmament p r o c e s s . " ^ 0
This strong West German preference to see shorter range 
nuclear missiles, rather than intermediate range nuclear 
missiles, become the focus of arms control negotiations was 
attributable to their conception of the role of intermediate 
range nuclear missiles in NATO strategy. Worner stated that:
All considerations, which through the weakening of the 
middle element of the NATO triad - the short and medium 
range nuclear systems - reduce the link between conventional 
and strategic nuclear systems are unrealistic and 
incompatible with the security demands of Europe, and also 
especially the Federal Republic of Germany.
It is precisely this middle element of the Triad that 
materializes the unity of the alliance and decisively 
contributes to the coupling of the strategic forces and the 
security of the United States to European security.
According to this logic, the elimination of this "middle element" 
would precipitate the decoupling of European and American 
security. Yet the momentum of arms control was clearly 
overtaking reservations concerning its precise content, and 
according to Worner, undermining nuclear deterrence through the 
progressive removal of the instruments necessary for its 
effectiveness.
Worner believed that Gorbachev was encouraging Western 
denuclearization proclivities by attempting to subordinate all
Theo Waigel, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. 
11. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokolle 11/1-11/21, 4 June 
1987, p. 946.
Ibid.. p. 18.
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other issues of peace to the question of nuclear arms control, 
thereby ignoring the other elements that constitute a stable 
security regime. He interpreted Gorbachev's strategy as a 
manifestation of the traditional Soviet policy of attempting to 
eliminate the American nuclear presence from Europe as a prelude 
to the dissolution of the NATO Alliance. In response Worner 
insisted that:
arms control policy must contribute to war prevention. It 
must preserve the strategic unity of the territory of the 
alliance. It must maintain the community of risk between 
the United States and Europe. And it cannot create 
differing zones of security... It also cannot put into 
question the ability of the Alliance to control crises. He 
who does not apply these criteria to arms control attempts 
harms our security. 2^
The implementation of the zero option for LRINF, therefore, 
threatened to bring about the very results that West Germany most 
wanted to avoid; but politically it could not oppose an agreement 
based on proposals which West Germany had a critical role in 
formulating.53 In response, German officials made a virtue of 
necessity. Manfred Worner stated that West Germany's continued 
support for the zero option, although it "contains unarguable 
politico-military disadvantages for Western Europe,"5* 
demonstrated the West's willingness to compromise in arms control
52 Worner, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. op. 
cit.. p. 18785.
53 See chapter 2.
5^  Speech by Worner, 31 January 1987, pp. cit., p. 21.
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negotiations. But more importantly, the prospect of the zero 
option's implementation demonstrated that the political 
requirements which dictated support for arms control agreements 
were coming increasingly into conflict with West European 
security requirements.
West German Anxieties About SDI After Reykjavik
The perception that the result of Reykjavik would increase 
the likelihood of nuclear war being confined to Europe did not 
lie solely in the calculation that Reykjavik brought the zero 
option closer to realization; it also stemmed from the German 
interpretation of American proposals to eliminate all long-range 
ballistic nuclear forces. Dregger maintained that the 
realization of these proposals would compel West Germany "to 
contemplate what consequences these really revolutionary changes 
in the present security structures could have for German and 
European security."^5 in order to place these proposals in 
their proper context he implored the Bundestag to view them as an 
understandable US desire to achieve invulnerability: "the 
Americans first lost the condition of invulnerability since 
strategic systems have existed that can reach her" and thus 
"historically it is thoroughly understandable that the USA, after 
having lost its nuclear superiority at all levels, desires a
Alfred Dregger, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen 
Bundestaaes. 10. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokoll 10/227- 
10/244, 6 November 1986, p. 18766.
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ballistic missile- free w o r l d . "^6 And "therefore, because we 
Germans, if we want to maintain the alliance, cannot simply 
ignore the security interests of the USA, we have supported the 
SDI programme of our American allies, since, as a purely 
defensive system, it is not morally contestable and with 
appropriate precautions can also be made useful for the European 
allies."57
At the same time, Dregger argued that "the Americans must 
understand that if the Alliance is to be maintained, their wish 
for invulnerability not be achieved at the expense of an even 
greater vulnerability of the Europeans, especially the non­
nuclear armed Europeans."5® in other words the Federal 
Republic deemed the continuation of the US strategic nuclear 
guarantee essential so long as Europe remained threatened. And 
the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles could render such 
guarantees unenforceable and ultimately make Europe either a 
battleground for limited nuclear war or, absent a plausible role 
for tactical nuclear weapons, safe for a conventional war.
Ironically though, it was SDI itself which blocked the 
elimination of strategic ballistic missiles. At the same time, 
it could be argued that the SDI created the strategic and 
tactical context in which these proposals were offered. In order 
to assuage Soviet fears that the combination of SDI and the
5® Ibid.
57 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
5® Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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continued existence of US strategic ballistic missiles could pose 
a grave threat, the Reagan Administration, eager to remove 
obstacles to SDI deployment, offered to eliminate all ballistic 
missiles. More broadly though, these proposals elicited concern 
because they indicated that the original vision of perfect 
defence against ballistic missiles was, after all, the one that 
Reagan was pursuing; and as such the Reykjavik proposals were a 
logical concomitant to Reagan's vision of a nuclear free world 
ensured by SDI.
The anxiety which the potential elimination of strategic 
ballistic missiles engendered in Europe testified to an important 
aspect of the SDI controversy. It was not the prospect of BMD 
deployment but the strategic philosophy that allowed it to be 
even contemplated which Europeans found most disturbing. It 
indicated a growing reluctance to use strategic nuclear weapons, 
an aversion made all the more worrying in light of the increased 
importance that strategic nuclear weapons would play on the 
ladder of nuclear escalation if the LRINF were removed. But most 
important it was the anti-nuclear tendency which the US proposals 
signified which generated European concern about their security.
West Germany was concerned that the Reagan Administration 
was pursuing nuclear arms control without giving proper attention 
to the critical role that nuclear weapons played in Western 
security. This fear was rendered particularly acute in light of 
the degree to which American policy, unwittingly, dovetailed with 
Soviet disarmament objectives. The combination of US and Soviet
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arms control policies evoked the fear that arms control 
agreements could be reached that would undermine rather than 
strengthen European security. Accordingly, Worner warned that it 
was important that "Disarmament not become and end in 
itself."59
West Germany was particularly concerned that the rush to 
nuclear disarmament would decrease or even vitiate the role of 
nuclear weapons in deterring conventional conflict. Kohl gave 
voice to these concerns in his Bundestag speech following his 
October visit to Washington. He told his colleagues that during 
his meetings with Reagan in Washington, "I explained that for 
Germans and other Europeans their peace and arms control policy 
depends on preventing every type of war - nuclear and 
conventional. Disarmament agreements must bring more and not 
less security for the allies also."5° In order to ensure that 
East-West agreements indeed fulfilled these criteria, German 
officials constantly reiterated the fundamental tenets of 
Alliance strategy and the growing threat which NATO confronted.
Hence Worner, while indicating his support for the 
convergence of views between the United States and the Soviet 
Union at Reykjavik, reminded the Bundestag that arms control 
served security only if it eschewed wishful thinking and 
concentrated on military realities. And for Western Europe these
59 Manfred Worner, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen
Bundestaaes. 10-Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokall 10/227 
10/244, 6 November 1986, p. 18785.
60 Kohl, pp. pit., p. 18739.
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realities remained stark. According to the Defence Minister:
The Soviet Union's "military doctrine remains offensive; it aims 
at the invasion of opposing territory, including our 
t e r r i t o r y . Moreover, the Warsaw Pact continued to enjoy 
conventional superiority vis-a-vis NATO. Worner argued that to 
allow arms control to focus exclusively on nuclear weapons risked 
undermining Europeans' security:
The concentration of the discussion about peace, security 
and disarmament exclusively on nuclear arms, the removal of 
which is being encouraged or pursued on all sides, distracts 
us from the modern conventional forces which, on the Soviet 
side, could be used for the conquest of Western Europe, if 
they are given a free ride. It cannot be the purpose and 
goal of western security policy to denude Europe of nuclear 
weapons of all ranges and thus create a denuclearised 
theatre of conflict, in which the superior conventional 
attack forces of the Warsaw Pact are dominant. "^ 2
The very real possibility that the logic of the arms control 
negotiations could lead to precisely such a result led the West 
German Defence Minister to reiterate emphatically what he thought 
many had forgotten in their zeal to achieve dramatic arms control 
agreements :
There is no substitute for the nuclear strategy that has 
helped preserve American and European peace; and it makes no 
sense, to remove nuclear weapons from the unity of the 
military instruments of this strategy, in order to 
isolatedly subjugate them to arms control, while
61 Worner, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. o p . 
cit.. p. 18785.
Rede des Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Manfred 
Worner, 24th Wehrkundetagung, Munich, 31 January 1987, 
Material Fur Die Presse, p. 16. Emphasis in the 
original.
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conventional forces remain free and able to be used for war 
as an instrument of aggressive policy. 3^
Clearly, Worner feared that, absent some change in the trend of
US-Soviet negotiations, the danger of denuclearization could
become a reality.
Revkiavik and The Possibility of Radical Political Change
Despite the concerns that West German officials had about 
the security implication of the trends set in motion at Reykjavik 
and manifested most prominently in the INF negotiations, they 
continued to praise the results and implications of the Reykjavik 
summit because they interpreted the fact of US-Soviet convergence 
as far more important than the specific nature of the agreements. 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was particularly eager to 
stress the positive aspects of the summit. He argued that it 
should have come as no surprise that the United States and the 
Soviet Union had considered such far ranging disarmament 
proposals. Genscher reminded the Bundestag that Reagan had 
indicated his desire to eliminate all nuclear weapons in his 
"Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983. Moreover, Secretary Shultz 
and Foreign Minister Gromyko had also committed their countries 
to the same goal in their January 8, 1985 agreement, although 
many had apparently not taken these objectives seriously.
The West German government believed that the Reykjavik 
summit offered the possibility of a new security regime through
63 Ibid., p. 15.
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which the division of Europe and Germany could be overcome. 
Dregger maintained that contrary to the perceptions of the SPD, 
"Reykjavik was not a failure; Reykjavik initiated a development, 
the ends of which are not yet foreseeable, a development that 
could change the world. He argued that the willingness to 
reach cooperative solutions evidenced at Reykjavik augured well 
for improved East-West relations and a reduction of the military 
confrontation in Europe. This in turn could lead to a peaceful 
order in Europe in which the division of the European continent 
could be overcome.
A New Spirit of East-West Cooperation
The West German government believed that the most 
significant aspect of the Reykjavik summit was not that the 
United States and the Soviet Union failed to reach agreement, but 
that the negotiations themselves revealed a desire to reach 
cooperative solutions. Genscher contended that "the meeting at 
Reykjavik has pushed open the door to a cooperative securitv 
policy. On both sides a changed thinking is revealing itself, 
one that is aimed at replacing confrontation and arming and 
counter arming with cooperation."^^ He stated that the United 
States and the Soviet Union "want to regulate the relationship
Dregger, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen Bundestaaes. 6 
November 1986, pp. pit., p. 18763.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen 
Bundestaaes. 11. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokolle 11/1- 
11/21, 7 May 1987, p. 557. Emphasis in the original
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between offensive and defensive weapons, and they want to reduce
the danger of a destruction of mankind through arms control
steps. The consciousness of their joint responsibility for the
survival of mankind not only opens the way for disarmament
negotiations, no, this consciousness aims at an improvement in
the relationship between the two great powers as well.”®^
The West German government realised that this outcome was
not guaranteed since it depended to a great extent on the
ultimate intentions of Gorbachev. Even Genscher conceded that
the evidence that existed in the aftermath of Reykjavik presented
"only a possibility and no more."^? Yet the opportunities that
lay ahead if Gorbachev's "new thinking" turned out to be genuine,
were of such momentous importance for the West, and particularly
Germany, that Genscher implored the West to respond with vision:
If there should be a chance today that, after 40 years of 
East-West confrontation, there could be a turning-point in 
East-West relations, it would be a mistake of historic 
dimensions for the West to let this chance slip just because 
it cannot escape from a way of thinking which invariably 
expects the worst from the Soviet Union.
At the same time that the West German government was 
stressing that it would be shortsighted to ignore the 
possibilities that new Soviet thinking offered, they were equally
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Verhandlunaen des Deutschen 
Bundestaaes. 11. Wahlperiode, Plenarprotokolle 11/1- 
11/21, 4 June 1987, p. 950. Emphasis in the original.
Genscher, "Taking Gorbachev at His Word," op. cit.. p. 
4.
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firm in recommending continued vigilance and defence 
preparedness. Although Worner was the primary expounder of this 
viewpoint's, was one Genscher also shared: "It should be 
beyond dispute that today still any Western policy towards 
Eastern Europe is possible solely on the basis of a reliable 
defense and deterrence capability. It is a fact that the 
military situation has not yet altered to the extent of allowing 
a different a p p r o a c h . M o r e o v e r ,  Genscher believed "European 
securitv can also in the future only be guaranteed through the 
association of the European and North American democracies. The 
transatlantic Alliance is now and in the future 
indispensable."71 And as Dregger stressed, "Westpolitik is the 
basis for Ostpolitik."?^
Need for Greater European Cooperation on Securitv Issues 
But West German officials also realized that the 
contemplated arms control agreements could have a significant 
impact on the European security regime, and they wanted to ensure 
that German interests were taken into consideration, preferably 
through a more coordinated European defence identity. Dregger,
69
70
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for instance, argued that "From the possible changes in the 
security structures of the two world powers the future fate of 
Germany and Europe will be deeply affected. In this situation it 
is our responsibility to introduce into the discussion between 
the world powers European security i n t e r e s t s . T h i s  
reguired, according to Dregger, that the German-French security 
collaboration be widened to include other West European 
countries. He hoped that this would allow for a gradual 
evolution of the role of Europe from one of economic cooperation 
to one that embraced greater cooperation in the security field. 
This was considered essential to allow Europe to exercise its 
proper weight in East-West arms control negotiations. They 
therefore welcomed the efforts of French Prime Minister Chirac to 
revitalize the WEU so that it could serve as a base from which to 
establish a European defence i d e n t i t y .
The Significance of Revkiavik For the West German Government
To conclude, the West German government's reaction to the 
Reykjavik summit was profoundly ambivalent. This ambivalence 
reflected the dual and often competing imperatives of West German 
security policy; detente and defence. There was a consensus in 
the West German cabinet that the double zero option, especially 
when viewed within the context of the Reykjavik summit and the
Ibid.
The role of the WEU will be discussed more fully at the 
end of this chapter.
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SDI programme, was not in West European security interests 
because it could encourage the complete denuclearization of 
Western Europe and vitiate the validity of NATO's flexible 
response doctrine. In short, they feared that the INF treaty 
would undermine the very security they were ostensibly designed 
to promote. Fears about the INF treaty were particularly acute 
in West Germany not only because West Germany was most 
geographically exposed to Soviet conventional forces, but because 
the US-Soviet treaty mandated the elimination of intermediate and 
medium range missiles but not the shortest range systems which 
West Germans saw as leaving them particularly exposed.
Nonetheless, because the INF treaty was seen as the most 
visible symbol of improved East-West relations, and given the 
importance that the West German government attached to detente, 
the option of openly opposing the INF treaty was not 
contemplated. West German officials, particularly Defence 
Minister Worner, were placed in the awkward position of being 
both enthusiastic supporters of the INF treaty for the reasons 
mentioned above, yet also most concerned about its implications 
for the credibility of nuclear deterrence.
At the same time, the West German government believed that
This was a case where perception and reality diverged 
rather starkly. It is true that West German, (as well 
as the Benelux countries) were vulnerable to these 
systems while Britain, France, and Italy were not; all 
of Western Europe was vulnerable to Soviet Variable 
Range I.C.B.M.'s which although classified as strategic 
also were targeted at Western Europe. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union retained the ability to strike all of 
Western Europe with nuclear armed aircraft.
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the substantial changes that were produced by the INF treaty and 
the even more far-reaching changes broached at the Reykjavik 
summit held out the prospect for a radical transformation of the 
West European security regime which in turn could lead to the end 
of the division of Europe. The West German government believed 
that SDI was a driving force behind the possibility of this 
change. The Reykjavik summit and the INF treaty therefore 
produced a change in the West German governments position toward 
SDI. While they continued to oppose deployment, they maintained 
that proposals and trends set in motion by SDI were instrumental 
in initiating change in the West European security regime. Thus, 
in some respects, the West German government began to believe 
that the issue of the deployment of BMDs was not the primary 
issue raised by SDI.
IV. THE FRENCH REACTION TO REYKJAVIK AND ITS AFTERMATH
The French government was an unambiguous and vocal critic of 
the proposals tabled at the Reykjavik summit. French officials 
believed that the results of the US-Soviet meeting in Iceland 
threatened to initiate a process that would delegitimate nuclear 
deterrence and thereby undermine the very basis of European 
security. In addition, the French government was concerned that 
the Iceland meeting could undermine the consensus behind nuclear 
deterrence within France itself. While Paris regarded the manner 
in which the American government conducted itself in Iceland as 
irresponsible and improvised, it later came to the view that
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Reykjavik needed to be seen within the context of the Reagan 
Administration's overall strategy to devalue the significance of 
nuclear weapons and seek accommodation with the Soviet Union on 
this basis. French officials regarded this attempt as dangerous 
for it lost sight of the irreplaceable significance of nuclear 
weapons to Western security and dovetailed with long-standing 
Soviet efforts to denuclearize the European continent.
Accordingly, the proposals tabled at Reykjavik by the United 
States and the Soviet Union evoked considerable concern in 
France. Moreover, French officials were less reticent than their 
European counterparts in articulating their misgivings. Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Bernard Raimond, succinctly 
encapsulated the French government's reactions when he 
characterized the plans outlined at Reykjavik as "probably 
utopian"7G and most likely "illusory or even dangerous.
French officials were critical of both Soviet and US 
attempts to alter radically the established deterrent regime. 
Raimond stated that Soviet calls for the complete elimination of 
ballistic missiles within ten years "cannot be considered
Statement of Jean-Bernard Raimond, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 19 
February 1987, Speeches and Statements. Service de 
Presse et d'information. Ambassade de France à Londres, 
London, p. 2.
77 Speech of Jean-Bernard Raimond at the Institute of 
Higher National Defence Studies, 14 March 1987,
Speeches and Statements. Service de Presse et 
d'information. Ambassador de France a Londres, London, 
p. 9.
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realistic."7® And US proposals for the elimination of 
ballistic missiles constituted a "risky gamble on maintaining 
American technological superiority in third-generation cruise 
missiles and stealth b o m b e r s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Raimond argued 
that such a proposal was "quite obviously a non-negotiable 
proposal for the USSR, since it would amount to abandoning 
investments made since the *60's."®° Aside from the staggering 
technical difficulties that such a transformation of the Western 
and Eastern nuclear arsenals would entail, it was unclear to 
France what could possibly be gained by such a new deterrent 
regime.
Despite its assessment that the Reykjavik proposals were 
unachievable, the French government was concerned that merely 
broaching such far-ranging proposals could "weaken the 
foundations or our present-day security."®^ Raimond contended 
that if the public were to gain the impression that the United 
States was serious about abandoning its ballistic missile force, 
removing its missiles from Europe, and developing "a more 
conventionally-orientated deterrence,"®^ it would jeopardise 
public support for nuclear deterrence. He argued that instead of 
contemplating highly unlikely, and ill-advised scenarios
"^® Ibid.
Ibid.
®° Ibid.
®^  Statement by Raimond, 19 February 1987, op. cit.. p. 2. 
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concerning complete nuclear disarmament, it would be better to 
"give priority to what is possible and desirable at this stage 
and avoid raising prospects likely to weaken politically the 
nuclear deterrent on which our continent's security will depend 
for the foreseeable future."®^
The French government was also concerned that the mere 
spectre of the superpowers giving up their nuclear arsenals would 
undermine the rationale for France's continued possession of a 
nuclear deterrent. Thus, in the aftermath of the Reykjavik 
summit, France missed few opportunities to reiterate the 
continued validity of its retention of an independent nuclear 
deterrent. Indeed, in response to a question about whether an 
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would 
cause France to change its defence policy. President Francois 
Mitterrand replied that:
France's policy is one of nuclear deterrence. Why and how 
would that strategy be set aside, since it is the very basis 
of our security? For my part, I am not considering the 
possibility of France giving up her nuclear strategy, which 
is a deterrent strategy aware of its own limitations; its 
object is by no means to have an offensive capability, it 
simply rests on the idea that France must stay above the 
credibility threshold, so that a war against her would bring 
absolutely no advantage or profit to whoever might think of 
waging one. No, there is no question of changing France's 
strategy.®*
83 Speech by Raimond, 14 March 1987, op. cit.. p. 9.
®* Press Conference of Francois Mitterrand, London, 16 
October 1986, in Speeches and Statements. Service de 
Presse et d'information. Ambassade de France a Londres, 
London, 3.
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By denying any plans for obtaining "an offensive capability," 
Mitterrand was emphasizing the different function of France's 
nuclear deterrent and thus stressing that what transpired at 
Reykjavik should not affect the validity of the French deterrent.
France was similarly concerned that the results of the 
Reykjavik summit tended to undermine the very concept of nuclear 
deterrence. French officials maintained that "Nuclear deterrence 
remains the only way effectively to prevent any war in Europe. 
There is no medium-term alternative."®^ Furthermore, in a 
scarcely concealed reference to SDI, Raimond contended that 
"Developments likely to flow from technological advances must be 
directed towards strengthening deterrence, not calling it into 
question."®® That this latter point required reiteration was 
significant, for it demonstrated the extent to which the American 
proposals at Reykjavik called into question France's previous 
assessment that SDI was not likely to undermine the traditional 
conception of nuclear deterrence. This realisation as well as 
the perception that the Reykjavik proposals constituted a threat 
to the very foundation of European security prompted French 
officials to articulate in the strongest and most public manner 
what they believed to be the fundamental realities of European 
security requirements.
France maintained that in addressing West European security 
the question of nuclear weapons could not be considered in
®® Speech by Raimond, 14 March 1987, pp. pit., p. 10. 
®® Ibid.
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isolation. It was necessary, argued Raimond, that the issue of 
nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons "be considered as a 
whole."87 French officials were concerned that in 
contemplating the elimination or drastic reduction in nuclear 
weapons the United States was losing sight of the vital role that 
nuclear weapons played in counterbalancing traditional East-West 
disparities in conventional and chemical forces. Mitterrand 
remarked that had an agreement been reached at Reykjavik, "the 
question would immediately have arisen of the conventional arms 
imbalance in Europe, which was the original reason for deploying 
nuclear weapons thirty years ago and is still a reality 
today."88 In short, the French were concerned that the Reagan 
Administration, in its anti-nuclear zeal, was failing to take 
into consideration the fact that nuclear weapons served purposes 
other than deterring Soviet nuclear weapons, and that should they 
be eliminated or drastically reduced the conditions that 
originally rendered them necessary would still obtain.
France stressed that effective deterrence vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union "necessitates the strategic coupling of the two 
sides of the Atlantic. "89 And this, according to Chirac, would
87 Ibid.
88 Statement of Pierre Morel, French Permanent 
Representative at the Disarmament Conference, Before 
First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 
17 October 1986, Speeches and Statements. Service de 
Presse et d*Information, Ambassade de France a Londres, 
London, p. 2.
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require "the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces 
on our continent."90 That the French government, which usually 
was reluctant to articulate Europe's ultimate dependence on the 
United States for its security, felt obliged to state so openly 
the requirements for extended deterrence attested to the deep 
anxiety which the Reykjavik proposals aroused in France. This 
admission was noteworthy as it demonstrated that the French 
(doubts about the credibility of US nuclear guarantees 
notwithstanding) viewed the continued American presence in Europe 
as indispensable to their security. Ironically, these sentiments 
were expressed at precisely the same time when it appeared that 
the United States was about to fulfil General de Gaulle's 
prophesy concerning the United States's eventual abandonment of 
Europe and vindicate, at least partially, the independent course 
that France chose in the 1960's.
Thus, Reykjavik served both to vindicate France's assessment 
of US unreliability and to expose the limitations of the strategy 
which General de Gaulle envisaged as replacing the US nuclear 
guarantee. In many respects, Reykjavik forced France to confront 
the incommensurability of its doctrine and its strategic nuclear 
capabilities. It was one thing, they discovered, to point out 
the logical inconsistencies in US extended deterrence doctrine; 
it was something else, given France's relatively modest resources 
and the still incomplete state of European defence cooperation, 
to develop a more credible alternative. Given these difficulties
Ibid.
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France felt most secure in embracing the status quo, namely, 
continued reliance on the residual credibility of US extended 
deterrence and the maintenance of its own independent nuclear 
deterrent.
In keeping with its declared preference for a continuation 
of existing security arrangements, France argued that arms 
control agreements "must aim at strengthening security at lower 
arms levels through realistic verifiable agreements."®^ While 
ostensibly a platitudinous endorsement of long-standing arms 
control positions, this statement was revealing. In advocating 
security at "lower arms levels" France was implicitly challenging 
the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons. Moreover, by 
calling for agreements that were "verifiable" and "realistic" the 
French government indicated that it regarded the more sweeping 
proposals broached at Reykjavik as not only undesirable in theory 
but also unworkable in practice. For even if the goal of 
eliminating nuclear weapons were deemed desirable, it was hardly 
realistic, according to French officials, in view of the daunting 
verification difficulties attending such agreements. While the 
elimination of entire classes of weaponry was generally 
considered as easy to verify, in a regime in which the possession 
of nuclear weapons were proscribed the potential significance of 
even small numbers of nuclear weapons would be so overwhelming 
that pressures for cheating (as well as anxieties concerning the 
ability to verify the compliance of others) would conspire to
Speech by Raimond, 14 March 1990, op. cit., p. 10.
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render such proposals unrealistic. France therefore endorsed an 
arms control agenda that would stabilize the status quo through 
preventing both excessive or exiguous levels of nuclear weapons.
Accordingly, France proposed that rather than attempting to 
achieve "utopian" and essentially undesirable agreements, it 
would be far better to concentrate upon the "achievement of the 
objective agreed between the Americans and Soviets in Reykjavik 
of a 50% reduction of their strategic arsenals over five 
y e a r s . "92 As Raimond stated, "this would be a considerable 
result, an unparalleled one in the history of arms control 
negotiation and which we obviously could not but welcome.
At the same time, he found it disturbing that the implementation 
of these proposals should be presented as but a prelude to 
"chancy alternative objectives targeted onto [sic] ten 
y e a r s . "94 France viewed the principle of 50 percent reductions 
as desirable only in its own right and as undesirable if it were 
tied to an eventual agreement on the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. Thus while supporting the principle of a 50 percent 
reduction in strategic nuclear missiles within five years, France 
wanted to see this proposal delinked from the plans to eliminate 
ballistic missiles entirely during a subsequent five year period.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
473
The French Government's Opposition to the INF Treaty
Pursuant to its interest in maintaining existing security 
arrangements, France was eager to ensure that any agreement 
governing intermediate range nuclear (INF) weapons not jeopardize 
European security. Raimond contended that changes since the 
original Alliance endorsement of the zero option had called into 
question the desirability of its implementation:
The zero option was implicitly accepted by our Alliance 
partners in 1979 and explicitly [sic] proposed by them in 
1981. The political reasons for this are well known. 
However, the situation in 1987 is different. In 1981 our 
Alliance partners proposed to abandon a deployment that had 
been announced but not yet put into effect, in exchange for 
a cut in the number of missiles on the Soviet side. In 1987 
there are intermediate-range missiles on both sides, but in 
unequal numbers. So the implementation of such a formula, 
which would in any case presuppose a timetable and some very 
specific verification measures, should not result tomorrow 
in a situation of lesser security for Europe.
The desirability of the zero option was not, however, contingent 
upon the number of missiles deployed at any one time. What 
Raimond's statement unwittingly revealed was that while support 
for the zero option was politically expedient when the prospects 
for its acceptance by the Soviet Union were slim, its 
implementation was something which the French government deemed 
deleterious to European security interests. Apart from the 
immediate results of the zero option France also feared that by 
endorsing the legitimacy of zero missiles at the intermediate
Ibid.
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level it would be difficult to resist the extension of this
principle to nuclear missiles of all ranges and categories.
Despite these misgivings, France officially supported the zero
option, for as Mitterrand remarked;
Eight years after the start of that [INF] debate, Mr. Reagan 
having said in 1981 that his strategy was the zero option 
for the long-range intermediate nuclear forces, and NATO 
having, on this point, accepted the prospect with France's 
full approval, we are not going to do a U-turn now that Mr. 
Gorbachev is coming round it.^°
Yet Raimond wanted to ensure that "there be no possibility 
of circumventing such an agreement at the top or bottom end; I am 
thinking more especially of the question of shorter-range 
missiles (SRINF)."^^ In short, the French government was 
concerned that considering intermediate-range weapons in 
isolation obscured the multiple nuclear threats that Europe 
faced. As Mitterrand noted, there was "a severe imbalance in the 
Soviet Union's favour with respect to short- or very short-range 
(100 to 1,000 km) intermediate weapons in Europe."^® Moreover, 
France realised that even the elimination of all "non-strategic" 
nuclear weapons would still leave the Soviet Union with the 
capacity to reach every target in Europe with their strategic
Press Conference of Francois Mitterrand with the French 
Diplomatic Press Association, 10 March 1987, Speeches 
and Statements. Service de Presse et d'information. 
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nuclear weapons.
The fear of denuclearisation was exacerbated on February 28, 
1987 when the Soviet Union agreed to abandon the link between the 
START and INF negotiations. The immediate American acceptance of 
this offer elicited, in France, "the impression that a new phase 
of East-West relations is opening."9* Although France 
officially endorsed the US decision to accept the Soviet offer to 
negotiate the elimination of long range intermediate missiles in 
Europe^®®, many French officials found it difficult to refrain 
from voicing their profound misgivings about the prospect of the 
zero option combined with the still unresolved status of SDI. In 
France, "the press and political circles" speculated that French 
forces now faced the "duel threat" of the denuclearization of the 
American presence in Europe as well as "the development of new 
defence s y s t e m s . W h i l e  both these prospects existed in the 
aftermath of Reykjavik and evoked considerable concern, the 
unlinking of INF and other arms control negotiations exacerbated 
French fears. Whereas prior to February 28, 1987, US-Soviet 
disagreement on SDI blocked implementation of the zero option.
Ibid., p. 1.
See Press Conference of Mitterrand, 10 March 1987, pp. 
pit., p. 2.; and Interview of Prime Minister Jacques 
Chirac on Soviet Television, Moscow, 16 May 1987, in 
Speeches and Statements. Press and Information Service, 
London. Both the President and the Prime Minister 
publicly supported the unlinking of the START and the 
INF talks, as well as the zero option. They left it to 
their ministers to express French misgivings.
Speech by Raimond, 14 March 1987, pp. pit., p. 1.
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now France confronted, from her perspective, the worst possible 
combination: the possibility of early SDI deployment and the 
realisation of the zero option.
French officials were particularly concerned that unlinking 
the strategic and intermediate-range negotiations could "turn the 
result of a technical achievement of the negotiations into a 
philosophical precedent. This fear reflected the long­
standing French position that US arms control policy was 
abstractly isolating the question of INF deployment from the 
wider issues of the European conventional force balance and 
strategic nuclear systems (that were capable of reaching Western 
European territory) as well as the European based nuclear systems 
that were not included in the INF negotiations. Raimond, 
therefore, asserted that "an INF reduction will have 
repercussions on all the other military potentialities: its 
implementation cannot therefore be considered separately from the 
overall balance of East-West f o r c e s . B y  ignoring these 
threats, France believed that the United States risked forgetting 
that "a security system can clearly not be divided up without 
losing its coherence and efficacity."i°*
In short, the French Government feared that the result of 
the INF treaty would lead to precisely the result which the 
original introduction of the Pershing II and cruise missiles was
Ibid. ■ p. 15. 
Ibid.
^0^ Ibid.
477
designed to prevent: the decoupling of European and American 
security. In an interview with Le Point. Jacques Chirac stated 
"that the withdrawal of the American missiles - their deployment 
having been presented by the Americans themselves as symbolizing 
the coupling between the United States and Europe - should not 
weaken that c o u p l i n g . F r a n c e  contended that this danger 
arose, not only from the actual removal of the long-range and 
intermediate- range weapons (though this was deemed sufficiently 
harmful in itself) but from the possibility that the 
concept of achieving the level of zero would be pursued to its 
seemingly logical conclusion, leaving American forces bereft of a 
nuclear capability in Europe and hence effecting the 
denuclearization of Europe.
French Concerns About the Direction of US Defence Policv 
More importantly, France regarded the Reagan 
Administration's stance toward a prospective INF agreement as 
symptomatic of a far wider and more dangerous trend in US policy. 
French officials believed that either by design or as a result of 
proposals conceived to thwart anti-nuclear sentiment, the United 
States was pursuing policies that would denuclearize European
Ibid.
106 France regarded the INF deployments as somewhat of a 
validation of its view of deterrence, as they 
threatened (in France's opinion) not so much to fight 
of war in Europe but to trigger a general nuclear war - 
a role that was more akin to "pure deterrence" than 
warfighting.
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security and lead ultimately to reliance on conventional weapons. 
Raimond argued that not only France but all West European 
governments
understand that a purely conventional deterrent in Europe is 
not possible economically or demographically and above all 
that it is not militarily credible. The feeling, whether 
justified or not, that the negotiation could ultimately lead 
to denuclearization of the American presence in Europe may, 
moreover, acquire a political significance. It might lead 
to a second question, this time concerning the maintenance 
of the troops stationed on our continent. Indeed, if the 
American presence in Europe were to lose its specificity, 
namely its nuclear element, it would become replaceable,
that is, precarious.107
For France what was at stake in the arms negotiations was the 
future of nuclear deterrence on the European continent and the 
very existence of the post-war security structure. French 
officials contended that the logic inherent in the zero option 
presented the very real danger that it would begin a chain 
reaction of denuclearization throughout the continent.
France contended that the altered arms control regime and 
changes in East-West relations were the result not of Soviet but 
of American policy. Raimond stated that "Right from his arrival 
to [sic] the White House, President Reagan had set his 
administration ambitious goals which demonstrated a deliberate 
determination to break with the preceding one."^°® These 
included the restoration of US military power through an
Speech by Raimond, 14 March 1987, pp. cit., p. 15.
Ibid.. p. 3.
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acceleration in military expenditures begun in the last year of 
the Carter Administration as well as "some spectacular decisions, 
demonstrating that the military strength of the United States, 
and this applied to all its components, was to be re-established 
to serve a strategy that was no longer solely centered on Europe, 
but was more g l o b a l . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the Reagan 
Administration consciously reduced the importance it attached to 
arms control agreements and attempted "to play the economic card 
in its relations with the USSR. This strategy, however,
created difficulties within the Alliance as America's European 
Allies opposed the lack of US enthusiasm for arms control 
agreements and regarded as dangerous attempts to exercise 
economic leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
At the end of 1982 and 1983, according to Raimond, "a 
radical change in Washington's attitude" occurred, "the 
implications of which we have probably not yet fully 
appreciated."Ill In response to the American nuclear freeze 
movement, "President Reagan decided to regain the initiative by 
setting against the pacific tenets the technological hope of a 
world released from the mutual balance of terror."H^ France
109 Ibid. This was an apparent reference to US strategy of 
horizontal escalation, which was in turn tied to the US 
maritime strategy as well as the renewed focus on the 
Pacific region.
11° Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
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maintained that the true significance of this initiative lay not
in the decision to pursue BMD research more energetically; rather
it resided "in the accompanying strategic argument and
repudiation of the theory of certain mutual destruction.
This conclusion, argued Raimond, had enormous implications for
the entire structure of East-West security for:
Once nuclear weapons were denounced as an intrinsic evil, 
transcending both East-West and ideological rivalries, 
cooperation with the USSR to eliminate those weapons once 
more became a legitimate and necessary goal. Politically, 
it was no longer a case of fighting a geographically and 
politically identified "evil empire", but an evil against 
which mankind should line up behind the United States and 
the USSR making common cause.
Despite these less than encouraging developments, France 
argued that "both Congress and the [Reagan] administration 
clearly perceive the strategic importance of Europe for the 
United S t a t e s . " N e v e r t h e l e s s , "  stated Raimond, "in the 
United States, the higher cost in budget terms of the defence 
effort, combined with maintenance of stable overall tax revenue 
pose difficult problems for the years to come. They can but 
contribute to reopening the old debate on reducing the present 
troop strength of the American forces stationed in E u r o p e .
And "it is in this context that we must understand the American 
reaction to Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 28 February abandoning
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the link established between the negotiations - themselves tied 
to SDI - on cutting back the strategic arsenals and those on an 
intermediate-range missile a g r e e m e n t , argued Raimond. In 
short France believed that a successful conclusion to the INF 
agreement would enable the United States to realise its desire to 
reduce its defence burden in Europe.
French Concerns About a Convergence in US and Soviet Thinking 
The trepidation with which France regarded this American 
objective was compounded by her perception that it unwittingly 
dovetailed with the Soviet Union's "long-standing objectives vis- 
a-vis Western Europe, but which are now being pursued with 
renewed d y n a m i s m . F r e n c h  officials were openly sceptical 
of the sincerity of Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy 
and Raimond characterized perestroika as "an old concept" that 
was "being presented in the sparkling colors of something that is 
brand n e w . R a i m o n d  believed that the Soviet decision to 
unlink INF from SDI and the START negotiations indicated that 
they "have chosen to play in priority the European card"^^° by 
attempting to denuclearise Europe and thereby expel the United 
States from Europe. At the same time, French officials contended 
that the Soviet Union was far from oblivious to the potential
Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 1. 
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 4.
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effects of an INF agreement on Congressional support for SDI and 
the Reagan Administration's interpretation of the ABM Treaty. 
France maintained that:
The fact that the USSR is conducting a policy specifically 
aimed at Europe at one and the same time as seeking action 
on the United States front raises a broader question.
Is the USSR pursuing unaltered goals with new methods 
or has Mr. Gorbachev's policy become, as he himself asserted 
at the recent Moscow Peace Conference, the external 
reflection, the simple corollary, of the new internal
priorities.121
The conduct and outcome of the INF negotiations confirmed 
and even strengthened France's belief that the confluence of 
unchanging Soviet objectives and an apparent waning desire of the 
United States to extend nuclear deterrence to its Allies 
threatened to undermine European security. Raimond was 
particularly candid in articulating these French concerns:
From one summit to the next, be it the Reykjavik meeting or 
the forthcoming Washington summit, the American-Soviet 
disarmament negotiations, particularly those on the INFs, 
have raised as many expectations as question marks in 
France, as elsewhere in the rest of Europe.
For the first time for many years, the Europeans are 
once against waking up to their defence imperatives and to 
the fact that, in the security context, the world to which 
they have grown accustomed is c r u m b l i n g . 1 2 2
"This feeling," maintained Raimond, "originated in the
121 Ibid.
122 Speech of Jean-Bernard Raimond in the National Assembly 
Budget Debate, 5 November 1987, Speeches and 
Statements. Service de Presse et d'information. 
Ambassade de France a Londres, London, p. 3.
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Reykjavik shock" and was subsequently exacerbated by the 
consideration of the second zero option which called for the 
elimination of all ballistic missiles between 500 and 5000km. 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac therefore stressed "that the zero 
option was not an end in itself and that we should be careful not 
to let our public opinion believe that the threat had suddenly 
evaporated."123 French officials believed that if this 
perception were allowed to gain currency, the entire basis for 
nuclear deterrence would be undermined.
The French government was, therefore, convinced that it was 
essential for the Alliance to "break out of the Soviet logic of 
d e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n " 124 or risk the almost certain evisceration of 
European security. This required first, and above all, the 
recognition that the maintenance of peace in Europe in the post 
war era was primarily attributable to the presence of American 
forces armed with nuclear weapons. In this regard "Mr.
Gorbachev, like his predecessors, aims progressively to weaken 
the military form of American presence."125 In particular 
Raimond believed that Moscow wanted "to try to limit the extent 
to which Soviet territory can, from Western European soil, be
12^ An Interview with Jacques Chirac, published in *Le 
Point', 5 October 1987, Speeches and Statements.
Service de Presse et d'information. Ambassade de France 
a Londres, London, p. 1.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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deprived of its status as a s a n c t u a r y . judged according to 
that criteria Raimond regarded that
the elimination of INF systems constitutes a major gain for 
the USSR, even if it requires the Soviets to sacrifice a 
greater number of systems. In any case, these systems can 
be substituted for strategic systems which, it may be 
assumed, are capable of striking the same targets in Western
Europe.127
French Concerns About West German Security
Furthermore, France maintained that agreement on the 
elimination of all land based American nuclear missiles in Europe 
except those of the shortest range promoted denuclearization by 
placing West Germany in a potentially untenable political 
position. With only East and West Germany in range of the 
remaining missiles, the perception arose within the Federal 
Republic that it constituted ”a 'special case* in relation to the 
Soviet nuclear threat."128 This, in turn, threatened to create 
"conditions for permanent pressure within the Alliance in favor 
of opening negotiations on those systems."12® While France 
regarded German fears of singularization as "exaggerated, since
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Speech of Jacques Chirac at the Institute of Higher 
National Defence Studies, 12 December 1987, Speeches 
and Statements. Service de Presse et d'information. 
Ambassade de France a Londres, London, p. 3.
12® Raimond, "The Future of European Security," op. cit.. 
p. 4.
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the whole of Europe is within range of the various categories of 
nuclear arms the Soviet Union possesses and will go on possessing 
in far too great quantities, even after the INF have been 
dismantled,” Chirac asked "how can one fail to understand the 
anxiety of our German friends, considering their situation?
He therefore warned that, however militarily illogical, "the zero 
option concept is in the process of acquiring the force of 
precedent. If two zero options are a good thing, why, it might 
be thought, would the same not be true of a third zero 
o p t i o n ? F r a n c e  feared "the danger of falling in with the 
Soviet reasoning whereby, by a succession of proposed 'zero 
options', the American nuclear presence in Europe, which we all 
believe vital, could be jeopardized and even eliminated.
France maintained that not only the place that arms control 
occupied within the context of East-West relations but also the 
objective of the negotiations themselves were being substantially 
altered. In contrast to past practice "the objective of arms
Speech of Chirac, 12 December 1987, op. cit.. p. 3. 
German fears were, of course not confined to the 
possibility of selective vulnerability; they feared as 
well that with the second and third rungs of the 
escalation ladder removed, the function of the SNF 
weapons was transformed from an initial salvo in an 
escalation process linking European defence to U.S. 
strategic systems - and thereby deterring conflict - to 
one of "warfighting." This concern was rendered 
particularly acute given that these SNF weapons could 
reach primarily if not exclusively East German 
territory.
Raimond, "The Future of European Security," pp. cit., 
p. 4.
Speech of Chirac, 12 December 1987, pp. pit., p. 3.
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control is now not so much the predictability and stability of 
the power relationship as the modification of the military 
balance of forces itself."1^3 Whereas during "the first period 
of detente in the seventies, the basic objective assigned to arms 
control was the management of overall strategic p a r i t y " , t h e  
Reagan Administration was now using arms control as a means of 
effecting "The transformation of the power relationship in 
Europe, and an evolution in the relationship between offensive 
and defensive f o r c e s . The concern which this engendered 
was exacerbated by the concurrent appearance of US statements 
expressing a preference for conventional deterrence. France 
feared that the United States was using arms control to implement 
its growing preference for a global security regime in which 
nuclear weapons would play a less prominent role. Because France 
was firmly wedded to nuclear deterrence and regarded its 
continuation as essential to its security, these American 
objectives were greeted with less than alacritous approval.
France believed that SDI played a notably deleterious role 
in channelling the budding US-Soviet convergence in arms control 
negotiations into questionable directions: "In view of the
current impasse on SDI, this convergence seems, for the time 
being, to involve less a preoccupation with Soviet and American 
strategic arsenals and more a concern with the level and forms of
Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 2.
Ibid., p. 5.
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the American presence, both nuclear and conventional, in 
E u r o p e . "136 French officials were therefore concerned that 
Europe was, in a sense, the victim of the US-Soviet impasse on 
the strategic level. Because agreement was difficult at the 
strategic level - primarily, though not exclusively, because of 
SDI - Europe was seen as a convenient theatre in which the 
superpowers could achieve dramatic results. France believed that 
this led to a hasty and ill-conceived agreement, the primary 
virtue of which was that it fulfilled the desire for tangible 
progress in East- West relations.
France argued that the limitations and dangers of this 
approach became apparent when, shortly after agreement on the 
terms of the INF treaty, discussions began concerning the 
compensatory military measures that would be necessary once the 
US-Soviet agreement were implemented. Indeed, as Raimond 
remarked, "it is impossible both to claim that an INF agreement 
in no way diminishes the effectiveness of the Alliance's flexible 
response and to assert that the resulting deficit must be 
compensated for by other m e a n s . "^37 Moreover, it was hardly 
more credible, according to France, to assert that the functions 
previously performed by land-based nuclear missiles could be 
overtaken by air and sea-based forces without adversely affecting 
European security, as this would inevitably entail diverting 
badly needed conventional units to nuclear duties.
Ibid.
Ibid. . p. 3.
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France and European Defence Cooperation
The French government's profound reservations about the INF 
treaty as well as the absence of significant European input in 
negotiations that so profoundly affected European security led to 
renewed calls for achieving a new balance within the Alliance. 
France believed that this "new balance must ensure an increased 
contribution by Europeans to the common defence and assign them a 
greater role in shaping that d e f e n c e . R a i m o n d  contended 
that it was only through the achievement of the former that the 
latter would be possible. France maintained that the need for a 
stronger European pillar necessitated, quite naturally, greater 
efforts in European defence cooperation. While these efforts had 
been accelerated in the aftermath of Reykjavik, primarily through 
the WEU, the reality of the INF treaty led to a realization that 
European defence cooperation would assume greater urgency. This 
involved, above all, tighter defence cooperation with the Federal 
Republic of Germany, a relationship that formed the basis for any 
serious European defence identity. Furthermore, nuclear 
cooperation with Britain would be essential to maintaining, and 
possibly expanding, the role of European nuclear weapons in 
performing deterrent functions. By pulling closer together and 
contributing a greater share to the Alliance burden, France hoped 
that "it should be possible to transcend the acrimonious dispute 
in which Europeans are invariably considered to be concerned only 
with preserving the gains resulting from detente, while the
Ibid.
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United States sees itself as the one country carrying the burden 
of d e f e n c e . T h i s  would in turn allow "joint consideration 
of the future of European security, changes in the Alliance and 
the role that Europeans can have in it."1*0
Ironically, the primary motivation for these efforts was not 
the creation of a Europe more capable of defending itself, but to 
ensure the continued commitment of the United States to European 
security. While France was concerned that greater European 
cooperation might "run the risk of precipitating American 
withdrawal", they believed that ultimately if Europe were 
seen as doing more for itself, it would quiet those in the United 
States who were criticizing Europe's putatively meagre 
contribution to defence and calling for US troop withdrawals.
The Significance of Revkiavik and Its Aftermath for French Policv 
France believed that the Reykjavik summit and the INF treaty 
threatened to undermine European security by creating a dangerous 
momentum toward the dismantlement of the basic security regime 
that had sustained peace since the end of the Second World War. 
French officials contended that this process was being driven by 
Soviet efforts at denuclearization as well as by the 
implementation of revolutionary American arms control concepts. 
These arms control concepts were conceived in the expectation not
Ibid., p. 6.
1^ 0 Ibid.
Ibid.
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that the Soviet Union would take them seriously but that they 
would act as an antidote to what US officials considered 
dangerous pressures for unwise agreements. Once the Soviet Union 
unexpectedly decided to accept the American proposals, the 
Alliance was confronted with a situation which prompted Raimond 
to ask "is not the remedy now proving more harmful than the 
illness it is supposed to cure?"^^^ He further queried: "If
such radical objectives are assigned to arms control, how will it 
be possible to keep public opinion from confusing that policy [of 
affirming radical arms control objectives] with a Soviet approach 
that itself, for obvious reasons, advertises equally radical 
ambitions?"
In other words, France contended that Western publics needed
to be reminded of the factors that had ensured its security and
of what the corresponding limits to arms control were.
Accordingly, Chirac stressed that it was necessary to state
forthrightly and repeatedly that "it is by nuclear deterrence
that peace has been preserved on our continent for more than
forty years. "144 And France believed that there were no
alternatives to ultimate reliance on nuclear weapons. Thus,
according to Raimond, there were two choices:
Either the Alliance accepts to be drawn, as the Soviet Union 
is urging, into a reasoning that ultimately could bring 
Europe's denuclearization and weaken the security link
142 Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid.
Speech by Chirac, 12 December 1987, pE* cit.. p. 3.
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between the United States and Europe. Or it goes on clearly 
maintaining its concept of deterrence whereby its security 
depends on a dual link; between nuclear and conventional 
weapons and between the United States and Europe.
France's clear preference for the latter scenario was matched by 
an equally clear sense of doubt concerning the willingness of the 
United States to join her in upholding these traditional tenets 
of Western security. In fact, France feared that the entire 
thrust of US policy since SDI had reflected a desire to overturn 
the post-war security regime and that the INF treaty was only 
part of a more overarching design that was clearly reflected in 
the Reykjavik proposals as well as in the decision to pursue SDI.
As France had predicted when the Soviet Union decided to 
unlink the INF negotiations from both START and SDI, an INF 
agreement would undermine support for SDI. The primary political 
result of the INF treaty was thus to give impetus to calls for 
progress on START negotiations in order to continue the trend 
toward improved East-West relations of which the INF treaty 
itself was a prominent symbol. And since SDI was the most 
significant obstacle to the success of the START talks. 
Congressional support for SDI funding began to wane, as did, 
predictably, support for even contemplating deployment. Thus, in 
many respects SDI became the victim of precisely the 
circumstances that its critics argued its promulgation would 
surely prevent: improved East-West relations and progress in arms
Speech by Raimond, 1 December 1987, op. cit.. p. 5.
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control. Moreover, since SDI was in many respects a response to 
the arms competitions which resulted from mutual antagonism, the 
general easing of this antagonism seemed to remove the necessity 
for strategic defences.
The INF treaty had an even more decisive impact on the ATM 
debate. Although following the implementation of the INF treaty 
the Soviet Union continued to possess a formidable array of SNF 
capable of striking Western Europe, the widespread perception was 
that the INF treaty had effectively eliminated the very threats 
that the ATMs were designed to counter. Furthermore, because 
continuing the trend toward improved East-West relations became 
the dominant consideration in European politics, continued 
advocacy was perceived as inimical to achieving detente.
V. THE WEU AND NATO
West European governments attempted to coordinate their 
positions through the WEU in the aftermath of the Reykjavik 
summit. It seemed a propitious time to do so, given the wide­
spread perception in Western Europe that the United States was 
attempting to guide Western defence strategy in directions they 
opposed. They believed that by fashioning a joint West European 
position, they could increase their leverage vis-a-vis the United
States.1*6
Following the Reykjavik summit the WEU issued a statement
1*6 France was particularly interested in utilizing the WEU 
in this way.
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that indicated West European concerns about the Reykjavik summit. 
However, these meetings and statements had little concrete effect 
on the controversy, largely because the same concerns had already 
been expressed by the WEU members in bilateral discussions with 
the United States. Moreover, American officials were well aware 
of the almost unanimous disapproval of its conduct at 
R e y k j a v i k . M o r e o v e r ,  Britain and West German, which were 
members of the both the WEU and NATO's military structure, had 
advanced many of these concerns within NATO's NPG and Defence 
Planning Committee.
While the WEU had little influence on the course of the 
transatlantic debate following the Reykjavik summit, the reverse 
is not true. The Reykjavik summit and the INF treaty led the WEU 
to redouble its efforts to achieve greater West European defence 
cooperation. On October 27, 1987, the foreign and defence 
ministers of the WEU agreed to a "Platform on European Security 
Interests."148 The participants agreed on three main points.
1. The conditions of European security;
2. the criteria on which European security is based;
147 The Reagan Administration was also widely criticized 
within the United States, where the predominant 
commentary echoed the West European position about the 
ill-advised nature of the proposals that had been 
forwarded at Reykjavik.
148 «The Platform on European Security Interests," The 
Hague, 27 October 1987, reprinted in Alfred Cahen, The 
Western European Union and NATO (London: Brassey's, 
1989), p. 91.
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3. the responsibilities of Europeans with regard to their 
security considered in the context of common Atlantic 
security, whether in the areas of defence, arms control 
or dialogue with the East.
What is a striking aspect of this communique is the emphasis
placed on the imperative of the US commitment to European
security. It stated that: "The substantial presence of US
conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in
the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to
the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with
the US strategic deterrent, "i** The report also reiterated the
West European view that: "To be credible and effective, the
strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on
an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces,
only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential
aggressor with an unacceptable risk."^^°
While the WEU stated that "the construction of an integrated
Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include
security and defence, it is clear that this integration was
deemed important primarily to ensure the continued commitment of
the United States to West European security. This was
significant because it pointed out the unanimity in the West
European positions on the requirements for security; but, more
importantly, it also revealed Western Europe's continued
Ibid.. p. 93. 
Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 91.
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dependence on the United States for security. And greater 
European cooperation was designed not to wean Western Europe from 
this dependence but to prevent the United States, through 
unilateral actions, from abandoning Western Europe.
The reaction of NATO as an institution to the Reykjavik 
summit was complicated. As was the case with Reagan's March 23, 
1983 speech, the Reykjavik proposals were not discussed in 
advance in the Nuclear Planning Group. Thus, West European 
governments were presented with a fait accompli. This came as a 
considerable disappointment to West European members of the 
Alliance, given the close consultations that had characterized 
Alliance deliberations following the initial unilateral manner in 
which SDI was originally presented. Despite the fact that the 
Reagan Administration resumed close consultations within NATO in 
the aftermath of Reykjavik, West European members of Alliance 
were once again confronted with the fact that one an issue of 
vital importance to their own security, they were not even 
informed about the proposed actions of the US government.
The Reagan Administration's failure to consult its Allies in 
advance of tabling the Reykjavik proposals demonstrated that 
senior American officials had a greater interest in effecting a 
radical change in the strategic regime than in consultations with 
their closest Allies. Indeed, it was what the content of 
Reykjavik proposals revealed more than the manner in which they 
were presented that caused such consternation in West European 
Capitols. In tabling proposals that called for the complete
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elimination of ballistic missiles within 10 years, Reagan 
demonstrated that he was committed to his original conception of 
rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. While in the 
aftermath of the Reykjavik summit, Reagan retreated from these 
ambitious objectives in favour of attempting to secure a 50 
percent reduction in US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the 
Reykjavik proposals aroused deep suspicion about Reagan's 
commitment to nuclear deterrence.
NATO's official reaction to Reykjavik was, therefore, to 
insist that the United States reaffirm its commitment to nuclear 
deterrence. At a December 1986 meeting of the Defence Planning 
Committee a communique was issued that stated:
NATO's aim is the prevention of war; therefore the Alliance 
must continue to ensure its security through the provision 
of adequate military capabilities and the parallel pursuit 
of a more stable East-West relationship. Credible 
deterrence and defense is an essential basis for improved 
relations between East and West.
The importance that the Alliance attached to maintaining its
reliance on nuclear deterrence was reiterated in many subsequent
communiques. Although West European concerns about the Reagan
Administration's commitment to established NATO doctrine abated
as a result of its willingness to publicly support nuclear
deterrence in Alliance communiques, doubts remained about the
Reagan Administration's intentions.
Indeed, as we have seen the Reagan Administration's pursuit
of the double zero option in the INF negotiations was deeply
disturbing to West European members of the Alliance. Yet because
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the zero option was a NATO initiative and the double zero option 
enjoyed wide public support, NATO communiques voiced strong 
support for the course of these negotiations, as well as the 
eventual treaty that emerged. West European governments feared, 
however, that the Reagan Administration was, in line with the 
anti-nuclear philosophy underpinning SDI, attempting to 
denuclearize NATO strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the Reykjavik summit and its 
aftermath revealed several important aspects of the transatlantic 
debate about SDI. In particular, it provided insight of the 
objectives that Reagan was pursuing through SDI; the analysis 
also revealed the nature of the underlying differences within the 
Alliance about SDI as well as how the Alliance managed its 
dispute about SDI. And finally, study of this period provided 
findings about the role of East-West relations in determining the 
course and outcome of the debate.
The Reykjavik summit demonstrated that Reagan remained 
committed to the vision he had articulated in his March 23, 1983 
speech. By tabling proposals that called for the complete 
elimination of ballistic missiles and seriously broaching the 
idea of complete nuclear disarmament Reagan demonstrated that he 
was indeed committed to "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and 
obsolete."
This revelation demonstrated that the Alliance consensus on
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SDI that had been formed prior to the Reykjavik summit was 
predicated on a fundamentally false premise. As was discussed in 
previous chapters, one of the prime reasons that the United 
States and its West European Allies were able to fashion a 
consensus of sorts on SDI was the perception in Western European 
capitals that US SDI policy had changed from that articulated in 
March 23, 1983 - that instead of transcending deterrence US 
policy was intent upon strengthening existing deterrence 
arrangements. This perception was assiduously fostered by the US 
State Department which took advantage of the confusion within the 
Reagan Administration and chose to emphasize the more limited 
objectives of SDI. West Europeans who were understandably 
reluctant to accept that Reagan was intent upon a radical change 
in the strategic nuclear regime gladly accepted these assurances 
despite indications to the contrary emanating from other parts of 
the Reagan Administration.
It is tempting to conclude that the Reagan Administration 
had consciously deceived its West European counterparts or that 
West European officials allowed themselves to be deceived. 
Reality, however, is more complex. Because the deployment of BMD 
systems capable of providing a near perfect defence against 
nuclear missiles - assuming technical feasibility - would by 
Reagan's own admission take decades, it was not unreasonable to 
stress that as a practical matter SDI would not be able to 
provide comprehensive defences in the foreseeable future. If one 
adds to this rationale strong doubts about SDI's technical
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feasibility and the fact that Reagan would not be in office when 
decisions about deployment would be taken, then the perception 
that SDI would serve to enhance and not transcend nuclear 
deterrence appeared plausible. But these assumptions all rested 
on the premise that the issue of deployment was the primary cause 
of the SDI dispute.
But the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath demonstrated that 
the issue of BMD deployment was not the central aspect of the SDI 
dispute. Had the Reykjavik proposals been agreed upon, the 
elimination of ballistic missiles would have been accomplished 
not primarily through deployment but through mutual agreement 
about their elimination. This indicated that it was Reagan's 
desire to change strategy that was the driving force of the 
controversy. This view was given further credence by the Reagan 
Administration's advocacy of the double zero option which had 
unmistakable anti-nuclear aspects to it.
The fact that the West European reaction to the Reykjavik 
proposals as well as to the INF treaty were strikingly similar to 
their reaction to SDI had far-reaching significance. It 
indicated that while both the United States and West European 
governments continued to believe that the issue of deployment was 
central to the SDI dispute, in fact it was the underlying 
conceptions about what constituted a credible nuclear strategy 
and a stable nuclear regime that was the underlying cause of the 
transatlantic controversy over SDI.
The most important intra-Alliance diplomacy that followed
500
the Reykjavik summit was conducted bilaterally. Shortly after 
the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Iceland, both Kohl and Thatcher 
travelled to Washington in order to mitigate the damage that the 
Reykjavik summit had done to Alliance unity. Each left after 
securing joint statements with the United States that reaffirmed 
the Reagan Administration's commitment to the defence of Europe 
as well as its commitment to arms control. While NATO 
communiques had echoed the sentiments expressed in these 
bilateral statements, it was clear from both the high level 
nature of the bilateral consultations as well as the repeated 
reference made to the bilateral statements in the Parliamentary 
debates about Reykjavik that these were the key instruments 
through which the post-Reykjavik diplomacy was conducted. Thus, 
the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit followed the same pattern 
that had preceded the US-Soviet meeting. The most important 
decisions would be reached on a bilateral basis and NATO 
communiques would reiterate these positions in order to create 
the impression of a unified position.
This is not to suggest that NATO's Defence Planning 
Committee and North Atlantic Council meetings did not play 
important roles, because they did. These declarations were 
significant because they indicated that despite the obvious 
disagreements occasioned by the Reykjavik summit and the INF 
treaty, the members of NATO were above all interested in 
maintaining Alliance unity or at least its appearance.
The Reykjavik summit also provided significant insights into
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how the Reagan Administration approached SDI from the perspective 
of Alliance politics. US officials had laboured to overcome the 
legacy of the March 23, 1983 speech by keeping their West 
European counterparts informed through extensive consultations 
thereafter. In numerous NATO communiques in 1985 and 1986 the 
importance of consultations were reiterated. Yet at Reykjavik 
the United States reverted to the unilateral course it had 
followed in launching SDI in 1983. They did so fully cognizant 
that this would anger its Allies and undermine Alliance unity. 
Why?
A definite answer to such a question must, perforce, remain 
speculative until further information is made available. 
Nonetheless, a tentative answer may still go to the very heart of 
the SDI controversy as well as to the dilemma facing the Alliance 
in the age of nuclear parity. Since the inception of the 
Alliance the United States has attempted to balance the 
requirements of fashioning a strategy for NATO that was perceived 
as credible to West Europeans but also one that held out the 
prospect that, if implemented, would not necessarily lead to the 
destruction of the United States.
SDI was, in essence, the manifestation of the Reagan 
Administration's assessment that these requirements could not be 
balanced under circumstances in which the United States was 
completely vulnerable to nuclear attack. This dictated that the 
condition of mutual vulnerability needed to be overcome even if 
it conflicted with the requirement of reassuring Alliance unity
502
by having a nuclear strategy that West Europeans interpreted as 
credible. This American assessment did not indicate a weakening 
the United States' commitment to Europe; it merely indicated that 
this commitment had to be reconciled with the United States' 
desire for self-preservation. Thus when, as at Reykjavik, the 
opportunity arose to establish a regime under which the United 
States would be invulnerable to nuclear attack, it was seized 
upon, even in the knowledge that it would create disunity within 
the Alliance.
The substantial improvement in East-West relations that 
occurred after the Reykjavik summit revealed the complex 
relationship between the perception of external threat and 
doctrinal coherence in determining Alliance unity. While the INF 
treaty was seen in Western Europe as a promising sign that East- 
West relations were improving, it was simultaneously viewed as 
inimical to West European security interests. Yet, two factors 
militated against strong and public West European opposition to 
the INF treaty. First, an INF treaty based on the zero option 
had been official Alliance policy since late 1981; therefore, to 
reject a treaty after the Soviet Union had essentially agreed to 
the Western position was clearly untenable. Second, any 
government that opposed the INF treaty would have been open to 
the charge that it was undermining improved East-West relations. 
Thus despite believing that the INF treaty would damage their 
security. West European governments felt compelled to support the 
US-Soviet agreement.
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This European support was significant because it indicated 
that improved East-West relations contributed significantly to 
improved Alliance unity. But it also indicated that the state of 
East-West relations, while important, was not decisive in 
determining West European reaction. For, despite welcoming the 
improvement in East-West relations. West European governments 
feared that this improvement was being achieved at the expense of 
their security by undermining the validity of nuclear deterrence. 
Therefore, while the linkage of the INF treaty with improved 
East-West relations constrained the willingness of West European 
governments to oppose the changes being effected through the US- 
Soviet agreement, it could not conceal that the Reykjavik summit 
and its aftermath created greater disunity within the Alliance. 
That it did so indicated the primacy of doctrinal concerns in 
determining the degree of cohesion within the Alliance and that, 
far from contributing to disunity within the Alliance, improved 
East-West relations exercised a negative influence on Alliance 
unity.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
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This study has attempted to answer three main questions 
about European/American relations over SDI. Why did the Reagan 
Administration's decision to pursue SDI cause such controversy 
within the Alliance? How, and to what extent, did the United 
States, Britain, West Germany and France reconcile their 
disagreements about SDI? And, what effect did East-West 
relations have on the transatlantic SDI debate? The answers to 
these questions can best be found by examining the findings 
pertaining to the three hypothesis that were posited at the 
beginning of this thesis.
I. THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES
The first hypothesis was that the primary or underlying 
cause of the disagreement within the Alliance about SDI was not 
the issue of deployment, but rather the differing conceptions of 
what constituted a credible nuclear strategy and a stable nuclear 
regime. With some minor exceptions this proposition was 
confirmed by the results of this study. In chapter four, we 
analyzed the British, West German and French reactions to SDI. 
While these reactions focused primarily on the prospective 
implications of deployment, a careful comparison of their 
positions with those of the United States revealed that while the 
issue of deployment was indeed important, it was more a 
manifestation of a deeper disagreement over strategy; SDI was a 
vehicle through which this disagreement was highlighted and 
heightened. Thus, it was found that while in general West
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European governments believed that if the United States and the 
Soviet Union were to deploy BMDs the credibility of flexible 
response would be vitiated, the United States believed that under 
the circumstances that already existed flexible response was no 
longer credible. The Reagan Administration argued that under 
conditions of nuclear parity and mutual vulnerability the US 
nuclear guarantee to Western Europe was incredible because 
executing it entailed the destruction not only of the United 
States but the very territory in Western Europe that it was 
designed to defend.
What these transatlantic differences revealed was that 
irrespective of whether or not the Strategic Defense Initiative 
resulted in deployment, the United States and Western Europe held 
fundamentally different views about what constituted a credible 
NATO strategy. The dominant role played by preexisting strategic 
differences explains why SDI, although only constituting a 
research programme that Reagan admitted could take decades to 
reach fruition, evoked such a strong reaction in Western Europe.
Subsequent chapters confirmed this assertion about the 
importance of underlying strategic differences. In chapter six, 
we analyzed the debate within the Alliance about the prospect of 
deploying an ATBM system in Western Europe. While there was 
considerable unanimity on the need for a defence against the 
emerging threat posed by Soviet conventionally-armed missiles, 
the reasons for this support varied widely. West European 
governments, and particularly the West German government.
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supported ATBM deployment because they wished to reinforce the 
validity of flexible response and its ultimate reliance on 
nuclear weapons. The Reagan Administration, on the other hand, 
while supporting the ATBM defence advocated by West Europeans as 
an interim step, continued to pursue the objective of 
comprehensive defences because they viewed flexible response as a 
doctrine that needed to be replaced. Thus even when achieving 
apparent agreement (on the issue of deployment no less) the 
differences in what constituted a credible strategy for the 
Alliance manifested themselves.
The Reykjavik summit and its aftermath, as analyzed in 
chapter seven, demonstrated the underlying nature of the 
transatlantic disagreement over SDI. Ostensibly, the 
transatlantic controversy engendered by the Reagan 
Administration's pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative was 
attributable to West European concerns regarding the negative 
impact that BMD deployment would have on NATO strategy, arms 
control negotiations and East-West relations. In reality, the 
controversy was generated by a disagreement between the United 
States and its West European allies concerning the proper nuclear 
strategy and arms control strategy for the Alliance as well as 
the most effective means of relating to the Soviet Union. The 
circumstances under which SDI was eclipsed demonstrated this 
salient, if oftentimes obscured, aspect of the transatlantic 
debate about SDI. The strategic circumstances that Europeans 
feared would occur if SDI were to lead to BMD deployment -
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decoupling of European and American security and increased risk 
of conventional and limited nuclear war - came about not through 
the deployment of BMD's but through the INF treaty. Moreover, 
these changes occurred within a climate of improved East-West 
relations and progress on arms control, circumstances to which 
SDI was thought to constitute an insurmountable hinderance. 
Consequently, the fears that were so often associated with SDI in 
fact existed independently of the American initiative; what SDI 
did was to highlight these fears rather than cause them. While 
publicly welcomed as marking a new stage in East-West relations, 
privately the INF treaty evoked considerable concern in European 
capitals because it was perceived as damaging to European 
security. European officials argued that by eliminating LRINF 
while keeping the shorter range nuclear weapons, the INF treaty 
removed a key rung in the escalation ladder which linked the use 
of battlefield nuclear weapons to the strategic nuclear weapons 
of the United States. Such a result, they contended, weakened 
deterrence of conventional conflict by diminishing the perception 
that a Soviet attack on Western Europe would lead to a strategic 
nuclear exchange involving Soviet territory. Moreover, they 
feared that if nuclear weapons were employed in response to a 
conventional attack, the likelihood that such exchanges would be 
confined to the battlefield would increase, for the remaining 
land-based missiles had ranges which confined their use to the 
immediate battlefield. In short, Europeans feared that the INF 
treaty would undermine the American strategic nuclear guarantee
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that had defined the very essence of their security since the 
establishment of NATO.
Therefore, the Reykjavik summit and its aftermath afforded a 
unique opportunity to determine the underlying causes of the 
transatlantic dispute over SDI. Both the proposals that the 
Reagan Administration tabled at Reykjavik and the INF treaty that 
followed it, evoked almost identical reactions from West 
Europeans as did the Reagan Administration's launching of SDI.
Yet neither the Reykjavik proposals nor the INF treaty involved 
the deployment of BMDs. This had enormous significance for it 
demonstrated a salient feature of the transatlantic debate about 
SDI. While the issue of deployment was not insignificant, it was 
not the primary cause of the SDI dispute within the Alliance 
because the same concerns manifested themselves when other 
initiatives were forwarded. Therefore, the underlying 
differences in conception of strategy, not the prospect of 
deployment, lay at the heart of Alliance disputes over SDI.
II. MANAGEMENT OF THE DEBATE: THE PAPERING OVER OF DIFFERENCES
The second proposition that was forwarded in this thesis 
concerned the manner in which the dispute about SDI was managed. 
In examining this dispute we have attempted to determine the 
validity of the following proposition: that the Alliance managed 
the dispute by ignoring the primary strategic differences that 
manifested themselves in the SDI debate and, instead, 
concentrated on secondary issues in order to seek areas of
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agreement. The MoUs that the United States signed with the 
British and West German governments certainly bore out this 
proposition. Yet, there were other important aspects of the way 
in which the SDI dispute unfolded that were not foreseen when 
this proposition was formulated, and this concerned the manner in 
which new issues were introduced into the SDI debate.
The Reagan Administration presented SDI, the offer to 
participate in SDI research, the Reykjavik summit proposals, and 
the second zero in the INF Treaty as fait accomplis. While these 
proposals were then followed by consultations and attempts to 
create a consensus within the Alliance, the actual formulation of 
the initiatives was done unilaterally. This proclivity to act 
unilaterally reflected a change in the Alliance decision-making 
process. For, after the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group, 
the role of NATO as an institution and, therefore, the influence 
of the West European members of the Alliance, increased. 
Consequently, when the Reagan Administration bypassed NATO's 
decision-making mechanisms in rendering these decisions (because 
they believed that otherwise initiatives that they regarded as 
vital would be blocked) this constituted a unilateral threat to 
established Alliance procedures.
The Reagan Administration's unilateral strategy should be 
seen in light of the reasons why Reagan pursued SDI. He believed 
that nuclear weapons had become a liability rather than an asset 
to United States security. Therefore, when Reagan's advisors 
informed him that comprehensive defences were possible and when.
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furthermore, at Reykjavik Gorbachev appeared to agree to the 
elimination of ballistic missiles, he seized the opportunity.
Yet, ultimately, the Alliance reverted to the policy of 
papering over differences in order to maintain unity. As we have 
seen, the reaction of NATO bears out this proposition. NATO 
responded to SDI by attempting to minimize the degree of intra- 
Alliance disagreement over SDI by obscuring the extent of 
doctrinal disagreement and finding areas of common agreement. 
Besides the desire of the major parties to avoid disunity, the 
Alliance reaction was facilitated by the fact that SDI did 
constitute only a research programme and, while it was clear that 
Reagan was intent on eventually deploying BMDs, even he 
acknowledged that such a decision would only be made after he had 
left office.
The Alliance response to SDI consisted of three main points. 
The first and by far the most important aspect of this response 
was to ensure the continued credibility of NATO strategy. While, 
as this study has amply demonstrated. West European governments 
were far from sanguine about SDI, the official Alliance reaction 
was to state that: "We support the United States research 
programme into these technologies, the aim of which is to enhance 
stability and deterrence at reduced levels of offensive nuclear 
f o r c e s . I n  literally every NATO communique between the March 
26-27, 1985 NPG meeting when the Alliance first began detailed
 ^ Final Communique, NPG meeting 26-27 March 1985, paragraph
4. Emphasis added.
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deliberations on SDI, until the 11 December 1987 North Atlantic 
Council meeting following the signing of the INF Treaty (which is 
the cut off point for this study) NATO stressed its continuing 
adherence to its doctrine of flexible response. Whether it was 
communiques of the NPG or DPC or the North Atlantic Council, the 
communiques repeated, often verbatim, that NATO was "resolved to 
sustain the credibility of NATO's strategy of flexible 
response."2 Accordingly, the Alliance constantly reiterated 
that the "objective of NATO's strategy of flexible response and 
forward defence is the prevention of all war. Nuclear weapons 
play an important part in achieving this o b j e c t i v e . Moreover, 
communiques stressed that not only were nuclear weapons important 
but specifically that the strategic nuclear forces: "NATO's 
strategic forces are the ultimate deterrent in preserving 
security, peace and freedom."* Thus NATO constantly reiterated 
that it "support[ed] United States and United Kingdom efforts to 
maintain the credibility of their strategic nuclear deterrent 
capabilities.
Maintaining unity on the issue of Alliance strategy was 
deemed of utmost importance given the fact that NATO's raison
Final Communique, Defence Planning Committee, 22 May 
1985, paragraph 2.
Final Communique, Defence Planning Committee, 3 December 
1985, paragraph 4.
Final Communique, Nuclear Planning Group, 29-30 October 
1985, paragraph 3.
Ibid.
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d'etre was the defence of its members. The sentiment 
undergirding the strong desire to ensure that the Alliance's 
strategy of deterrence should remain credible was articulated on 
the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of flexible response 
when the NPG stated that:
Deterrence of any aggression continues to be the central 
security objective of the Alliance. To that end, in this 
the year of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the 
strategy of flexible response, we noted that this strategy 
has stood the test of time and remains an essential and 
sound basis for the future security of all Alliance members. 
While improving NATO's conventional forces, we will maintain 
and improve the nuclear forces necessary to carry out that
strategy.G
Given the Reagan Administration's stated intention to deploy 
strategic defences and "render nuclear weapons impotent and 
obsolete," it may seem surprising that the United States affixed 
its signature to NATO communiques that extolled the virtues of 
continued reliance on nuclear weapons for Alliance security. Two 
main points are advanced to explain this seeming incongruity and 
illuminate why the SDI controversy was managed successfully 
within the Alliance. First, while the Reagan Administration and 
particularly Reagan himself was keen to transcend nuclear 
deterrence, they argued that, in Reagan's own words, "this was 
many years perhaps decades away." In the interim nuclear 
deterrence, despite Reagan's distaste for it and his belief in 
its waning credibility, would have to be relied upon since
Final Communique, Nuclear Planning Group, 14-15 May 1987, 
paragraph 2.
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nothing could immediately take its place. Given these realities 
as well as the imperatives of Alliance unity, the Reagan 
Administration could support the continued reliance on nuclear 
deterrence without fear of undermining the possibilities of 
eventually overcoming this reliance. In short, it was the fact 
that SDI was indeed a research programme and would remain so 
throughout Reagan's tenure in office that facilitated the 
compromise.
In addition to insisting that flexible response must remain 
valid, NATO's response consisted of ensuring that SDI research 
remained within the confines of the ABM treaty and that the US 
negotiating position in arms control talks with the Soviet Union 
be supported by the Alliance. Although these two criteria were 
closely related, they reflected distinct concerns.
The insistence that SDI research be conduced within the 
confines of the ABM treaty reflected the Alliance's concern that 
should research go beyond the bounds of this 1972 treaty the 
entire basis for arms control would be undermined. As the ABM 
treaty was regarded as the cornerstone of the arms control regime 
established during the early 1970's, its continued existence was 
deemed essential to any future arms control agreements.
Moreover, West European governments were keen to obtain the 
Reagan Administration's acquiescence to this provision and codify 
it in NATO communiques.
As with the provisions regarding the Alliance's insistence 
on the continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence, it may seem
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puzzling that the Reagan Administration would agree to provisions 
that were designed to prevent SDI deployment. Yet a careful 
examination of the US government's predicament explains why it 
agreed to these stipulations. Again, the fact that deployment 
decisions were not imminent meant that it cost little to remain 
within the confines of the ABM treaty during the research phase. 
Indeed it was an advantage. It enabled the Reagan Administration 
to appease its West European allies and thereby maintain unity; 
it was indispensable for maintaining Congressional support; and 
it did little to constrain the effectiveness of SDI research.
The distinguishing feature of the Alliance reaction was, 
therefore, the desire to demonstrate unity through avoiding the 
doctrinal differences that were exposed by SDI. The 
distinguishing factor that enabled them to do so was the fact 
that SDI was indeed only a research programme, a fact that 
enabled the Alliance to postpone the ultimate questions about SDI 
deployment through delay. From an Alliance perspective, however, 
a striking aspect of the manner in which the SDI dispute was 
managed was that it was not, like the INF issue, handled 
primarily through NATO's consultative mechanisms, such as the 
NPG, the DPC and the NAA. Instead these bodies were utilized on 
occasion to reiterate and state publicly what had been agreed to 
on a bilateral basis. In order to understand more fully how the 
SDI debate was managed it is necessary to review the role of the 
specific countries involved in the debate.
In Britain, Margaret Thatcher placed unique importance on
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the "special relationship" between London and Washington. This 
connection with the United States was given greater weight in 
London than considerations of greater European unity, for which 
Thatcher held well-known and thinly disguised scepticism. Apart 
from her generally negative attitude toward European cooperation, 
Thatcher contended that the United States must take precedence 
over Europe, particularly on defence matters, as ultimately the 
United States was the guarantor of European security. To risk 
alienating Washington over an issue which the Reagan 
Administration regarded as central to its defence strategy was 
not regarded to be in the interest of Britain or Europe. Britain 
was also averse to creating distinctive groups within NATO that 
were perceived as working against the United States.
The British government therefore decided to deal with the 
United States bilaterally, believing that this afforded Britain 
far more influence than it would have as only one voice among 
many Europeans. Thatcher argued that maintaining Britain's close 
relationship with the United States and refraining from public 
criticism of SDI would engender greater respect from the United 
States and allow Britain to exercise far more influence behind 
the scenes, in the spirit of genuine friendship and trust, than 
public carping which was bound to be ineffective in any case. 
Furthermore, British officials believed that they were ideally 
suited to act as Europe's interpreter in Washington and to 
extract concessions which other Europeans would be unable to 
obtain - a calculation that was essentially correct as Britain
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was able to create the framework for the transatlantic debate 
about SDI. Although there were other impediments to the forging 
of a joint European position, Britain's firm decision to deal 
bilaterally with the United States effectively precluded a joint 
European position. Without British support a European consensus 
was not possible.
Unlike Britain, France? eschewed official bilateral 
cooperation with the United States on SDI, fearing that this 
could be construed as an endorsement of SDI concepts. Moreover, 
Paris feared that too close an involvement might entail involving 
France in a defence system over which French officials would not 
exercise control - a prospect that was anathema to France, which 
prided itself on its independence in defence matters. 
Nevertheless, the French government, unwilling to deny French 
companies the technological and financial opportunities afforded 
by SDI research contracts, allowed French firms to participate in 
SDI research without, however, formalising this participation 
through government to government arrangements. France believed 
that unless a means of responding to SDI's technological 
implications through an exclusively European forum were found, 
European countries would risk falling under the economic and 
technological tutelage of the United States. As an alternative 
to SDI research, France proposed the creation of a technological
The order in which the role of each country is dealt with 
has been modified here in order to facilitate discussion 
of the West German reaction to Eureka. Therefore I 
discuss the countries in the following order; Britain, 
France, West Germany.
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consortium named Eureka that would enable European firms to pool 
their expertise and thereby enhance Europe's technological 
potential. Mitterrand argued that this was a far superior 
alternative to official participation in SDI research, because 
the technological discoveries of European firms would remain in 
Europe and add to Europe's technological base, whereas 
participation in SDI research would not allow Europe to improve 
its technological position vis-a-vis the United States and Japan.
While West Germany agreed to participate in Eureka, it did 
not do so to the exclusion of participation in SDI research. The 
Federal Republic, as a non-nuclear power in the centre of Europe, 
was more dependent than its European allies on the United States 
for its security and was therefore reluctant to embrace Eureka - 
which was in essence a French attempt to undermine American 
efforts to enlist European support for SDI. While the West 
German government shared many of France's misgivings concerning 
SDI, it was not, in light of its ultimate dependence on the 
United States's security guarantee, in a position to risk 
alienating Washington.
West Germany's decision to embrace both SDI and Eureka 
simultaneously was symbolic of the overall difficulty which 
Europe had in responding as one to SDI. On the one hand,
European cooperation was deemed desirable; on the other hand, 
because the political will necessary to translate this desire 
into a military capability that would allow independence from the 
United States was absent, ultimate dependence, particularly for
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West Germany, rested in the United States which meant that 
forging a truly European alternative to SDI was not practical. 
While in principle a joint European position made sense, in 
practice this ideal had to be accommodated to the reality of the 
continuing necessity of maintaining the US commitment to West 
European security. Consequently, a joint European position in 
opposition to a programme which the United States deemed central 
to its defence strategy was incompatible with the requirement of 
maintaining America's commitment to European security.
III. THE ROLE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE SDI DEBATE
The third proposition examined was that the degree of 
cohesion within the Alliance increased as the external threat 
declined. Generally, this was confirmed by the evidence, 
although the relationship was somewhat more complex than 
originally posited. In chapter five, we saw how the improved 
East-West relationship in the aftermath of the November, 1985 
Geneva summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan facilitated 
agreement on the terms of SDI research. The continued 
improvement in US-Soviet relations between the Geneva summit and 
the Reykjavik summit led to further Alliance cohesion as it 
appeared that SDI would not constitute the insurmountable 
obstacle to detente as originally thought.
The course of East-West relations and Alliance cohesion 
following the Reykjavik summit shed further light on the 
relationship between external threat and Alliance cohesion.
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While East-West relations improved after the initial acrimony at 
Reykjavik, NATO unity did not improve in tandem with this 
development. But this outcome does not disprove the validity of 
the proposition; factors other than East-West relations had a 
greater impact on Alliance cohesion than East-West relations.
Because an improvement in East-West relations occurred 
simultaneously with the INF treaty (a treaty that most West 
Europeans believed was harmful to their interests), the role of 
East-West relations in determining Alliance cohesion was somewhat 
ambiguous. West European governments, particularly France, 
believed that the United States was sacrificing West European 
security in order to achieve improved East-West relations. This 
led to less not more Alliance unity, but not because the external 
threat was diminishing. In fact, the diminishing threat rendered 
the changes created by the INF Treaty more palatable by 
decreasing the perception of threat from the Soviet Union. Thus 
far from contributing to an a decrease in Alliance cohesion as 
the literature on alliances would suggest, improved East-West 
relations led to greater Alliance cohesion.
The reason that improved East-West relations increased 
rather than decreased Alliance unity points to a significant 
point that can be learned from the transatlantic SDI debate: the 
mutuality of security. Because in the age of nuclear parity the 
penalties for a failure to avert war entail the possibility of 
annihilation, it becomes at least as important to avoid 
antagonizing one's adversary as it does to fashion a credible
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strategy to thwart whatever aggressive designs he may have. 
Therefore when East-West relations improved dramatically in the 
aftermath of the Reykjavik summit. Alliance members felt more 
secure and thus NATO unity increased.
Still, the fundamental disagreements about what constituted 
a credible nuclear strategy that were at the core of the SDI 
dispute remained unresolved; they were managed and eventually 
eclipsed by the improvement in East-West relations. While it 
would seem unlikely that given the fundamental transformation 
that has occurred in international politics, that the Soviet 
Union will ever again pose a sufficient threat to NATO to bring 
these unresolved differences to the fore, it is worth making some 
concluding statements about SDI that may be applicable to future 
alliances that may confront the same dilemmas as NATO.
To properly understand SDI* s role in the history of NATO 
strategy, it is essential to keep in mind that, while in many 
respects unique, it also represented the culmination of a long­
standing trend in US strategic thinking towards reducing NATO's 
reliance on nuclear weapons. In launching SDI Reagan did not 
offer a way to reduce this reliance in the near term, but his 
rationale for pursuing SDI undermined the credibility of the very 
doctrine - extended deterrence - that SDI was designed to enhance 
and on which NATO had to depend for its security. Thus, it would 
seem that it is fair to conclude that it is unwise to create 
doubts about the credibility of a strategy on which one must 
depend, if one can not immediately replace it.
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At the same time, the reasons that Reagan forwarded in 
criticizing the validity of extended deterrence were not without 
merit. NATO's reliance on flexible response rested on two 
contradictory premises: that mutual vulnerability made nuclear 
war unthinkable and, concomitantly, that NATO would start a 
nuclear war if it were attacked and could not defend itself with 
conventional weapons. While SDI may have contributed to exposing 
this contradiction, the solution it offered could not resolve it. 
For with SDI the Reagan Administration attempted to achieve what 
was at best a daunting and distant objective of overcoming the 
United States vulnerability to nuclear attack. A more sensible 
and far less divisive course would have been to use the enormous 
political energy expended on the SDI dispute to achieve the less 
glamorous and more prosaic objective of augmenting conventional 
capabilities and thereby creating a conventional force balance in 
which the attacker rather than the defender would have to use 
nuclear weapons first.
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